JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
https://e-journal.unair.ac.id/JDE/index

WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNANCE: A QUICK FIX TO DEVELOPMENT CONSTRAINTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?

Abiodun Samuel Isayomi*[1]
Olumide Olumuyiwa Omodunbi[2]
Akin George Ogunleye[3]
Kehinde Ajike Olabiyi[4]
Samson Olajide Olaniyan[5]

[1,3,4,5] Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria
[2]Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria

ABSTRACT

The inhuman socioeconomic repercussions of corruption and bad governance inherent in successive male-dominated governments have generated agitation for increased women's participation in governance. Primarily, this agitation is based on the premise that women are less inclined to corruption, which is a major impediment to good governance. Given the notoriety of these two impediments to development, this study aims to investigate the relationship between women's participation in governance, corruption, and quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa from 1996 to 2021. This study analyzed annual panel data of four sub-Saharan African countries using the autoregressive distributed lag model and the Granger causality test. Governance quality was proxied by government effectiveness, while women's participation in governance and corruption were proxied by the number of women in government positions and control of corruption, respectively. Economic development and institutional quality were used as control variables. The findings revealed negative main and interaction effects of women's participation in governance and corruption on governance quality, unidirectional causality from corruption to women's participation in governance and from governance quality to women's participation in governance, and bidirectional causality between corruption and governance quality. Quantitative increases in women's participation in governance and corruption exacerbates governance quality. Women's ability to participate in governance is determined by the prevalence of corruption in previous years. Anticorruption campaigns that focused on women's participation in governance often result in reductions in corruption insufficient for improvement of governance quality. Corruption and bad governance are mutually reinforcing. Governance quality determines women's participation in governance. To minimize corruption and bad governance, sub-Saharan African countries should shift their focus away from merely increasing the number of women in government positions to building strong institutions capable of creating a meritocratic political and socioeconomic environment in which selfless women and men have equal chances of being elected or appointed to public offices.

Keywords: *Inequality, Corruption, Good Governance, ARDL Approach*
JEL: D73; H11; J16

ARTICLE INFO

Received: November 15th, 2023
Revised: March 21st, 2024
Accepted: April 16th, 2024
Online: June 4th, 2024

*Correspondence:
Abiodun Samuel Isayomi

E-mail:
abiodun.isayomi@uniosun.edu.ng

To cite this document: Isayomi, A. S., Omodunbi, O. O., Ogunleye, A. G., Olabiyi, K. A., & Olaniyan, S. O. (2024). Women's Participation in Governance: A Quick Fix to Development Constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa? *Journal of Developing Economies, 9*(1), 47-64. https://doi.org/10.20473/jde.v9i1.51659

Journal of Developing Economies; p-ISSN: 2541-1012; e-ISSN: 2528-2018
DOI: 10.20473/jde.v9i1.51659

Introduction

After years of colonization, the achievement of self-government is often accompanied by enormous socioeconomic expectations. However, after years of independence, many former colonies have struggled to achieve the level of development expected from self-governance. Consequently, for these countries, self-governance has not been synonymous with good governance that produces desirable socioeconomic outcomes. The aforementioned scenario has aroused public and scholarly interest in the determinants of governance quality, defined as "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development" (World Bank, 1992). Prominent among the determinants of governance quality is corruption, whose detrimental effect on governance quality and status as a major obstacle to good governance is well recognized and confirmed in the literature (Momoh, 2015; Di Pietra & Melis, 2016; Salihu & Gbolam, 2018; Brody et al., 2020; Salihu, 2022). Similarly, corruption and poor governance are well recognized as major obstacles to development (Aborisade & Aliyyu, 2018; Mlambo et al., 2019; Isayomi et al., 2023).

Unfortunately, many sub-Saharan African countries fall into the category of described above, given their history of colonization, prevalence of corruption, poor governance, and stage of development. This reality is underscored by the 2022 Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which ranked sub-Saharan Africa (with a regional average CPI of 32 out of 100) as the region with the lowest CPI globally. Specifically, about 90% of the 49 sub-Saharan African countries surveyed had below-average CPI scores (Transparency International/TI, 2023). Similarly, the 2021 Global Governance Indicators revealed that sub-Saharan Africa (with a regional average government effectiveness score of -0.81) was one of the worst performing regions in terms of government effectiveness globally. Specifically, about 85% of the 48 sub-Saharan African countries assessed scored below average in governance effectiveness (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2022). Furthermore, sub-Saharan Africa (with a low regional average human development index of 0.547) is the least developed region in the world (United Nations Development Program/UNDP, 2022).

The inhumane socioeconomic repercussions of corruption and bad governance inherent in successive male-dominated governments have sparked global interest in women's participation in governance (Enaifoghe & Maramura, 2019; Boateng et al., 2021; Dar & Shairgojri, 2022). Nevertheless, women remain underrepresented at all levels of decision-making in sub-Saharan Africa (International Parliamentary Union/IPU, 2023; United Nations Women/UN Women, 2023). Specifically, women account for 26.5% of all legislators in sub-Saharan Africa (IPU, 2023). Similarly, only 25.4% of representatives in local deliberative bodies in sub-Saharan Africa are women (UN Women, 2023). Despite the global underrepresentation of women in governance, the existing literature is replete with established evidence that women's political leadership improves socioeconomic and political decision-making processes and outcomes (UN Women, 2013; Mechkova et al., 2022; Tusalem, 2022)

Additionally, there is growing evidence that suggests that women are less inclined towards corruption than men (Hernandez & McGee, 2012; Breen et al., 2017; Debski et al., 2018; Alexander & Bagenholm, 2018; Bauhr & Charron, 2020). This evidence corroborates studies which found a negative relationship between women's political representation and corruption (Bauhr et al., 2019; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2018; Stensöta & Wängnerud, 2018). Some of the explanations for the negative relationship between women's representation in government and corruption include women's risk aversion, high societal expectations, and pro-social tendencies, (Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2018; Barnes & Beaulieu, 2018; Eagly & Crowley,

1986). However, the negative relationship between women's representation and corruption has been found to be more pronounced in more advanced economies, and democracies with strong institutions capable of detecting and punishing corruption (Alatas et al., 2009; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2018).

