

The role of social media in changing community social behaviour: Study case Wahhabi conflict in East Lombok

Peran media sosial dalam mengubah perilaku sosial masyarakat: Studi kasus konflik Wahhabi di Lombok Timur

Latifah & Titing Reza Fahriza✉

Master of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Science, Universitas
Airlangga

Surabaya, East Java, Indonesia 60115

e-mail of corresponding author: fahrifatiting@gmail.com

Abstract

Sentiment between religious groups (Wahhabis and non-Wahhabis) due to misuse of social media has sparked open conflict between these groups. This paper aims to explain the case of the burning of the mosque of the Wahhabi in As-Sunnah Foundation by the 'Sunni Muslim' group in Aikmel, East Lombok, by looking at the contribution of digital media to changes in people's behavior patterns and the impact it has on human security especially community and individual security. The discussion focuses on answering the question: how the media contributes to changes in social behavior that's threats to human security in the case of the burning of the Wahhabi As-Sunnah group mosque in East Lombok. This study uses a qualitative-descriptive method with media strategies and human security as the analytical framework. Data collection was carried out using in-depth interviews, observation, focused group discussion and literature review. This study shows that digitalization contributes to changes in people's behavior. Social media (Facebook and YouTube) are used to spread disinformation and hate speech between religious groups in East Lombok which trigger conflict. The open conflict became a threat to the security of the Wahhabi community and individuals in East Lombok.

Keywords: human security; role of social media; Wahhabism As-Sunnah; Wahabbi conflict

Abstrak

Sentimen antar kelompok agama (Wahhabi dan non-Wahhabi) akibat penyalahgunaan media sosial telah memicu konflik terbuka antar kelompok tersebut. Tulisan ini bertujuan untuk menjelaskan kasus pembakaran masjid Wahhabi di Yayasan As-Sunnah oleh kelompok 'Muslim Sunni' di Aikmel, Lombok Timur, dengan melihat kontribusi media digital terhadap perubahan pola perilaku masyarakat dan dampaknya terhadap keamanan manusia terutama komunitas dan keamanan individu. Pembahasan difokuskan untuk menjawab pertanyaan: bagaimana media berkontribusi terhadap perubahan perilaku sosial yang mengancam keamanan manusia dalam kasus pembakaran masjid kelompok As-Sunnah Wahhabi di Lombok Timur. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif-deskriptif dengan strategi media dan keamanan manusia sebagai kerangka analisisnya. Pengumpulan data dilakukan dengan wawancara mendalam, observasi, diskusi kelompok terfokus dan kajian pustaka. Studi ini menunjukkan bahwa digitalisasi berkontribusi terhadap perubahan perilaku masyarakat. Media sosial (Facebook dan YouTube) digunakan untuk menyebarkan disinformasi dan ujaran kebencian antar kelompok agama di Lombok Timur yang memicu konflik. Konflik terbuka tersebut menjadi ancaman bagi keamanan komunitas dan individu Wahhabi di Lombok Timur.

Kata kunci: keamanan manusia; peran media sosial; Wahabbi As-Sunnah; konflik Wahabbi

Introduction

Islam is one of the religions with the highest number of followers after Christianity, with 2B (two Billion) followers or about 24.9% and spread in approximately 200 countries and states (Hackett & McClendon 2017, Vaughan n.d). There are several popular sects in Indonesia, such as Sunni, Shia and Wahhabi. Among them, several important points are the main differences between belief and ritual.

Where Sunnis are the majority, and almost 90% of Muslims worldwide adhere to the Sunni sect, while members of the Wahabbi movement originating and residing in Saudi Arabia are only a minority of their followers. The secondary differences between Sunni Muslims and Wahhabis caused these sects to break apart and emerge independently. Wahabbi Muslims are followers of Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahab who was present in the 18th century in Saudi Arabia, while Sunni Muslims are followers of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions.

According to Widhana (2017), Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia was spread to all Muslim countries, including Indonesia. According to Howard Federspiel (2004) in his book entitled *Labyrinth of Muslim Ideology*, efforts to spread Wahhabi beliefs were carried out “through militant actions” in various communities in the archipelago in the 1800s. Wahhabis also established an Islamic and Arabic educational institution in Jakarta in 1980. The majority of students are Salafis who emphasize aspects of “pure Islam” and sentiments towards tradition. This movement carries the understanding that Islamic teachings must be free from heresy and superstition (Idris & Sahlan 2018), and their da’wah is often called *salafiyah da’wah* (Algar 2011, Salman 2017, Kusumah 2020). This Wahhabi group is known to be very massive through the *Campus Da’wah Institute* movement, which they formed for a long time as a forum for regeneration; from this LDK (*Campus Da’wah Institute*), the seeds of Wahhabi leaders and groups emerged in 1998 (Kusumah 2020).

Wahhabi-Salafi’s extreme ideology secretly tries to use various methods to expand its influence. Wahhabis and parties close to their ideology carry the discourse of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. To realize this mission, they generally take advantage of public, religious, and educational activities such as; universities, schools, Islamic boarding schools and prayer rooms in government offices. The LIPIA campus is a place to gain knowledge directly connected to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In fact, according to Kusumah (2020), Saudi became the largest funder of the Global Wahhabism movement after September 11, 2001, and spent USD 90 billion to fund Foundations around the world to spread Wahhabism. They also take advantage of the media, especially radio networks and social media. With the globalization era and social media development, the dark side of Wahhabism makes it easy for groups to spread teachings and understanding to their prospective followers to follow directions and carry out acts of violence.

