

Transformation of the political struggle model at the village level due to the fight for village fund resources: A case study of village head elections before and after the enactment of UU Desa Number 6 of 2014

Transformasi model pertarungan politik di tingkat desa akibat perebutan sumber daya dana desa: Studi kasus pilkades sebelum dan sesudah lahirnya UU Desa Nomor 6 Tahun 2014

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Abstract

This study captures how the Village Law (UU) Number 6 of 2014 has radically changed political behavior at the village level. The political dynamics involved several former DPRD members, former KPU members, and local businessmen in the succession arena for the Village Head Election (Pilkades), in which conditions were rarely encountered in previous times. This study analyzed how changes occurred as they were triggered by the struggle for resources due to the allocation of village funds (DD). This study uses qualitative research methods. Data were collected through interviews with actors who contested in village elections, documentation, and literature studies. The results of this study show how changes in political behavior at the village level only occur after the Village Law is enacted. This study concludes that the Village Law number 6 of 2014 has shifted the political behavior of rural communities as evidenced by the massive circulation of money politics which has led to tense political battles. This study also concludes that the Village Law entices political actors and local businessmen to participate in the contest to seize the power of the village head.

Keywords: village fund; village head; village head election; village law

Abstrak

Studi ini memotret bagaimana Undang-undang (UU) Desa Nomor 6 tahun 2014 telah mengubah secara radikal perilaku politik di tingkat desa. Dinamika politik itu terjadi dengan melibatkan sejumlah mantan anggota DPRD, mantan anggota KPU, dan pengusaha lokal di arena suksesi Pemilihan Kepala Desa (Pilkades), yang mana kondisi-kondisi itu nyaris tidak pernah ditemui di masa-masa sebelumnya. Studi ini menganalisis bagaimana perubahan berlangsung karena dipicu oleh perebutan sumber daya akibat pengalokasian dana desa (DD). Studi ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif. Pengumpulan data dilakukan melalui wawancara dengan aktor peserta pilkada, dokumentasi, dan studi pustaka. Hasil studi ini menunjukkan bagaimana perubahan perilaku politik di tingkat desa hanya terjadi setelah UU Desa diundangkan. Studi ini menemukan bahwa UU Desa nomor 6 Tahun 2014 telah menggeser perilaku politik masyarakat pedesaan yang dibuktikan dengan maraknya peredaran politik uang yang berujung pada ketegangan pertarungan politik. Studi ini juga menyimpulkan bahwa UU Desa menarik para aktor politik dan pengusaha lokal untuk ikut serta dalam kontes perebutan kekuasaan kepala desa.

Kata kunci: dana desa; kepala desa; pemilihan kepala desa; UU Desa

Introduction

Undang-undang Desa (Village Law) Number 6 of 2014 has many implications for village development (Antlöv et al. 2016, Herdiana 2020). Where before the law was issued, village funds were not sufficient

to build infrastructure, develop village resources, let alone to build business entities or business institutions owned by the village. With an increase in the budget for villages which has been slowly starting to be given since 2015, the village seems to be starting to grow. Some of its forms are the construction of trails, agricultural roads, and infrastructure needed by rural communities that can be built with relatively sufficient funds. The rural community became actively involved, because some of the work on projects funded from village funds was carried out by workers from the local village. In addition to getting infrastructure facilities, the community also gets income from the infrastructure that is used for themselves. The village has its own authority with the law, although in some cases it is still directly controlled by the district or city government (Triputro 2005, Lopulalan 2019). However, in fact the Village Law has not only changed the physical form, but has shifted the political model at the village level. The position of Village Head before the Village Law was not considered attractive because there were no lucrative resources up for grabs. When the government started pouring money into the village, then the position of the village head became a bone of contention.