Given the embryonic state of most economies and democracies in sub-Saharan Africa, we hypothesize that increased women's participation in governance has no effect on the constraints to development (corruption and poor governance) in sub-Saharan Africa. First, most women who get elected or appointed to public offices in sub-Saharan Africa are usually associated with the few elites who perpetuate and benefit mostly from corruption and bad governance. Consequently, such women end up as window-dressers or supporters of draconian and corrupt governments whose policies neither benefit women nor the general public. Second, weak institutions and disincentives to corruption encourage political office holders (regardless of gender) in sub-Saharan Africa to engage in corrupt practices with impunity. Third, most political office holders (regardless of gender) in sub-Saharan Africa enter politics for self-interest rather than public interest. Fourth, increased appointment or even election of women to strategic public offices may be a mere charade intended to obscure corruption and bad governance.

From the foregoing, it is evident that a considerable number of studies in the literature agree that corruption lowers governance quality and that both corruption and poor governance are major obstacles to development. However, there is still no consensus on the impact of women's participation in governance on corruption (Watson & Moreland 2014; Ayodeji et al., 2020; Goel & Nelson, 2023). Furthermore, there is still no consensus on whether women's participation in governance is a cause or an effect of corruption (Sundstrom & Wängenerud, 2016; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019; Armstrong et al., 2022). Combining these observations, this study aims to investigate the relationship between women's participation in governance, corruption, and governance quality (obstacles to development) in sub-Saharan Africa from 1996 to 2021 using the pooled mean group (PMG) version of the panel autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) estimation technique and the panel Granger causality test.

Literature Review

Feminist institutionalism advocates for increased representation of women in government and other institutions where women have historically been underrepresented. Specifically, feminist institutionalism focuses on institutional gender dynamics and how these dynamics, which typically favor men, ignore women's political and socioeconomic interests (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2016). As a result, feminist institutionalism sees increased women's representation in government and other political institutions as a crucial step towards initiating positive transformative change within such institutions (Childs, 2013). In the context of the current study, feminist institutionalism predicts a positive effect of women's representation in government on corruption and governance. Consequently, we hypothesize that women's participation in governance has no effect on constraints to development (corruption and poor governance) in sub-Saharan Africa. This hypothesis has been tested by many empirical studies on the relationship between women's participation in governance, corruption, and governance quality.

Mechkova et al. (2022) carried out a quantitative analysis of the relationship between women's political representation, good governance, and development by estimating time series cross-sectional data for 182 countries from 1900 to 2014. The results of the study

revealed that women's political representation improves development outcomes at low levels of corruption, but worsens development outcomes at high levels of corruption. The study concluded that having women in power have a transformative effect when governance quality is high and corruption is low, as well as a detrimental effect when governance is poor and corruption is prevalent. The study attributed the exacerbating effect of women in power to women's vulnerable positions in a clientelist environment, strong patriarchal gender norms, women's lower likelihood of going against party policy, and use of women to legitimize the rule of corrupt elites, which does not improve the welfare of women and society at large. Conversely, the result of the panel study by Tusalem (2022) revealed a positive relationship between women's representation in legislatures and the provision of tangible public services that are essential to women constituents.

Goel & Nelson (2023) compared the relative influence of women in the legislative and executive branches on cross-country corruption in a large sample of nations from 2018 to 2020 using quantile regression analysis. The results of the study revealed that women's participation in the legislative branch of government (women in parliaments) has a negative effect on corruption, while women's participation in the executive branch of government (female heads of state and female cabinet ministers) has a statistically insignificant effect on corruption. The study also found that countries with quotas for women's political participation tended to be more corrupt. The study concluded that women's participation across the board in government does not necessarily reduce corruption and that the use of quotas to increase women's participation in governance is counterproductive to reducing corruption.

Similarly, Watson & Moreland (2014) using a time series analysis of 140 countries found gender quotas to be correlated with higher perceptions of corruption among political elites. The results of the study also revealed women's substantive and descriptive representation to be correlated with low perception of corruption. Conversely, some other studies have investigated the effect of corruption on women's participation in governance. Armstrong et al. (2022) examined whether and where corruption necessitates women's appointment as finance ministers (a high-profile post that could curb corruption) by analyzing the data for 150 countries over 16 years using logistic regression. The results of the study suggest that increases in corruption increase women's participation in governance, particularly in countries with free and fair elections and presidential systems of government. This finding further suggests that women are perceived to be less corrupt than men and that women's inclusion in high-profile posts such as finance minister is often perceived as a signal of the government's sincere intention to curb corruption.

Contrary to this finding, Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer (2019) studied the causal relationship between women's representation in government and corruption in 76 democratic countries from 1990 to 2010 using two-stage least squares and two-stage generalized method of moments. The results of the study revealed strong statistically significant evidence that corruption reduces women's participation in government and that women's participation in goverment reduces corruption. Similarly, Sundstrom and Wängenerud (2016) analyzed corruption as an obstacle to women's political representation in 18 European countries by analyzing a dataset of locally elected councilors in 167 regions. The results of the study revealed a negative effect of corruption on the proportion of women elected. The study suggested that corruption indicates the existence of undue advantages which create a direct obstacle for women in the presence of male-dominated networks that determine political party candidates in an election.

Data And Research Methods

Data Description and Source

This study analyzed annual panel data on four sub-Saharan African countries, namely Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Cameroon, from 1996 to 2021. These countries were selected because of their economic importance and leadership in their respective regional communities. Specifically, the aforementioned countries are notable members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), respectively. The study period was principally determined by the availability of data for the proxies for development constraints and institutional quality. The data analyzed were taken from the World Governance Indicators, World Development Indicators, and Teorell et al. (2023).

The development constraint variable was represented by corruption (COR) and governance quality (GOV). The choice of these two challenges is based on the assumption that almost all obstacles to development in sub-Saharan Africa stem from corruption and poor governance quality. Specifically, development requires deliberate quality governance run by selfless politicians who use public office and power solely for the public welfare. GOV is proxied by government effectiveness, which measures the quality of public services and the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of its commitment to such policies. COR is proxied by control of corruption, which measures the extent to which public power is used for private gain, petty and grand forms of corruption, and capture of the state by elites and private interests.