According to Kusumah (2020) in his writing entitled *Wahhabism: Religious Politics and the Desire for Power in Indonesia*, Wahhabi history has never been separated from violent acts, whether doctrinal, cultural, or social. In the conquest of the Arabian Peninsula in the 1920s, more than 400,000 Muslims were murdered, publicly executed or amputated, including women and children. Moreover, globalization accelerates technological development and makes national borders thinner so that information spreads quickly and often cannot be adequately filtered (Kusumah 2020). The spread of Wahhabism in Indonesia, especially in East Lombok, has also coloured the dynamics of the Islamic development of the Lombok-Sasak people. Thus, the splendour of religion in East Lombok is getting thicker and growing like mushrooms in the rainy season, marked by the number of mosques, so Lombok gets the nickname *Island of a Thousand Mosques*.

The development of the world of technology that cannot be dammed, such as the presence of the internet and other social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, has been intelligently responded to by the Wahhabis in East Lombok. One of the acts of violence and rebellion that occurred due to the existence of social media between Wahhabis or who prefer to be called *sunnah* and Sunnis, occurred in Aikmel, East Lombok, which was the most extreme event at the opening of 2022. Because the trigger was social media in this modern era where information can be obtained. Disseminated quickly, videos are edited in such a way that it triggers tension in the community. The author tries to present the role of social media in the tragedy that occurred in Aikmel with human security in this case. For a long time, Wahhabis and Sunnis have lived side by side in East Lombok; although there are many conflicting and different teachings from one another, they live side by side. Even though they are different, they are still *Bhinekka Tunggal Ika* (Diversity of Unity).

The phenomenon of the formation of community religious patterns is a social reality whose existence cannot be denied. In Lombok there are at least two religious' patterns, namely first, traditional Islam which is represented by Nahdatul Ulama and Nadhatul Wathan. Before the boom in social media, both religions respected each other, even Hindus. Living together peacefully without any conflict. Small conflicts barely happen, and they will do "deliberation" or ignore the little conflicts on behalf of respecting other opinions or beliefs and continue living. nowadays, using social media frequently and accessible to all people makes it easier to spread hoax news and hate speeches which are still the subject of interesting discussion in every activity that causes tension.

According to Asmoro (2022), the number of Wahhabi Salafi followers is around two million. The data was obtained from various sources, including the Nekad Hijrah Community on the Facebook platform, which has 639,324 members; Da'wah Sunnah, with many members of around 750,000 members. It seems that the followers affected by the da'wah of monotheism that Wahhabis echo are decreasing or not as busy as in previous years who are so enthusiastic about listening to or participating in a study called Wahhabi Salafi by all users of the virtual universe. So that what is discussed is feasible on any social media and in any official forum, which is only a debate on the issue of discussing religion. Apart from that, it's a bit quiet. In East Lombok, besides using the mosque as an arena for da'wah, they also maximize media such as As-Sunnah radio, Facebook page and YouTube (Chaplin 2020).

The incident occurred not without reason but because of the trigger, namely the appearance of a lecture video uploaded on YouTube entitled "Religious Tour to the Grave - Ustadz Mizan Qudsiyah" (Akbar & Zufikar 2022). Starting from a video uploaded on social media, it went viral, resulting in arson, destruction, and arson at the As-Syafi'I Mosque, which belongs to the As-Sunnah group with the Salafi Wahhabi sect. Wahhabism in East Lombok created identity problems for its followers. Through the massive construction of mosques and Islamic boarding schools through social media and local TV, Wahhabi ideology's dissemination is increasing and tension because of aggressive and reactionary actions if they are contrary to their doctrine.

This study uses media strategy and human security as a framework for analysis. The author identifies in this case, the role of social media (Facebook and YouTube) is huge considering that the cause of information dissemination is through YouTube video clips and then presents a domino effect of changes in the personality of the Aikmel community, which used to be mutually tolerant turned into hatred because of "new wars" ideas that resulted in insecurity both individuals and groups. group in Aikmel, East Lombok. This paper also internalizes the influence of social media misuse, which can naturally cause changes in behaviour and social communication.

The theoretical framework/concept used to explain this case study is a media strategy and human security referring to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 1994). First, the media strategy, in this case, is used to explain the role of the media that contributed to the outbreak of open conflict by focusing on social media as a vehicle for radicalization and increasing hate speech to followers and society at large. According to Marthoz (2017), who works as a journalist, there is a link between media and violence in this global era where in countries with a strong religious identity (such as Indonesia and East Lombok), many media have traditionally adapted to local norms. Religious norms that are common or allied with certain religious groups can even be said that the current form of government is "*media-ocracy*", no longer traditional democracy (Schechter 2013). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the media have played an increasingly prominent role in social and cultural life since the emergence of the so-called "mass media" in the late nineteenth century. Mass media emerged due to the interaction of technological and social developments. So that sometimes they bring and spread issues that lead to violence and create hatred between groups.

In line with the information revolution as one of the "*great waves of change*", currently, social media platforms involve around 4.1 billion users, more than half of the world's population (Toffler 1980). Social media indeed brings many benefits, but on the other hand, the media also affects human behaviour

in a negative aspect, namely differences in flow that cause disputes due to media abuse. Thus, the media also harm society in many ways. Mass media has become a powerful tool of war, and its use can cause changes in behaviour and social communication naturally (Cull 2008, Paramo & Legovini 2021). A previous study conducted by Targema & Sanda (2022) proved that the conflict in Taraba was due to the role of social media. These practices included publishing false and misleading information about ethnic-religious disputes resulting in hatred. The media control society and can change human behaviour, lifestyle, moral thinking, and consequences (Lita & Cho 2013, Saurabh 2019).

