ASEAN-China Non-Traditional Security Cooperation and the Inescapability of the Politics of Security

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ABSTRACT

Both ASEAN and China used the concept of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) in order to pursue security diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. For ASEAN, NTS is an area of security cooperation that allows it to drive the agenda of security architectures involving extra-regional powers such as the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For China, NTS policy agenda allows it to gain acceptance among ASEAN member-states and an active role in the security agenda of ASEAN-led security architectures. The question that this article is pursuing is to what extent has ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS balanced between addressing the humanitarian aspect and the political objectives of security? This question is derived from the conceptual origin of NTS that stands on the importance of both the state and the individuals as the referent subjects of security. This article argues that ASEAN-China NTS cooperation emphasized more towards the strengthening of state's capacity to deal with non-state actors' transnational criminal activities, either for profit-seeking or subversive purposes. It is also apparent from evaluating the Memorandum of Understandings and Plans of Action between ASEAN and China that NTS cooperation is one China's investments to engage a closer cooperation with ASEAN as well as a stronger presence in Southeast Asia's strategic environment.

Keywords: ASEAN, China, Non-Traditional Security, security cooperation

ASEAN dan Tiongkok sama-sama mengedepankan konsep Keamanan Non-Tradisional (Non-Traditional Security/ NTS) untuk membangun diplomasi keamanan di Asia Pasifik. Bagi ASEAN, kerjasama NTS adalah wilayah kerjasama yang memfasilitasi sentralitas ASEAN di berbagai institusi keamanan regional yang menempatkan ASEAN pada posisi kepemimpinan atau agenda-setter seperti ADMM Plus dan ARF. Ini menjadi penting ketika ASEAN berusaha menjaga relevansinya di tengah persaingan geopolitik dan persengketaan territorial di Asia Timur. Sementara itu Tiongkok juga memiliki kepentingan politik untuk menjaga kehadiran strategisnya di Asia Tenggara, khususnya keberterimaan dalam institusi-institusi keamanan regional yang bersentral pada ASEAN. Pertanyaan yang diajukan di sini adalah apakah kerjasama NTS ASEAN-Tiongkok lebih melayani tujuan politik-keamanan negara atau keamanan insani? Pertanyaan ini diderivasikan dari fondasi konsep NTS itu sendiri yang terdiri dari keamanan tradisional (realsis) dan keamanan insani (liberalis). Artikel ini berargumen bahwa kerjasama ASEAN-Tiongkok lebih menekankan aspek keamanan negara ketimbang keamanan insani, dengan melihat agenda kerjasama yang mengedepankan upaya negara menghadapi actor-aktor non-negara yang menyalahgunakan kebebasan mobilitas untuk tindakan criminal menguntungkan diri sendiri atau tindakan subversive. Selain itu dokumen-dokumen kerjasama NTS ASEAN-Tiongkok juga memperlihatkan peran Tiongkok yang lebih besar dalam memfasilitasi aktivitas-aktivitas kerjasama, sehingga menunjukkan upaya aktif Tiongkok untuk berinvestasi dalam diplomasi keamanan dengan negara-negara Asia Tenggara.

Kata-kata kunci: ASEAN, Cina, Keamanan Non-Tradisional, kerjasama keamanan

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Both ASEAN and China used the concept of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) in order to pursue security diplomacy in the Asia Pacific. For ASEAN, NTS is an area of security cooperation that allows it to drive the agenda of security architectures involving extra-regional powers such as the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For China, NTS policy agenda allows it to gain acceptance among ASEAN member-states and an active role in the security agenda of ASEAN-led security architectures (Sato 2013). The question that this article is pursuing is to what extent has ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS balanced between addressing the humanitarian and state security aspects of NTS? This article argues that ASEAN-China NTS cooperation emphasized more on the latter by strengthening state’s capacity to deal with non-state actors’ transnational criminal activities. It is also apparent from evaluating the Memorandum of Understandings and Plans of Action between ASEAN and China that NTS cooperation is one China’s investments to engage a closer cooperation with ASEAN as well as a stronger presence in Southeast Asia’s strategic environment.