Women's participation in governance (WOM) is proxied by the number of women in government positions. The interaction of WOM and COR (WOM*COR) is proxied by the product of the proxies for WOM and COR. Economic development (DEV) and institutional quality (INS) respectively proxied by GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$) and rule of law are used as control variables. Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society (especially the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, police, and courts) and the likelihood of crime and violence. The possible value of the proxy for GOV, COR, and RUL ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, while the possible value of the proxy for DEV ranges from 0 to ∞. The possible value of the proxy for WOM ranges from 0 to the total number of available government positions.

Model Specification

The empirical model for this study is based on the theoretical prediction of feminist institutionalism that increased women's representation in institutions leads to beneficial institutional transformation. Given this theoretical proposition, the implicit model for the study is specified as follows.

$$GOV = f(WOM, COR, WOM * COR, DEV, INS) \quad (1)$$

The implicit model in Eq. (1) is explicitly specified in unrestricted ARDL (1,3,3,3,3,3) form as follows.

$$\Delta GOV_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_{b=1}^{1} \beta_{1b} \Delta GOV_{i,t-b} + \sum_{c=0}^{3} \beta_{2c} \Delta WOM_{i,t-c} + \sum_{d=0}^{3} \beta_{3d} \Delta COR_{i,t-d} + \sum_{e=0}^{3} \beta_{4e} \Delta WOM * COR_{i,t-e} + \sum_{f=0}^{3} \beta_{5f} \Delta DEV_{i,t-f} + \sum_{g=0}^{3} \beta_{6g} \Delta INS_{i,t-g} + \pi_1 GOV_{t-1} + + \pi_2 WOM_{t-1} + \pi_3 COR_{t-1} + \pi_4 (WOM * COR)_{t-1} + \pi_5 DEV_{t-1} + \pi_6 INS_{t-1} + \mu_{it} \quad (2)$$

Where β_0 is the design vector such as intercept, time trend and dummy variable; $\beta_{1b}, \beta_{2c}, \beta_{3d}, \beta_{4e}, \beta_{5f}, \beta_{6g}$ are the short-run coefficients of the explanatory variables; $\pi_1, \pi_2, \pi_3, \pi_4, \pi_5, \pi_6$ are long-run coefficients of the explanatory variables and μ_{it} is the error term. Replacing the long-run effects in equation (2) with the one period lag of error correction term ECT_{t-1} and making θ the coefficient of ECT_{t-1} then the restricted version of the ARDL model (i.e., the error correction model) is specified as follows.

$$\Delta GOV_{it} = \beta_0 + \sum_{b=1}^{1} \beta_{1b} \Delta GOV_{i,t-b} + \sum_{c=0}^{3} \beta_{2c} \Delta WOM_{i,t-c} + \sum_{d=0}^{3} \beta_{3d} \Delta COR_{i,t-d} + \sum_{e=0}^{3} \beta_{4e} \Delta WOM * COR_{i,t-e} + \sum_{f=0}^{3} \beta_{5f} \Delta DEV_{i,t-f} + \sum_{g=0}^{3} \beta_{6g} \Delta INS_{i,t-g} + \theta ECT_{t-1} + \mu_{it} \quad (3)$$

A priori Expectation

The coefficients of both the explanatory and control variables are expected to be positive since all the independent variables are expected to have a positive effect on governance quality.

$$\beta_{1b}; \beta_{2c}, \pi_2; \beta_{3d}, \pi_3; \beta_{4e}, \pi_4; \beta_{5f}, \pi_5; \beta_{6g}, \pi_6 > 0 \quad (4)$$

The coefficient of the error correction term (θ) is expected to fall between 0 and -1 and to be statistically significant.

$$-1 < \theta < 0 \quad (5)$$

Estimation Technique

This study adopted the panel autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) estimation technique after establishing the mixed order of integration [I(0)] and I(1)] of the study variables using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS) unit root test, and the Phillips Perron-Fisher (PP-Fisher) unit root test**.** The selection of these first-generation panel unit root tests is based on the assumption that the disturbances in the estimated panel ARDL model are cross-sectionally independent given the fact that the four sub-Saharan African countries under study belong to different regional communities (ECOWAS, ECA, SADC, and ECCAS) and are less likely to be bound by unanimous political and socioeconomic policies and attitudes. This assumption was verified after estimating the specified panel ARDL model using the Pesaran cross-sectional dependency test for panel equations. Specifically, the Pesaran cross-sectional dependency test was chosen among other tests due to its suitability for panels with relatively small cross sections (N) or time series (T).

Recognizing both the political and socioeconomic peculiarities and similarities of the sub-Saharan African countries under study, we adopted the pooled mean group (PMG) version of panel ARDL to obtain the long- and short-run estimates of this study. The PMG assumes long-run homogeneity by restricting long-run coefficients to be identical for the cross sections; and short-run heterogeneity by allowing short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across cross sections. The statistical significance of the long-run homogeneity restriction of the PMG was verified after estimating the specified panel ARDL model using the Wald test of coefficient

restriction. Prior to estimating the Panel ARDL model, the Kao residual cointegration test was used to determine the long-run relationship among the study variables.

Since the estimates of the panel ARDL model cannot identify the direction of causality between women's participation in governance, corruption, and governance quality, the Granger causality test was used. The choice of this causality test is based on the assumption of the homogeneity of the coefficients across cross sections. The Jarque-Bera test was used to check the normality of the residuals. Descriptive statistics was used to reveal the descriptive properties of the study variables, while the pairwise correlation coefficients of the study variables were used to check whether WOM and COR move in the same direction with GOV and to ensure that no pair of independent variables is perfectly correlated. The optimal lag for the panel ARDL model was selected automatically using the Akaike Information Criterion.