In short, the “*war of ideas*” occurred in the Aikmel community as Clausewitz (1873) argued that “*The form of war can change, but its nature does not*”. Certain parties use media as a tool for ‘war’/in certain conflict situations, including by utilizing the content in the media to achieve certain interests of a particular group or party. Media strategy refers to using media to achieve certain interests to win conflict situations with a “*war of ideas*”. Meanwhile, the second concept, human security, is used to frame the impact caused by this media that threatens the security of individuals and communities. In the aims paper, we will focus on the role of social media as the trigger for all conflicts and its impact on human security. According to UNDP (1994) and as the UN (2003) defines in the report “*Human Security Now*”, human security means protecting the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment. Furthermore, human security means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations, which means that individuals also have the right to be protected. In this case, the concept of human security applied is to protect fundamental freedoms - the essence of life.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security also includes human security, which integrates three freedoms: freedom from fear, desire, and humiliation. Individual security includes freedom from threats and physical violence such as torture, war, criminal assault, domestic violence, drug use, suicide, and even traffic accidents. Meanwhile, community security includes the security of cultural and cultural identities, being safe as members of certain groups in society, the survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups, and the physical safety of groups (Listiarani 2020:23-24).

Islamic groups with other sects such as Sunnis become offended because they feel they are the object of accusations of shirk and heresy so that horizontal conflicts cannot be avoided. As a result, the humiliation and fear experienced by the Aikmel community tends to increase. Thus, freedom from desire as an individual is not achieved because there is indirect pressure because they have to keep their distance from non-Muslim communities and systems (Said 2019). As Giorgino Shani (2014) says, Religion, Identity and Human Security seek to show that the primary source of human insecurity stems from the failure of countries around the world to recognize the increasing cultural diversity of their populations caused by globalization. Ongoing conflicts are becoming increasingly complex and thus also hinder efforts to narrow development gaps between groups.

Research Method

This study uses descriptive qualitative research methods. First, the author uses primary data by interviewing related parties such as representatives from the KUA, ustadz (Islamic master) from the As Sunnah group, local Sunni religious leaders from mass organizations (Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Nahdlatul Wathan (NW/NWDI), the village head of Bagik-Nyaka Santri and related parties. Next, develop research questions that focus on actors who know the history, cause or are involved in arson and riots between religious sects, namely Wahhabis and Sunnis in Aikmel, East Lombok and how these conflicts can occur. Then secondary data through information from relevant books, journals and websites. In terminology, secondary data analysis is a type of research that investigates previously and analyzes data collected by other researchers in the relevant field to explore what is already known and what can be further explored in a particular area (Johnston 2014).

All these different parts of the research have been carried out by operationalizing the sub-questions. This is done by generating other indicators for all the sub-questions from various chapters and finding ways to gather the information needed for those indicators. This information is either in the literature,

by comparing data sheets with information obtained from different secondary data or during qualitative interviews. Together all this information will be used to answer the main question of this research: to answer the question: how does the media contribute to changes in social behaviour and threaten human security in the case of burning the mosque of the Wahhabi As-Sunnah group in East Lombok?

Miles & Huberman in (Fadli 2021:43-44) mentioned data analysis techniques include three activities namely data reduction, display and conclusions. Referring to these three, in data reduction the researcher will summarize, sort and focus on important matters related to open conflict in the form of the burning of the Wahhabi As-Sunnah Mosque in East Lombok to get an overview of the conditions that occurred and simplify the next data collection process. Including trimming unnecessary data according to the focus of this study. In the data display, the researcher will present the reduced data in the form of descriptions, descriptions, interview transcripts and temporary reports according to the category and type intended to make it easier to understand what is happening in the field. Then finally conclusions and verification are drawn and then set forth in this paper.

Results and Discussion

In this section, the author will describe a brief history related to the origin of the development of Wahhabism in East Lombok. In addition, an overview is also given regarding the religious traditions of the majority of people who develop with the Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Aswaja) sect, both affiliated with the NW/NWDI organizations. Then, it continues with the dynamics of religious sentiment between the Sunni/Aswaja groups and the Wahhabis. Some of these things are important to be discussed first before the next section (discussion) discusses the case study of the attack and arson at the As Sunnah Islamic boarding school headquarters complex, which is the center of Wahhabi activities in East Lombok.

There are several previous studies discussing the Wahhabi issue and its dynamics in Lombok. Several studies discuss Wahhabism in Lombok in general but are more focused on studying the 'original' form of this movement, namely in the field of religious preaching and Islamic education. The authors see it as a socio-religious group such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Nahdlatul Wathan/Diniyah Islamiah (NW/NWDI), Maraqit Ta'limat, as written by Said (2019:167) and Saparudin (2022a:40). Besides that, there are also articles discussing Wahhabi on the institutional side and methods of da'wah carried out through formal and informal institutions under Islamic boarding schools. They mostly show the dynamic of those institutions on educational revivalism of each. In addition, several studies also mentioned that the development of Wahhabi formal and non-formal education focused on the two largest Wahhabi institutions in Lombok, namely the Abu Hurairoh Islamic Boarding School Foundation, Mataram and the Markaz As-Sunnah Islamic Boarding School Foundation, East Lombok. This is evident in the writings of Saparudin (2017), Hasbially (2021:14), Muharir (2022:1) and Saparudin (2022b:30).