This article discusses ASEAN-China NTS cooperation in three sections. The first section elaborates on the evolution of thoughts in security studies in order to trace the intellectual progenitors that are the foundation of Non-Traditional Security. The second section elaborates on the measures that are undertaken by ASEAN and China in pursuing their NTS cooperation. Thirdly, it will delve on the political outcomes that are achieved by ASEAN and China in pursuing NTS cooperation. This part will also discuss the discrepancy between NTS agenda that is adopted by ASEAN’s intra-mural cooperation and Chinese domestic NTS concerns and the NTS agenda of ASEAN and China. This article concludes that ASEAN-China NTS cooperation has focused more on the state-security aspect of NTS rather than the human security aspect. Secondly, NTS cooperation between ASEAN and China has been driven by and fulfilled mostly the political objectives of both parties. China has stood to gain in terms of its strategic presence in Southeast Asia, which it did not have during the Cold War and early 1990s. ASEAN maintains its centrality in the security architectures that it leads by incorporating China onboard and setting the agenda to focus largely on NTS issues. In order to give more substance to ongoing ASEAN-China NTS cooperation, ASEAN needs to have more ownership of its partnership with China and shapes the NTS cooperation in a fashion that adopts more aspects of human security, such as environmental protection and food security. On theoretical level, NTS cooperation reflects the inescapability of the politics of security. The latter refers to situation in which the substance and measurement of success (or failure) of security by states are defined by their political objectives. The humanitarian dimension of NTS has been undermined by the political objectives of ASEAN and China in their pursuit of security diplomacy in East Asia.

**Traditional Security, Human Security and NTS**

Non-traditional security stands on the humanitarian and statist aspects of security. In order to understand the concept of Non-Traditional Security, therefore, one needs to review the traditional understanding of security, its widening move and human security as the building blocks of the concept. The traditional understanding of security dates back to the work of Arnold Wolfers (1962) who suggested that national security is a symbol that represents “protection through power”, but also “national self-reliance” instead of reliance on international cooperation; he also warned that the term security
covers a wide range of policy goals so that varying policies can be interpreted as security policies. He further argues that security refers to the protection of ‘acquired values’ and therefore. Thus, there is no absolute security; rather, the degree of security depends on a leader’s interpretation of ‘core values’ of the nation and how secure they are today and in the future. Wolfers’ understanding of security hints the political nature of security, i.e. the cognitive limit to security that is set by the objectives of the political actors who commits the act of providing security (Wolfers 1962, 147-165). In this respect, the act of providing security is political as it safeguards and/or influences other actors in a way that safeguards particular interests. Furthermore, Wolfers’ interpretation set the inter-twined pillars of research and policy in security.

The issues that the traditional security prioritizes usually involve an adversary with a capacity for a use of force that can or already is compromising the integrity of the state’s sovereignty, including its territorial integrity, national identity and the sustainability of resources (Wolfers 1962). The state is perceived to be the most formidable actor in providing security as well as causing insecurity. Traditional security relies on the instruments of the sovereign (the military, police and intelligence agencies) and can be projected outwards or inwards by the national government. When projected outwards, the implementation of traditional security will appear as a coalition or defense pact building and counter-balance against the emergence of revisionist powers. When projected inwards, traditional security will emphasize on the need for the ruling regime or political party to survive through the challenges of political discord from within (Greenwood & Waever 2013). Recently, however, outward projection of security also responds to humanitarian aspect of security, such as Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations.

The widening of international security policy and research agenda has begun in the early 80’s with Ullman’s critique on the overly militarized understanding of security which he perceived to lead to sources of harmful dangers being ignored and may result in the insecurity of international relations as military affairs dominated international relations. Buzan’s *People, States and Fear* (1983) provided the first comprehensive articulation of a widening of security that maintains the centrality of the state; the book discusses the dangers to national security that emanate from military aggression, political propaganda, and disruption to continuity of resources required to keep the national economy running. In addition, insecurity may also emanate from the state’s effort to establish a degree of deterrence towards potential aggressors to its sovereignty. On the other hand, insecurity also emanates from the state’s inability to maintain its dominance and sovereign authority to the legitimate use of force vis-à-vis violent non-state actors (Buzan, 1983). It was not until 1998, that Buzan and his collaborators came up with a framework of thinking that provides a cognitive and yet state-centric limit to the widening of security policy/research agenda through the frame of securitization.

The securitisation framework illustrates a spectrum of different frames of a particular issue from non-politicised (or public issue), to politicised, to a securitised issue. Appearing in 1998, securitization framework is a ‘filter’ through which issues of security-widening can be assessed. These issues can be seen - among others - in the works of Deudney (1990) on the need to re-think the state’s securitisation of the environment that might not be helpful for the environment as it only secures the state, Posen’s (1993) exploration of how ethnic conflict might emenate from a security dilemma between clans, explorations on the place of identity in security studies such as the one provided
by Katzenstein & Okawara (1995), R.B.J. Walker (1990), and Huntington (1993), and finally the UNDP Report in 1994 which is a formal impetus to human security concept.

