Comparative analysis of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo’s food estate policies as a national food securitization attempts

**Analisis komparatif kebijakan food estate Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dan Joko Widodo sebagai upaya ketahanan pangan nasional**

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**Abstract**

Food-related issues affecting many people have long been a point of concern for nations, including Indonesia. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi) had signed policies for food resilient policies that were riddled with problems such as land rights misallocation. Therefore, this research is conducted to answer research questions, including the comparison of food estate policies during the SBY and Jokowi, the act of securitization by both governments using food estate policies, and the inclusion of local farmers or people’s interest in the implementation of food estate policy strategies. The descriptive approach explains the impact and insufficiencies of policy implementation in their respective regimes. The comparison technique is called Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), focusing on seeking the most similar out of the most different. The securitization concept is used to define a wide-ranging strategy utilized to reduce food vulnerabilities. This research showcased several differences between each regime’s national food securitization attempts, especially regarding the involvement of military mechanisms in Jokowi’s food estate. This research proved the existence of securitization attempts in each regime’s policy implementation, with problems relating to land access and lack of local farmers’ agencies. Researchers found that this is partially caused by limited government understanding surrounding food security, which only persisted on availability instead of sustainability.

**Keywords**: food estate; food securitization; policy comparison

**Introduction**

Food as the primary commodity in human life has become a significant concern, particularly when a threat such as the global food crisis impacts several other problems, nationally and individually.
The threat of a global food crisis occurred once again in 2020, alarmed by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) due to the Covid-19 pandemic with large-scale restrictions that had an impact on the disruption of the global food chain (Nurshafira 2019). This, in turn, led to limited food availability and access that caused a drastic upsurge in food prices with a decline in people’s purchasing power. The urgency was getting clearer and exacerbated by the Russia-Ukrainian war in February 2022, which increasingly required the government to take immediate action against the threat. With this, the concept of large-scale food granaries or Food Estate that are used and prioritized by the government as a program to fulfill domestic food demands by maximizing the private sector with the mobilization of global-scale investment in food production, is being questioned about its significance in implementation and the results obtained (Simamora et al. 2021).

Referring to research conducted by Simanjuntak & Erwinsyah (2020), large-scale cultivation of food crops was actually implemented during the President Soeharto era through his green revolution by relying on agricultural households to meet domestic food needs amid a drastic increase in population growth. This program, known as the Mega Rice Project, managed one million hectares of peatland and later was ultimately marked by failure in the absence of discontinuity in food production to land degradation. However, at least these efforts succeeded in achieving food sufficiency even though it did not last long with the deployment of the people or local farmers. In contrast to this, emphasized in study by Dewi (2012), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) developed a Food Estate differently by adding an investment sector to support large-scale production in overcoming the narrative of the 2007-2008 global food and energy crisis through Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE). This implies that the central land managers are not farmers or local communities but large corporations in realizing the fulfillment of large-scale food barns. Dewi (2012) and Simanjuntak & Erwinsyah (2020) explained that the corporation’s involvement had a destructive impact by increasingly marginalizing local farmers who could only manage small-scale land. Therefore, it adds to other problems, such as the land-grabbing problems that potentially threaten the prospect of farmer regeneration and the government bias toward the industrial-based agriculture system. This can be seen especially in oil palm, as evidenced by land management exceeding the permit quota while the food crops have been cultivated at the least (Simamora et al. 2021).

Both studies use descriptive-comparative analysis by presenting the specification of examining Food Estate policies in three governments but without a clear theoretical basis. The authors then cite another study by Putri (2019) regarding the food securitization agenda, which only focuses on the era of President SBY using the securitization theory by Scott D. Watson. However, Putri (2019) was not providing a clear basis for implementation issues and several problems in the wake of the Food Estate. With this, the authors conducted distinct research to find out the comparison between presidents SBY and Jokowi due to several things, including first, the background of anticipating the global food crisis in the government’s steps to implement the Food Estate policy. Second, the authors compare the implementation and results of Food Estate shown by the most similar and most different design from SBY to Jokowi administration, as both use a corporate-based approach rather than farmers. According to the Global Hunger Index (GHI 2014), food insecurity has increased with Indonesia’s hunger index since the end of the SBY presidency by 10.3 points. It continued to grow to 22.1 at the beginning of the Jokowi administration until the latest data in 2021 still shows 18, which means Indonesia’s average hunger rate is moderate to high.