However, the majority of these writings come from the disciplines of Islamic Education and Da'wah so that the focus of the study only discusses development, infiltration and the process of spreading da'wah to the development of the Wahhabi group in Lombok. Even though some of them mention local conflicts and rivalries, this is only seen as an effect of the da'wah method of the religious actor, ustaz. In addition, these writings focus more on the spread and methods of da'wah but are not focused on the study of conflict or the media as a method of da'wah especially on the contribution of the media in the security sector. So that there is a clear difference with this study which focuses more on looking at the contribution of the media in changing behavior patterns and resulting in conflict. In the future, the conflict will have an impact on the human security of the local community.

Dynamics of Wahhabi dakwah: AS-Sunnah in East Lombok

As Sunnah Jamaah or other local people call it a Wahhabi group in East Lombok, centered in Bagik-Nyaka Santri village, Aikmel sub-district, East Lombok district, West Nusa Tenggara. The development of Wahhabism for the first time in East Lombok cannot be separated from the figure of Tuan Guru HUS, the son of TGH ABD, a prominent NU figure in East Lombok. TG HUS, or from now on referred to

as Ustadz HUS, is a person who diligently studied while in Mecca, Saudi Arabia. He often moved to halaqah (recitation places), found the halaqah of Wahhabi recitation, and practised it (Said 2019:176-177). According to TGH AHM's narrative, Ustadz HUS did not immediately return to Indonesia after completing his education in Solatayah-Mekkah. AHM stated, "after completing his studies at Solatayah-Mecca, he did not return directly to Lombok but had taught at a Saudi Arabian royal school. that's why he also learned a lot about wahabi understanding because of the demands of work". So that, Ustadz HUS must understand and master the doctrines and teachings of Wahhabi Abdul Wahhab, which are applied to the royal curriculum due to his work. According to AHM, this adds to the strong understanding of Wahhabism owned by Ustadz HUS.

In 1984, Ustadz HUS returned to his hometown in Bagik-Nyaka, Aikmel and was the forerunner to the start of the Wahhabi da'wah in the East Lombok district. Ustadz HUS immediately gained the community's trust to preach, considering that his grandfather and father were elite religious figures, namely a Tuan Guru at a leading NU mass organization in this region. Informant BAH and KAS stated "at the beginning of his preaching, Ustadz HUS was still involved in various religious activities of the local community (such as: tahlilan, greetings, prayer together, ta'ziah etc.). The da'wah method used if it is concluded that in the first stage, Ustadz HUS tried to get the sympathy of the general public to gather congregations (followers), namely by involving himself in various community activities which, although deemed not following Wahhabism, were often referred to as unfounded or Bid'ah. According to BAH informants, Ustadz HUS was attended and filled routine public recitations held at the Samsul Falah Besar mosque, Bagik-NyakaSantri village, which was attended by worshipers from 60 villages, including those outside the Aikmel sub-district.

In the next stage, Ustadz HUS began to discuss the doctrine of Wahhabi teachings at the recitations he attended while criticizing several religious traditions that were usually carried out by local people who belonged to the Aswaja sect such as tahlilan, maulidan, qunut and so on. which are considered to have no valid basis from the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the prophet Muhammad SAW. The material and style of da'wah, which is quite firm and related to traditions that have been deeply rooted in the religious culture of the local community, has received resistance and rejection as a form of resistance to previously believed beliefs. Finally, Ustadz HUS moved temporarily to Batu Jai village, Central Lombok district, to carry out da'wah, where his da'wah went quite smoothly and gained many followers. In this area, Ustadz HUS was received quite well and was able to carry out da'wah more smoothly when compared to Aikmel, East Lombok, because, at that time, this region did not have solid religious figures either in the form of militant cadres from NU or NW/ NWDI (Said 2019:177).

According to KAS's statement at the FGD (Forum Group Discussion) conducted by the author along with several resource persons, the style and material of da'wah, which of course was very contrary to Aswaja's religious tradition began to be realized by several religious figures affiliated with NU in Aikmel at that time including Ustadz LUT (his brother), Ustadz H. AZI and H. MUI. So that the division in the community and TGH HUS decided to move to an outside mushalla followed by several worshipers who began to move from NU. KAS, one of informant stated, "Initially, several religious figures and Ustadz Husni's brothers suspected that there was something odd about his preaching, but after investigation, it turned out that he was teaching Wahhabism. Since then there has been a split in families and communities". According to KAS informants, after this division and secession, religious sentiments began between community groups who adhered to the Aswaja religious tradition (the majority of NU in Bagik-Nyaka, and some NW/NWDI in the Aikmel sub-district) versus the Wahhabi congregation or those who identified themselves more as-Sunnah.

Religious sentiments are in the form of sarcasm in each of their general recitations or in each group's halaqah, which is often heated by the inconsistency of social relations in the community. For example, the As Sunnah group satirized the tradition of tahlil, maulidan, etc. Meanwhile, the Aswaja congregation brought in religious leaders with qualifications and da'wah methods that attacked Wahhabi understanding. Minor conflicts such as divorce between husband and wife were common at that time. However, what has developed up to now is a religious sentiment in the form of open sarcasm, but it has never led to open conflict in society. This dynamic continued so that Ustadz HUS moved his preaching centre to the Markaz Assunnah, which is located outside the main village of Bagik-Nyakabut is still

part of Bagik-Nyaka village. However, this transfer does not necessarily eliminate the Jamaluddin Al-mannan foundation (the base of their previous da'wah movement), which is seen as a split in the sunnah group. The Salafi/as sunnah congregations at the Jamiluddin foundation are considered more moderate/as sunnah half-hearted people call it that because its preaching tends not to be black-and-white or halal and haram and very firm. KAS informants said that this was different from the group's style under the Markaz As Sunnah congregation which tends to be militant.

