THE POLITICS OF LOCAL VERSUS GLOBAL OF SEXUALITY AND GENDER DEBATES IN THE POST-SOEHARTO ERA

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Abstrak


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Introduction and Framework

In September 2004 some colleagues from PUAN Amal Hayati, an Islamic feminist organization based in Jakarta I worked with and I, we
visited Jember, a town in East Java for a campaign program on women’s rights and gender equality in a Muslim community. The town is popular among Indonesian Muslims as one of kota santri (a city of pious Muslim), a claim based on the dominance of Muslims both in number and religious articulation in daily basis and in formal political life. The campaign program used a lot of references to Islamic knowledge in voicing women’s rights and gender equality and applied other so-called “Islamic approaches” (pendekatan Islam); we invited religious figures and leaders as resource persons; we promoted some verses from the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad’s life stories (hadith) viewed as “positive religious texts” that support the voices of women’s rights and gender equality in the Islamic context. This campaign strategy has been widely believed and approached by a number of feminist organizations within Islamic traditional backgrounds to mainly reduce public resistances showing a great concern against women’s rights and gender issues.

During the campaign in Jember, while we used Islamic terms as the campaign strategy, we received a critical response from one of the audiences who blamed us of being intoxicated and poisoned by Western “ways of thinking.” He said that there was no such thing as gender in Islam; gender was introduced to Muslim communities, including in Indonesia as a form of ghazw al-fikr (Arabic, literally “war of thinking”) to destroy the “Islamic social order.” In addition, this audience, a prominent Muslim leader at the village level in Jember, called all the audiences to return to Islamic beliefs and our local wisdom (kearifan lokal) and local custom (adat).

Reflecting (again) to this debate in the campaign program above, in this paper I will discuss how the contestation around gender and sexuality
issues framed in the controversies of “local versus global” articulates a specific political interest in contemporary Indonesian societies. In so doing, I will examine a question: in what sense local and global are defined and conceptualized and how these conceptualizations become “political”? In other words, I will elaborate how the debate of “local versus global” is instilled in the discussion of gender and sexuality issues to create political contestations? Through the discussion of these research questions I wish to contribute to the earlier studies and researches of the politics of gender and sexuality in Indonesia.

I observe two influential literatures on the sexual politics and gender in Indonesia, during and post-Soeharto era. The first literature focuses on analyzing the state’s “deployment of sexuality” (Foucault 1978) and the “deployment of sexuality and gender” (Blackwood 2010) for political purpose. With an analysis of the so-called state’s motherism, Suryakusuma (1996) and Wieringa (2002, 2003) examine the politics of gender and sexuality by the New Order regime under Soeharto through the construction of the state’s traditional gender and sexual ideology. Suryakusuma and Wieringa address three important phases in the development of this state’s ideology of gender and sexuality. First, Wieringa (2003) observes, is through the way President Soeharto took the presidential position and maintained his power by “destroying” the Communist Party of Indonesia and its largest women’s organization, Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani). The politics of sexual morality was applied when Soeharto labeled women members of Gerwani as immoral, as “communist whores” (Wieringa, 2003:70), accused of getting involved in the murder of the “seven generals” and the mutilation of the generals’ genitalia. By punishing women Gerwani,
Soeharto, who claimed himself as the Father of the Nation, made another political claim based on the politics of sexual morality as the savior and the protector of the nation’s morality.

Second, as Suryakusuma (1996) examines, is in Soeharto’s idea of establishing associations of wives whose husbands work as government clerks or military members and applying an image of good wives who always stay behind their husbands (*konco wingking*) and provide psychological support for their husbands. Women were also characterized as “passive” sexual providers of their husbands’ sexual desire. Finally, the state’s traditional gender and sexuality was constructed through the formulation of the Marriage Act in 1974 that makes traditional gender roles and sexuality norms as the main legal reference. In the Act, for instance, marriage is defined as a relationship between a woman as housewife and a husband as breadwinner (Suryakusuma 1996, 2004; Wieringa 2002, 2003). In these literatures, those did not conform to the state’s ideology were mainly portrayed as voiceless victims.