This enthusiasm was illustrated, for example, in the election of the Head of Kutasari Village, Cipari District, Cilacap Regency, Central Java in March 2013. The people were very enthusiastic about welcoming the democratic party in various ways. Some held light discussions which were held at the time of gathering with neighbors. The themes surrounding the names of the village head candidates, to the quality and credibility of the candidates are the most frequently discussed topics. This enthusiasm was driven because the candidates for the village head were very active in socializing themselves. This was triggered by the village fund factor which is very tempting for a candidate for Village Head (Sholikhah 2014). Each village receives official income from the *APBN* (State budget) and *APBD* (Regional budget). Thus, the round of money at the village level every year ranges from IDR 1 billion to IDR 1.5 billion (Nurjaya 2015, Tim Palu Poso 2019, Naylor et al. 2019). Not to mention village income obtained from other sources. In addition, the Village Law also stipulates that the village head and his apparatus are entitled to receive salaries and allowances from village funds (Nurcholis 2014, Vel & Bedner 2015). According to information obtained from several informants, it was stated that each village head could on average bring home a monthly income ranging from Rp. 10 million to Rp. 20 million (Suriadi et al. 2015).

Since 2014, along with the issuance of the Village Law by the government, there have been many political changes at the village level. In the past, contestants who ran in the village were limited to those who live in the village, and not many political actors of various variations appeared (Rozaki 2022). However, since the Village Law was issued which was followed up by the existence of village funds, village politics has experienced several dynamics and changes. Several political actors who previously seemed not at all interested in village politics, became contestants and ran for village head (Aspinall & Rohman 2017).

In Jambi Province, Dori Syafridi, a local businessman in Pulau Pandan Village, lowered his money to Rp 1 billion to win the contest (results of interviews with FAR informants). His rivals were powerless to face the power of money resources that are spread massively in society. Then, another variation, there is the former Chairperson of the Merangin Regency KPU, Barlef Tama, who competed in the post-retirement village head election candidacy from the KPU (the results of interviews with AWN informants). Next was Musharuddin, who succeeded in occupying the Jambi Provincial DPRD seat after two terms as village head in Sungai Manau, Merangin.

In fact, during the 2019 legislative election (hereinafter written: pileg), Musharuddin, who ran from the National Mandate Party (PAN) was placed by the party at the distended serial number, number 10. Musharuddin, who had never been involved in politics, was not taken into account at all at first. His internal opponents in PAN were elite parties. Some of them former members and leaders of the Jambi Provincial DPRD. Musharuddin took advantage of the network of village heads throughout Merangin Regency who were his colleagues during his tenure as village head. Musharuddin found it relatively easy to mobilize the Kades network because he was the Chair of the Village Heads Forum throughout Merangin Regency. Musharuddin's efforts were not in vain, in the 2019 Pileg, and he succeeded in

obtaining seven thousand votes and at the same time outperforming the internal party votes. The former village head was inaugurated as a member of the Jambi Provincial DPRD for the 2019-2024 term of service (Jambiupdate 2019).

Many researchers have long conducted studies on village head elections in Indonesia. Some of these studies were conducted to read political phenomena at the village level, see the shifts that occurred, then use these studies as an impetus to create villages with integrity, care about the suffering of the people, all of which will be very useful in the future. Tjiptoherjanto & Prijono (1983) studied about villages in Java, which focused on the domination of the village elite. In their research, they found that certain groups in the village, such as wealthy people, religious leaders, traditional leaders, dominated the deliberation process in the election of village heads. Thus, the village head who was elected through the mechanism of deliberation and consensus is a figure desired by only a handful of people. Those who have strong access to this small group are more likely to become village heads (Prijono 2012).

Then research on democracy in village head elections was conducted by Yuningsih and Subekti, who focused on photographing the election of village heads in West Java Province in 2008-2013 (Yuningsih & Subekti 2016). They analyzed the different patterns of democracy that occurred in the village, between traditional villages and modern villages. The focus of the study is on three villages in West Java with different typologies, namely Neglasari Village, Cimekar Village and Cipacing Village. The focus of the research was to see how the Pilkades activities in the three villages are phenomena that meet the ideal criteria of democracy or not. As a result, it was found that the phenomenon of Pilkades practice in the three villages had partially met the ideal criteria of democracy, but some of the other criteria had not yet been met.

Two criteria that are fully applicable in the three villages are effective participation and control over the agenda. Meanwhile, the other three criteria, namely equality of choice, adequate understanding, and inclusion have not been fully achieved. However, so far, no studies or research have been found that specifically capture the comparison of village political conditions before and after the implementation of the 2014 Village Law. This article has provided the answer because it portrays how changes in political behavior at the village level took place radically only after the Village Law was enacted.