Markaz As Sunnah is overgrowing, with various congregations and branches spread throughout the district of East Lombok. Said (2019:179-180) mentions that his massive da'wah movement utilizes the mosque movement strategy, namely increasing the construction of separate mosques in almost all places where there are worshipers in the region with large financial contributions from the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In addition, Said concluded several factors that caused people to follow this congregation, including: (1) ordinary people who were affected by the purification and return to Islamic teachings based on the Qur'an and hadith alone and overriding the opinions of scholars; (2) the economic factor is characterized by the provision of public services to the community funded by Saudi and Kuwait, especially while Aswaja does not maximize this. Such as providing family allowances, scholarships to study in the Middle East, funding for the construction of mosques and Islamic boarding schools; (3) marriage; (4) the generosity of the sunnah elite group, which usually provides assistance and jobs for the lower-class economic community which attracts them to be influenced and follow this ideology; (5) frustration at the internal conflict of NW/NWDI dualism. Furthermore, religious sentiment continues but remains relatively safe and does not cause open conflict.

Media and conflict: Burning of the Wahhabi Mosque As-Sunnah East Lombok

This section is the core of the discussion that will explain more about how media strategies are used to achieve the interests of the Aswaja 'rogue' group in achieving its goals. In this case, social media is used as a tool to 'war' ideas with a specific goal to be achieved through the distribution of video clips of a recitation of one of the religious leaders of the sunnah congregation (Ustadz MIZ). Therefore, this section will also elaborate on the chronology of the conflict in the As Sunnah Mosque attack by relating it to media strategy. The author also discusses how the impact of open conflict in the form of the mosque attack on human security focuses on the security of individuals and groups. Finally, before the conclusion, there are efforts to resolve this issue or media by the parties concerned.

The religious sentiment between the Wahhabi/as sunnah versus Aswaja (non-sunnah) groups in the Bagik-Nyaka area and its surroundings at this time is not a problem that has the potential for conflict. According to ZAM's explanation, this is because the local community and congregation have been accustomed to various forms of satire between their respective beliefs and traditions since the 1990s. In other terms, he calls it thick ears. However, there is undeniable friction in the clear distinction between beliefs and beliefs. DHO informants stated that this was commonplace among heterogeneous communities, although there are some differences in treatment in social interactions between the two groups, but not to the point of causing open conflict. However, for the first time, open conflict was expressed through burning a mosque in the Markaz As Sunnah Bagik-Nyaka foundation because of media contributions that were driven by specific group interests.

If traced, the case of assault and arson in the As Sunnah Markaz area is related to the two previous cases, as stated by the local village head. The two cases are demonstrations and the burning of a prospective mosque building belonging to the As Sunnah group in Mamben Daya and the case of the 2022 viral video clip of Ustadz MIZ's recitation of religious tourism. (1) In December 2021, hundreds of people in Mambendaya held a demonstration against constructing a mosque belonging to the As Sunnah group in the area adjacent to Bagik-Nyaka. They also held a demonstration at the Mamben Daya village office demanding to stop the mosque's construction because they considered that they did not get permission from local religious leaders and only got a construction permit from the village. In addition, the local community is reluctant to accept the development of Wahhabi/Salafi ideology in the Mamben area where the congregation of this Sunnah group is a minority (Nuwarang 2021). (2) A viral video clip related to Ustadz MIZ's lecture on religious tourism to the cemetery, which immediately caused an overreaction among the people of East Lombok and Lombok in general. The full video lecture at Dasan Bantet in

November 2020 was uploaded by streaming, cut at 30.50 in duration by certain parties. The contents of the lecture that offended and insulted other beliefs of the majority of the people of Lombok were "... Selaparang Tomb, Bintaro, Sekarbela, Loang Baloq, Ali Batu, Batu Layar, tain acong grave, sacred tain acong..." – Said Ustadz MIZ, taken from an online media (Radar Lombok 2022). (*Tain acong in Sasak language means dog feces. This diction is very rude to the Sasak people*).

Then, how are these two cases related and lead to cases of assault and arson in the Markaz As Sunnah Islamic Boarding School? Emphasizing the author's main argument, namely, in this digitalization era, the media contributes to changes in social behavior; with a media strategy, social media is used as a tool to spread disinformation and hate speech against sentiments among religious groups to achieve certain interests. Elaboration on this case study where the two previous cases above are a related entity. Based on field observations, FGDs and interviews with several related informants, logical thinking was drawn that the case of the attack at the Markaz As Sunnah Islamic Boarding School was a form of 'issue transfer' as well as a response to public hatred to achieve the main goal of the Aswaja group, in this case, the majority of whom were affiliated with the Maraquit Ta'limat/Maraquit.

The religious culture of the Mamben Daya community is the Aswaja sect, with the majority of the congregation in the Maraquit mass organization reluctant to allow Wahhabi groups to preach in the local area. This is because the beliefs that are firmly held are different from the teachings of Wahhabism and are worried about being influenced by the local community to join this group. Even though people are used to religious sentiments between groups. As mentioned in the results section, the construction of a mosque for the sunnah group is a centre for da'wah and worship activities (movement mosque). The construction of the mosque in As Sunnah in the Mamben area received financial support from the Middle East through the Markaz As Sunnah Islamic Boarding School foundation, not self-help as is common among the local community (DHO informant confession). So, in this case, the author concludes that the main interest/motive to be achieved with these various cases is the cessation of the construction of mosques in the Mamben area.