Findings and Discussion

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the variables. The significant differences between the median and mean values of the variables indicate the presence of outliers in the series. Given that the possible values of GOV, COR, and INS range from -2.5 (minimum) to +2.5 (maximum), the median values of GOV, COR, and INS indicate that sub-Saharan African countries performed far below average in terms of governance quality, corruption reduction, and institutional quality during the study period. This implies that sub-Saharan African countries are plagued by corruption, poor governance, and weak institutions. Similarly, the maximum and minimum values of GOV, COR, INS show that sub-Saharan African countries still have a long way to go in achieving maximum governance quality, reduction and control of corruption, and institutional quality. Overall, these findings show that development constraints are prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa.

The standard deviation values of GOV, COR, and INS show that the values of governance quality, corruption, and institutional quality in the sub-Saharan African countries are within 1 standard deviation from their respective means. This indicates little variation in governance quality, corruption, and institutional quality in the sub-Saharan Africa. The median, maximum, and minimum values of WOM show that governance in sub-Saharan African countries is largely male-dominated and that these countries still have a long way to go to achieve gender equality in governance. The standard deviation value of WOM shows a wide variation in the number of women participating in governance in the West African countries. Similarly, the median, maximum, and minimum values of DEV show that sub-Saharan African countries are still lagging behind in economic development. The standard deviation value of DEV shows a wide variation in level of economic development in sub-Saharan African countries.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

	GOV	WOM	COR	DEV	INS
Mean	-0.5271	6.7212	-0.7819	2587.2260	-0.7410
Median	-0.7697	6.0000	-1.0389	1517.1490	-0.9604
Maximum	1.0205	17.0000	0.7329	6263.1040	0.1813
Minimum	-1.2048	0.0000	-1.5021	1064.6460	-1.5125
Std. Dev.	0.5507	4.2937	0.5737	1825.7170	0.5033
Observations	104	104	104	104	104

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10

Correlation Analysis

Table 2 presents the correlation matrix showing the statistically significant pair-wise correlation coefficients of the variables used in this study. The pair-wise correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables show that no pair of explanatory variables is perfectly correlated. The correlation matrix also shows that the pair-wise correlation coefficients of all independent variables with the dependent variable are positive. This implies that corruption and governance quality are negatively correlated, while women's participation in governance and governance quality are positively correlated. The correlation matrix also shows that women's participation in governance and corruption are negatively correlated. The combination of these relationships shows that corruption does not move in the same direction as women's participation in governance and quality of governance.

Table 2: Correlation Matrix

	GOV	WOM	COR	DEV	INS
GOV	1.0000				
	[.....]				
WOM	0.5670	1.0000			
	[0.0000]	[.....]			
COR	0.9481	0.6387	1.0000		
	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[.....]		
DEV	0.8002	0.8331	0.8832	1.0000	
	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[.....]	
INS	0.9325	0.6577	0.9345	0.8587	1.0000
	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[0.0000]	[.....]

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10, p-values in [ ], H_0 = no linear relationship

Unit Root Tests

Table 3 presents the results of the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), and Phillips Perron-Fisher (PP- Fisher) unit root tests. The probability values of the IPS unit root test show that the null hypothesis (unit root) is rejected at first difference I(1) for all variables. The results of the PP-Fisher unit root test show that the null hypothesis (unit root) is rejected at level I(0) for GOV, COR, WOM, and INS, while the null hypothesis (unit root) is rejected at level I(1) for InDEV. This implies that all the variables are either integrated of order zero I(0) or order one I(1).

Table 3: Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS), and Phillips Perron-Fisher (PP-Fisher) Unit Root Tests

	IPS			PP-FISHER		
	H_0: Unit Root			H_0: Unit Root		
Variable	I(n)	Statistic	p-Value	I(n)	Statistic	p-Value
GOV	I(1)	-6.6597	0.0000***	I(0)	37.5783	0.0000***
WOM	I(1)	-6.0953	0.0000***	I(0)	24.7101	0.0017***
COR	I(1)	-4.5994	0.0000***	I(0)	29.2511	0.0003***
InDEV	I(1)	-1.7771	0.0378**	I(1)	32.4628	0.0001***
RUL	I(1)	-4.0533	0.0000***	I(0)	20.9956	0.0072***

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10; ** → p significant at 5%, *** → p significant at 1%

Cointegration Test

Table 4 presents the results of the Kao residual cointegration test. The probability value of the ADF t-statistic reveals that the null hypothesis (no cointegration) is rejected at 5% significance level. This implies that there is evidence of a long-run relationship among the study variables.

Table 4: Kao Residual Cointegration Test

H_0: No cointegration		
Test	t-Statistic	Probability
ADF	-1.9594	0.0250**

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10; ** → p significant at 5%, *** → p significant at 1%

ARDL-EC Model Estimates

Table 5 presents the long-run and short-run estimates of the ARDL-EC model. The p-values of the long-run coefficients of all independent variables are statistically significant at 5% level. First, this implies that all independent variables are useful in explaining the long-run governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, this implies the long-run causality between the independent variables and governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa. The long-run coefficient of COR (0.8949) is the main effect of corruption on governance quality. It can also be seen as the effect of corruption on governance quality when women's participation in governance is at the possible minimum level (0). It implies that 1unit reduction in corruption will lead to approximately 0.8949 unit increase in quality of governance in the long run. This result is consistent with the a priori expectation and Anazodo et al. (2015), Mohmoh (2015), Arif & Rawat (2018), and Salihu (2022).

The long-run coefficient of WOM (-0.0503) is the main effect of women's participation in governance on governance quality. It can also be seen as the effect of women's participation in governance on governance quality when corruption is at the possible maximum level (-2.5). It implies that 1 unit increase in women's participation in governance will lead to approximately 0.0503 unit decrease in quality of governance government in the long run. This result is inconsistent with the a priori expectation and Tusalem (2022). However, this result partially agrees with Mechkova et al. (2022) who discovered that the relationship between women's participation in governance and government effectiveness depends on the severity of corruption. The contradiction of this finding with the a priori expectation may be due to the use of women's participation in governance as a strategy for window dressing ineffective and corrupt government, strong patriarchal gender norms, allegiance of the few women who are fortunate to be appointed or elected to public offices to the status quo, and existing structures which benefit from bad governance.