The phenomenon of local businessmen, former KPU chairman, and council members becoming village heads is relatively new and only happened after the Village Law was passed. The wastage of money at the village level is indeed tempting to anyone. This has prompted a number of political actors and local rich people to take part in controlling village democracy. By controlling the position of village head, they continue to increase their coffers and maintain wealth. If previously there was no known voter mobilization, only now are the candidates for village heads competing for votes in various ways (Harker et al. 2009). This research is very interesting because it clearly describes how the voter mobilization process is carried out by the Pilkades contestants, including through money politics.

The novelties that are contributed in this research are: first, this research shows a radical change in political conditions before and after the Village Law was enacted where the village is no longer merely a subordinate of the sub-district and district/city, but has been independent, autonomously, although it has not yet found a clear form; secondly, the circulation of money within the village authority (approximately 1-1.5 billion rupiah) (Katadata 2019) every year has made it possible for several people to want to get involved in controlling these resources. In addition, in the last election, several former village heads who ran as members of the regional representative councils, were proven to have won the election battle. Some of them are currently members of the Provincial DPRD with a convincing vote from the village where they live. This research has illustrated how the availability of resources is the main reason why former DPRD members, businessmen, former KPU members are moved to participate in contesting for the position of village head.

This study uses a theoretical framework to analyze changes and political dynamics that occurred at the village level before and after the enactment of the Village Law through an analysis of the village head election process. This study uses Bourdieu's theory to explain how actors operate and involve

themselves in village head elections. Bourdieu's theory was used to map out how the candidates for village head mobilized the masses to achieve victory. Utilizing Bourdieu's capital theory allows the author to see how and what are the supporting factors that cause village head candidates to win the contest and, vice versa, why other candidates can lose.

In Bourdieu's view, each actor in achieving his goals has a habitus that has been embedded in a certain period. Habitus are social values that are lived by humans, and are created through a process of socialization of values that lasts a long time, so that they settle into ways of thinking and patterns of behavior that settle within the human being. A person's habit is so strong, it affects his physical body. In turn, these habits serve as the framework that gives birth to and gives shape to one's perceptions, presentations and actions (Harker et al. 2009). So that Bourdieu's theory becomes relevant to see the factors that cause a contestant to succeed in winning.

Research Method

This study collects data from three villages that are the object of research, including Desa Pulau Pandan, Kerinci Regency, then Desa Kungkai and Desa Sungai Manau, Merangin Regency, all three of which are in the Jambi Province area. The approach used in this study is a qualitative approach. According to Bogdan (in Sugiyono 2010:244) qualitative data analysis is: "The process of systematically searching and compiling data obtained from interviews, field notes and other materials." Data analysis is done by organizing the data, breaking it down into units, synthesizing it, compiling it into patterns, choosing which ones are important and what will be studied and making conclusions so that they are easily accessible by themselves and others (Katz 2014).

The data collection methods used in this study are: (1) Literature Study, namely by studying information from a study of books, literature, regulations, articles, journals, websites, and other related library materials with the problem under study, (2) Documentation Study, which is carried out using written secondary data, either in the form of personal documents or official documents, (3) Field Study, for which, in-depth interviews were conducted, either by means of face-to-face interviews, by telephone, or by electronic mail (e-mail) to informants considered capable of provide accurate and accountable information (Abbas 2012, Tsay & Li 2017, Sangrá et al. 2019).

A number of informants interviewed in this study, including FAR, DEL, AWN, FAH and RAN, LEN are leaders in the local village (three villages that became the object of research), where they are direct actors in the election of the village head, who know and directly hear the process of selecting the village head. In fact, some informants, such as FAR, FAH and DEL, are figures who helped win candidates by mobilizing the masses through money politics. This study interviewed them face-to-face in the locations of the three villages. Furthermore, follow-up interviews were conducted via telephone and e-mail. In relation to research, this study explores the process of Pilkades which is expected to explain the dynamics that occur in rural politics. Then the data used in qualitative research are obtained from various sources (multiple resources of data) (Azungah 2018, Mohajan 2018, Natow 2020).

