South Korean Hurry-Hurry (빨리 빨리) COVID-19 Strategy: Privacy Concern, No-Lockdown, and Discriminations

Annisa Pratamasari
Universitas Airlangga

ABSTRACT

South Korea has been hailed as one of the most successful countries in containing the spread of the novel coronavirus, Covid-19, within a relatively short period. Some argued that East Asian countries’ success could be attributed to Confucianist culture, to which I disagree. In this paper, I shall describe in details how Korean government managed to curb the Covid-19 spread with the combination of epidemiological investigation, advanced technology, and haste (빨리 빨리) culture, leading to a hurry-hurry strategy unique to South Korea. I would also outline some social impacts on LGBT-Q communities and the exclusion of foreign residents in South Korean pandemic efforts.

Keywords: South Korea, Covid-19, hurry-hurry strategy.


South Korea has proven to be one of the most successful countries in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and flatten its curve much earlier than other countries. It has received praise from other countries and its public for its fast responses and actions (Max and Choe 2020). According to a report by Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (hereafter, KCDC), South Korea had its first COVID-19 confirmed case on January 20th, 2019, and it was an imported case from Wuhan (Hyun et al. 2020). Domestic situation was seemingly under control with around 30 cases until early February 2020 so that R.O.K.’s president, Moon Jae-In, claimed that COVID-19 would ‘disappear before long’ and refused to close the country’s border from any visitors from all over China, except those from Hubei Province (Choe 2020).

Contrary to the president’s conviction, the case suddenly escalated when a woman from Shincheonji Church, who was later identified as Patient #31, became the super spreader and triggered Daegu and...
Gyeongbuk Province outbreak from mid-February to March (as shown in Figure 1). Daegu outbreak promptly made South Korea became the number one hotspot for COVID-19 (outside China) with around 2,000 cases, recorded more than 900 cases a day in early March, and its citizens are being banned from entering more than 100 countries (Park et al. 2020; Choe 2020; Kim 2020c). The outbreak also causes domestic uproar among Korean citizens, mainly directed at the Moon government and Shincheonji Church.

Public and the opposition party initially blamed the government’s complacency in dealing with COVID-19. There was an online petition to the Blue House, which demanded Moon Jae-In to ban the entrance Chinese visitors and signed by 760,000 supporters (Choe 2020), but the Korean government insisted to open the border, citing economic and diplomacy reasons. Meanwhile, Shincheonji Church in Daegu has caused the infection of around 60.3% COVID-19 patients by mid-March (KCDC as cited in Chung and Hill 2020). The late mayor of Seoul, Park Won-Son, even attempted to prosecute Shincheonji Church for ‘murder through willful negligence’ in late February (Rashid 2020) and the Prosecutor Office in Suwon finally issued an arrest warrant against three officials of the church in July for alleged obstruction of COVID-19 containment efforts (Yonhap News 2020a).

Moving from the background of South Korean’s COVID-19 containment efforts, this article will descriptively lay out the government strategies and the critics for the lack of inclusivity and social impacts of the pandemic itself. As the pandemic is still ongoing, this article shall limit its scope to the strategies and issues that occurred in South Korea from January to June 2020.

South Korea *Hurry-Hurry* (빨리 빨리) COVID-19 Strategy

Massive Tracing-Testing: the hurry-hurry culture

In the first three months of the pandemic, it was notable that East Asian countries contained the pandemic better than some Western countries. Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore were among those countries cited as having ‘best strategy and response’ toward the pandemic with relatively low cases per capita and low death rate.
Some articles (Ong 2020; Escobar 2020; Breen 2020; Park 2020) produced and debated against the worn-out Confucian argument with its collectivism and obedience nature that successfully made those countries contained the pandemic. I argue that while socio-culture indeed played some determining role in the public or country’s response toward the pandemic, the Confucian argument can be misleading, stereotyped-inducing, and reductionist. Taiwanese, South Korean, and Singaporean governments all had formulated different strategic responses, and their citizens responded in various ways. The nature of one country’s society can be very complicated; thus, it cannot be explained with only ‘Confucianism.’