Responding to the first case of a demonstration against the presence of Wahhabi/sunnah groups with the construction of the mosque, on December 10 2021, the East Lombok Regional Government stated by the Regent H.M. SUK which contained: to maintain the conduciveness of the Lotim Regency area, the regency government stopped the construction of the As-Sunnah mosque in the Hamlet Dasan Bembek, Mamben Daya Village; urges the public to continue to respect each other in carrying out their respective beliefs and understandings (Husen 2021). However, BAH and DHOs confession stated that the Sunnah had ignored this and continued to carry out the development process by bringing in materials and construction workers. Based on the congregation's narrative, "Mudir" (supervisor/leader) of the As Sunnah foundation, Ustadz ABL, called for the mosque's construction to stop. However, the foundation's chairman, Ustadz MIZ, still wanted to continue the process and even had time to bring in a reliable lawyer to handle this case. In addition, billboards were displayed, which triggered the disappointment of the Aswaja/Maraquit Mamben group (according to the DHO informant).

As a result, on January 2, 2022, there was a mass rioting incident with open conflict in the form of attacks and arson at the As Sunnah Markaz, which was previously triggered by the second case, namely the viral video of Ustadz MIZ's lecture. The police stated that they had detected the account owner who spread video clips of provocative and insulting lectures by Ustadz MIZ that offended many people. This case proves that social media contributes to sharpening religious sentiment and is able to change people's social behavior. The reason is, after the viral video has succeeded in provoking mass anger and was followed by several demonstrations in several areas in Lombok as a response to it. This time it's not only the Aswaja people around Aikmel who usually get along, the people of Mamben Daya, however, but the masses from the breed group and TGH MUH lovers also staged a demonstration on January 5, 2022, and followed the next day on January 6, 2022, a combined mass from NU, MMI, KAHMI and others held a similar action in front of the East Lombok Regent's Office. They demanded the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (forkopimda) to close all activities of Wahhabi/sunnah groups. In addition, they required to carry out a consistent legal process against Ustadz MIZ.

Although the police did not publicly announce the perpetrators of spreading videos containing hate speech using the social media platform (Facebook & WhatsApp), Nyaka Santri's village officials stated that there was a strong suspicion that the perpetrators were from "maraqit group elements". ALI said there had been rumors that video spreaders were from NW/NWDI youths, so this caused a commotion among the NW/HIMMAH youth forums. After being investigated, it turns out that this is a strategy used by video spreaders on behalf of NW/NWDI as the mass organization with the enormous mass in Lombok, especially East Lombok (according to the ZUB informant). The head of the local village said, "according to the results of our discussion, this is an effort to divert the issue as well as attract more masses to achieve the goal of stopping the construction of mosques. Because if they rely on congregations, they are very few" (according to the BAH informant). BAH added that this was used to provoke an enormous mass reaction, considering that the number of maraqit masses was not significant, and it was assumed that they were unable to fight the As Sunnah congregation, as proven by the failure in the first case. Once again, the author emphasizes that the media plays a significant role in changing people's behaviour in this era of disruption as stated in Clausewitz' war of ideas' where "The form of war can change, but its nature does not".

The impact of the Wahhabi Mosque burning conflict: As-Sunnah on human security

Then, how does the impact of the conflict triggered by the media have an effect on human security? Reaffirming the author's argument that open conflict leading to the burning of mosques is in fact a threat to the security of communities and individuals in the Wahhabi group in East Lombok. (1) community security, this case clearly shows that the as sunnah/Salafi/Wahhabi communities in Bagik-Nyaka and East Lombok are threatened with attacks on the centers of their da'wah and worship activities. In addition, the congregation mentioned that they felt insecure about their religious identity after this case. The village official explained that his party carried out night security with the congregation for two months until conditions were completely safe (according to the BAH informant). In addition, the ustadz were not allowed to carry out da'wah activities at any time and location throughout East Lombok at that time, this was intended to avoid triggering mass commotion. In addition, the barrier for movement and activities of all santri (female students) are closed. The SAD informant added that, this shows that there is no feeling of security and freedom, which are two of the three pillars of human security.

Meanwhile, (2) individual security is also threatened in this case, especially Ustadz MIZ. Threats in this dimension can be identified in the form of physical violence such as torture, criminal attacks, including restrictions on individual freedom (Listiarani 2020:23). In this context, Ustadz MIZ was the target of the attack on the night of the incident but was successfully arrested by the local police and village officials. Identified threats in the form of physical violence such as torture, and criminal attacks, including the deprivation of individual liberty. He was targeted for an attack on the night of the incident, after which he was immediately taken into custody by the police and transferred to the provincial city of West Nusa Tenggara, Mataram, while his status as a city prisoner. According to SAD informant, Aikmel KUA religious adviser stated, "he is not allowed to carry out da'wah activities. As of now he is only allowed to study independently at his home". According to SAD and several others, until now, he was not given permission to do da'wah in public places except at his own home. In addition, security in his private home is maintained, showing that he is actually in an unsafe condition supported by restrictions on da'wah activities which are the absolute activities of a ustadz (additional explanation from the SAD informant).