In terms of data analysis, this study applies the analytical method of Miles et al. (2014). First, data were collected and coded for each interview result. Furthermore, the results of the interviews were grouped according to the research objectives that had been determined. Data not suitable are reduced or not used, so that the available core data can be used as a basis for analysis. The reduced data are then grouped again to be presented in the form of a data description (Houghton et al. 2015, Nath & Ramanathan 2016, Lester et al. 2020).

Results and Discussion

Money politics in the village election of Pandan Island Village

Money politics has colored democratic parties that take place at the village level in Indonesia. Initially, money politics was carried out by village head candidates who felt that their electability level was

low. They then used money instruments to boost the vote. The other motive is as a response to money politics actions carried out by rival candidates. Meanwhile, the voting community tends to be permissive toward the practice of money politics, even some of them are deliberately waiting for candidates to pour in money (Aspinall et al. 2018, Halili 2018, Barus et al. 2019). The practice of money politics has also polluted the election of village heads on Pandan Island, Kerinci Regency. The history of village head elections on Pandan Island, Kerinci Regency, actually started from the Dutch colonial period until before the 2014 Village Law; what happened was that the community did not respond enthusiastically and did not really care about the circulation of the village elite. Community participation in village head elections is minimal. They tend to ignore village head elections and prefer to spend their time in gardens and rice fields. Moreover, the majority of local residents work as farmers and fishermen. In the early days, the position of village head was appointed by deliberation by customary people consisting of the *depati* and his staff. *Depati* is the highest customary leader in a village who has the responsibility to determine the rules for living in the village. The *depati* position is not the same as the village head although both have the right to manage the village. However, the *depati* focuses his duties on matters of custom, morality, behavior, inheritance, marriage, and so on (Ahmad 2017).

The village head is the highest administrative leader in a village who has the right to take care of all aspects of village governance and to coordinate vertically with the sub-district or district government. Whoever is appointed to be a *depati* will automatically be immediately trusted to serve as village head. Pulau Pandan Village was formerly the *depati* of Talang Pandan. The first village head came from Bako Rio. Bako is a term for a large family in the Kerinci regional language. Based on the agreement of the village community, as long as he is a *depati*, he will also serve as the village head. Thus, Bako Rio registered himself as an official village head who led until the end of his life (Ahmad 2017).

After Bako Rio's death, traditional leaders began to think hard about finding the latest designs in selecting candidates for village heads. In the absence of official guidelines on how to choose a village head, the community then left their full trust to customary institutions to think about it. What is a customary decision, will automatically be approved and become a citizen's decision. Thus, throughout the 1980s, the position of village head on Pulau Pandan was only rotated to four bako or extended families, namely Bako Rio, Bako Hamid, Bako Dibendei and Bako Disna. The reason why the position of village head is trusted by the *adat* group to the descendants of these four bako is because it is only for those who control the economy or have qualified resources. It is as if it has become an unwritten tradition that only rich people are the most appropriate to become village heads because the village head's job is tough. Meanwhile, ordinary people who are busy making a living in the fields and fields are considered not to have much time to take care of the village administration. Some people are aware of this. There was no competition in the village head election process at that time, and even each bako was not ambitious to mobilize the masses.

Therefore, the people who were invited to come to the village on the day of the election of candidates did not respond enthusiastically. They prefer to work in the fields or in the fields. They don't care who becomes the village head. There are some people who come to vote; however, they are just close family, neighbors or old people who are no longer able to go to the fields. Another thing is that when this Village Law was applied, the enthusiasm of the people in the *Pilkades* even exceeds the euphoria of the presidential, legislative and regional elections. People flocked out of their homes, they poured into the streets, jostling long queues at polling stations. They were willing to leave work in the fields or in the fields, in order to choose and win the candidate they support. Situations like this on Pandan Island only occurred after the Village Law was enacted in 2014.