The facts above can then have implications for several things, such as the problem of malnutrition in Indonesia and economic marginality (Simanjuntak & Erwinsyah 2020). The authors also analyze comparisons from different viewpoints using securitization theory which has been seen since the establishment of this program as a government priority. However, this study not only identifies the agenda but also analyzes the implementation of its strategy with a series of actions to improve food security using Gwen Pulliat’s basic understanding of food securitization in the long term. Moreover, this study uses not only literature studies but also processed data obtained through interviews with several informants, including the government, NGOs, academics, and local farmers, to enrich the analysis and data in the field. Thus, research can also become the basis for the government’s evaluation
in implementing food policies amid relatively insignificant results despite the national vision to realize the Indonesia Maju 2045 following the international commitment. This commitment comprises the 2nd SDGs to end hunger, the 15th to protect terrestrial ecosystems, and the 16th to support achieving a decent and inclusive society for sustainable development in the implementation of food security.

**Research Method**

This qualitative research utilizes a descriptive-comparative model. This research model was conducted using narratively-produced data from structured interviews and reviews of related works of literature. This research compared policies developed or in force within the reigns of former President SBY and President Jokowi. Via said approach, the writers broaden the collective understanding of public policymakers’ works and clarify their policy outcomes, especially in the expenditures and societal benefits sectors (Guy-Peters & Fontaine 2020). The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) technique serves as a foundation for analyzing the most similar and different aspects of the two regimes’ policies. Comparative parameters are the policy problem, formulation, implementation, and outcome. Afterward, the descriptive analysis method is used to construct a conclusion from the evolution of similarities and differences in the discussed policies (Samsu 2017).

This article draws upon the concept of “food securitization” as a derivation from the Copenhagen School of International Relations’ Securitization Theory. Securitization may be defined as a process in which non-political issues are politicized by governing or powerful actors to the extent that they will be considered essential, constitute security issue(s) with a source of threat and are complemented by emergency response measures (Buzan et al. 1998). These steps are often used to justify actions unaligned with accepted regulations. Regarding “Food Securitization,” this research adopts the framework offered by Scott D. Watson and Gwenn Pulliat’s concept definition. Securitization begins with issue identification to determine the interacting units’ relationship. This action affects the process of issue-selection for public policy agenda and the output of such discussion on policies and the following series of actions. When securitizing actors claim a specific issue as a threat, they must convince their audience to believe in conditions supporting such a claim until legitimation for a responding policy has been achieved. The success of this process relies on the government actors’ approach, the position of parties involved, and the general believability of the threat. Within this stage of the analysis process, the writers would insert Pulliat’s (2015) understanding of food securitization, which aims to reduce food insecurity by implementing several strategies. Therefore, the writers will focus on assessing the implementation of those strategies in the context of Indonesian food securitization policies. The step includes an analysis of government-led precautions to reduce food insecurity and measures to develop sustainable food security.

**Results and Discussion**

Based on the problem, the results obtained through data collection techniques to draw conclusions based on the comparative model to find design indicators using the most similar and the most different according to the method offered qualitatively. In the results of comparative research, there are parameters associated with the analysis of the two presidents with food estate policies: (1) defining the background of the problem (Policy Problem); (2) the process of policy formulation (Policy Formulation); (3) the actual implementation of food estate policies (Policy Implementation); and (4) analyze the results of the policies to find the success or ineffectiveness of the two governments (Policy Outcome). The data was taken from the interviews equipped with official government documents and refined using secondary data which was analyzed through a literature review. More clearly, a comparative analysis can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison of food estate policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>President SBY</th>
<th>President Jokowi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy problem</strong></td>
<td>Global food and energy crisis 2007-2008</td>
<td>Global food crisis 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In line with RPJPN 2005-2025 and RPJMN 2005-2009</td>
<td>In line with RPJPN 2005-2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy formula</strong></td>
<td>Master Plan Percepatan dan Perluasan Ekonomi Indonesia (MP3EI) 2010-2014</td>
<td>Strategic National Project 2020-2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kementerian Pertanian, Kementerian BUMN, and private sectors</td>
<td>Kementerian Pertahanan, Kementerian Pertanian, Kementerian BUMN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land clearing in 16 districts, Merauke covering an area of 1.23 million ha</td>
<td>Kementerian PUPR, and private sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target surplus of 10 tons of rice in 2014</td>
<td>Land development of 10,000 ha/area, 2,000 ha/cluster, and allocation of 4.3 million ha in Central Kalimantan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy implementation</strong></td>
<td>Only 400 ha of land were successfully utilized (0.03%)</td>
<td>A total land area of 165,000 ha has been cultivated since 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Land-grabbing problems</td>
<td>Land-grabbing problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Policy outcome</strong></td>
<td>Surplus only 2 million in 2014 (20%)</td>
<td>Only 3 locations have been developed and have problems in Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia’s 2014 hunger score based on GHI 10.3 (Moderate)</td>
<td>Indonesia’s 2021 hunger score based on GHI 18 (Moderate)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Primary data