This case study shows that the media contribute to changes in people's behaviour, especially in this digitalization era. Religious sentiment in a heterogeneous society is common, especially in the Bagik-Nyaka-Aikmel. The change in people pattern of behavior happened in Bagik Nyaka in line with the information revolution as one of the "great waves of change", currently, social media platforms as main tools to share information and lifestyle of the people. As result media digital is used to achieve spesific intrest to win conflict situations with a "war of ideas". Still, problems arise when the media is used to achieve specific group interests. This study shows the media strategy was used by 'unscrupulous' members of the Maraqit group to provoke a more significant mass response to reach the primary goal of stopping the construction of mosques and, at the same time, rejecting the presence and development of Wahhabi/Salafi teachings in the area.

Incidents of attacks and arson around the As Sunnah foundation can be seen as a 'diversion of issues'. It is proven by the inability of the masses of Mamben Daya to contain the activities of the Sunnah group in (case 1), then using a media strategy in point (2) to achieve the main goal of stopping the construction of the mosque but by attacking the as-sunnah centre (case 3). Even though it was an indirect process, the main objective in this matter was achieved, as evidenced by the termination of the mosque's construction with the land being purchased by the local government. Meanwhile, on the as-sunnah side, as a result of mediation and negotiations, Ustadz MIZ was found not guilty and only under house arrest, and as-sunnah activities returned to normal. The police also did not publish the perpetrators of the video spread, and the as-sunnah party received a school bus 'gift' from the local government.

Finally, mediation efforts carried out by related parties to respond to this problem include signing a joint statement on January 3, 2022 to maintain conduciveness in the district. This signing was carried out by all parties involved with this issue, namely the East Lombok Regent, Forkopimda ranks, DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or Regional Legislative Council) Chairman, Chair of the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB), Head of NWDI Regional Management (PD), Chair of East Lombok MUI, Chairman of the Nahdatul Ulama Branch Management (PCNU), Chairman of PD NW, Chairman of the Maraqitta'limat Foundation, and Chairman of the As-Sunnah Lombok Foundation. This statement contains seven points to prevent similar intolerant acts in the future (Prawira 2022). In addition according to SAD informants, the Head of the NTB regional office (Kanwil) and the East Lombok Ministry of Religion, accompanied by KUA Aikmel on January 4, 2022, visited the As Sunnah Islamic boarding school and appealed to Ustadz MIZ and all administrators of the As Sunnah Foundation to maintain harmony and order. BAH added that mediation effort s was carried out with all traditional leaders in East Lombok, the village head of Mamben Daya, and the village head of Bagik-Nyaka santri at the Lenek Traditional Hall. This mediation agreed to respect each other and get back in harmony to maintain regional security and conduciveness.

Conclusion

This paper has shown that changes in people's behavior in the digital era, especially in this case study, have led to divisions and open conflicts that have arisen in the East Lombok community between Wahabbi Asunnah vs non sunnah/Wahabbi especially the Maraqit group. This has a very real impact in the context of the human security of the local community. Human insecurities were felt by the As-Sunnah group after the attack where all their activities were restricted and threatened with an attack followed by large-scale demonstrations. Apart from that, individually the Ustadz MIZ who was involved had to stop all activities and remain under close supervision by the security forces of the police and army because it was feared that further attacks would still occur.

This shows that the media is not only capable of changing individual and societal behaviour patterns in this era but has actually created and ignited conflict in countries with a religious dimension. So far, after the cold war, the majority of intrastate conflicts have ethnic dimensions by utilizing various strategies. However, this case study shows a different matter where local conflicts with religious dimensions have a further impact on the human insecurity of the local community. This is rarely studied further, especially related to the impact of religious conflict on the human security of local local communities which is actually the most important thing to look at, considering that local people are victims and give rise to strong trauma and polarization in society.

References

- Akbar JR & Zulfikar S (2022) Ponpes As-Sunnah Lombok Timur diserbu massa, ini kronologi lengkapnya. Viva, 2 January. [Accessed 13 July 2022]. https://www.viva.co.id/berita/nasional/1437180-ponpes-assunnah-lombok-timur-diserbu-massa-ini-kronologinya?page=all&utm_medium=all-page.
- Algar H (2011) Wahhabisme: Sebuah Tinjauan Kritis (Trans). Jakarta: Democracy Project Yayasan Abad Demokrasi.