Another difference lies in how the candidate for village head responds to the implementation of the *Pilkades*. In the past, the four bako had no ambition to get the village head position, were loyal enough to wait for their turn to be appointed by the traditional leaders, but now they are fighting desperately to win. The four bako who used to be in harmony are now having a confrontation in the *Pilkades* arena. Unlike in the past, which only considered the village head position as prestige, now they are encouraged to participate in the contest because they want to control the village's abundant resources. The three candidates competing in the March 2021 *Pilkades* came from three bako, namely Hamid, Dibendei

and Disna. Meanwhile Bako Rio chose to support Dori Syafriadi, a local businessman, Bako Hamid's candidate. The Bako Rio and Bako Hamid coalition finally succeeded in delivering victory for Dori Syafriadi, with a vote that was quite convincing.

The pattern that took place prior to the 2014 Village Law was that there was no village head candidate mobilizing voters massively. Or, moreover, to practice money politics. So far, in the experience on Pulau Pandan, the candidates for the village head who will be elected are brought to a traditional institution, then undergo a ritual oath on the Al Qur'an. The oath-taking is witnessed by representatives of traditional leaders and ninik mamak in a mosque. In addition to carrying out their duties with trust, one of the contents of the oath is not to commit fraudulent practices, including money politics. Thus, according to FAR informants, the process for selecting the village head was very simple, without mass mobilization and without turmoil. "In the past, candidates who fought in the Pilkades did not need to spend a lot of financial capital. This is because the election process tends to take place by consensus. The candidates are also people from the three bako. The community also does not need to be mobilized" (Informant FAR).

The practice of money politics that took place during the village head election in Pulau Pandan is relevant to Valina Singka's research on the village head election in Cipacing Village, West Java. The candidates in Cipacing mobilized the masses by lowering their money, ranging from Rp 800 million to Rp 1.5 billion (Yuningsih & Subekti 2016). The main difference between Pulau Pandan and Cipacing villages lies in the source of money. In Cipacing Village, the candidates for village head got financial assistance from the investors behind them. Meanwhile in Pulau Pandan Village, the money came from the village head candidate's pocket. Referring to Bourdieu's theory, which states that capital is one of the instruments that contribute to victory for a habitus, in the context of the Pilkades on Pandan Island, Dori Syafriadi, as the only candidate who had large capital and poured it on a large scale, succeeded in becoming the winner in the Pilkades contestation on Pulau Pandan.

Oligarchy in the vortex of selecting Pandan Island Village Chief

The enactment of the Village Law has encouraged local entrepreneurs as strong actors to be directly involved in the contestation of village head elections. In previous times, these local businessmen were not at all interested in the village head position. The phenomenon of local rich people in the Pilkades was clearly illustrated in the Pilkades of Pulau Pandan, Kerinci Regency, last March 2021. Of the three candidates who competed, one candidate was named Dori Syafriadi. He is a wealthy local businessman. Until then, Dori Syafriadi and his extended family had never been interested in participating in the succession of village head elections. It was only at this time that he got involved.

In Pulau Pandan Village, Dori Syafriadi is known as a landlord and his wealth is inherited from his parents. His father was known as the landlord in the village. The land is spread from Pulau Pandan to Sarangagung Village, Danau Kerinci District, Kerinci Regency. The Kerinci lake tourism location was once the land of Dori's father which was later sold to the Kerinci Regency Government. During this time, Dori worked as a businessman with his sister by opening a car showroom in Jakarta. His older brother was even listed as an aide to the Chief Justice of the Indonesian Supreme Court.

The succession of village heads in March 2021 became Dori's momentum to take part. He was registered as candidate number three against two other candidates, Usmadi (sequence number 1) and Mardoni (sequence number 2). The previous village head, Syamsul Bahar, chose not to participate in the competition. Syamsul Bahar set up to win Dori Syafriadi. He didn't care if he had to confront his sister-in-law, Mardoni, who was competing to be Dori's rival. Regarding Syamsul Bahar's attitude, the following is an excerpt from an interview with one of the informants: "Syamsul measures himself and is reluctant to contradict Dori, who he knows controls very large capital resources. He's afraid of Dori's money power" (Informant FAR).