Securitization framework embarks from the idea that ‘security’ cannot be defined by consciously thinking of what it means; security can be defined only by looking at how it is implicitly used. Textual analysis of the use of the word ‘security’ suggests that it implies a prioritisation of an issue above everything else; such an issue is called an “existential threat” because if it is not handled first, nothing else will matter. A securitised issue is treated with a temporary disregard to existing rules or values; secrecy, limitation of rights and conscription are the examples of forms of such extra-ordinary measures. They further assert that a securitised issue enters a security black box in the political process: “The presence of a secretive security institution or operation is an indication of a successful securitisation...Non-public security practices presented a very clear case of the security logic.” (Buzan et.al. 1998, 28, see also Buzan & Hansen 2009)

The securitising ‘move’ performs as a break between the politicised and securitised frames of the issue. The realms of the politicised and the securitised are in absolute opposition, as Waever suggested, ‘security constituted the opposite of politics’ (Buzan, et.al., 1998 24). The ‘normal politics’, on the other hand, is where public has influence over the government’s treatment and, more importantly, budget-spending on a particular issue. Politicisation is defined as: “...to make an issue appear to be open, a matter of choice, something that is decided upon and that therefore entails responsibility.” (Buzan et.al., 1998, 29) The definition of securitisation reflected this break of normal politics by means of security rhetoric: “...securitization can be defined as the positioning through speech acts (usually by a political leader) of a particular issue as a threat to survival, which in turn (with the consent of the relevant constituency) enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue.” (McDonald 2008)

So far this article has reviewed the realist and traditional constructivist interpretation of security, both of which maintains the centrality of the state and its political objectives in pursuit of security. Throughout the works that have been reviewed so far, security is a product of political decision-making and operates to fulfil political objectives of responding to particular threats. Traditional or realist conception of politics of security limits the scope of security “as engagement with radical dangers and the adoption of emergency measures” (Buzan & Hansen 2009, 29). The centrality of state’s role - more fundamental than provider of or threat to security - is its capacity in determining the objective of security exclusively for its own security. The degree to which a security policy is successful or failed to secure an actor against another, safeguard a core value, achieve an objective that is externally defined, is determined by the state, or rather the executive power; and in a state-centric approach of security, such objective revolves around the security of the state.

In contrast, Human Security redirects the objective of security explicitly towards individuals, regardless of their citizenship (Glasius 2008). As expressed by the United Nations Development Program, human security usually means freedom from fear and want, or more specifically “protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards.” (UNDP 1994, 22-23) Human security is a strictly non-state view of security in a sense that it does not incline to view security and insecurity - often viewed as risks instead of threats - from a
national value-based assumption (Gasper & Gómez 2015). As such, human security is also a subject of global security as it pertains to subjects of security that are pertinent to human beings in any part of the world. Human Security emphasizes on the ethical duty of International Relations to consider human rights as the basis of security for human beings in the world, wherever they reside (Garcia 2015). The referent subject of security is human-beings, and the state is obliged to provide this security, either through national or international cooperation effort (Bourne & Bulley 2011; Evans 2004; Newman 2010).

Non-traditional security (NTS) is often described as an ambiguous concept as it maintains a balance between individual-centered and state-centered security interpretations (Martel 2016). NTS research/policy agenda values the state as a resourceful actor to respond to major disruptions to human well-being and the fact that such disruptions also means the state’s political instability; indeed, NTS prescribes the state gain a better control of complex interdependencies of the 21st century world (Fjäder, 36 in Masys. 2016). However, proponents of NTS take into consideration of other functional actors or stake holders that need to get on board with a coordinated and synchronised response to security challenges. Therefore, NTS agenda not only transforms the issues (specific security threats) that policy-makers and academics discuss, but also ideas (new frameworks for defining sources of insecurity and outlining appropriate responses) (Zimmerman 2016). For states in Southeast Asia in particular and Asia in general, NTS provides a new template for threat identification and management.

In order to have a better traction of what NTS means and comprises of, quoted at length below is a definition provided by Consortium on Non-Traditional Security in Asia:

“those [issues] that challenge the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. Aside from these issues being non-military in nature, they also share common characteristics, namely: that they are transnational in scope; come at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly due to globalization, communication revolution, etc.; cannot entirely be prevented but coping mechanisms can be devised; national solutions are often inadequate and would thus make regional and multilateral cooperation essential; and finally, the object of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty or territorial integrity), but also the people (their survival, well-being and dignity), both at the individual and societal levels.”(Caballero-anthony 2009)

The definition excerpted above shows not just the elements that build the understanding about non-traditional security in Southeast Asian security studies parlance but also to show the political meaning of NTS for the region. First, the definition shows us a dichotomy of non-traditional from traditional security issues by emphasizing on the first’s nature to be a people-centered challenges or impending problems that dictate people’s survival and well-being as depicted by their everyday lives (Liotta 2005). Secondly, although most of the NTS issues are described in the definition as non-military in nature, the issues themselves divide between those that does not involve the use of force (climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine) and those that may at some point involve the use of force (people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime). This means that all NTS
issues are not threats posed by enemy forces but they do not absolve the involvement of the state’s coercive agencies (the military, the police and security agencies) to cope with the issues (Capie 2007). Thirdly, NTS issues are not to be dealt with in a similar fashion to a state that is facing enemy combatants through a military campaign; rather, NTS issues require a long term policy of response that is geared ultimately not to “solve” the issue in a traditional fashion but to strengthen the institutions of the state as well as the society in coping with the issues (Allison and Taylor 2016).