- Asmoro H (2022) Jumlah Wahabi di Indonesia dan Afiliasinya.
- Chaplin C (2020) Communal Salafi learning and Islamic selfhood: Examining religious boundaries through ethnographic encounters in Indonesia. *Ethnography* 21(1):113-132. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1466138118795988>.
- Clausewitz C (1873) On War, Carl von Clausewitz. <https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/TOC.htm>.
- Cull NJ (2008) Public diplomacy: Taxonomies and histories. In: Cowan G & Cull NJ (ed). *Diplomacy in a Changing World*. The annals of the American academy of political and social science 616 (1):31-54.
- Fadli MR (2021) Memahami desain metode penelitian kualitatif. *Humanika, Kajian Ilmiah Mata Kuliah Umum* 21 (1):35-54.
- Federspiel HM (2004) Labirin Ideologi Muslim: Pencarian dan Pergulatan Persis di Era Kemunculan Negara Indonesia. Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta.
- Hackett C & McClendon D (2017) Christians remain world's largest religious group, but they are declining in Europe. Pew Research Center, 5 April. [Accessed 13 July 2022]. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2017/04/05/christians-remain-worlds-largest-religious-group-but-they-are-declining-in-europe/>.
- Hasbiallyh (2021) Eksistensi Lembaga Pendidikan Salafi Di NTB (Kajian resistensi dan konflik keyakinan serta motivasi masyarakat memilih Lembaga Pendidikan Salafi). Dissertation, Universitas Islam Negeri Mataram, Mataram.
- Idris M & Sahlan M (2018) Antara salah paham dan paham yang salah: Pandangan Teungku Seumeubeut terhadap Wahabi. *Substantia* 20 (1).
- Johnston MP (2014) Secondary data analysis: A method of which the time has come. *Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Libraries* 3 (3):619-626.
- Kusumah EA (2020) Wahabi: Politik agama dan hasrat kekuasaan di Indonesia. *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-agama dan Lintas Budaya* 4 (1):58-63. <https://journal.uinsgd.ac.id/index.php/Religious/article/view/7296/pdf>.
- Listiarani T (2020) Analisis kebijakan luar negeri Indonesia dalam menerima pengungsi Rohingya di Indonesia. *Jurnal PIR* 5 (1):19-32. <http://dx.doi.org/10.22303/pir.5.1.2020.19-32>.
- Lita R & Cho CY (2013) The influence of media on attitudinal and behavioral changes: Acceptance of culture and products. *International Business & Economics Research Journal (IBER)* 11 (12):1433-1444. <http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/iber.v11i12.7617>.
- Marthoz J (2017) *Terrorism and the Media: A Handbook for Journalists*. UNESCO Publishing.
- Nuwarang R (2021) Ratusan warga di Lotim tolak pembangunan Masjid Assunnah, ini alasannya. *iNewsNTB.id*, 3 December. [Accessed 3 July 2022]. <https://ntb.inews.id/berita/ratusan-warga-dilotim-tolak-pembangunan-masjid-assunnah-ini-alasannya/1>.
- Paramo SC & Legovini A (2021) Using social media to change norms and behaviors at scale. <https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/using-social-media-change-norms-and-behaviors-scale>.
- Prawira D (2022) Inilah pernyataan bersama buntut kasus perusakan Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah di Lombok Timur. *Mataram Pikiran Rakyat*, 4 January. [Accessed 3 July 2022]. <https://mataram.pikiran-rakyat.com/klik-news/pr-2223390034/inilah-pernyataan-bersama-buntut-kasus-perusakan-pondok-pesantren-as-sunnah-di-lombok-timur>.
- Radar Lombok (2022) Viral potongan video hina makam, ini klarifikasi Ustadz Mizan Qudsiah, LC, MA. *Radar Lombok*, 2 January. [Accessed 13 July 2022]. <https://radarlombok.co.id/viral-potongan-video-hina-makam-ini-klarifikasi-ustadz-mizan-qudsiah-lc-ma.html>.
- Said M (2019) Dinamika Wahabisme di Lombok Timur: Problem identitas, kesalehan dan kebangsaan. *Fikrah: Jurnal Ilmu Aqidah dan Studi Keagamaan* 7 (1):167-194.
- Salman AM (2017) Gerakan Salafiyah: Islam, politik dan rigiditas Interpretasi hukum Islam. *Jurnal Pemikiran Hukum Islam* 16 (2):135-152.
- Saparudin (2017) Salafism, state recognition and local tension: New trends in Islamic Education in Lombok. *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies* 21 (1):81-107.
- Saparudin (2022a) Desakralisasi otoritas keagamaan Tuan Guru: Purifikasi Salafi versus tradisionalisme Nahdlatul Wathan. *Khazanah: Jurnal Studi Islam dan Humaniora* 20 (1):25-44.

- Saparudin (2022b) Ideological trap in education: Rivalry discourse on Islamic literature in Nahdlatul Wathan and Salafi School. *TARBIYA: Jurnal of Education in Muslim Society* 9 (2):19-34.
- Saurabh A (2019) Effect of media on human behaviour. *International Journal of Indian Psychology* 7 (3):533-549.
- Schechter D (2013) Dissecting the news& lighting the fuse, dispatches from the media war. <http://www.coldtype.net/Assets.13/PDFs/0513.Dissecting.pdf>.
- Shani G (2014) Religion, Identity and Human Security. Tokyo: International Christian University.
- Suara Islam (2022) Polisi tahan Ustadz Mizan Qudsiyah pimpinan Pesantren As-Sunnah Lombok Timur. *Suara Islam*, 4 January. [Accessed 13 July 2022]. <https://suaraislam.id/polisi-tahan-ustaz-mizan-qudsiah-pimpinan-pesantren-as-sunnah-lombok-timur/>.
- Targema ST & Sanda UH (2022) Social media and the management of ethno-religious conflicts: Stakeholders' perspectives. *The Journal of Society and Media* 6 (1):232-256.
- Toffler A (1980) *The Third Wave*. William Morrow & Co.
- UN (2003) *Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People/Commission on Human Security*. New York: The Commission.
- UNDP (1994) *Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security*. New York: United Nations Development Programme. <https://www.gdrc.org/sustdev/husec/z-categories.html>.
- Vaughan D (n.d) What is the most widely practiced religion in the world? <https://www.britannica.com/story/what-is-the-most-widely-practiced-religion-in-the-world>.
- Widhana HD (2017) *LIPIA, ajaran Wahabi di Indonesia*. Tirta, 6 March. [Accessed 13 July 2022]. <https://tirto.id/lipia-ajaran-wahabi-di-indonesia-ckes>.