To some extent, I agree that the societies in those countries display various levels of collectivism or a sense of conformity; however, Korea displayed the lowest level of communitarian feeling among OECD members so that the ‘Confucian’ factor cannot be the primary determinant (Park 2020). In South Korea, I maintain that it is a combination between the complex socio-cultural characteristics among its citizens and the government’s science-and technology-based policies have helped South Korea to flatten its curve earlier and faster than most countries. In that case, the connecting dot between the two factors is the ‘hurry-hurry’ (빨리빨리 – ppalli ppalli) socio-cultural character of South Korea.

South Korea was a war-torn country 70 years ago, but it quickly developed its economy to reach its status as an advanced economy country in 1996. Korea only took 50 years to become an economic powerhouse and known as the ‘Miracle of the Han River,’ and it also becomes the starting point of their haste or hurry-hurry culture (Yoon 2018). This culture refers to South Korean’s fixation on getting everything done swiftly, from ordering food to doing business. Jung (2013) wrote that this tendency to do everything fast also impacts the rapid technological innovation and South Korean’s promptness in business, albeit causing significant stress and intense competition among society members.

In facing pandemic, the South Korean government and citizens have experienced the MERS outbreak in 2015, which was recorded as the largest outbreak outside Middle-East (WHO n.d). When the MERS outbreak happened, the then-conservative government
withheld some vital information about the epidemiological tracing from the public for fear of the economic fallout. Learning from these experiences, the government reformed Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) and introduced a new law on technology-based tracing (Kang et al. 2020). Acknowledging that an outbreak can potentially happen in the country, the Korean government and KCDC even held a pandemic simulation to measure its severity and formulate a suitable response for it as early as December 2019 (Shin 2020). Even though the simulation aimed to solve a hypothetical disease, the KCDC team managed to develop an algorithm for contact tracing and testing, and successfully mobilized their simulation to contain the actual COVID-19 pandemic later on.

Since its first case in January, the central government swiftly activated these public health measures by launching an early warning/prevention system and an active tracing and monitoring for potential cases. The strategy is called a swift and broad Test-Trace-Treat approach (MOFA KR 2020). This approach works through several stages. Firstly, the potential patient would get tested through the rapid test and swab test. Once she/he becomes a confirmed case, the central and local government would conduct a rapid epidemiological investigation (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2020) and start tracing the source of infection and potential contacts of this confirmed patient. This second step is mainly technological-based, because the government would trace the confirmed patient’s credit card details, CCTV analysis, mobile phone location, then disseminate the information to the public through the district’s and city’s website and emergency text (Figure 3). The third step is contact isolation and testing for anyone who happened to have direct or indirect contact with the confirmed patient. The violation of self-isolation or quarantine rules could lead to 10 million won fine and one year of imprisonment (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2020). As the locations of confirmed patients are announced, whoever happened to be around the patients at the same time can request to get tested. Lastly, the confirmed patient would be treated at the hospital for free (Kang et al. 2020).
The government of all levels swiftly began a massive testing program that tests and treats all potential patients based on contact-tracing results. All tracing data are available on district and municipal government websites, aside from a constant update via text messages. This step is part of the government’s effort to be more transparent and accountable to the public, instead of withholding the information. To not overwhelm hospitals and endanger the medical staff, South Korea invented drive-thru testing sites and some special boxes for testing across the country (Rashid 2020). According to Oxford researchers (2020), South Korea recorded one of the highest testing per capita among all nations, including the asymptomatic cases, had a positive rate of less than 1% out of thousands of tests, and logged one of the lowest death rates (around 300 cases in 6 months).

Nevertheless, though the tracing method is successful and effective in mapping out the disease spread, it has also raised concerns about the legitimacy of the surveillance system and the breach of privacy (Harari 2020; BBC 2020). Such a question also emerged among citizens when the Korean government released a detailed result of contact tracing on municipal/district websites. Figure 3 below illustrates the real contract-tracing data from
patient number 13,507 in Korea. It does not show any name, but there is information about the district where the patient lives, the hospital’s name, and detailed location, including the date and time of the patient’s whereabouts. Such details potentially breach the privacy of the patients and their family members.