In the post-Soeharto period, since 1998, anthropological and feminist studies elaborating gender and sexual diversities in Indonesia and how members of the societies are engaged in social and cultural negotiation of their gender and sexual roles and identities emerge significantly. Unlike previous studies, these studies importantly contribute to the construction of the sense of agency and subjectivity and the development of a notion of the existing public and private spaces to express gender and sexuality freedoms and diversities. Boellstorff (2005b) and Blackwood (2010) examine the capacity of non-normative gender and sexuality communities such as *tomboi, femme, gay, and lesbi* to negotiate certain forms of gender and
sexual identities and manipulate the state’s gender and sexuality ideology. The later works observe the sense of agency and the negotiation of different gender and sexuality identities and norms within non-state institutions, such as Muslim communities (Rinaldo 2008, 2010; Brenner 2006, 2011) and popular media and culture (Jones 2010a, 2010b).

It is worth noting that the sense of agency in the (political) contestation around the issues of gender and sexuality is found also in the political realm of the integration of gender and sexual rights into the post-Soeharto democratization project. The Law of the Elimination of Domestic Violence issued in 2004 significantly shapes public perspective about the non-politics of private domain to see domestic sphere, the primary women’s sphere, as a political space. As an affirmative action, the Election Law of 2008 includes the provision to grant 30% quota for women candidate of parliament; this law give a significant impact to increasing women’s participation in other public sectors. Critical voices to reform the Marriage Act toward the law that accommodate diverse gender and sexual identities are also rising. While on one hand, these all efforts reflect the growing critical consciousness within Indonesian societies to negotiate their gender and sexual identities, on the other hand, these also indicate the important intersection of gender, sexuality, and Indonesian politics, both at formal and daily basis. However, this central intersectionality does not seem to gain a sufficient attention in more recent studies on gender and sexual politics in Indonesia.

The studies of the state’s politics of gender and sexuality under Soeharto (Wieringa 2003, Suryakusuma 1996) are insightful in understanding the complexities of gender and sexual politics in Indonesia,
particularly their relations and impacts to violations against many civil rights of Indonesian societies. However, these studies do not address the importance of looking at the contestation of local versus global behind this state’s gender and sexual politics. In fact, further question for these studies include the issue of how the national politics was influenced by the global politics, including the global politics of gender and sexuality as found in the issues of family planning, women’s participation in development projects, and the anti-communism campaigns.

Meanwhile, the later anthropological and feminist studies on gender and politics in the post Soeharto bring about a focus on the debates on local versus global in the discussion of gender and sexuality. These studies importantly address how Indonesian societies deploy gender and sexuality discourse to build deeper engagement in “informal politics” or politics in daily lives. Nevertheless, these studies do not really deal with the debates at the formal political level, especially to understand how the debates at the social levels have transformed into the formal political domains, a situation that shows more complexities in the deployment of gender and sexuality in the recent Indonesian politics.

I found in the post-Soeharto period some critical political moments that articulated a political contestation by approaching gender and sexuality within the debate of local versus global as one of the central issues. These moments include the provision of the affirmative action taken to meet the 30 percent quota for women as legislative candidates in the 2008 Election Law, the formulation of the 2004 Law of the Elimination of Domestic Violence, the formulation of the Law Number 11/2006 on the Government of Aceh, and the making of the 2008 Anti-Pornography Law. The formulation of
these regulations indicates the importance of the deployment of gender and sexuality in political arena in the national political changes. In other words, gender and sexuality debates in this political period become an important political tool and strategy for certain political groups within Indonesian societies.

It is worth observing how even in the more recent period, the politics of gender and sexuality in the formal political level are approached by different political groups, mostly with an Islamic background, as a legal back up of their social movements in promoting their “ideology” of gender and sexuality. The debate of local versus local, in this period, appears to be emerging and more powerfully political. Here, I will discuss how the debate of local versus global in the discussion of sexuality and gender among different “political” entities becomes more political when it is used to define the most authentic identities as Indonesian citizens and how this conceptualization of authentic identities gives a serious implication to the acknowledgement or violation of legal, political, economic and social rights. Therefore, it can be said that it is within this framework of understanding how certain social-political moments in the contemporary post-Soeharto Indonesia display the debate of local and global in discussing the issues of gender and sexuality.