The long-run coefficient of WOM*COR (-0.0401) is the interaction effect of women's participation in governance and corruption on quality of governance. It implies that 1 unit increase in women's participation in governance will lead to approximately 0.0401 unit decrease in the total effect of corruption on quality of governance in the long run. This implies that women's participation in governance interacts with corruption to worsen governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa. This contradicts the a priori expectation. The long-run coefficient of InDEV (0.1017) is the effect of economic development on government effectiveness. It implies that a 1% increase in economic development will lead to approximately 0.0010 unit increase in quality of governance in the long run. This result is consistent with the a priori

expectation and Abdelbary (2018) who concluded that economic development increases human capital development, political awareness, participation in government elections, and demand for rights and freedoms.

The long-run coefficient of INS (0.5475) is the effect of institutional quality on governance quality. It implies that 1 unit increase in institutional quality will lead to approximately 0.5475 unit increase in governance quality in the long run. This result is consistent with the a priori expectation and Arora & Chong (2018) who concluded that higher institutional quality increases positive perception of public service quality. The standardized coefficients of the explanatory variables show that the control for corruption and institutional quality respectively have the highest standardized coefficients. This indicates that corruption and institutional quality are the two most important determinants of the quality of governance.

The p-values of the short-run coefficients show that only the coefficient of ECT(-1) and the coefficient of DEV(-1) are statistically significant at 5% level. The coefficient of economic development lagged by one period (1.4504) implies that 1% increase in economic development in any current year will result in approximately 0.0145 unit increase in quality of governance in the following year. The coefficient of ECT(-1) is negative, statistically significant, and between 0 and 1 as expected. The coefficient of ECT(-1) (-0.3372) implies that approximately 33.72% of the short-run deviation from the long-run equilibrium is corrected annually. This implies that it takes about 2.97 years (0.3372^{-1}) to correct the current year's deviation from the long-run equilibrium. The significance of the error correction term confirms the existence of a causal relationship among the study variables in the long run. The statistical significance of the short-run coefficient of DEV(-1), the long-run coefficients of DEV, and ECT(-) implies strong causality between economic development and quality of governance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 5: ARDL-ECM Estimates

Dependent Variable: GOV					
Long-Run Estimates					
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standardized Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**T-statistic**	**Probability**
COR	0.8949	0.9322	0.1950	4.5892	0.0001***
WOM	-0.0503	-0.3923	0.0165	-3.0510	0.0043***
WOM*COR	-0.0401	-0.2953	0.0152	-2.6436	0.0122**
lnDEV	0.1017	0.1130	0.0277	3.6725	0.0008***
INS	0.5475	0.5004	0.0962	5.6935	0.0000***
Short-Run Estimates					
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**T-statistic**	**Probability**	
ECT(-1)	-0.3372	0.1481	-2.2765	0.0290**	
D[WOM]	0.1123	0.0973	1.1547	0.2560	
D[WOM(-1)]	0.0065	0.0247	0.2624	0.7945	
D[WOM(-2)]	-0.0716	0.0835	-0.8571	0.3972	
D[COR]	-0.3316	0.6277	-0.5282	0.6007	
D[COR(-1)]	-0.0039	0.2840	-0.0136	0.9892	
D[COR(-2)]	-0.0315	0.5227	-0.0602	0.9523	
D[WOM*GOV]	0.0910	0.0905	1.0051	0.3217	
D[WOM(-1)*COR(-1)]	-0.0119	0.0232	-0.5131	0.6111	

Short-Run Estimates				
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**T-statistic**	**Probability**
D[WOM(-2)*COR(-2)]	-0.0568	0.0786	-0.7226	0.4747
DLOG[DEV]	0.0238	0.8308	0.0286	0.9773
DLOG[DEV(-1)]	1.4504	0.6095	2.3795	0.0229**
DLOG[DEV(-2)]	0.2712	0.4774	0.5682	0.5735
D(INS)	-0.1960	0.1226	-1.5991	0.1188
D[(INS-1)]	-0.1403	0.0874	-1.6063	0.1172
D[INS-2)]	-0.0225	0.1573	-0.1430	0.8871

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10; ** → p significant at 5%, *** → p significant at 1%

Analysis of the Interaction Effect of Women's Participation in Governance and Corruption on Quality of Governance

Figure 1 presents the interaction plot which shows how the direction of the effect of corruption on governance quality depends on the level of women's participation in governance. Combining high levels of women's participation in governance (36) with decreasing levels (-2.5, -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5) of corruption in the long-run equation while holding control variables constant, corruption reduction decreases governance quality. Conversely, corruption reduction increases government quality when low levels of women's participation in governance (10) are combined with decreasing levels of corruption (-2.5, -1.5, -0.5, 0.5, 1.5, 2.5) in the long-run equation while holding control variables constant.

This finding suggests that the level of women's participation in governance determines the direction of the effect of anticorruption efforts on governance quality. Specifically, anticorruption efforts which rely on participation of more women in governance reduce governance quality. Conversely, anticorruption efforts which rely on participation of fewer women in governance increase governance quality. This finding is consistent with studies which concluded that women's participation in governance enhances anticorruption effort (Alexander & Bagenholm, 2018; Jha & Sarangi, 2018; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019; Goel & Nelson, 2023) and studies which suggested that the ability of such anticorruption efforts to achieve corruption reduction sufficient to improve governance quality depends on whether these women are accessible or dignified in character (Hewitt, 2018), connected to the existing corrupt male-dominated structure or not (Mechkova et. al. 2022), appointed or elected to public office directly related to corruption deterrence or not (Alexander & Bagenholm, 2018), and wholly committed to the pursuit of pro-women issues or not (Bauhr et. al., 2019).