Changes in the political behavior of local entrepreneurs who are directly involved in the struggle for village power can be interpreted as an effort to maintain and multiply wealth. Power means the opportunity to enrich oneself. According to Jeffri Winters (2011), the rich or the so-called oligarchs have a wealth defense industry. They use the state as an instrument to maintain wealth. Government

institutions are a potential pathway and source of wealth to become oligarchs. Thus, it can be concluded that the shift in the political motives of local entrepreneurs by participating in fighting over the position of village head that occurred after the issuance of the Village Law on Pandan Island was a response to the availability of very large resources at the village level. Dori Syafriadi even spent billions of rupiah in capital and costs because the resources available and which would be obtained through his position would be much greater.

The ways in which Dori operated by mobilizing the masses through the power of his money can be explained as follows. Before the registration stage was opened, Dori Syafriadi had already moved first. He formed a core team, which he named team 12, which was specifically tasked with conducting guerrilla voting. They were important and quite influential figures in the village. Each of them got a monthly salary facility of Rp. 1.5 million. Dori also bought them a new android phone, which costs Rp 3 million. It is this team that moved to people's homes, seduced them and lured with money. Practically, before the voting process, Dori had already pocketed the data on the number of votes he would get.

Dori has his own way to tame and protect the citizens who have been successfully recruited. Through the power of money, Dori was able to keep his voters, until they were solid until the voting period. The following is an explanation from one of the informants about how Dori's strategy is:

"Dori promised residents a lot of money. The money is then awarded in three stages. The first stage is worth IDR 1 million. It counts as a down payment. It was handed over when residents expressed their willingness to vote and that was a few months before the registration process opened. The second stage, money worth Rp 500 thousand is given when Dori as a candidate has received a serial number. Then, Rp 1.5 million was handed over again on the D day of voting. On average, people get money worth Rp. 3 million. However, there are some residents who get up to IDR 5 million" (Informant DEL).

As a rich person, Dori is known to be royal. Not a few people who came to see him, then asked for additional money and this was immediately given. Dori also used his money to disarm the opponent's power. The way he does this was by offering huge sums of money to the opposing team and supporters, if they are willing to turn around. Some were tempted, some were not. For those whose defenses are strong, Dori still had other strategies to destabilize them. He offered large sums of money (an average of IDR 5 million per person), and asked them to abstain or destroy the ballot paper. Thus, this method was effective in reducing the number of opposing votes. That way, before the Pilkades process took place, Dori could already predict his victory. The voice that he had already pocketed could no longer be missed and that was enough to make him a village head.

Two weeks before the election, Dori became more and more aggressive in mobilizing the masses. His house was always crowded with local residents. They went back and forth to Dori's house, morning, afternoon, evening, night until morning again. Every day Dori prepared an average of 200 packs of rice for the people who came to his house. The intensity of the movement was getting higher on the election day. Dori, according to information from a number of informants, even prepared 600 packs of rice. He invited residents to come to his house to eat, after returning from voting. On that day, Dori's residence was crowded with people. By dawn, the vote count was over. Dori's voice did not miss the forecast. He managed to outperform two of his rivals, by pocketing nearly 400 votes. Again, Dori expressed his joy by showing the power of his money to the public. Here's an informant's statement:

"In the afternoon, after the counting was completed and Dori was declared victorious, 12 cows for the core team were immediately ordered. Dori then again invited the community to come to his house that same night for a party celebrating the victory. Dori even rented a single organ for two nights in a row to celebrate the win. People were entertained and invited to have fun" (Informant RAN).

Dori's victory was absolutely due to the power of his money. This is as explained by Pierre Bourdieu, a social scientist, who states that the victory of a candidate in an arena is partly due to the power of capital. When talking about capital, Bourdieu divides capital into four types, namely; economic capital, social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital (Sholikin 2020). These four modalities are sufficient

to help us understand the reality of political struggles. Capital is a resource that can be a means of production and financial means. Capital includes the means of production (machinery, land, labor), materials (income and goods), and money. So all these types of capital are very easy to use for all purposes, including the goal of winning the Pilkades (Jupri 2021). The greater the accumulated capital owned by a candidate, the greater the support obtained, so that money is a political capital and money is one of the tools used to generate political power, in gaining power (Yanur 2019).