**Figure 3.**

**Tracing data for the patients in Seoul Metropolitan Area**

![Tracing data for patients in Seoul Metropolitan Area](source: Seoul Metropolitan Government (2020b); screenshot by the author)

This privacy issue also includes the quarantine policy in which the potential patients should install a particular tracking app on their phones and several phone calls from the government officers to make sure they stay within quarantine place. Ministry of Health and Welfare (2020) released a quarantine guideline in which they mentioned that the potential patients should download a mandatory tracing application to log their daily health check and provide some personal information, including phone numbers. Further, they also require some more ‘objective data’ to be collected, including medical records, mobile GPS, CCTV footages, and credit card records (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2020).

The quarantine policy of the South Korean government changed along with the development of the COVID-19 outbreak worldwide. There were lists of countries targeted for mandatory report and quarantine, starting from China (from January 28th), Europe (from March 5th), and finally worldwide arrivals (from March 18th). In addition to the tracking devices, the incoming travelers must stay...
South Korean Hurry-Hurry (빨리 빨리) Covid-19 Strategy: Privacy Concern, No-Lockdown, and Discriminations

in a government-designated facility and pay 100,000 won per day (The Guardian 2020). The surveillance for the quarantines grew stricter when there were runaway cases in some cities, resulting in deportation for foreign nationals and hefty fines for Korean nationals (Woo 2020; Lee and Choi 2020). By May 2020, more than 15 foreign nationals have been deported for no compliance with quarantine measures, and 35 were not allowed to board the plane after refusing compliance (Woo 2020). The Prime Minister then proposed putting an electric bracelet, which is usually put on sexual criminals, on the potential patients so that they remain traceable without mobile phones. Unexpectedly, most Korean citizens seem to favor this policy, based on their fear of more breakouts (Korea Times 2020). This issue raises concern beyond breach of privacy, as it can be considered a human right violation; however, this matter of public opinion needs further study and is not part of this paper’s scope.

Social Distancing without Lockdown

One of the most remarkable COVID-19 strategies of South Korea is the no-lockdown policy. The government let the borders open and did not order shut-down to society’s lives. Instead, they decided to enforce social distancing policy (사회적 거리두기 – sahwajeok georidugi). Though this strategy draws some criticism as they rely too much on people’s cooperation and awareness (Choe 2020), it arguably works to some extent with the help of people’s cooperation and the government’s aggressive testing strategy.

South Korean residents are accustomed to wearing masks due to the country’s high pollution level; hence, eliciting their compliance to follow public health measures is not difficult for the government. However, the South Korean government decides to enforce social distancing without any lockdown, which arguably would not be sustainable in the long-term (Park and Yum 2020). This policy relies heavily on public cooperation and awareness to follow; thus, it is hard to enforce the rules and measure its effectiveness. Park and Yum (2020) asserted that the public already reduced their movement voluntarily before the Daegu outbreak, based on the phone signal tracing and the number of subway passengers. Another flaw of social distancing policy is the lack of clarity and
guidance on when to enforce it, how to enforce it, and its strictness.

After the case of COVID-19 dipped below 20, the government announced daily life distancing measures (생활 속 거리 두기 – saenghwal suk georidugi) in May. South Korean government only formulated the uniform guidelines of social distancing on June 28\textsuperscript{th} (Park and Yum 2020) by considering the regional characteristics and capacities in dealing with the pandemic. Based on KBRI Seoul’s Official Facebook (2020), the Korean government derived on the number of daily-infected persons: less than 50 infected people means level 1, between 50-100 people means level 2, and more than 100 or multiple by two in a week means level 3.