Figure 1: Interaction Plot

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using Excel; Quality of Governance on Y-axis, Corruption on X-axis

Analysis of the Total Effect of Corruption on Quality of Governance

Table 6 shows how a unit increase in women's participation below and above a certain threshold of women's participation in governance calculated as 22.3167 influence the magnitude of the effect of corruption reduction on governance quality. Specifically, a unit increase in women's participation in governance (from 20.3167 to 21.3167) which occurs below the women's participation in governance threshold (22.3167) reduces the positive effect of corruption reduction on governance quality (from 0.0802 to 0.0401). Conversely, a unit increase in women's participation in governance (from 23.3167 to 24.3167) which occurs above the women's participation in governance threshold (22.3167) increases the negative effect of corruption reduction on governance quality (from -0.0401 to -0.0802).

These findings suggest that corruption reduction has a desirable effect on quality of governance at zero woman's participation in governance. However, successive increases in women's participation in governance initially reduce the desirable effect of corruption reduction on quality of governance until a threshold is reached. After that, corruption reduction has an undesirable effect on quality of governance, and further increases in women's participation in governance thereafter intensifies the negative effect of corruption reduction on quality of governance. This finding is inconsistent with the a priori expectation but is consistent with Stensöta & Wängnerud, (2018) and Rothstein (2016) who found that the negative effect of exclusionary gender equality strategies such as increasing the number of women in government is an ineffective strategy for corruption reduction and governance quality improvements.

Table 6: Analysis of the Total Effect of Corruption on Quality of Governance

Level of WOM	WOM values	Total effect of corruption on quality of governance: δGOV/δCOR=0.8949– 0.0401*WOM	Remarks
Below Threshold	↓ 20.3167	0.8949 – 0.0401*20.3167 = 0.0802	Positive
	↓ 21.3167	0.8949 – 0.0401*21.3167 = 0.0401	Positive, reduced by 0.0401
Threshold	**22.3167**	**0.8949– 0.0401*22.3167 = 0.0000**	**Zero**
Above Threshold	↓ 23.3167	0.8949 – 0.0401*23.3167 = -0.0401	Negative
	↓ 24.3167	0.8949 – 0.0401*24.3167 = -0.0802	Negative, increased by 0.0401

Note: Authors' computation (2023); Women's participation in governance (WOM) threshold is the level of women's participation in governance (WOM) which equates the partial derivative of quality of governance with respect to control of corruption (total effect to control of corruption) to zero.

Post Estimation Diagnostics

Table 7 presents the results of the cross-sectional dependence test for the panel equation and the residual normality test. The probability values of the test statistic of the Pesaran cross-sectional dependency tests indicate that the null hypothesis (cross-sectional independence) cannot be rejected at 5% level of significance. This shows that the efficiency of the estimates obtained from the panel ARDL model used in this study is not diminished by cross-sectional dependence. Similarly, the probability values of the Jarque-Bera test statistic indicate that the null hypothesis (normal distribution) cannot be rejected at 5% level of significance. This implies that the estimated ARDL model captures the main patterns and sources of variation in the data and that the errors are random and independent. Both the probability of the F statistic and the Chi-squared statistic of the Wald test of coefficient restriction indicate that the null hypothesis (long-run coefficients are equal to zero) is rejected

at 1% level of significance. This implies that the long-run homogeneity restriction of the PMG is applicable to the sub-Saharan African countries under study.

Table 7: Post Estimation Diagnostics

Cross-Sectional Dependence Test for Panel Equation		
H_0: Cross-Sectional Independence		
Test	Statistic	Probability
Pearson CD	-1.3548	0.1755
Residual Normality Test		
H_0: Normal Distribution		
Test	Statistic	Probability
Jarque-Bera	5.9815	0.0503
Wald Test of Coefficient Restriction		
H_0: Long run coefficients are equals zero		
Test	Statistic	Probability
F	961.2630	0.0000***
Chi-Square	4806.315	0.0000***

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10; ** → p significant at 5%, *** → p significant at 1%

Causality Test

Table 8 presents the results of the pair-wise Granger causality test. The probability values of the F-statistic reveal a statistically significant, unidirectional causality from corruption to women's participation in governance, bidirectional causality between corruption and quality of governance, and unidirectional causality from quality of governance to women's participation in governance. The unidirectional causality from quality of governance to women's participation in governance indicates that quality of governance provides statistically significant information about the future values of women's participation in governance in sub-Saharan Africa. This finding agrees with studies which conclude that the quality of governance determines women's participation in governance (Nyadera, 2020; Rios et al., 2022) and disagrees with studies which conclude that women's participation in governance is a determinant of quality of governance (Minoletti, 2014; Abakah, 2018). The bidirectional causality between corruption and quality of governance implies that the two constraints to development are mutually reinforcing. This finding is consistent with studies which conclude that corruption is a determinant of quality of governance and that quality of governance is a determinant of corruption (Prihanto & Gunawan, 2020; Lee et al., 2020).

The unidirectional causality from corruption to women's participation in governance indicates that corruption provides statistically significant information about the future values of women's participation in governance in sub-Saharan Africa. This finding is consistent with the study which concluded that history and prevalence of corruption determines women's appointment to top public offices such as finance minister (Armstrong et al., 2022). Furthermore, this finding implies that that control of corruption is a cause and not an effect of women's participation in governance in sub-Saharan Africa. This is consistent with the existing studies which have examined corruption as a determinant of women's participation in governance (Sundström & Wängenerud, 2016; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2019; Armstrong et al., 2022) but is inconsistent with studies which have examined women's participation in governance as a determinant of control of corruption (Watson & Moreland, 2014; Mechkova et al., 2022; Tusalem, 2022; Goel & Nelson, 2023).