NTS framework recognizes the fact that destabilizing factors to the state are coming from threats that cross state borders and impacting on both domestic and regional level (Dupont 2001). The transnational feature of threats in NTS is the most enduring across the multiple different issues in its agenda. The inclusion of non-state actors and non-military issues, therefore, should not be seen as undermining the sub-discipline of International Security Studies, but rather to increase its policy-relevance. We can compare this with the concept of Comprehensive Security that also proposes the idea that domestic and regional securities are inter-twined. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), a track-two research institution that supports the ASEAN Regional Forum defines comprehensive security as ‘the pursuit of sustainable security in all fields (personal, political, economic, social, cultural, military, environmental), covering both the domestic and external spheres, essentially through cooperative means’ (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific [CSCAP] 1995).

However, Comprehensive Security stops short of suggesting multilateral governance in responding to transnational threats (Sukma 2012). NTS framework specifically renegotiates state sovereignty and non-interference principle by suggesting that the most appropriate response to NTS issues is a coordinated or joint response mechanism in mitigating risks of disruptions to human well-being. A security community is therefore eventually required to match this proposed response. NTS has been chosen by China as a leading discourse for its entry into Southeast Asia’s market of ideas, especially in the face of Japanese discourse on comprehensive security (Dosch 2007). Comprehensive security emphasizes the capacity of the state to build resilience against challenges or potential disruptions of its citizens; Non-Traditional Security concept further includes challenges coming from particular enemy non-state actors such as terrorist groups, smugglers, traffickers and pirates but the idea is still about the resilience of the state in defending its sovereign features (borders, resources, population).

More fundamentally, NTS framework also alters the idea of state sovereignty and, therefore, if implemented thoroughly will have a structural impact on international relations. Traditional security conception of state sovereignty is highly geopolitical where power is mostly manifested in force and its impact on access to and control over territories and their resources. By proposing multilateral regional governing structures to play as security managers, NTS framework allows the emergence of new forms of networked and multilevel governance (Carroll & Hameiri 2007) without undermining the state and even requiring it to act more effectively. Therefore, the geopolitical nature that dominates traditional security is being re-negotiated in NTS framework; since insecurity transcends across borders, the responses to them should rely on multilateral security institutions. It is at this point that NTS cannot truly escape the politics of security that has traditionally present in security policy.
Relations between states in non-traditional security issues are most probably cooperative rather than competitive, manifesting in information exchange and co-enhancement on states’ capability to combat non-traditional security issues. Non-traditional security cooperations are often applaud for being a gesture of a responsible state or group of states that fulfill their responsibility to protect their citizens from upcoming dangers. This feature separates NTS from traditional security thinking that is mostly competitive in nature (Wolfers 1962).

Geopolitical competition that is dominant in traditional security is suspended in NTS framework. Due to its characteristic as a non-geopolitical security problem, NTS cooperation facilitates cooperation that is acceptable to all participating states, including among those who have threat perception towards one another (Hong 2013). This is because NTS is composed of threats that are caused not by other actors using force against the state but by problems of common concerns regarding natural resources and environmental sustainability that may cause harm to human beings - and to some extent the state’s sovereignty.

**ASEAN’s and China’s Pursuit of the NTS Agenda**

Issues that are now embedded in the NTS agenda have been part of ASEAN’s intra-mural cooperation since the Cold War years. Notable among other topics was the establishment of ASEAN Food Security Reserve, which was followed by the first meeting ASEAN Agriculture, and Forestry Ministers in 1979. Most of the topics that are today under the heading of “security” have been discussed within the forum of ASEAN Ministers Meeting, including energy and health (first convened in 1980), environment (1981), petroleum security (1986), and transnational crime (1997). ASEAN’s intra-mural dialogue and cooperation on issues of NTS before 1997, however, had been unable to establish a visible institutionalized regional cooperation in mitigating or responding to sudden disruptions. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis showcased the unpreparedness of the region of the calamity caused by domestically rooted non-traditional threat’s disruption to the well-being of the people as the financial crisis spiraled into socio-economic, political and security problems.

The outbreak of SARS in 2003 was yet another wake-up call for ASEAN’s intra-mural NTS coordination. The event became an impetus for ASEAN to strengthen the monitoring of disease outbreaks at the national and regional level, which came through with the establishment of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Task Force in December 2004. Specifically mandated to address the spread of avian flu in Southeast Asia, HPAI’s responsibility to harmonize vaccination procedures, draft action plans to contain disease and establish disease-free zones, increasing public awareness and creating surveillance systems and information-sharing were divided among five original members of ASEAN (Caballero-Anthony 2005). ASEAN’s intra-mural cooperation on NTS is also visible in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and food security issues.

ASEAN also actively pursues its NTS cooperation with extra-regional powers including the United States, Japan, the EU and China. On multilateral planes, the NTS cooperation is even more dynamic as it is embedded within the agenda of ASEAN-led regional security institutions, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN
Defense Ministerial Meeting (ADMM and ADMM+), East Asia Summit and ASEAN Plus Three. Different from its intra-mural cooperation, however, ASEAN’s extra-regional engagement on NTS displays an inclination towards an involvement of the use of force - through military or security law-enforcement agencies - in responding to NTS problems. Therefore, sectors of cooperation on HADR, combating transnational crime, drug trafficking and terrorism are more prominent than food or health security.

The ARF has notably been an instrumental vehicle for ASEAN’s pursuit of NTS cooperation. The ARF itself was not built to respond to NTS issues. Established in 1994 and comprising of 27 members from Southeast, South and Northeast Asia, the ARF’s purpose is to facilitate a creation of a stable, predictable pattern of relationships for Asia Pacific; specifically, as Leifer suggested, ARF was aimed at creating a stable balance of power between China, Japan and the United States. The foundational philosophy of the forum was therefore largely informed by traditional security agenda. The ARF, however, is not an alliance that is capable of generating a set of rules and socialise its members to them; rather, ARF is a dialogue and consultation forum on political and security issues. Issues have remained largely East Asia in focus, including SCS, Korean peninsula, Taiwan straits, trans-boundary problems.

Since 2008, the ARF has increasingly been able to materialise practical cooperation on responding to NTS issues. NTS-type problems, including transnational crime, environmental degradation, cyber security, and disaster relief have fulfilled half of forum’s meeting agendas. Maritime disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, transnational crime and terrorism have separated inter-sessional support group and inter-sessional meetings and dominate ARF’s agenda. In light of the ARF’s goal in the beginning to create a habit of dialogue and confidence building between participants, the transnational threats from NTS issues can unite participant states that largely share the concern of the NTS issues and therefore can act to spur enhanced cooperation. For example, in 2008 the ARF held a tabletop exercise with a focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) which was followed by a field exercise in the following year in an event called Voluntary Demonstration of Response (VDR) in May 2009. The latter involved live field exercise to demonstrate Southeast Asia’s ability to work together as a region in conducting disaster relief. In 2011, Indonesia hosted - as part of the ARF agenda - a full scale Disaster Relief Exercise (DiREx), consisting of a hypothetical earthquake in North Sulawesi. DiREx events, consisting of Table-Top Exercise, field Training Exercise and After Action Review, are scheduled to take place every two years and is the most practical manifestation of the forum’s effort in enhancing cooperation and coordination among participating states’ civilian and military agencies, thereby strengthening confidence and mutual understanding through HADR exercises.

Similarly, both the ADMM and ADMM Plus (plus eight ASEAN Dialogue Partners: Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States) are also pursuing NTS cooperation in a more practical manner. Also, similar to the ARF, both ADMM and ADMM+ were not established specifically for NTS cooperation. Established in 2006 and 2010 respectively, ADMM and ADMM+ were meant to facilitate practical security cooperation to ensure stability and peace (RSIS 2016). However, since 2013, beginning with Maritime Security Field Training Exercise and Maritime Security Community Sharing Portal, the ADMM+ began its NTS engagement. Furthermore, in March 2015 in Langkawi ADMM agreed on establishing
ASEAN Militaries Ready Group on HADR and on the establishment of the ASEAN Centre of Military Medicine, as well as counter-terrorism cooperation that included information sharing, surveillance and promoting public awareness. In 2015, the ADMM also declared the importance of freedom of navigation in, and over-flight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). Meanwhile, in 2009, the ADMM Plus conducted a massive military medicine exercise for disaster relief purposes. This was followed by a counter-terrorism exercise in Sentul, Indonesia in September that year (Zimmerman 2014).

The pursuit of NTS cooperation by ASEAN within the framework of ARF and ADMM+ has been driven partly by the need to respond to the pressure from extra-regional powers to make ASEAN-led security cooperation more practical and relevant to the security challenges of Southeast Asia and the wider Asia Pacific. Diplomats working in ASEAN have been noted to perceive NTS issues as convenient issues to keep the dialogue habit to continue in the ARF, and at the same time ‘sweep the more pressing issues such as tensions in the South China Sea under the carpet’. NTS issues allowed the ARF to continue the dialogue because other - more traditional - issues that involve the rivalry between great powers, notably the United States and China, are too sensitive to many participating states. NTS agenda is used by ASEAN to pursue its core interest of folding extra-regional powers within its regionalism in order to take the edges of extra-regional powers’ intervention off while providing it with assurance of regional stability and non-intervention.

**ASEAN-China Engagement on NTS**

ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS, however, predates all of the other multilateral fora on NTS mentioned above, NTS agenda has been an agreeable area of cooperation interest shared by ASEAN and China since China’s economic modernisation in the late 1970s. The prioritisation of the security of national development by both actors strengthened bilateral economic relations and enabled constructive engagement between ASEAN states and China. China understands itself and states in Southeast Asia as being dependent on economic performance to maintain state’s legitimacy and stability. Since then, despite waxing and waning relations between China and Southeast Asia, both sides have been agreeable on NTS issues and employed NTS similarly, prioritising state stability as something that is contingent on economic development. A tension in the post-Cold War ASEAN-China relations took place in the early 1990s as the territorial disputes in the South China Sea flared up and aggravated the relations. Tensions with Taiwan over missile tests increased in the mid-1990s, re-affirming the seriousness of China as a threat in the South China Sea to Southeast Asian claimant countries. Heightened threat perceptions rekindled individual military alliances of ASEAN member states’ with the USA. Nevertheless, China was quick to realise the futility of assertive gestures to shape the behavior of ASEAN member-states towards its own interest. Therefore, China initiated in 1996 a transformation of its international strategy from Cold War era focus on denying the influence of other great powers into a strategy that is more compatible with ASEAN’s security doctrine of resilience, called New Security Concept (NSC). Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen introduced the NSC and China’s 1997 Defense White Paper stipulated it and so did
other high officials including President Jiang Zemin (Rumley, Doyle, & Chaturvedi, 2012) regional constructions are devised and propagated for a range of purposes describing economic success, structuring a set of relationships, reproducing a particular vision of.

The Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China Cooperation in the Field of Non-Traditional Security Issues, which was signed at 6th ASEAN-China Summit in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002, formalized ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS and the declaration was the first formal expression of NTS in Southeast Asia. The Joint Declaration was further strengthened by Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN-China NTS cooperation signed in 2004 in Bangkok, Thailand where non-traditional security issues are explicated to include trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling including trafficking in women and children, sea piracy, terrorism, arms smuggling, money laundering, international economic crime and cyber crime. Four areas of cooperation are identified in the MoU, including information exchange, personnel exchange and training, joint research and law enforcement cooperation (Kementrian Luar Negeri 2004). ASEAN Secretariat and China’s Ministry of Public Security are appointed as implementing agencies of the cooperation. In 2009, the MoU is renewed in Seam Reap, Cambodia.

The financial regulation within the 2004 and 2009 MoU’s suggested a heavier investment by China compared to ASEAN in funding activities governed under their terms. Article 4 of the 2009 MoU for example stipulated that all of the workshops and training courses provided by China would be covered by the Chinese government, but similar activities provided by ASEAN would be arranged through further coordination, instead of being funded by ASEAN definitively (Kementrian Luar Negeri 2009).

The most recent formal manifestation ASEAN-China partnership on NTS cooperation is the Plan of Action to Implement Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity (2016-2020). The Plan of Action (POA), among others, agrees on activities of capacity building between ASEAN and China in drug control and trafficking, criminal forensic technology, border control management, anti-money laundering, countering terrorism including its financing, investigation into international economic crimes and cybercrimes, through exchange of best practices and experiences in evidence gathering, tracing of crime proceeds, asset recovery, apprehension and investigation of criminal fugitives. Another area of cooperation is in addressing humanitarian aspects of landmines in the region through the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Centre (ARMAC) including financial and technical supports to the Centre (Plan Of Action 2016).

The choice of areas of cooperation that China and ASEAN could agree on within the framework of cooperation with ASEAN shows a propensity to areas that would not necessarily require a push for internal reform or strategic national interest of participant states. Other issues that could have been included in accordance with the concept of NTS such as income disparity and energy security are not included. These issues are the preserve of the states in ASEAN as well as China as policy areas where sovereign and independent decision is sought for.
Political Objectives and Partial NTS Fulfillment

As can be seen in the manifestation of NTS cooperation by ASEAN and China in the previous section, both actors pursue NTS cooperation for their own political-diplomatic purposes. China seeks to gain security through regional presence in Southeast Asia in the form of commitments for regional capacity building responding non-traditional security issues. This regional presence is critical in supporting a geopolitical interest of mitigating disruptions to navigation and access to resources and market in Southeast Asia. ASEAN opens itself to China’s membership and participation of China in ASEAN-led regional arrangements provide more legitimacy to such arrangements as a meeting hub of great powers with agendas set by ASEAN.

The limit of political objectives structures the scope of NTS cooperation, and diminishes the humanitarian/globalist aspect of NTS. As a result, ASEAN-China cooperation on NTS does not treat issues of NTS with a view towards human security or the security of individuals; rather, the cooperation treats NTS issues as challenges to state’s sovereignty and responds them through the strengthening of the latter. For example, the response to the issue of the trafficking of illegal drugs emphasizes on the strengthening of the criminal justice system in terms of investigation and prosecution of traffickers, instead of the protecting the vulnerable groups, including women and children, who are affected by the trade and abuse of illicit drugs, or at least suppressing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS from the use of illicit drugs.

China’s initiatives in engaging ASEAN in non-traditional security cooperation focuses on issues that are designed to maintain its presence in the region. This can be seen from the difference between China’s agenda of NTS on domestic and regional level (with ASEAN). A survey of the influential elite conducted in 2004 about the challenges that China will encounter more in the future that are likely to impact on the economic and social development revealed that a crisis of confidence in governance was repeatedly mentioned by the participants (Craig 2007, 101). This includers people’s lack of confidence in the conduct of good governance, the credibility of enterprises and individuals, the government’s credibility, policy efficiency, and transparency. In addition, other challenges include social disparities, unemployment, and public safety, oil and energy supplies or resource-related problems (Craig 2007, 103). Therefore, issues pertinent to China’s social and economic development and stability are not included in the agenda of NTS cooperation with ASEAN as well as ASEAN-led institutions, which focus largely on HADR operations, transnational crime and terrorism. Issues of social and economic development and stability, while being the most important issues in the minds of the Chinese elite, will require serious internal reforms.

China-ASEAN cooperation has also been integrated to the wider progression of ASEAN-led regional security architectures. This is stipulated in the Plan of Action to Implement Joint Declaration on ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, which has been signed in 2003, 2010, and 2016. For example, ASEAN-China Plan of Action 2003 to operationalise the 2002 Joint Declaration stipulated that enhanced cooperation would sought through existing mechanisms such as ASEAN Senior Officials Meetings and ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meetings (Plan of Action 2003). Furthermore, the subsequent Plan of Action (2011-2015) mentioned ASEAN Community realisation by 2015 as part of goal in cooperation (Plan of Action, 2010). These Plans of Action, including the most recent one for 2016-2020 (Plan of Action, 2016), are operationalised through a series of workshops and training for ASEAN Member...
States hosted by China. Therefore, China’s investment in NTS cooperation allows it to draw closer presence in Southeast Asian strategic environment (Arase 2010).

ASEAN also implemented different agenda of NTS cooperation between its own intra-mural cooperation and the one with China. Food security is one area that is missing from ASEAN-China NTS cooperation but has been in the agenda of ASEAN intra-mural cooperation since 1979. The same goes for energy or petroleum security (since 1986) and health security (since 1980) (Akhir & Ba 2016, 214). NTS cooperation sectors of energy, health and food security are included in the agenda of regional cooperation that involves other great powers. This is notably the case in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) that convened ministerial meetings on the environment (2002), health (2004), energy (2004), and food security (2011). The role of other great powers, Japan and South Korea may have been more instrumental in these sectors, notably in food security where Japan was a leading actor in the creation of ASEAN+3 Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) in 2011 (Wajjwalku 2016).

The promotion of cooperation on NTS issues, therefore, is driven by particular political objectives for ASEAN, which may result in undermining the humanitarian aspect of NTS. Despite the fact that ASEAN has paid attention to NTS issues during the Cold War, ASEAN officials and eminent persons tend to explain NTS issues as newly emerging, unprecedented issues which eventually require a regional cooperation to respond. Rizal Sukma, then the Executive Director of Centre for Strategic and International Studies Jakarta stipulated that NTS issues comprise of a range of “new challenges” that ASEAN states need to respond to in a region-wide fashion due to their trans-boundary nature, or domestic problems with regional implications. To some extent, the success of responding to NTS issues is justified to be limited due to their nature as “new challenges”, because the newness of the challenges means ASEAN must learn and adapt to them and mitigation success should be expected to be limited.

The limit of the ADMM and ADMM Plus in convening a dialogue on sensitive traditional security issue is exemplified by the refusal of ASEAN member states - who set the agenda for ADMM Plus - to include the South China Sea in the proposed joint declaration, although the issue is mentioned in the Chairman’s Statement issued by Malaysia as ASEAN Chair 2015. This should not be seen as the failure of ADMM and ADMM Plus in resolving the South China Sea issue, because the ADMM was never meant to play a role of conflict resolution but rather to maintain peace and stability through dialogue and cooperation on defence matters. The trust that has been gained in practical cooperation between defense institutions in the ARF and ADMM has not been able to pave the way towards conflict resolution, but that trust would be withered by the shift towards traditional security focus. Besides, both the ADMM and ADMM Plus still played a role in affirming the core values of ASEAN states on South China Sea conflict management: peaceful resolution, freedom of navigation and compliance to international laws including 1982 UNCLOS.