Each level of social distancing also signifies the level of public gathering allowed by the government (Figure 4). Level 1 has the least strict requirement in which schools and nurseries can be opened, sports events may have limited supporters, and public facilities are opened. The restrictions become stricter as the number of social gatherings must be limited to 50-100 people, sports events have no spectators, and most schools and workplaces must be conducted online. At the highest level of social distancing, all public facilities and events must be canceled, offices must be closed, and gathering for more than ten people is forbidden.
South Korean Hurry-Hurry (빨리 빨리) Covid-19 Strategy: Privacy Concern, No-Lockdown, and Discriminations

Even so, since the means of enforcement to ensure compliance, some people would still do their business-as-usual, though with lesser frequency and crowds (Gallo 2020). Besides, as people would grow more uneasy in living without social interaction and the virus case continues to decline in Korea, they might tend to be more complacent; however, this claim would need to be proven in further study.

Social Impacts of COVID-19: Neglected foreign residents and discriminated minorities

As the world applauds South Korea for doing well with virus containment, there have been some arising social issues in South Korea that do not fully grab the international media’s attention. I would only list a few notable cases in this article, including the
inclusivity of the government policy and LGBTQ issues. The issues focus on excluding foreign residents from the initial COVID-19 policies and the stigmatization of minorities from the public due to the sudden spike of the case in Itaewon outbreak.

Exclusion of foreign residents

Similar to many other countries, South Korea experienced a period of shortage of mask supply. In normal conditions, masks (KF80 and KF94) can easily be found anywhere in the country. In order to solve this problem, in late March, the government bought the remaining supply and implemented a ration system (2 masks per person) for the public based on the birth years (Kang et al. 2020). The mask-rationing is decided based on the subscription to National Health Insurance (NHI), to which 1.2 million foreigners are not enrolled in (Shin 2020). Some foreigners could not enroll in the program as well if they only stay for less than six months in Korea, and those who subscribed to the program work beyond the open hours of pharmacies. At the same time, international students are not required to join until 2021. Seoul Metropolitan Government addressed this problem in late March by distributing cloth masks to the universities and global centers (Kim 2020). Unfortunately, such a program was only available to Seoul residents. The government only started expanding the rationing program to non-insurance holders in late April (S.N.U. Medicine 2020).

The exclusion further extended to the coronavirus relief fund. In May, the Korean government decided to provide some cash funding to its residents whose income less than the median income, yet it excludes the migrant workers’ households who also held working visas and paid taxes (Lee 2020). Only the holder of F-6 visas, or the spouse visa, are eligible to receive the funding. Each municipal government has different requirements for the relief fund; however, they generally overlook the migrant workers. For instance, only Seoul, Ansan, and Bucheon provided cash for all registered foreigners, while Goyang City only gave the fund to foreigners subscribed to the NHI (Ock 2020a; Lee 2020).
These instances have fueled the discussion about discriminatory treatments against foreigners in South Korea. This country has long been debating about signing Anti-Discriminatory Law against all kinds of discrimination (gender, age, disability, country of origin, sexual orientation, academic background, etc.), yet to date, the National Assembly has not reached any conclusive result (Jung 2020). Covid-19 outbreak escalated the discussion on discrimination, as some restaurants blatantly put ‘No Chinese’ sign on their places of business, and half a million people signed a petition to urge the government to ban Chinese entry (Goh 2020). Yoon (2020) revealed through an interview with several foreign residents that some of them experienced differential treatment when they tried to buy the ration masks as the pharmacists asked them to pay more and to wait until all Koreans got their masks.

**Itaewon Outbreak**

On May 6th, a new infection cluster was confirmed to be linked to clubs in Itaewon district, Seoul. The new cluster, which became Seoul’s second-biggest cluster infection, had its first confirmed case when a 29-year-old man from Yongin City tested positive after having visited five clubs and bars in Itaewon, namely King Club, Trunk Club, Club Queen, Soho, and H.I.M., on May 1 and 2 (Yonhap News 2020b; Park 2020). As per May 25th, the total number of cases has grown to 237, and this day, there are still fears of sporadic outbreaks linked to the Itaewon cluster (Yonhap 2020b). The cases related to the first five clubs were eventually followed by a second batch, which is linked to the nightclubs Club Made, Pistil, Pink Elephant, and Fountain (Chang 2020). The Itaewon cluster has become an incendiary occurrence for the South Korean LGBT-Q community because the district provides a concentration of gay nightclubs and bars, which led to its association as a “gay nightlife district” (Klasto and Simpson 2020).