Table 8: Pairwise Granger Causality Test

Lags: 2		
Null Hypothesis	**F-Statistic**	**Probability**
COR does not granger cause WOM	5.3962	0.0019***
WOM does not granger cause COR	0.7908	0.5023
COR does not granger cause GOV	3.8062	0.0130**
GOV does not granger cause COR	3.6470	0.0158**
WOM does not granger cause GOV	0.0191	0.9964
GOV does not granger cause WOM	5.9184	0.0010***

Note: Authors' computation (2023) using EViews 10; ** → p significant at 5%, *** → p significant at 1%

Conclusion

Contrary to popular opinion and feminist institutionalism, we hypothesize that women's participation in governance has no effect on constraints (corruption and poor governance) to development in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, we analyzed annual panel data of four sub-Saharan African countries from 1996 to 2021 using a panel autoregressive distributed lag model. The estimated main effect of corruption on quality of governance supports the conclusion that that development constraints (corruption and poor governance) can be minimized without women's participation in governance and that anticorruption efforts can achieve their ultimate goal of good governance without women's participation in governance. Consequently, women's participation in governance is not a requirement for the reduction of the two major constraints to development. The interaction effect analysis supports the conclusion that anticorruption efforts focusing on women's participation in governance yields corruption reductions insufficient for the improvement of the quality of governance. As a result, using women's participation in governance as an anticorruption strategy is counterproductive since it neither significantly reduces corruption nor achieves quality governance, which is the ultimate goal of corruption reduction. By extension, women's participation in governance is not an effective strategy for minimizing constraints to development in sub-Saharan Africa.

The analysis of the overall effect of corruption on quality of governance supports the conclusion that corruption on its own has a detrimental effect on good governance and that this detrimental effect is exacerbated by the quantitative increase in women's participation in governance. This conclusion supports the notion that women's participation in governance maximizes hindrances to development. The estimated main effect of women's participation in governance supports the conclusion that women's participation in governance is detrimental to quality of governance when corruption is prevalent. Consequently, women's participation in governance will not improve quality of governance in a highly corrupt environment. This conclusion supports the idea that most of the few women elected or appointed to public offices are unable to engage in or support thorough anticorruption campaigns since they are usually connected to the existing male-dominated structure which benefits from corruption and poor governance, have amenable character, are rarely elected or appointed to public offices directly related to corruption deterrence, are elected or appointed to public offices concerned with women affairs, and wholly focus on reducing corruption which affects the public service delivery to the women folk.

The results of the Granger causality test support the conclusion that corruption is a cause rather than an effect of women's participation in governance. History of corruption provides useful information about women's opportunity to participate in governance.

Corruption and poor governance are mutually reinforcing. Quality of governance determines women's participation in governance. This study also supports the argument that economic development creates positive political and socioeconomic conditions which improves quality of governance and that the quality of institutions which check the excesses of those in government determines the quality of governance.

Not surprisingly, this study supports the conclusion that corruption and institutional quality are the two most effective determinants of quality of governance. Based on these conclusions, to minimize hindrances to development (corruption and poor governance), sub-Saharan African countries should deemphasize quantitative increases in women's participation in governance and focus on building strong institutions capable of creating a meritocratic political and socioeconomic environment in which selfless women and men have equal opportunities to participate in governance. This study is limited by the unavailability of data on women in government positions disaggregated into the number of women in the executive, legislative and judiciary boards of government. Future research can disaggregate women's participation in government in order to see the effect of women's participation in each arm of government on hindrances to development (corruption and poor governance).

Declaration

Conflict of Interest

This study was not influenced by any form of financial, professional, or personal interests.

Availability of Data and Materials

The secondary data analyzed in this study are accessible from the World Development Indicators, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Teorell et. al. (2023).

Authors' Contribution

Authors 1 and 2 conceptualized the study; Author 1 developed the methodology; Authors 3, 4, and 5 reviewed and edited the manuscript; Authors 1 and 2 wrote the original draft of the manuscript.

Funding Source

This study was not funded by any institution.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Ms. Motunrayo Isayomi for her technical support. We also appreciate reviewers and editors for their invaluable comments and suggestions.

References

Abakah, E. (2018). Participation without a voice? Rural Women's Experiences and Participation in local governance activities in the Abura–Asebu–Kwamankese district of Ghana. *Cogent Social Sciences*, *4*(1), 1549768.

Aborisade, R. A., &Aliyuu, N. B. (2018). Corruption and Africa. In O. Akanle & J. O. Adésìnà (Eds.), *The Development of Africa: Issues, Diagnoses and Prognoses (pp. 227–254).* Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Abdelbary, I. (2018). Governance matters and economic growth: beyond the Egyptian revolution. *Theoretical Economics Letters*, *8*(4), 741-754.

Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Gender, culture, and corruption: Insights from an experimental analysis. *Southern Economic Journal, 75*(3), 663-680. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2009.tb00925.x

Alexander, A. C., &Bågenholm, A. (2018). Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-corruption Efforts. In H. Stensöta & L. Wängnerud (Eds.), *Gender and Corruption: Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research* (pp. 171–189). Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Anazodo, R. O., Igbokwe-Ibeto, C. J., & Nkah, B. C. (2015). Leadership, corruption and governance in Nigeria: Issues and categorical imperatives. *African Research Review*, *9*(2), 41-58.

Arif, I., & Rawat, A. S. (2018). Corruption, governance, and tax revenue: evidence from EAGLE countries. *Journal of transnational Management*, *23*(2-3), 119-133.

Armstrong, B., Barnes, T. D., O'Brien, D. Z., & Taylor-Robinson, M. M. (2022). Corruption, accountability, and women's access to power. *The Journal of Politics*, *84*(2), 1207-1213.

Arora, P., & Chong, A. (2018). Government effectiveness in the provision of public goods: the role of institutional quality. *Journal of Applied Economics*, *21*(1), 175-196.

Ayodeji, G. I., Kolade, F. A., & Abiodun, T. E. (2020). Gender and corruption: Explaining women involvement in governance corruption in Nigeria. *Dynamics of Public Administration*, *37*(2), 95-106.

Barnes, T. D., Beaulieu, E., & Saxton, G. W. (2018). Restoring trust in the police: Why female officers reduce suspicions of corruption. *Governance, 31*(1), 143-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12281

Bauhr, M., Charron, N., & Wängnerud, L. (2019). Exclusion or interests? Why females in elected office reduce petty and grand corruption. *European Journal of Political Research*, *58*(4), 1043-1065.

Bauhr, M., & Charron, N. (2020). Do men and women perceive corruption differently? Gender differences in perception of need and greed corruption. *Politics and Governance*, *8*(2), 92-102.

Bjarnegård, E., & Kenny, M. (2016). Comparing candidate selection: A feminist institutionalist approach. *Government and Opposition*, *51*(3), 370-392.