**Contextual Backgrounds: National Politics, Global Politics, and the Global Gay Thesis**

Two political moments and one academic development are the important contextual backgrounds in discussing the topic discussed in this research paper. I will discuss how these three political and academic
developments provide important impacts on the shifts of the recent sexual and gender politics in Indonesia’s post-Soeharto era.

**Post-Soeharto Indonesia, The Reform Era**

Within Indonesian peoples, the post-Soeharto period is popular as the reform era (*era reformasi*). Fueled by the monetary and economic crisis since the mid-1997, this key historical moment began when the social protests mobilized primarily by university students insisted the government to “totally” reform (*reformasi total*) all aspects of Indonesian social, political, and economic lives. The protesters voiced some specific demands in the banner of rebuilding the new Indonesia clean from corruption, collusion, and nepotism or cronyism. They blamed Soeharto and his New Order administration to create the crisis. When Soeharto’s political position became weaker, the protesters added more political issues in their movements. They accused Soeharto of committing human rights violations in various forms such as the killings and the arrests without legal process of the Indonesian Communist Party members, the arrests of a number of political activists, and the oppression against freedom of expression. In May 21st 1998, Soeharto finally announced his retirement from the presidential position he held in 32 years.

The idea of reform refers to the radical change in the Indonesian politics. This political change brought freedom of expression to Indonesian peoples. This new political development provides equal public spaces to different political groups in the societies to express their political interests. Religious groups are among the political entities benefit from this situation. As I will describe below, gender and sexuality are key issues in this political
contestation.

Liberal Muslim groups like the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and a number of Islamic feminist organizations such as Rahima, PUAN Amal Hayati, and Fatayat-NU started being actively engaged in the campaigns of civil rights, including freedom of religion to call for the state’s acknowledgement of religious pluralism and protection of civil rights of religious minority groups; gender and sexual rights to call for the state’s acknowledgement of the rights of women, LGBT and other gender and sexual minority groups. They demand the amendment of the 1974 Marriage Act viewed as carrying traditional and normative gender and sexuality norms and violating gender and sexual minority groups like LGBT peoples.

Meanwhile, some conservative religious groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Defender of Islam Front (FPI), and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) have been actively engaged in the political movements to propose the implementation of Islamic sharia law (Collins, 2007: 8-9). In this period, these Islamic organizations appear to play more active roles in the “Islamization of Indonesian law and politics.” Public and political spaces in the post-Soeharto era therefore became a media of political contestation between these two different religious groups within Muslim communities.

Beside an effort by conservative and fundamentalist Muslim groups to formulate the Anti-Pornography Law to control “the discourse” of pornography by determining what action or behavior is in violation of the law, the Islamic movement to pass Islamic shariah law is most successfully voiced and demanded by conservative and fundamentalist groups at the level of local governments, called Perda Syariat. The central issues of both the
Anti-Pornography Law and *Perda Syariat* are to make a regulation to limit the rights and freedoms of women, as part of the political movement of leading Indonesian nation-state more morally “Islamic.”

In the view of conservative Muslim groups and political leaders the rise of freedom of expression following the reform movement has led to serious moral decline. The shariah movement is a conservative effort to control freedom of thought and expression among Indonesian Muslims. Since progressive Islamic feminist movements promote Islamic renewal and reform, they are directly affected by the Islamic shariah movement.

The focus on moral decline gives the Islamic conservatives authority to define morality and pornography to mainstream society. The Anti-Pornography Law defined pornography as “every human creation containing sexual materials, including pictures, vignettes, illustrations, photography, writing, voice, sound, motion pictures, animation, cartoons, lyrics, conversation or other forms of communication in media for public consumption that can invite sexual desires and violate moral values and create the rise of ‘porn-action’ within society.” The conservatives blame progressive groups, including Muslim feminists, as the source of moral decadence because they defend freedom of expression. This presents a dilemma to Islamic feminist organizations.

They are given a choice between accepting anti-pornography laws in order to be included with all like-minded people as moral and religious Muslims or rejecting the law and being seen as immoral. The traditionalist Islamic perspective expressed in *Perda Syariat* and the Anti-Pornography Law positions women as the source of moral decadence. Prostitution is also blamed on women. In Tangerang district, an industrial suburb of Jakarta,
Perda No. 8/2005 authorizes the arrest of women suspected of being prostitutes. In one case security guards arrested a woman waiting for a taxi at night assuming she was a prostituted. She was in fact a poor woman who had to work at night with no connection to prostitution, but the local government jailed her. Following traditionalist perspectives the government of Tangerang views it as morally inappropriate for a woman to be in the street after dark.

The Islamic shariah movement emerged in the context of political reforms adopted after the 1998 reform movement. Decentralization and regional autonomy give local government greater power to manage their resources. Local leaders have associated themselves with the conservative Muslim groups and use Islam-based discrimination against women as a vehicle to increase their support. With Perda Syariat, the number of groups opposing feminist organizations has increased due to decentralization and regional autonomy adopted after the 1998 reform movement. In the past, political challenge to feminist organizations was centralized in the national government. This situation is more problematic for women due to the lack of experience of local women’s groups. Feminist groups have limited opportunities to sit together in one forum to consolidate their efforts. The politics of shariah law also distracts feminists from other projects to empower local women. Feminists have less time to devote to state gender budgeting or other political efforts to support women’s movements. With Perda Syariat the state apparatus, such as police and security guards, are used to enforce patriarchal restrictions on the activities of women.

More recently, the so-called religious violence against communities with non-mainstream and non-normative gender and sexual identities
significantly increase. In March 26, 2010, the Defender of Islamic Front (Front Pembela Islam or FPI) attacked a number of participants of the 4th Regional Conference of International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA-Asia) in Surabaya, Indonesia. At the same day, the Islamic Community Forum (Forum Umat Islam or FUI) occupied the office of GAYa Nusantara, one of Indonesian LGBT organizations that appointed to be the organizational committee of the ILGA conference.

In April 4, 2010 FPI attacked a seminar and training forum on human rights for transgender people in Depok, southern Jakarta, facilitated by the National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM). In May 4 2012, FPI attacked and boycotted a discussion forum and a book launching attended by its author Irshad Manji, a Canadian Muslim lesbian. FPI members boycotted a concert of an American pop singer, Lady Gaga, to be held in Jakarta in the late May 2012 under the reason that the singer was actively involved in LGBT rights campaigns. And, in April 2013, FPI has mobilized public protest against Dede Oetomo, a prominent LGBT rights activist, who was running for being a commissioner of Komnas HAM.

It seems that freedom of expression in the contemporary political situation is manipulated by a number of conservative religious groups. It is within this political context we can observe and address the contestation of local versus global in the political struggle by deploying gender and sexuality.

**Global Politics after 9/11 and Iraq and Afghanistan War**

The end of the Cold War was followed by three influential political moments that reshape the political relationship of the “West” and the
“Islamic” worlds: the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The 9/11 attacks have been used by the US to continuously re-construct “negative” images of Muslim societies, about the rise of Islamic “extremism”, about Muslim men as terrorist, cruel, inhuman, violent, barbarian, and “uncivilized” and about Muslim women as powerless and voiceless. In this section, I am more interested in examining the different responses within global Muslim communities to these political events.

To respond to the Western’s typically using the 9/11 attacks to reenacting the stereotypical images of “Islamic” masculinities by stigmatizing Muslim men who were accused of getting involved in these attacks as inhuman terrorists and violent, conservative and fundamentalist Muslim groups in various Islamic countries, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan and Iran (Women Living Under Muslim Laws 2007) use the US military intervention in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars as a central argument to challenge and reject the Western model of human rights, women’s rights and democracy. The emerging phenomena of the revival of the Islamic law of adultery or sexual intercourse outside legal marriage (zina) in some Islamic countries mentioned above are seen as an important Islamic politics of sexuality and gender aimed directly to critically respond to the “failure” and “ambiguity” of the Western concept and idea of human rights and women’s right as they accused some Western countries, particularly the United States of being involved in the violent actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some Islamic fundamentalist and conservative groups even use the issue to start campaigning for the development of “an authentic Islamic feminism” derived from the rich traditions of Islam (Mir-Hosseini and Hamzic 2010) that are pure from the influences of the Western concepts.
of human rights and women’s rights. Therefore, the increasing voices toward the revival of *zina* law provide an important argument to observe the growing phenomena of the deployment of gender and sexuality as a political tool among contemporary Islamic fundamentalist groups, including some cases within Indonesian Islamic context.

I found another form of response in regard to the global political change as a result of the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Unlike conservative and fundamentalist groups who critically challenge the Western human rights idea as point of departure in building the revival of Islamic law movements, some feminist groups of these Islamic countries consolidate their human rights, women’s rights and LGBT movements. Here, despite their concerns toward the military intervention of the US and other Western countries in Iraq and Afghanistan, these feminist groups show greater concerns to the emerging voices of the revival of Islamic sharia law.

“Violence is Not Our Culture” –previously called the “Global Campaign to Stop Killing and Stoning Women”-- is a campaign program made by *Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML)*, “an international solidarity network that provides information, support and a collective space for women whose lives are shaped, conditioned or governed by laws and customs said to derive from Islam.” Established in November 2007, this campaign program is “a global network of organizations and individuals committed to end all forms of discrimination and violence against women being justified in the name of culture/religion” called 'culturally-justified' violence against women (CVAW).

Unlike the conservative groups that glorifies “culture” and “religion,” that network show strong criticisms against the use of “culture” and
“religion” as reference and legitimacy of “violence” as seen in the case of criminalizing those accused of being involved in non-marital sexual relationship or in homosexual sexual intercourse under the *zina* and the Islamic criminal law. The network extensively use some international legal concepts such as human rights, women’s rights, gender and sexual rights as in some UN conventions such as The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) as fundamentally legal reference of their campaign programs. They also develop their strategy of movements through a close partnership with progressive and liberal Muslim groups and a deep engagement with “the UN human rights system” that is different with conservative religious groups, which prefer to mobilize “traditional” Muslim communities and reject the intervention of Western “institutions.”

In the context of Indonesia, the intersectionality of the global political dynamics and the national political dynamics that present gender and sexuality as the central political issue is found clearly in the case of the implementation of Islamic sharia law in the Aceh province. In 2009, the provincial government issued the Islamic Criminal Law that criminalizes *zina* and homosexual sexual intercourse. The political contestation of local versus global was exploited by both the pros and the cons of the Islamic sharia enactment.

The pros of Islamic sharia draw their argument based on the perspective that their local wisdoms (*kearifan lokal*), local customs (*adat*) or local culture (*budaya lokal*) provide better and more appropriate norms to create just relationship between men and women; they indeed reject using some terms produced in the Western academia such as gender, sexuality,
feminism, and patriarchy. Rather, they refer to “Islamic” and “Arabic” concepts such as ádalah (justice) and musawah (equality). While the cons coming from women’s and LGBT groups, as the global level, often use human rights and other international conventions as the main reference of their movement to reject the idea of applying Islamic sharia law.

In addition, unlike feminist movement at the global level as the “Violence is Not Our Culture” network, feminist groups in Indonesia and in Aceh highlights cultural diversities and religious heterogeneities of Indonesian societies as another argument to reject the Islamic sharia law as it exclusively serve only specific Muslim groups. The political contestation of local and global also clearly exists in this political dynamics of the deployment of gender and sexuality in political arena. In other words, it is within the global political situation of the post 9/11 attacks and the Iraq and Afghanistan wars that the political debate of local versus global in the discussion of gender and sexuality in Indonesia emerges.

Global Gay Thesis: Internationalization of Western Gay Identities

In “Rupture or Continuity? The Internationalization of Gay Identities” first published in Social Text, a sociologist Dennis Altman (1996) provokes us with “the global gay” idea that later creates debates and polemics among researchers from various disciplines studying sexualities, particularly “homosexualities” or queer identities in a cross-cultural and transnational context. Altman conceptualizes “the global gay” as “the apparent internationalization of a certain form of social and cultural identity based upon homosexuality” (1996:77); gay (and lesbian) in many (non-American) countries are now “conceptualized in terms that are very much
derived from recent American fashion and intellectual style: young, upwardly mobile, sexually adventurous, with an in-you-face attitude toward traditional restrictions and an interest in both activism and fashion. Here Altman particularly locates this discussion on the global gay in the context of the influence of economic and cultural forces of globalization in producing “a common consciousness and identity based on homosexuality” (1996:79).

Altman specifically brings about the experiences of (economic) development, a facet toward encountering “modernity,” as a background in the opening gate for “homosexuals” in “underdeveloped parts of the world” to experience “American fashion and intellectual style” that led to the emergence of “global gay.” He indeed emphasizes his analysis based on specific aspects of “lifestyle and identity politics.” The establishment of “commercial space” as a new gay space in (new) “gay cities” in non-American countries, especially in Southeast Asian, Central America, and Eastern Europe indicated the development of the global gay’s “lifestyle and identity politics” derived from American gay experiences. Yet, Altman notes that the global gay was emerged not only under “Western-style consumerism,” but also “the development of gay/lesbian press… and, most significant,… the emergence of gay/lesbian political groups” (1996:78).

Altman elaborates the transformation in the history of “sexual culture” in the Western society; in the early twentieth century, men who engaged in sexual relation with other men were not regarded gay. Today, Altman asserts, “becoming [modern] ‘gay’ is to take on a particular set of styles and behaviors.” He summarizes the characteristics of modern homosexualities as “(1) a differentiation between sexual and gender transgression; (2) an
emphasis on emotional as much as on sexual relationships; and (3) the development of public homosexual worlds” (1996:83). Altman, furthermore, observes the emerging phenomena of such a “modern homosexual” relationship in developing countries (1996:83).

The process of the global gay continues, as Altman (1996:84) mentions, in the creation of social, commercial, and political “gay world” in some non-Western countries that was followed by the development of a “new willingness to discuss homosexuality openly;” “gay community” was developed. Altman (1996:84) understands that despite different consciousness brought by the development of commercial world within different societies, “some form of gay and lesbian identity is becoming more common across the world.”

Altman figures out the impact of capitalism in reshaping traditional sex/gender orders to adjust with “the ideology and consciousness imposed by huge changes in economy” (1996:86). Therefore, he suggests the importance of looking at broader contexts under that fast economic development, including industrialization, in analyzing “the development of modern sexual identity” (1996:86). He also considers the impact of globalization in perpetuating “the erosion of custom, of existing kinship and villages/communities, and of once-private space in the interests of an expanding market dominated by the firms of the First World” (1996:87). The growth of affluence, Altman asserts is an important aspect of the globalization of capitalism that, with education, is viewed as “prerequisites for the adoption of new forms of identity, and the spread of these conditions will increase the extent to which gay identity develop beyond their base in liberal Western societies” (1996: 88).
Altman develops his argument on the global gay thesis based on a research carried out in some Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia. Two anthropological works provide critical responses against Altman’s claim. Boellstorff (2005b) suggests the existence of “national” gay and lesbian identities in Indonesia as found in life experiences of gay and lesbi. While these sexual minority groups are sometimes engaged in “western” gay life style, they still maintain their “Indonesian” gay identities, such as being involved in heterosexual relationship. Blackwood (2010) offers a similar analysis. Yet, unlike Boelstorff who centers his argument on the “national identities” called gay archipelago, Blackwood examines gender and sexual negotiations within tomboi and their girlfriends called femme even in the context of “global” and “national” gay thesis. A key point in this debate is the idea of local (and national) versus global gender and sexual identities within gender and sexual minority groups in the recent Indonesian society.

However, the debate of local versus global in these works do not strongly appear as a political articulation of different political groups. In fact, considering the reasons behind some attacks and violence against LGBT peoples by a number of Islamic fundamentalist groups described above, the debate of local versus global around non-normative gender and sexual identities articulates political fights. Islamic fundamentalist groups often present the idea of rejecting Western gender and sexual “life style” as a legitimacy and argument of their attacks against LGBT communities. Meanwhile, LGBT groups refer to the international conventions of human rights to blame the Islamic groups of perpetrating a serious violation against human rights.
Analytical Framework: Authenticity, Piety, and Anti “(Neo-Colonialism)”

In this section, I will discuss how the political contestation of local versus global in the debate of gender and sexuality issues in the post-Soeharto era significantly contributes to the construction of the new definition of citizenship in contemporary Indonesia that gives further impacts to neglecting certain forms of “civil rights.” I will focus the discussion by analyzing three issues contested the most among different political groups in the debate around the issues of gender and sexuality.

The first is the idea of authenticity. Following Ong’s (1999) idea of flexible citizenship created under globalization and transnationalism to define a concept of citizenship that does not depend on the rigid category of geographical boundary; rather it considers social, cultural and political identities. While Ong’s idea is developed through an analysis of transnational migrations, I will apply this concept to approach the ways different political groups use the issues of gender and sexuality to define the most authentic category of Indonesian citizenship. Here, as the debate center in the different “ideologies” of gender and sexuality as a social, cultural and political product, I underline the point that even at national level beyond transnational migration, the idea of flexible citizenship can also be identified.

To oppose non-normative gender and sexuality norms and identities such as “homosexuality”, “transgenderism,” and “transexism,” Islamic fundamentalist groups and other conservative groups often use the argument that such non-normative sexuality and gender identities are a Western intellectual and political product; the application of these “peripheral”
gender and sexuality identities will destroy Indonesian “national” and “authentic” identity of being men and women and the relationship between them. This argument can be found for instance when the Islamic fundamentalist groups attacked the ILGA-Asia conference; the seminar and training forum on human rights for transgender people in Depok, southern Jakarta; the discussion forum and a book launching attended by its author Irshad Manji; the concert of an American pop singer, Lady Gaga; and Dede Oetomo, a prominent LGBT rights activist, who was running for being a commissioner of National Commission of Human Rights.

By defining LGBT communities as non-authentic citizens of Indonesia, the Islamic fundamentalist groups find a social-political-cultural legitimacy to attack the groups. While some LGBT, feminist, and human rights activists accuse the Islamic groups of perpetrating a serious violation of human rights, no legal-formal process by legal apparatuses, including the police department to handle the attacks.

To critically respond to the conceptualization of authentic citizenship of the Islamic fundamentalist groups, LGBT, feminist, and human rights activists build their arguments based on an interpretation of the state’s national constitutions of Pancasila and UUD 1945 (Said 2013, Hartoyo 2013). In general these constitutions provide generally fundamental principle of becoming Indonesian citizenship, including freedom of expression, free from fear, and equality before the law. Nevertheless, it seems that this legal-formal argument is not an effective way to oppose the conceptualization of citizenship of the Islamic fundamentalist groups. In addition to this constitutional argument, I observe that to counter the fundamentalists’ conceptualization of the authentic Indonesian citizenship based on “Islamic
tradition” there is a critical voice by making the concept of authentic citizenship based on Islamic sharia as found in the case of the sharia law enactment in Aceh as far from the category of authentic Indonesian as the idea is seen as being intoxicated by religious fundamentalist and traditionalist movement of both the Afghanistan based Thaliban and Saudi Arabia based Wahabism.

Second is the idea of social and religious piety. The formulation of the Anti-Pornography Law in 2008 creates social-political situations where Islamic fundamentalist and religious groups often make categorization of certain sexual and gender identities as forms of social and religious pieties. In the category the make, they include traditional gender and sexual norms and identities as locally and nationally produced gender and sexual norms and identities in the category of social and religious piety. Heterosexual relationship, traditional gender role of women as housewife and men as husband, wearing hijab as the “Islamic way of clothing,” and segregation of women and men are among gender and sexual norms and identities considered form of religious and social pieties. Those who embrace such gender and sexual norms deserve social, political, and religious respects.

On the other hand, those who do not follow these locally and nationally constructed normative gender and sexual norms like LGBT peoples and “feminists” deserve social, cultural, and political disrespects. They blame LGBT and feminist groups of facilitating the Western “infiltration” to gender and sexual norms creating the increase of sex outside marriage or free sex (Al Fairusyi 2013). As Wieringa (2001) points out, “While [the Anti-Pornography Law] does not formally penalize homosexuality, this law paves the way for so-called community action...
against gay and lesbian people.” She addresses the attacks of FPI, FUI and other Islamic fundamentalist groups against LGBT are meant “to cleanse society from what members consider to be a social evil” as a direct consequence of the adoption of the Anti-Pornography Law.