Both locals and foreign nationals visiting these clubs have strong reasons to hesitate from getting tested. For locals, getting tested and therefore admitting to having visited these “gay nightclubs” means revealing their identity as sexual minorities, which would expose them to risks of hatred and discrimination in the largely-homophobic Korean society (Ock 2020b). Furthermore, critics and human rights activists have cited the tendency of Korean media
to highlight the LGBT-Q element in the Itaewon cluster; thus, framing the Korean LGBT-Q community—albeit indirectly—as a spoiler to the nationwide efforts in containing the spread of the virus, potentially worsening the already-widespread homophobia.

Seoul-based freelance journalist Raphael Rashid (@koryodynasty), highlighted the offensive remarks that emerged from Korean users on Twitter and NAVER towards the LGBT-Q community, some of which used the infection cluster to prove their points against the formulation of a more comprehensive anti-discrimination law. In opposition to these remarks, Rashid linked these media practices and attacks to the absence of acknowledgment by the South Korean government for the LGBT-Q community.

Foreign nationals, especially expatriate workers, have also been facing an increased risk of discrimination and harassment since the Itaewon outbreak. About 90 foreign teachers, as an example, were estimated to have visited Itaewon around the time of the outbreak, causing fear of students getting infected at school. Some foreign teachers have reported receiving discriminatory practices and intimidations by school authorities (Bahk 2020; Kim 2020), or being asked to surrender their credit card details to track their movements (Park 2020). They are also exposed to the risk of losing their jobs and residence permits if they revealed to have been in Itaewon around the outbreak period. The government responded to this problem by promising anonymous testing and convincing those without proper stay permits not to worry about deportation, as a way to encourage foreign nationals to get tested for COVID-19 (Park 2020). Nonetheless, another set of issues, such as language barriers and the inaccuracy of foreign visitor information provided by the clubs, continued to hamper government efforts to track, test, and isolate foreign nationals who had possibly contracted COVID-19 from the Itaewon cluster (Chang 2020; Park 2020).

The difficulties faced by the South Korean government in responding to the Itaewon infection cluster have therefore provided a sobering revelation of the underlying societal issues faced by sexual minorities and foreign nationals, as well as the consequences of these issues on any nationwide effort that requires commitment from all elements of the Korean society. The South Korean government needs to acknowledge and protect its minority groups’ rights so that they can feel safe to take their part in containing the spread of COVID-19 in South Korea.
Conclusion

This article aims to outline the South Korean government strategy to contain COVID-19 and find the underlying reasons why it has been hailed as one of the most successful strategies to tackle the pandemic. Moreover, it also touches on the non-inclusivity of the government strategy towards the minorities and the existing stigmatizations against some parts of the society, including pseudo-cults, foreign workers and residents, and LGBT-Q communities.

It has been more than six months since countries worldwide fighting with the novel coronavirus, and there have been discussions on how it has changed world order, how nations cooperate, and how each nation battles the disease within its border. Even though there has not been apparent cooperation between nations for a coordinated effort to solve the pandemic, we may be able to learn from another country’s strategies in order to curb the spread of the disease, as well as to deal with the consequences of the pandemic, including economic recession and social unrest.

Reference

Journal and Online Journal


**Official Reports and Articles**


**Online Articles**


on 9 October 2020].


on 9 October 2020].


Park, Nathan S., 2020. “Confucianism Isn’t Helping Beat the


South Korean Hurry-Hurry (빨리 빨리) Covid-19 Strategy: Privacy Concern, No-Lockdown, and Discriminations


Others


@koryodynasty, 2020. 8 May, [online]. in https://twitter.com/koryodynasty/status/1258567907438497793 [accessed on 9 October 2020].