Boateng, J. S., Banham, V., Kosi, I., & Ayentimi, D. T. (2021). Socialisation and women's participation in governance: exploring important themes from Ghana. *International Journal of Gender Studies in Developing Societies*, *4*(1), 75-94.

Breen, M., Gillanders, R., McNulty, G., & Suzuki, A. (2017). Gender and corruption in business. *The journal of development studies*, *53*(9), 1486-1501.

Brody, R. G., Gupta, G., Ekofo, A. N., & Ogunade, K. M. (2020). The need for anti corruption policies in developing countries. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *28*(1), 131-141.

Childs, S. (2013). Negotiating gendered institutions: Women's parliamentary friendships. *Politics & Gender*, *9*(2), 127-151.

Dar, S. A., & Shairgojri, A. A. (2022). Role of Women in Good Governance. *Journal of social science*, *3*(4), 648-655.

Debski, J., Jetter, M., Mösle, S., & Stadelmann, D. (2018). Gender and corruption: The neglected role of culture. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *55*, 526-537.

Di Pietra, R., & Melis, A. (2016). "Governance and corruption: Is history repeating itself?" Fostering a debate and inviting contributions from a multidisciplinary perspective. *Journal of Management & Governance*, *20*, 689-701.

Eagly, A. H., & Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and helping behavior: A meta-analytic review of the social psychological literature. *Psychological Bulletin, 100*(3), 283–308. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.100.3.283

Enaifoghe, A. O., & Maramura, T. C. (2019). The proficiency in gender representation towards realizing good administration in governance for South Africa. *Journal of Gender, Information and Development in Africa*, *8*(2), 223-242.

Esarey, J., & Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2019). Estimating causal relationships between women's representation in government and corruption. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(11), 1713-1741.

Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M. A. (2023). Women's political empowerment: Influence of women in legislative versus executive branches in the fight against corruption. *Journal of Policy Modeling*, *45*(1), 139-159.

Hewitt, S. (2018). *The Struggle for Women's Participation in Kenya*. Australian Institute of International Affairs.

Hernandez, T., & R.W. McGee (2012). The Ethics of Accepting a Bribe: An Empirical Study of Opinion in the USA, Brazil, Germany and China. *International Journal of Business, Accounting, and Finance, 6*(2): 178-196. Reprinted at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2426956.

International Parliamentary union [IPU]. (2023). *Global and Regional averages of women in national parliaments.* https://data.ipu.org/women-averages?month=1&year=2023

Isayomi, A. S., Omodunbi, O. O., & Abalaba, B. P. (2023). Income inequality, clientelism and governance: Implications for socioeconomic development in West Africa. *Annals of Spiru Haret University. Economic Series, 23* (1), 146-166.

Jha, C. K., & Sarangi, S. (2018). Women and corruption: What positions must they hold to make a difference? *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization*, *151*, 219-233.

Kadamu, J. (2020). *The contribution of Women Leaders in the fight against corruption in Nairobi County, Kenya* [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Nairobi.

Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2022). *Worldwide Government Indicators, 2022 update* (www.govindicators.org)

Lee, C. C., Wang, C. W., & Ho, S. J. (2020). Country governance, corruption, and the likelihood of firms' innovation. *Economic Modelling*, *92*, 326-338.

Mechkova, V., Dahlum, S., & Petrarca, C. S. (2024). Women's political representation, good governance and human development. *Governance, 37*(1), 19–38.

Minoletti, P. (2014). *Women's participation in the sub-national governance of Myanmar*. Yangon: MDRI-CESD.

Mlambo, D. N., Mubecua, M. A., Mpanza, S. E., & Mlambo, V. H. (2019). Corruption and its implications for development and good governace: A perspective from post-colonial Africa. *Journal of Economics and Behavioural Studies, 11*(1),39-47

Momoh, Z. (2015, March). Corruption and governance in Africa. *Proceedings of The International Academic Conference for Sub-Sahara African Transformation & Development, 3*(6).

Nyadera, S. A. (2020). *Determinants of women political empowerment in Kenya: A case study of Nairobi County (1992-2017)* [Doctoral dissertation]. University of Nairobi.

Prihanto, H., & Gunawan, I. D. (2020). Corruption in Indonesia (Is It Right to Governance, Leadership and It to Be Caused?). *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*, *11*(2), 56-65.

Rios, V., Beltrán-Esteve, M., Peiró-Palomino, J., Gianmoena, L., & Picazo, A. (2022). Quality of Government and Women's Political Empowerment in European Regions: Sorting Out the Causality. *Available at SSRN 4184547*.

Rothstein, B. (2016). *Corruption, gender equality and feminist strategies*. QOG Working Paper Series, (9).

Salihu, H. A., & Gholami, H. (2018). Corruption in the Nigeria judicial system: An overview. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *25*(3), 669-680.

Salihu, H. A. (2022). Corruption: an impediment to good governance. *Journal of Financial Crime*, *29*(1), 101-110.

Stensöta, H., & Wängnerud, L. (Eds.). (2018). *Gender and corruption: Historical roots and new avenues for research*. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Sundström, A., &Wängnerud, L. (2016). Corruption as an obstacle to women's political representation: Evidence from local councils in 18 European countries. *Party Politics*, *22*(3), 354-369.

Teorell, J., Sundström, A., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Pachon N. A., Dalli, C. M., Valverde, R. L., & Nilsson, P. (2024). *The Quality of Government Standard Dataset*. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute.

Tusalem, R. F. (2022). Gendered governance: Examining the relationship between women legislators and effective public goods provision from a global sample. *Polity*, *54*(2), 298-333.

United Nations Development Programme (2022). *Human Development Report 2021/2022: Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World*. New York: UNDP.

United Nations Women (2013). In brief: *Women's leadership and political participation*

United Nations Women (2023). *Women in local government*. https://localgov.unwomen.org/sdg-5551b-country-ranking accessed 28/09/2023

Watson, D., & Moreland, A. (2014). Perceptions of corruption and the dynamics of women's representation. *Politics & Gender*, *10*(3), 392-412.

World Bank, (1992) *Governance and Development.* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank