

## Challenges and problems in the recruitment of ad hoc workers of election management body at the local level: Evidence from Banyumas

### *Tantangan dan masalah dalam rekrutmen tenaga ad hoc lembaga penyelenggara pemilu: Bukti dari Banyumas*

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#### Abstract

The prevailing national regulation on the recruitment of PPK, PPS, and KPPS staff sets forth that those temporary officers can be of service for only two periods of general election and cannot be involved afterwards. This regulation actually has positive aspect, but is not easy in its implementation. This article aims at examining the challenges and problems faced by the election management body at local level (Regency KPU) in preparing the human resource of ad hoc staff for the 2019 general election in Indonesia. This article was based on a qualitative research conducted in 2020 in Banyumas Regency, Central Java. This article shows that challenges that had to be faced by Regency KPU in the recruitment of ad hoc employees were the duration of screening and the way village leaders socialized the information regarding the recruitment. Whereas, the involvement of young generation and women as general election ad hoc workers in Banyumas was still low because of a number of factors, from know-how of general election to having lack information of the recruitment. This study concludes that actor's action choice is limited by a number of matters, such as the path previously taken, rules regulating the agency, and social-political context.

**Keywords:** ad hoc worker; election; election management body

#### Abstrak

Peraturan nasional yang berlaku tentang rekrutmen anggota PPK, PPS, dan KPPS mengatur bahwa petugas ad hoc pemilihan umum hanya dapat menjabat selama dua periode pemilihan dan tidak dapat terlibat setelahnya. Peraturan ini sebenarnya memiliki aspek positif, namun tidak mudah dalam implementasinya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji tantangan dan permasalahan yang dihadapi oleh penyelenggara pemilu di tingkat daerah (KPU Kabupaten) dalam mempersiapkan sumber daya manusia pekerja ad hoc untuk pemilihan umum 2019 di Indonesia. Artikel ini didasarkan pada penelitian kualitatif yang dilakukan pada tahun 2020 di Kabupaten Banyumas. Artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa tantangan yang harus dihadapi KPU Kabupaten dalam perekrutan tenaga ad hoc adalah durasi penyaringan dan cara kepala desa mensosialisasikan tentang perekrutan tersebut. Sedangkan keterlibatan generasi muda dan perempuan sebagai tenaga ad hoc pemilu di Banyumas masih rendah karena beberapa faktor, mulai dari pengetahuan tentang pemilu sampai budaya partisipasi politik di desa. Studi ini berkesimpulan bahwa pilihan tindakan aktor dibatasi oleh sejumlah hal, seperti jalan yang sebelumnya diambil, aturan yang mengatur keagenan, dan konteks sosial-politik.

**Kata kunci:** pekerja ad hoc; pemilihan umum; badan penyelenggara pemilu

## Introduction

The number of scholarly works on the contemporary democracy in Indonesia keeps increasing in line with the political development in this country, which tends to be quite dynamic. Recently, experts have highlighted the influence of populism on democracy (Aspinall 2015, Hadiz & Robison 2017, Hadiz 2018, Mietzner 2018, Mietzner 2020, Rakhmani & Saraswati 2021) and the signs of the declining democracy in this country (Aspinall 2010, Fealy 2011, Mietzner 2012, Hadiz 2017, Aspinall & Mietzner

2019, Warburton & Aspinall 2019, Aspinall et al. 2020, Power & Warburton 2020). However, there are rare studies on the administration of election management body (EMB) and the human resources management of this body. It is quite unfortunate, considering that EMB plays an important role not only in the success of general election management, but also in maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of the general election. The success in the transition of Indonesian democracy from Suharto's authoritarian regime is partially the contribution of the EMB newly formed during the transition period. In the context of institution of democracy in Indonesia, that reorganization of EMB was no longer fully under the government's control was the strategic choice of the political actors involved in the transitional process for this body to have higher integrity.

Regardless of the EMB's contribution to bringing the first general election during the transitional period of democracy in Indonesia that was held in 1999, this body was not free from problems. The problems were related to: this body's preparation period in organizing general election, incomplete and non-detailed laws and regulations, and, with its big work volume, its members from political parties were busy with their campaigns. In the era of the administration formed after the first general election after Suharto's regime, a new law was enacted regulating general election management in Indonesia. Based on previous general election experience of which members were partially representatives of political parties, the newly formed law mandated an independent and professional EMB. The body formed under this new law was responsible for organizing general elections nationally to elect the members of House of People's Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), Provincial *DPR*, City/Regency *DPR*, and President/Vice President in 2004. In general, the EMB worked better than previous one. For example, this body made progress regarding voter registration system and computerization of centralized counting (International IDEA 2012).