Based on the results of the analysis, it can be concluded in detail about the comparisons shown using the aligned table as described in Table 1. In the Policy Problem section, different crisis narratives and objectives were found as the background for the origination of food estates in both the leadership of SBY or Jokowi, based on the same official state documents, namely through the RPJPN and RPJMN. The results are then clarified in the Policy Formula starting with the emergence of food barns with different names (MIFEE and food estate) which are entrusted to different ministries between the two presidents, namely by including the role of the military (Kementerian Pertahanan) as one of the in charge of food estate in the Jokowi era. However, almost similar problems were found in the Policy Implementation section which showed problems related to land-grabbing and the success of food estate output in the two eras, which in reality were not comparable to the previously designed plans. Finally, the Policy Outcome then shows the overall results of the two food estate programs in each president, such as only a 20% surplus in the SBY era, only 3 locations of food barns that have been developed during the Jokowi era, and the hunger index from Indonesia which still at the same score (moderate) since SBY’s leadership until Jokowi’s. From this brief overview, it can be described in more detail with the following description.

**MIFEE policy under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY)**

Food is one of the issues that has played a strategic role and has become a crucial issue in non-traditional security (Trihartono et al. 2020). With this, food must be freed from the threat, as shown in the global food crisis (2007-2008) that occurred during the leadership of SBY due to the sharp spike in world oil prices, which impacted the agricultural sector as one of the fields that intensively utilize energy. This
crisis triggered a reaction in the form of a drastic increase in the need for food and energy commodities in the international market. This crisis resulted in various international institutions ranging from countries to international organizations, especially the Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), emphasizing the importance of solutions to maintain food security.

This phenomenon has demanded countries, including Indonesia, to immediately take concrete action because food in the world market is also not always a solution in a crisis. President SBY, who has a basic understanding of food security, stated that food autonomy is as vital as military autonomy. As explained, it then reacted to changes in dynamics that threatened domestic stability, especially one related to food security, as its leadership food policy position (Yulian 2022). With this demand on the government to accelerate the transformation of the national economy, Indonesia is using this crisis narrative to carry out an agenda of expansion and acceleration of development by attracting foreign investors to the program planned in Master Plan Percepatan dan Perluasan Ekonomi Indonesia (MP3EI), which integrated with a focus and concrete manner from Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Nasional (RPJPN) (2005-2025). The 2005-2025 RPJPN shows the government’s concern for food under the SBY leadership. Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) 2005-2009 or RPJMN 1 shows the specifications for the focus of issues, including food as a strategic issue in national development, through realizing food security with an agenda for improving people’s welfare. This harmony is shown in MP3EI, which contained a food estate policy or large-scale food barn in the SBY era, known as the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) after the nationalization of the program proposed by the Merauke Government, namely the Merauke Rice Integrated Estate (MIRE) in 2007.

In addition to being presented in RPJMN 1, crisis management continued as a priority issue for the next period in RPJMN 2 (2010-2014). The MIFEE program is implemented based on Pemerintah PP No. 18 Tahun 2010 about Usaha Budidaya Tanaman dalam Skala Luas. The Merauke area was later designated as a food and energy barn in the form of MIFEE development with the concept of agriculture as a modern industrial system. The allocation of land for MIFEE development of 1.23 million hectares with the percentage of food crops by 50%, sugar cane by 30%, and oil palm by 20%, is expected to produce 1.95 million tons of rice; 2.02 million tons of corn; 167,000 tons of soybeans; 2.5 million sugar & 937,000 palm oil per year. In addition, there is also a record of a surplus target of 10 tons of rice in 2014 (Khudori 2008). With the idea of developing a food estate that focuses on increasing national economic income based on the availability of land with a minimum of 25 hectares that is processed using the agribusiness industrial system, Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) and the private sector are also needed to support the implementation of MIFEE. Farmers and local communities’ involvement is planned through a corporate approach.

Following the MIFEE development plan, the government has carried out a land clearing in several areas in Merauke. However, problems arise in the pattern of partnerships between farmers and local communities with corporations filled with conflicts over land rights. In addition, MIFEE, according to data, has been found to sacrifice many peatlands that do not comply with technical requirements. Peat should be a maximum of 3 meters. However, still, MIFEE uses more than that, thus reducing the water storage space in it, which impacts the community and harms the local farming community’s ecological management and socio-economic conditions. In achieving the agenda of maintaining food security, the government is too focused on the dimensions of the availability of food production. This is proven by massive land expansion, even though there are other pillars, especially the distribution dimension, that this has become a long-standing problem for the food system in Indonesia, such as high logistics costs, weak management in goods, and long food supply chain. However, the reality of the production itself is also still not following the target of land management which has only succeeded in covering an area of 400 hectares or about 0.03%, which has survived to date, namely 1.5 tons of GKP/ha in the initial production and is experiencing depreciation with now only produce 4 tons of GKP. In addition, the surplus target that had been set also turned out to be only successful in producing 2 tons of rice, fulfilling only 20% of the initial goal (Khudori 2020).
Moreover, MIFEE leaves large-scale land grabbing that impacts customary forest lands and social conflict. SBY’s MIFEE policy has drawn criticism about opening large-scale forest areas. This impacted the food cultures of local communities because customary forests and sago forests were converted into food estate programs. It was then coupled with land ownership by investors in food estate land, showing land tenure inequality. It also shows a straight comparison between the reduction in the number of farmers by 5 million households and the number of land tenures calculated to have decreased by 110,000 per year, as shown in detail through the Agricultural Census (Sensus Pertanian/ST) in 2003 and 2013 that ushered in Table 2 (IPB 2021).

Table 2.
Condition of land tenure or Indonesian land based on number of agricultural business households (Rumah Tangga Usaha Pertanian/RTUP) using ST2003 and ST2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Land Area Group (Hectares)</th>
<th>ST2003</th>
<th>ST2013</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Absolut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>&lt; 0,1</td>
<td>9.380.300</td>
<td>4.338.847</td>
<td>-5.041.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>0,1 – 0,2</td>
<td>3.602.348</td>
<td>3.550.185</td>
<td>-52.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>0,2 – 0,5</td>
<td>6.816.943</td>
<td>6.733.364</td>
<td>-83.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>0,5 – 1</td>
<td>4.782.812</td>
<td>4.555.075</td>
<td>-227.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>1 – 2</td>
<td>3.661.529</td>
<td>3.725.865</td>
<td>64.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>2 – 3</td>
<td>1.678.356</td>
<td>1.623.434</td>
<td>-54.922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>&gt; 3</td>
<td>1.309.896</td>
<td>1.608.699</td>
<td>298.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMOUNT</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.232.184</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.135.469</strong></td>
<td><strong>-5.096.715</strong></td>
<td><strong>-16,32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BPS (2013)

Based on Table 2, the decline in the number of farmer households decreased to only 26.13 million in 2013 from the beginning in 2003, which still showed 31.23 million households. This drastic decrease in the number of farmers is dangerous, especially if the majority are farmers who depend on their livelihoods from agricultural sector activities. This also indicates unsustainability in our food sector, with the government’s primary protection being on consumers who again tend to harm farmers. Consequently, this has not been implemented well enough, considering the final results of this administration show that Indonesia’s hunger rate is still high at 10.3 percent (Khudori 2020).

Food estate policy in the era of President Joko Widodo

As a follow-up program, the Food Estate was then developed by President Jokowi by reactivating land that had been used and processed by the leadership of previous presidents. The declaration of a Food Estate in the era of President Jokowi’s leadership was mainly motivated by efforts to fulfill concerns over food scarcity since the FAO warned of a possible global food crisis on March 24, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Fahrizal (2020) also explained the existence of a food estate which can be regarded as a form of presidential discretion as stated in Law Number 30 of 2014 to deal with concrete problems, namely the pandemic itself. Referring to the RPJMN for the 2020-2024 period, the operation of a food estate as a food production center and one of 41 strategic priority projects that the government is trying to focus on. In addition, the food estate was published as one of the National Strategic Programs (PSN) for 2020-2024 as instructed in Presidential Decree no. 109 of 2020 concerning the Acceleration of the Implementation of PSN. The realization of the food estate is planned with details of the main priorities in Central Kalimantan and North Sumatra until it is continued if the initial location has been implemented with a plan to spread out in South Sumatra, East Nusa Tenggara, to Papua.
In more detail, the food estate during 2020 will be implemented in stages, with 30,000 to 600,000 hectares in the future (Khudori 2020). In projecting food estates, referring to the exposure to aspects of spatial planning and supporting infrastructure for food estates in Central Kalimantan, President Jokowi has a mechanism scheme with a significant contribution to the involvement of military mechanisms by the Ministry of Defense as the leading sector and non-military mechanisms through Ministry of Defense, Agriculture, BUMN, PUPR, and the private sector. The design of a food estate as a Food Production Center Area (KSPP) is primarily carried out by centralizing the goal of food availability for around 273 million Indonesians. The food estate will be developed as an area with a total land area of 10,000 hectares per area and 2,000 hectares per cluster. With the implementation of national food granaries, food estate can be described in detail with details of land touching 165,000 hectares in 2020 as a national pilot model utilizing modern technology-based agricultural systems (WALHI 2021). In the implementation until 2022, it is recorded that three locations have been worked on with problems in Papua which are considered as robbing the rights of indigenous Papuans with the planning of land allocation reaching 2.6 million hectares which can exacerbate the food crisis due to forest conversion and the destruction of biodiversity (WALHI 2021). This also returns to the old problems with land tenure conflicts with a reasonably significant distinction between corporations that manage plantations and massive forestry of 94% while farmers are only 0.5%.

This is in line with the statement of a local farmer group, regarding the distribution of agricultural land, which is still lacking in the process of regulation and operation in the field. This argument is supported by the decrease in the percentage of farm households in the latest sources in 2018. Compared to the 2003 census, which was 27,682,117 in 2018 and 31,232,180 in 2003, there was an increase of up to 6% compared to 2013 (Bayu 2021). At the same time, there are also problems related to land ownership, food estate will indirectly lead to future crises with farmer regeneration which is directly proportional to the decrease in agricultural land yearly. Supported by data from Fahrizal (2021), the concept of ‘beras-isasi’ will only cover the purpose of diversification and diversity of Indonesian food, including disturbing the gastronomy of the community in some areas. The involvement of the Ministry of Defense (Kemenhan) also, in reality, does not have a significant impact on the results of the food estate itself because the data shows that although there is an attempt to plant cassava as an alternative, this effort tends to be seen from the ranks of retired officers and military officials who are involved in the non-profit foundation PT Agrinas. With a direct report to Defense Minister Prabowo (The Gecko Project 2021). Observing the goal of food estates in this era by successfully providing food for 273 Indonesians has not been achieved until now, as evidenced by the Indonesian hunger rate by the Global Hunger Index, which still shows a moderate level of 18. Still, it ranks third with the highest hunger level in Southeast Asia (Khudori 2020).

**Food estate as national food securitization**

From the comparison, the identification of referent object-global food crisis-preceded the creation of securitization policy on food planning both in SBY and Jokowi reigns. In other words, the two governments created and used food estate policies to reduce the impacts of said food crises. The reinforcing foundation for the actions taken was the 2005-2025 RPJPN. By incorporating food as an important developmental issue (Nussio & Pernet 2013). SBY realized this vision through agricultural revitalization and self-sufficiency measures, particularly in five food commodities, under the 2005-2009 and 2009-2014 RPJMN (Permatasari & Wijaya 2018). However, this developmental strategy was ultimately scrapped because of high commodity prices, decreased purchasing power, and a rise in hunger and poverty.

The protectionist tendency of producer countries, coupled with financial crises, only accelerates FDIs to secure much-needed land for agricultural industrialization, pressuring governments to transform their national economy. This pattern was evident in President Jokowi’s maneuvers of imposing export restrictions and lockdown to deal with the pandemic-led food crisis. However, these measures disrupted the global food chain and contributed to increasing global-scale food scarcity (Nugroho et al. 2020).
When Russia started its invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022, the already-stretched global food supply chains suffered more blows while the world simultaneously grasped the grim possibility of universal recession (Muhammad 2022). Responding to those episodes, the two presidents each constructed a sense of crisis through their statements which emphasized the grim “impacts” of food crises and hoped to mobilize broader public attention, connected with fierce attempts to establish the necessary environment for food securitization policies. The MP3EI and PSN 2020-2024 projects showcased the regimes’ attempt to accelerate plans on ensuring food availability. This plan includes incentivizing investment in developing unused and abandoned land outside the Island of Java which, for years, served as the land used for food estate policy.

In line with securitization, each president published a series of speech acts to persuade the people into legitimizing actions addressing food security-related problems, notably the food estate. SBY has, on multiple occasions, such as in his remarks on the anniversary of Indonesia’s independence in 2008, 2009, and 2012, underlined the global problem that necessitates strengthening national food reserves. Similarly, at one of the cabinet meetings with the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce (Kamar Dagang Indonesia) on April 17, 2008, SBY articulated that the solution to the domestic food problem is to increase production and productivity (Djalal 2008). In Jokowi’s era, the president conducted speech acts on two important occasions: (1) the annual session of the Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat) on August 14, 2020 and (2) the opening session of the 2022 National Development Planning Deliberation (Pembukaan Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional) on April 28, 2022.

Public persuasion measures come as well in the form of institutionalized agencies. The SBY administration created the Dewan Ketahanan Pangan (Board on Food Resiliency), while Jokowi instated the National Food Agency (Badan Pangan Nasional/Bapanas) (Bapanas 2021). Both presidents have engaged the international community as well in their endeavors. Djalal (2008) stated that SBY once engaged the then chair of ASEAN, Singapore, to conduct a leader-scale ASEAN special meeting to discuss joint responses in overcoming the food and energy crisis. Quite differently, President Jokowi partnered with the World Food Programme (WFP) to establish a strategy on food securitization, notably by implementing integrated collaboration to accomplish the second goal of the Sustainable Development Goals and the goals in general (WFP 2020).

After identifying an actor’s pattern of actions, analysis of its securitization attempt continues to its output judgment (Watson 2009). In implementing the securitization agenda, powerful officials could violate the established laws based on priority. During the implementation of the food estate policy, several attempts include clearing and converting unproductive land into forest areas in violation of several MIFEE statutes and regulations. Said policy violates international norms and regulations, such as the Paris Agreement, to which Indonesia is bound. As showcased by the comparison, however, securitization entails a trade-off between priority actions and collateral impacts. Often these trade-offs tended to create collateral impact rather than achieving food security and self-sufficiency goals. Reports found that this circumstance is partly due to the government’s strict orientation towards only improving aspects of food availability, despite other dimensions to food security, namely physical and economic access, utilization, and stability (Suryana 2019). By utilizing the concepts of food security and food self-sufficiency through self-sufficiency targets, the government expects the fulfillment of domestic food needs. Nevertheless, it is evident that through government statements and national development documents.

The practice of invasive land-grabbing should concern the government in its attempt to realize the dimensions of food availability. The government’s inclination toward accelerating food production is showcased through its adamant willingness to issue processing licenses to private enterprises with the capacity to process vast acres of land (Shohibuddin 2019). Jokowi’s action to include the Indonesian Ministry of Defense in the securitization of food estate policy intended crops-mainly cassava and rice—further proved the president’s securitization act. On the contrary, however, the MoD’s deployment only worsens the land-grabbing practices. The burgeoning effect of such action is the decline of agricultural
households in Indonesia from 2003 to 2020. Furthermore, this strategy proved insufficient in addressing food security-related problems in Indonesia, such as the soaring hunger rate-as statistically shown from the end of SBY’s years until now. To reiterate, Indonesia’s attempt to achieve adequate food security is hampered by access, distribution, and utilization of food while protecting the culture surrounding it.

**Food estate and the involvement of farmers and local community**

In light of this mind, the government, particularly the leading sector in this case such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Defense, must consider several changes in managing and implementing food estate policies by maximizing the role of farmers and local communities engaged in the family – or peasant-based farming as opposed to corporate farming – based agriculture with the following strategy suggestions.

![Figure 1. Food sovereignty orientation as a direction for development](source: Primary data)

Based on Figure 1, it is anticipated that the food estate policy can be continued or re-implemented in the future, but the government must be politically committed to making food issues a priority and security issue not only in the context of food security but also by using the concept of food sovereignty as stated in the law. As evidenced by several food sovereignty indicators, this often involves the significance of the involvement of local communities and their culture in the food industry. The restoration of food to the community has been a success, as evidenced by the presence of “Leuit” belonging to the Sundanese indigenous people (Badui) in Banten, which can last up to 90 years based on their knowledge and abilities (Yulian 2022). Investment then serves as a supplement to its implementation, rather than as its primary source of support, so that farmers’ rights may continue to be maintained (Mustofa et al. 2014).

In this case, the Ministry of Agriculture can also emphasize the use of internationally agreed farmer rights guidelines, as the Non-Governmental Organization, namely *Serikat Petani Indonesia*, is a key driver in this regard, namely La Via Campina via Henry Saragih’s concept which has been outlined in The United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Peasants (UNDROP).

To preserve the production side, the Ministry of Agriculture can also implement a framework that empowers farmers to cultivate land with ever-more-advanced technologies. In this context, modernization refers to the government’s efforts to educate farmers, beginning with the planting of seeds, preparation of land, harvesting, and distribution of crops, and extending to the processing of crops that do not sell on the market, so that no crops are wasted through mechanisms that maintain environmental sensitivity. In addition, by the Fahrizal (2021) evaluation, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Defense is expected to optimize existing policies and conduct a review of the concept of social forestry, which
holds that the clearing of forest land for agricultural purposes must be accompanied by the preservation of forest ecosystems. This might be accomplished through a sort of socio-forestry agriculture that is nevertheless directed by principles of forest sustainability, by Peraturan Pemerintah nomor 23 Tahun 2021 concerning Forestry Implementation as an existing regulation, as opposed to an emphasis on land-grabbing.

Conclusion

By the preceding explanation, this study can conclude that between the two food estate policies, similarities were found mainly in using national food security as a policy objective, whereas the differences can be identified in the military mechanism in Jokowi’s leadership, which in reality was used mainly to help the production and productivity of Food Estate until later gave rise to its controversy because of its partiality with the investors. Concerning the food securitization agenda, the food estate policy in both leaderships is indicated by the reconceptualization of food as a part of national development to become a priority issue after the global food crisis, which played as a referent object or a threatening problem. As a result, a sense of crisis arose to serve as the foundation for using the investment sector in implementing MIFEE and Food Estate as an acceleration plan for the national economy’s demands. SBY and Jokowi, with their governments, then functioned as securitization actors by carrying out a series of actions to persuade the public regarding the urgency, necessitating the construction of large-scale food barns outside of Java.

The period of securitization can be identified by a succession of outreach operations to the community, the institutionalization of food-related government agencies, and international collaboration attempts to bring attention to the problem of food security. In securitization, the act of violating regulations or official political regulations can be justified as a form of sacrifice considering the urgent priorities that must be met. However, it has been discovered that the trade-off that occurs between sacrifices and the results achieved in the implementation of food estate itself is not quite comparable, as there is no continuous trend in it. This is identified by this study with an understanding orientation of the government, which tends to prioritize the usage of the vision of food security with the efforts of food sufficiency and food autonomy, which only has the dimension of food availability in their output. In fact, there are still a variety of food issues in Indonesia that are deemed more important to address, such as physical and economic access or distribution, utilization in the form of satisfying food quality, and food security itself. Moreover, there’s still concern about the level of hunger even though Indonesia itself is fully committed to achieving the 2nd SDGs regarding Zero Hunger. Thus, it is concluded that national food securitization through the food estate policy is successful in the agenda process but not in its implementation, and the government can explore several measures to enhance future policies. This study provides recommendations in the form of strategies that utilize the synergy of the concept of food sovereignty to maximize the role of farmers and local communities in achieving food security as well as sustainability, with utilizing existing regulations to implement national food barns such as the realization of social forestry (perhutanan sosial).

References