Some LGBT and feminist groups respond to the fundamentalist discourse of religious and social piety through the creation of new subjectivity and identity. Some feminist groups as I describe in the introduction come up with idea of promoting women’s rights, gender equality, and sexual diversities by drawing inspiration form Islamic knowledge and tradition (Rinaldo 2008, 2010; Brenner 2006, 2011) that within the majority of Muslim communities consider “local”; some feminists maintain their way of “Islamic clothing” of wearing hijab. They develop these strategies under the framework of promoting Islamic values. A group of transgender established an Islamic boarding school for transgender communities (Habibi 2010). Boellstorff (2005b) addresses how this political situation of social and religious oppression against different sexual and gender diversities lead gay Muslim to get engaged in the creation of religious interpretation to reconcile their identities of being a gay and a Muslim.

Despite this effort successfully creates a sense of agency, these new subjectivities are still a marginal gender and sexual identity; despite this subjectivity create social, political and religious visibility of gender and sexual minority groups, this still cannot really challenge the dominantly public view as carried out by the Islamic fundamentalist groups that label peoples with non-normative gender and sexuality identities and norms as irreligious and “unislamic” (tidak Islami). Therefore, it is legitimate to attack
their rights and to exclude them from the category of good Indonesian citizens.

Third is the idea based on “anti-(neo)colonialism.” I refer “anti-(neo)colonialism” to the expression derived from the idea of living under colonialism in the post-colonial Dutch period that is widely found in some area outside Java, especially Aceh. This “anti-(neo)colonialism” expression was first established in response to the award of national heroine for RA Kartini from President Soeharto. With this award, the state celebrates the birth of RA Kartini every April 21st as one of the national women’s days. RA Kartini was viewed to pioneering women’s movements in Indonesia with her initiatives in developing education for women and girls in the late 19th century.

It becomes the issue of “anti-colonialism” since people in area like Aceh viewed the award for RA Kartini was meant to maintain Soeharto’s (“domestic colonial”) power. As ethnically Javanese, Soeharto centered his political power in the Javanese “traditions, cultures, and civilization.” He centered the national development projects only in the island of Java in which the Javanese ethnic groups gained the most benefits of the development. RA Kartini came from an aristocratic Javanese background. The sense of anti-colonialism grew up when people in Aceh who show the loudest “anti-colonial” voice based an ethnopolitical perspective see that that their heroines such as Malahayati and Tjut Nyak Dhien are more “valid” to grant the award as the heroine of women’s liberation in the country.

In addition, this sense of anti-(neo)colonialism was also significantly developed as a result of the colonial trauma of living long time under the Dutch. They view that RA Kartini’s ideas of education for women and girls
were a product of her encounter with the Dutch colonial rulers who had a close relationship with the Javanese aristocrats. Therefore, RA Kartini’s ideas were not “authentic” and did not reflect nationalism. Unlike RA Kartini, Tjut Nyak Dhien was the female leader of the military forces in Aceh to fight against the Dutch colonial rulers.

Thus, even the political contestation expand into three levels of local of Aceh, national of the central government of Indonesia, and global of the Dutch colonial “politics of gender and sexuality.” Interestingly, these political contestations often increase the political turbulence, not only between the provincial government and the central government, but also among different ethnic groups, mostly between Javanese and Acehnese ethnic groups. This reflects the important positions of the political contestation of local versus national versus global drawn from the politics of gender and sexuality to shifting Indonesian social and political lives.

**Conclusion**

Gender and sexuality appear to be an important variable in shaping Indonesian politics, both during the New Order era under President Soeharto and in the reform period. While during Soeharto power the state predominantly controlled the politics of gender and sexuality, in the reform era, religious groups, particularly Muslim communities play a greater role in the politics of sexuality and gender. Under certain political contexts, both at the national level regarding the democratic reform movement, and the global politics of post-9/11 and the Iraq and Afghanistan war as well as the academic context of the globalization of western gay identities, there have
been increasing political contestation of local versus global in the discussion of gender and sexuality issues in contemporary post-Soeharto era.

It is important to note that this political contestation does not always mean the increase of political and religious violence; it can also mean the dynamic political and socio-cultural negotiation that result to the development of new sexual, gender, religious, and political subjectivities.

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