Referring to the opinion of Linz and Stepan (1996) on the four requirements of transition of democracy, Liddle and Mujani (2013) argue that the transition of democracy in Indonesia started from 1998 and completed in 2004. This means that the procedure to organize general elections had been agreed on and a general election to elect the government with policy making authority was organized freely and universally. On this basis, it is no exaggeration to say that the EMB relatively successfully performed its role in the transition process. In the 2009 general election, the EMB had a more independent position. In the 2014 general election and 2019 general election, the EMB consisted of the General Election Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum/KPU*), General Election Supervisory Agency (*Badan Pengawas Pemilu/Bawaslu*), and Election Organization Ethics Council (*Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu/DKPP*) as confirmed in the law regulating election (Perdana et al. 2019:118).

For the 2019 election, *KPU* had to implement *KPU* Regulation No. 13/2017 that employees of *KPU*'s ad hoc agencies at local level, namely Sub-district Election Committee (*Panitia Pemilihan Kecamatan/PPK*) at sub-district level, Voting Committee (*Panitia Pemungutan Suara/PPS*) at village level, and Voting Organizing Group (*Kelompok Penyelenggara Pemungutan Suara/KPPS*) at Polling Station (*Tempat Pemungutan Suara/TPS*) level, can be of service for only two periods of election and cannot be chosen afterwards. This regulation actually has positive aspects since it aims at reducing the fraud level which may be performed by election officers who have been holding a position for a long time. In addition, this regulation also encourages regeneration of election ad hoc workers. Among the few scholarly works on election management body in Indonesia, this article tries to give a modest contribution to the study on Indonesia contemporary politics by filling the lack of the study on EMB.

The focus of this article is to discuss the challenges and problems faced by Regency *KPU* in implementing *KPU* regulation on the limitation of period of service of ad hoc election organizing officers. This article gives a modest contribution since its scope only covers Banyumas, a regency in Central Java Province. This article is expected to be the stepping stone for further researches on election management body in Indonesia with wider geographical coverage.

A special attention was paid to the extent *KPU* at regency level attempted to reach and involve the young generation and women to be election organizing ad hoc workers. *KPU* Banyumas released the data of the 2019 election, in which there were 993 *PPS* workers (Village) consisting of 780 men and 213 women. This means that women's role has arisen but needs to increase. From an age perspective, there is also significant disparity. Among the *PPS* workers, 202 were 17-30 years old and 791 were 31-70 years old. This means that the temporary staff were dominated by elders, who are prone to sickness and fatigue in performing their election technical works.

Just like the other experts, Pastor (2007) argues that modern democracy cannot be reduced to only regarding election, but it cannot be less than that since basically an election is a prerequisite of democracy. In other words, free and fair elections are one of the requirements of a large-scale democracy (Dahl 1998). To measure the quality of election administration, Bland, Green, and Moore (2013) propose a measurement framework based on three electoral dimensions, namely participation, competition, and integrity. Electoral integrity covers institutionalization and process which supports election implementation and progress. This covers budget availability, institution impartiality, election staff recruitment process, and election dispute settlement procedure. The third dimension they proposed clearly refers to the importance of performance and integrity of election management body to secure the quality of election administration. Norris (2019:5) argues that there are three conditions that can strengthen electoral administration and enhance legitimacy of electoral results: organizational structure, functional capacity and administrative ethos. According to Norris, trained and competent employees of the electoral authority and their recruitment practices are among important conditions for electoral management.

Considering the urgency of EMB for a democracy, it is important for us to know what influences this body's performance. James et al. (2019) argue that even though there are variations of EMB in the world, there are causal linkages between EMB design, performance and outcomes. The study conducted by James (2019) shows that the performance of an election management body will tend to be determined by some factors, namely management of human resources and employee outcomes. However, there are evidently only few studies on those involved in this body, particularly at lower levels. Kimball and Kropf (2006) argue that study on street level bureaucracy in organizing election is important since election administration is quite vital to ensure the integrity and legitimacy of election. Since they are the parties who directly make decision in the field of election organization, study on them, including their selection method, is important academically and by policy. However, according to James (2019), we still know only a little about employees of an election management body.

This article does not specifically review election organizing officers at lower levels. As previously indicated, this article focuses on election management body at local level in recruiting ad hoc workers in service at lower level structure of election management organization. This article took one perspective of new-institutionalism in viewing institutional change emphasizing agency factor (Lowndes & Robert 2013). Agency here may refer to individual or organization actor as a collection of individuals. In this perspective, actor's action choice is limited by a number of matters, such as the path previously taken, rules regulating the agency, and social-political context. With this perspective, this article intends to view the extent the election management body at local level is capable of adapting to the newly prevailing national regulation amidst limitations applied to them. This article argues that, in order to explain the extent the election management body at local level adapts to the new regulation, it is necessary to consider the agency factor; to what extent the body makes innovative measures or anticipates various limitations to meet what is intended by the new regulation.

## **Research Method**

This article is based on a qualitative research conducted in 2020 with interviews with 15 informants who were selected based on purposive and snowball samplings. They were ad hoc workers who organized election at local levels (ex-*PPK* staff and ex-*PPS* staff), members and ex-members of *KPU* of Banyumas

Regency, members and ex-members of *Bawaslu* of Banyumas, and a social activist of a women's organization. The interviews conducted in this research were based on open-ended questions so that informants had an opportunity to express their opinions and reveal new issues considered relevant with the research according to them.

Data were analyzed manually through the major phase of data analysis, i.e., data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification (Miles et al. 2014). Meaning generated by various tactics in the data analysis stage, including noting patterns and categorizing, were presented in the conclusion to give an answer for the research question.

## Results and Discussion

### Election management body in Indonesia

The International IDEA (Wall et al. 2016:1) argues that an institution is called an election management body when it has the following important elements: determine electable party, receive and validate candidate, perform voting, count votes, and tabulate votes. Mentioned early are the basic elements of an election management body, while in many countries in the world we will find various types of such institution. In general, the variation of the election management body may be divided into three models, namely independent, government, and combination model.

Independent organizing model is an institution which is not part of the executive branch and is not directly responsible to any ministry or governmental department. Government organizing model is an institution organized and managed by an executive institution through a ministry and/or through local government. In the combination organizing model there are two institution structures, one to deal with policy and supervise election implementation and the other to implement election process. The first one tends to be similar to the independent model, whereas the second is usually under state department or local government (Wall et al. 2016:3-4). Slightly different from the opinion above, López-Pintor (2000:21-25) categorizes election management body into five types but can be summarized into three models, namely models of government as election organizer, government under supervision of certain authority, and independent election commission.

Based on the typology above, since the 2002 election, the election management body in Indonesia can be categorized as independent model. According to General Election Law No. 7/2017, the election administrator in Indonesia consists of three institutions, namely General Election Commission (*KPU*), General Election Supervisory Agency (*Bawaslu*), and Election Organization Ethics Council (*DKKP*). Referring to the opinion of Wall et al. (2016), among the three institutions above, *KPU* is the main election management body in Indonesia. *KPU* is the institution which administers all important elements in election process, while *Bawaslu*'s main duty is to supervise election implementation in Indonesia. *DKKP* is an institution authorized to enforce the code of conduct of election implementation in this country. Although *KPU* is the one to design and establish rules of the implementation of election stages, this does not mean this institution is superior to the other institutions. Moreover, juridical speaking, *Bawaslu* and *DKKP* are authorized to make resolutions which bind *KPU* (Perdana et al. 2019:179).

As the election administrator of which its working area covers all regions of Indonesia, *KPU* has a national structure. At national level, there is *KPU* of the Republic of Indonesia which domiciles in the State Capital City. In addition, there are also *KPUs* at provincial and regency/city levels which domicile in provincial or regency/city capital city. As the implementer of elections at respective level, Regency/City *KPU* recruits people to fill in the ad hoc agencies that will help them implement election process at local levels. The ad hoc agencies formed are Sub-district Election Committee (*PPK*) at sub-district level, Voting Committee (*PPS*) at village level, and Voting Organizing Group (*KPPS*) at Polling Station (*TPS*) level. Regency/City *KPU* will organize and manage every stage of election implemented by *PPK*, *PPS* and *KPPS* that operate within its territory. In addition to having cooperation with Regency/City *KPU*,

*PPK* also should have cooperation with *PPS*, and vice versa. Whereas, *KPPS* that operates in a polling station will organize voting and vote counting during elections (Perdana et al. 2019).

The institutional structure of *Bawaslu* basically bears a resemblance to that of *KPU*. The structural relationship between *Bawaslu*, Provincial *Bawaslu* and Regency/City *Bawaslu* is hierarchical in nature, including their respective authorities, which is in line with their administrative territory. Since it domiciles in the State Capital, *Bawaslu*'s authority covers national level, whereas Provincial and Regency/City *Bawaslu* supervise elections within their respective territory (province or regency/city). Thus, tasks, authorities and responsibilities of *Bawaslu* are also that of Provincial and Regency/City *Bawaslu* except mentioned otherwise by law and regulation (Perdana et al. 2019).

### **Setting the context of elections in Banyumas**

In the context of Indonesia, a number of electoral aspects always leave issues for evaluation and improvement from election to election. The 2009 and 2014 elections used staged recapitulation procedure from *TPS* to *PPS* at village level and *PPK* at sub-district level. Many problems arose when the result of *TPS*'s recapitulation did not conform to the recapitulation at village and sub-district. A number of ad hoc employees faced disputes and accusation of involvement in modifying the result of election. Moreover, vote buying (in Indonesia it is usually called money politics) is also quite dangerous for the quality of election and democracy and, therefore, election observers attempt to find solutions, which are currently expressed in *PKPU* of 2017 election, by requiring election administrators at sub-district and village levels to be involved for a maximum two periods. This rule does not apply to *TPS* or *KPPS* staff where they can be of service indefinitely as long as they are still acceptable to the organizing committee.

The logic of this limitation may be read from the change in the vote recapitulation pattern from election to election. Below is the overview: (a) 2009 Election: Staged recapitulation from *TPS* (*KPPS*) to sub-district (*PPK*). This pattern was quite prone and easy for *PPK* to play the data of votes in the election because of the far direct range from *TPS* to sub-district. The 2009 election also did not have complete and trained witnesses from political parties. The long waiting time for vote recapitulation from *TPS*, which numbered thousands per sub-district, weakened supervision over the ballot box and archiving at sub-district offices. In the 2009 election, there was also no witness at *TPS* prepared by *Bawaslu* as that in the 2019 election. (b) 2014 Election: Staged recapitulation was made in three layers from *TPS* (*KPPS*) to village (*PPS*) and to sub-district (*PPK*). This pattern started to be tidier and in controlled since there was staged recapitulation where a party might detect earlier its vote gain at *TPS* and village. In this position, sub-district served only to inspect and rematch the time of vote counting at each village and *TPS*. However, vulnerability was still possible since at village and sub-district levels there were senior staff that may potentially conspire to manipulate the votes. In this election, there was effort to strengthen supervision with three Field Supervisors (*Petugas Pengawas Lapangan/PPLs*) at each village, although this was felt lacking since there were possibly more than five *TPSs* in a village, and even 15-17 *TPSs*. (c) 2019 Election: There were various solutions of improvement of election procedures in this election. This included witnesses at each *TPS* recruited by *Bawaslu* and funded by the state. There was acceleration of election data delivery from *TPS* by snapshotting the blank of vote recapitulation from *TPS* to Regency *KPU*.

The society also had wide access to witnessing and documenting vote recapitulation, thus the society had maximum supervision. *KPU* also regulated the period of service of ad hoc workers at sub-district and village for only two periods, thus there would be regeneration of those temporary workers. What was interesting is that, with strengthening witnesses and supervision, the stages of recapitulation were shortened again from *TPS* to *PPK*. *KPU* made it easier and quicker to renew election vote gain. This election prepared witnesses for each *TPS* of which personnel were recruited by *Bawaslu*, relieving political parties' spending so that they did not have to prepare witnesses at *TPS* level. Political parties' witnesses were generally centralized at sub-district and *KPU*.

From this comparison, we may understand that this regulation of period limitation aims at limiting opportunity of election officers to manipulate the result of the staged election recapitulation. Repeated period of service as election officers at the same region and position will make it easier for a committee at village or sub-district level to cheat. This manipulation requires agreement of all committee members and the agreement may occur when they are close personally to each other. Closeness and similar orientation may occur when one is in the same position and functions for a long time. They may arrange to help a certain candidate or party, agree on the reward and share it to the other members of ad hoc committee.

To cut off the chain of such practice, limitation of ad hoc working period requires election officers to make rotation and regeneration for each election. The existence of new people in the committee will make election fraud difficult to happen and also encourage the committee to have a better performance. The important solution in the 2019 election was the formation of a *TPS* supervisor from *Bawaslu*. This witness was a compromise after the disagreement between political parties and the government in funding political party's witnesses with the large number of personnel and the high amount of cost the state had to incur. The combination of regeneration and massive supervision will improve the quality and integrity of elections in the future.

### **Ad hoc worker recruitment process**

In 2018, Banyumas Regency had elections to elect Head of Regency and Governor of Central Java. Because of the schedule of the elections close to the general election of 2019, *KPU* Banyumas decided that temporary staff who previously served in the elections of 2018 would also serve in the general election of 2019. Recruitment of *KPU*'s ad hoc workers started with socialization of the formation of ad hoc body to the society in cooperation with all stakeholders from regency, sub-district, to village levels. The strategy of socialization of ad hoc body recruitment was, among others, made with publication through all of the existing socialization media at *KPU* of Banyumas Regency through printed media and its website.

The socialization of formation of ad hoc body was socialized to society, particularly those who potentially became part of the ad hoc body. Because of the large number of workers of the ad hoc body, more than those needed for local head of region general election, the socialization was implemented intensively and massively to *TPS* levels. The need for workers at *TPS* level, for example, was up to 38,059 people (with assumed number of *TPS*s up to 5,437 times seven workers at *TPS*), and plus two security workers for each *TPS*.

### *Types of challenges*

The first challenge has to do with duration of the recruitment process. *PKPU* gave only two weeks for those who interested to register as *PPK* and *PPS* staff. The short time had to be coped with by village governments to give the information to the society. This research finding shows that not all villages made massive socialization. Many villages prioritized the existing human resources in the villages from among village officials, teachers, relatives, and social organizations. This means that the villages prioritized the closest network with political and personal affiliation to village heads. This means also that those persons were the first to know the information, and even the information went only among them. Administrators of social organization and networking and seniority of organization also influenced this recruitment process.

The *PPS* and *KPPS* members were mostly determined by village heads through some criteria, including those who used to be election temporary staff, those recommended by village heads and, in case of difficulty in meeting the numbers, it was informed to anyone who was interested. This means that the recruitment was not automatically opened to the public since there were opinions that the society had not heard of or seen any announcement in their villages or that the announcement was made when the

time was almost up, making the society finding it difficult to register. Therefore, the second challenge was related to how village leaders socialized the information of the recruitment.

The recruitment pattern at *PPK* level is three veterans of ad hoc body and two newcomers with good and professional performances. The staged shift aims at strengthening *PPK* capacity by recruiting those experienced with networking and capability to face pressure from a political party and supervisor. The recruitment process prioritizes those with strong mentality to face political pressure, thus it prioritizes those with experience. In addition, there are also criteria for those taken as a figure respected and appreciated by the society. The source of personnel is usually with background of village official with experience and seniority, thus they will be capable of facing pressure and respected by the administrators and cadres of political parties. There are practically many who register for *PPK* for sub-districts, but registrants for *PPS* and *KPPS* find it difficult because of competition with registrants of *PPL* and *TPS* supervisor.

So far, it is apparent that the ad hoc staff recruitment was hindered by challenges of the duration of the recruitment and how village leaders distributed information regarding the recruitment. In general, we may understand that the ad hoc worker recruitment pattern is determined by the social network of village leaders and the discretion of demoting complicating requirements while still prioritizing experience. It is also important to pay attention to the professionalism aspect of ad hoc administrators, which means it must choose those who are truly willing to work and cooperate. In other words, it is not limited only to meeting the number of human resources needed. There are also some cases where ad hoc workers accepted only for the reward but had minimum and ineffective performance.

Lastly, *Bawaslu* may actually supervise the quality of this recruitment process. The supervision assessed the availability and completeness of personnel of ad hoc workers, and also assessed the committee's work quality from mastery of assignments, communication and team cooperation. The supervision over this recruitment received least attention or is highlighted compared to other election stages such as verification of parties and candidates, voter data update, campaign and dispute of vote counting. With the existence of *PKPU*'s limitation of working period and increasing demand for the election committee to master information technology and computerization, *Bawaslu* should pay more attention to the human resource aspect of ad hoc workers.

#### *Constraints in recruiting the young generation and women*

The preparation for a more sustainable human resource of temporary election staff is the solution to the limitation of period for sub-district and village election staff. Meanwhile, a solution to the low interest of the youth at *TPS* level must be found by increasing young generation and women's participation as election staff. This study found that there are at least four constraints that limit *KPU* Banyumas in recruiting the young and women. First, lack of knowledge; village young generation did not have much information and technical knowledge of election. This indifference often caused excessive perception that temporary staff's works were difficult, political and risky. There were many documents to be worked on, burden of administrative activities and clarification of problems with many parties, encouraging their disinterest in becoming the election staff. In a formal context, there was indeed no special policy or activity targeting the young generation for them to be more knowledgeable, accustomed and trained in implementing election technical aspects. In an informal context, the young generation did not receive information and socialization from experienced people. Elders who were experienced in becoming *PPK*, *PPS* and *KPPS* did not have motivation and medium to connect with village young generation and provide election education and training.

Second, lack of information; the other more dominant cause influenced by bureaucratic and political aspects was the young generation's acknowledgement that they hardly obtained information of recruitment of committee during election time. They generally felt they did not receive actual, open and faster information from the village government. Information at the early stage was spread among

village apparatuses, relatives of village government and community figures. When there was constraint in fulfilling the need for committee, *KPU* just attempted to contact the public. The two-week time limit from *KPU* made the young generation's access to information more limited. Information in the last days of registration made them reluctant to participate because of insufficient requirements for preparing their files in comparison to the available time. When the remaining time was only three days and they had to deal with some files, they would automatically choose to give up. The informants also claimed that, if the socialization was made properly, there was a possibility that many of the young generation would take the blank. But if the administrative stage was of limited time, there would be quite few to reregister. It was possible that the factor was the limited time available.

Third, political participation in village; the disinterest in becoming election officers was only part of the apathetic response to village government's activities. When village governance tended to be elitist, lack of young generation's involvement in village development and social activities, youths' response to voluntary collaboration and cooperation also got lower. The young generation who felt lack of attention all this time, without activities given and assistance by village government, would feel it not important to help the village in election and development activities. Disconnection between the young generation and village government might also occur when the base of the youths' involvement conventionally targeted only those affiliated to big social organizations. These social organizations have had social and political reputation since they were involved in political campaign organizations at various levels, from village to regional and national levels. This research confirms that the youth and female figures from youth and religious organizations who were mature in terms of social activities, organization and social networks usually choose to be political campaign workers, legislative candidates or part of elite networks instead of getting involved in technical activities at the village like election committee. AAN, a former head of *KPU* Banyumas, said: "As for women senior members of and be considered figures in Fatayat, PKK, Aisiyah in fact were interested in joining of 'success teams' or candidates of member of parliament." The same thing was conveyed by GUN, a former member of Bawaslu Banyumas, who said: "Activists of civil society organizations who were prominent in the society chose to be 'success teams' during election."

Meanwhile, the youths who interacted with smaller community level at the village were not reached by *KPU*. Sports community, hobby community, etc., whose percentage is quite significant at villages are usually willing to be involved voluntarily or in mutual cooperation in any village activities. Village government also should serve to give them assistance in the form of occupation when they are unemployed. With such assistance, their respect and adherence will be higher to the village than when there is no affirmation at all. However, youth organizations and woman groups were often not empowered in a village's daily activities. Therefore, there emerged non-concern about and disinterest in activities with public involvement in village governance. When village government needed human resources for election, it did not have reference for potential youths and women to recruit. Similarly, youth and women's organizations which lack of activeness have limited scope and membership.

The further effect of minimum youth political education and empowerment at village level was that the young had negative impression of politics and politicians; they deemed political activities not interesting, not important and old generation's work. Politics were defined as the activities of certain people and far from the youth's habits which tended to be informal and relaxed. The information of politics developing among the youth was mostly regarding political practice, and there was not much information of other political roles such as election administration, both at *KPU* and *Bawaslu*.

Fourth, field constraint; women generally complained about the heavy work burden aspect, the extraordinary pressure in performing the work, and working time exceeding normal working hours. Women's involvement was greatly influenced by their daily activities. Generally, women who were not involved in social activities had low interest in election activities. Interest was also determined by social organization experience they has participated in. Women classified as important figures, such as those involved in youth, social and religious organizations, were interested more in becoming political



campaign workers or legislative candidates. These field constraints were found in remote areas such as Lumbr Sub-district, where there was minimum or even zero women's involvement. Conversely, *PPKs* in urban area were relatively capable of accommodating a minimum one person at sub-district (*PPK*) while the position at village (*PPS*) was almost none.

The informants deemed that the patriarchic cultural factor which limits women's social actualization did not have much effect. The following is ENI's (a former staff of *PPS*) statement:

"Thank God, before applying (for a job as a staff of the ad hoc body), I previously asked for permission to my husband and children, who already have grown up, that I would be hardly at home during my duty. Finally they gave me the permission even though the distance between our house and the office was quite far."

Her statement is supported by LIL's (a social activist of a women's organization) opinion, as follows: "In my opinion, cultural problem may still persist but it's not quite significant because many women have more skill and capability than some men; the important thing is that they should be given a chance to involve (in the election process)."

Women's limitedness was caused more by the technical matters of election and field constraint, location, indifference or ignorance and work pressure. Women deemed it was not the patriarchic culture which weakened their involvement intention, but the risk of work, that they would be detested by the society in case of mistake, and working late in the night was deemed unusual for women. The next heavy problem faced by women when they become *KPU* and *Bawaslu* election staff was to face vote buying. The vote buying cases were usually complicated, full of pressure and risk from those involved. The psychological or mental maturity aspect was important since *KPU*'s temporary staff (*PPS* and *PPK*) and *Bawaslu*'s committee must be willing to work technically until late in the night, witnessed by many parties who were prone to dispute between themselves or with administrators. Besides the technical rules to take into consideration, *PKPU* did not emphasize the existence of one woman at each *TPS* or *KPPS* officer as mandatory; it was just a suggestion and consideration for the committee to attempt the availability of woman at each stage of the committee. During the previous leadership of the commissioner of *KPU* of *Banyumas* Regency, there was women's participation mainstreaming activity at *KPU* at that time. In the current leadership, the women's participation activity was no longer massive. *PKPU* regulation regarding the periods for *PPK* and *PPS* seems to need careful attention from the Indonesian Government, considering that, based on the experience of the 2019 election, there was difficulty in meeting the number of registrants, at least up to two times of the number needed.

This study shows that the recruitment practice of EMB temporary staffs for the 2019 election did not change significantly compared with the practice in previous years. According to Sulastri and Handayani (2017), the recruitment practices of *PPS* and *KPPS* staff were not conducted in a transparent manner due to the recruitment information was circulated only among village elites. Such recruitment practices and the domination of village (*desa/kelurahan*) government in these practices made nepotism and political intervention from political parties and the government occur. This study does not claim that such nepotism and political intervention from external parties also happened in the case of the recruitment of *PPS* and *KPPS* staff in *Banyumas*. Nevertheless, in order to achieve electoral integrity, the recruitment practices of EMB temporary staff in the future should be improved by providing information to wider audiences and an accessible platform for registration.

#### *Attempt to implement the regulation*

The recruited ad hoc staff would enter the process of working capacity improvement through technical guidance (*bimbingan teknis*). The condition of *bimbingan teknis* for *PPS* (*TPS* level) was not conducive, since only one representative participated from each village and each *TPS*, which was organized only for one evening. Further, this one representative would provide technical guidance to his/her team at

*TPS*. In short, the time and trained personnel influenced the technical understanding of the election in the field. In many cases, the committee argued there should be at least two representatives from each *TPS* encouraged to master the election technical matters so that they would be capable of completing the many election administrative matters and help in giving a solution to problems they faced in the field. The working atmosphere also exhausted the workers since they worked under pressure, particularly from the supervisors and witnesses of political parties. The committees were also under pressure of fearing making a mistake and had to be strong to face pressure or protest from parties' supporters.

Meanwhile, staff at sub-districts (*PPK*) and villages (*PPS*) levels were demanded to master the computer's Excel program. Only a few officers mastered this program, making quick and systematic input difficult. MIF, a former staff of *PPS*, said: "There were many staff who did not yet master some computer programs so that data inputted could not be done quickly and systematically."

Based on the *KPU* commissioner's experience, it was confirmed that the complicated issue was to find human resources of *PPS* who were capable of operating a computer. They had to work correctly and avoid any error in prevention of election data trouble. In addition to technical issues, administration and communication skills also matter. UNG, a former Head of *KPU* Banyumas, said: "The recruitment strategy was carried out based on one's experiences and his/her ability to handle administration process of the election and the mental maturity of facing political pressure in the field." That statement is supported by the experience of MIF, a former staff of *PPS*: "The working condition consumed our energy because we worked under pressure especially coming from the supervisor of the election and representative of political parties." Therefore, they must diligently communicate with administrators of political parties and *KPU* itself. This communication helps mediate differences and find a solution from *KPU* in case of problems beyond the knowledge of committees.

The next issue was frequent change in technical rules from *KPU RI*, requiring ad hoc workers to actively consult with *KPU*. The short time of technical guidance and change in technical rules which might take place at any time led to confusion and misperception in the field. There were some delays in distribution of election manuals; meaning what was understood and agreed on by the officers had to be rechecked with the technical rules in the manual. *KPU*'s circular was given to help interpret technical rules, such as a case of limited number of people meeting the educational requirements for a *PPS* committee. In such a case, *KPU*'s regulation circular was issued to search for those experienced with a minimal elementary school education.

In general, the committee's honorarium was far better than that in previous elections. Those who had become election ad hoc workers twice in the 2014 and 2019 elections stated that, in the two elections, the committee's honorarium increased. Its amount in the 2019 election was far higher although it was still below the standard regency minimum wage (*UMK*). Only Semarang City government paid committee's honorarium higher than its regency minimum wage. The others were close to *UMK*. Other than the honorarium factor, most *PPL* and *TPS* supervisors were proud to be election officers. The work load and honorarium factors were no longer a problem this time since the salary was quite good.

As indicated in the previous description, it is apparent that *KPU* attempted to make improvements of electoral management in the 2019 election. However, the improvement of human resource management of EMB was not yet implemented comprehensively. For instance, the technical guidance (*bimtek*) of *PPS* and *KPPS* staff was still conducted by the system of representation. This kind of practice was, in fact, also implemented in the 2014 election. Sulastri and Handayani (2017) suggest that such practice has a weakness: when a staff who became a participant of the *bimtek* did not convey important information he/she got from the *bimtek*, his/her partners would not know about it. In turn, such improper practice will influence the quality of the election. For the next election, considering the budget constraint for organizing *bimtek* for all *PPS* and *KPPS* staff, *KPU* should seek for a reasonable solution to this problem.

## Conclusion

The main focus of this article is the challenges and problems faced by *KPU* Banyumas Regency in preparing the human resources of ad hoc workers for the 2019 General Election in Banyumas Regency. This research shows that *KPU* Regulation No. 13/2017 basically wants to prevent possible fraud by election ad hoc worker at local levels. This is a possibility since they who have been ad hoc workers for more than two periods are prone, for their experience and networks, to be involved in election fraud. To cut off the chain of fraud, rotation and regeneration of election ad hoc workers are necessary. If the good idea was to be seriously implemented, local *KPU* and government should seriously involve the young generation for the regeneration to take place. In addition, women also needed to be involved more so as not only to meet the quota mandated by *PKPU*. This research shows that the two's involvement as ad hoc workers in Banyumas Regency was relatively minimum.

This research shows that problems of recruitment of election ad hoc workers in Banyumas Regency are registration time and socialization of the recruitment at village level, that failed to reach potential registrants. Although *KPU* Banyumas claimed that it had socialized the recruitment through various mediums, the two weeks of screening time was quite short. The tendency to engage community figures to register was inevitable as an important measure to reduce conflict which may arise in the future. However, since community figures were usually senior figures and male, it would surely reduce the young generation and women's opportunity to be chosen.

The young generation and women's participation as ad hoc workers of the 2019 election was still low because of a number of factors. First, they usually lacked of knowledge of general election and its technical aspects. Second, they lacked of information of recruitment of election ad hoc workers. The socialization of recruitment seems to be not really massive in that it had not reached them. Third, the young generation was generally seldom involved in village governance. Consequently, they lacked of interest in getting involved in political activities in the village. Fourth, specifically for some women, field constraints and assumed risks of the work were also the factors to prevent their participation. Those are considered problems that constrained Regency *KPU* to recruit more young generation and woman for the job.

This study concludes that actors' (*KPU* Banyumas) action choice was limited by a number of matters, such as the path previously taken (patterns of recruitment), rules regulating the agency (rule on technical guidance), and social-political context (youth's and women's involvement in village governance). This study suggests that, to recruit more young generation and woman as ad hoc workers of the election management body, Regency *KPU* might consider various channels to socialize the recruitment so that it can reach as many potential registrants as possible. Regency *KPU* can no longer rely on formal government institutions to do it or advertisement on television or radio; rather it might utilize social media to reach the young generation. This method might reduce potential politicization of EMB staff at the local level; something that *PKPU* regulation prevents to take place.

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