Conclusion

The concept of non-traditional security has been partly discussed in the literature of International Security Studies during the Cold War as scholars considered the insufficiency and even danger of limiting the context of security studies and policy
to the threat of state’s military aggression. NTS stands on both of its predecessors: traditional security and human security. It praises the state as an important stakeholder of security due to its ability to mobilize resources to mitigate insecurity, but NTS leaves out the geopolitical baggage that state’s power brings. NTS issues are trans-boundary in nature and, therefore, disregard the limits set by state’s power safeguard of territorial access to resources and mobility. NTS agenda prioritizes the mitigation of risks to sustainability socio-economic enterprises, but it also includes threats coming from non-state’s use of force. Therefore, there is an enduring dichotomy in NTS agenda. On the one hand, there are issues involving the use of force requiring traditional state-centric enforcement measures to provide a decisive deterrence as a preliminary response and enforcement of the rule of laws. On the other, there are environment and people-centered issues involving long-term management of resources and capacity building in mitigation of disasters or diseases outbreaks.

Whatever the issues, NTS is more than an old wine in new bottling, because it negotiates the site of practice of sovereignty. In regard to responding to transnational threats, NTS perceives the operation of sovereignty to ideally take place on a multilateral framework in order to exercise a coordinated or synchronized response to particular transnational issues designated as non-traditional security threat or risk. In comparison with Comprehensive Security, NTS concept’s implementation would require a re-negotiation of non-interference and the sanctity of state sovereignty in way that allows the reconsideration of political objectives of security: state’s political objective in the pursuit of NTS cooperation should be directed towards the enhancement of the capacity to mitigate sudden disruptions of people’s lives. Therefore, NTS cooperation should mean more than the capacity building of the security and defense agencies in participating states. More fundamentally, NTS cooperation should enable the policies of removing the sources of vulnerabilities emanating from their environment and governance.

In evaluating NTS cooperation between ASEAN and China, this article finds that both actors are driven by their own political objectives, which limit the effectiveness of capacity building of member states in mitigating NTS risks. ASEAN is driven by the need to maintain the dialogue habit in ASEAN-led institutions to continue while keeping itself in the driving seat in terms of agenda setting that concurs with ASEAN’s enduring cooperation on NTS. China, on the other hand, aims to maintain presence and influence to Southeast Asian states, which - together with the growing trade relations - helps shape the management of more traditional issue in accordance to its interests.

Due to the impact of such political interests, the issues that fell under the rubric of ASEAN-China NTS cooperation - as stipulated in 2004 and 2009 MoU - suggested an inclination towards the state-centric understanding of security rather than human security such as terrorism, trafficking in illegal drugs, people smuggling, trafficking persons especially women and children, arms smuggling, sea piracy, money laundering, international economic crime and cybercrime. Indeed, these are crucial part of the NTS agenda and they directly impact on the daily lives of people. However, a focus on these issues left out or marginalized human security issues of NTS such as climate change, natural disasters, diseases outbreaks, food and clean water scarcity, and energy crisis. Therefore, it can be concluded in the end that the initiatives and investment for activities in NTS cooperation between ASEAN and China have been coming mostly from China,
and logically the latter stands to gain more in terms of its presence in the circle of Southeast Asian’s amity. Secondly, the understanding of NTS adopted in ASEAN-China NTS cooperation veered towards the strengthening state’s capacity in dealing with non-state actors’ profit-seeking transnational criminal activities, rather than their capacity to mitigate disruptions from the environmental calamities to people’s lives. In other words, the NTS understanding of ASEAN-China NTS cooperation is more state-centric and force-oriented than people-centered. Thirdly, there is a room for ASEAN to gain more from its NTS cooperation by including other sectors of cooperation, including joint exercises in HADR, health security, environmental protection, and food security within the ambit of NTS cooperation. This latter move can be expected to provide better security to both the navigation of the South China Sea and its biodiversity.

This article notes that a further research is required in exploring the question of to what extent can NTS cooperation lead to the resolution of traditional security issues? As a non-competitive security relations NTS cooperation allows participating states to get involved in dialogues and practical security practices to mitigate or respond NTS issues, for example in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the scenarios of natural disaster impact mitigation. Such practical cooperative measures may indeed gain and build trust and encourage the states to find peaceful and just solutions. However, what remains to be seen is whether traditional security agenda, such as geopolitical rivalry and territorial dispute can be ameliorated or only suspended due to NTS cooperation, or whether the latter facilitates the resolution of traditional security conflicts or disputes.

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