However, what makes a little difference in Pulau Pandan Village is that Dori absolutely only relied on the power of capital in the Pilkades. It does not receive electoral contributions from other capital, such as social capital, cultural capital or symbolic capital. In fact, according to Bourdieu, the victory of a habitus should be supported by four capital forces. In the context of the Pulau Pandan Pilkades, Dori did not bolster voters and get votes from other sources, except only from economic capital. Dori does not have enough social capital because he is not an influential figure and his youth was mostly outside Pulau Pandan. He is also relatively young. Dori also does not need cultural capital and symbolic capital to gain support.

Another informant said that Dori Syafriadi was tempted to become a village head because, apart from the fairly large village budget allocation, there were other resources that he was eyeing. Apart from village funds, the village head can get a fee from the sale of land to the Hydro Power Plant (PLTA) owned by PT Kerinci Merangin Hidro (Bukaka group). Since the presence of the hydropower plant there, a number of Pandan Island people have suddenly become rich. They got their wealth from selling land. The position of the village head in the context of the sale of land is very important. Without the role of the village head, the sales process can be hampered.

“The village head gets a fee for the sale of the land from two sources, the community who owns the land and the hydropower plant. In addition, based on information from a number of informants, Dori Syafiadi is eyeing a river widening mega project on Pulau Pandan. The river widening project is the main access to the hydropower center” (Informant FAH).

Social capital in the election of the village heads of Sungai Manau and Kungkai Villages, Merangin Regency

Conditions such as on Pulau Pandan also occurred in Sungai Manau Village, Merangin Regency, Jambi Province, where this research was carried out. There has been a radical shift in the pattern of political struggle at the village level. Prior to the Village Law, the community did not really care about village head elections. They completely surrendered the appointment of the village head to village leaders, who on average came from religious groups. What slightly distinguishes it from Pulau Pandan, is that local figures whose voices are influential in the Sungai Manau are those who are religious scholars or people with strong religions. In the view of these figures, the village head figure must have criteria; besides being rich, he must also have good morals and religion. So, what happened in the Sungai Manau was that the majority of village heads must have conglomerate backgrounds who are also generous.

The case of the election of Musharuddin in the first period in 2010 illustrates that the character and pattern of Kades recruitment took place under such conditions. Besides being identified as a rich person, Musharuddin is known as a philanthropist. He often helps with religious activities in the local village and is a regular donor to several mosques. He, for example, often sends sand and cement materials for the construction of mosques. His caring and populist figure is the main capital why he is strongly encouraged by the community to lead.

The following is an interview with one of the informants, AWN:

“In fact, at the time of the election, Musharuddin was not at the location. He was living in the middle of the forest for three months, running his timber business. As soon as he returned to the village, he was told that he had been chosen as the village head. Barely any meaningful ripples and contestations” (Informant AWN).

Different conditions occurred in the second period, when the Village Law was passed. Musharuddin, who had had time to enjoy the 'abundance' of village funds at the end of his post, was tempted to perpetuate his power. From 2015 to 2020, IDR 329.8 trillion of village funds had been distributed from the Central Government. In particular, in 2020, the total village funds allocated by the APBN reached IDR 72 trillion and each village received an average of IDR 930 million from village funds (Jannah 2020). Through these funds, the Village Government is given the responsibility to manage village funds for priority purposes in their respective villages, in accordance with the Village Government Work Plan (RKP Desa) and the Village Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBDesa) that have been prepared previously (Baihaqi et al. 2017).

Musharuddin's success in becoming a village head cannot be separated from the social capital he has. According to Bourdieu, habitus must have the capital to win the contest. In order for it to become a superior habitus, namely a superior habitus, according to Bourdieu, there are four capitals that must be owned. These capitals include social capital, cultural capital, economic capital and symbolic capital. In the context of Musharuddin, he is a village figure who has both social and economic capital. His social capital was formed because of his flexible relationship he married the daughter of a former village head, a wealthy businessman and known philanthropist. Musharuddin, in the context of Bourdieu's theory, has a very strong social network.

This study is relevant to research conducted by Fikhri Andhito Putra and Haniah Hanafie at the village head election of Susukan Village, West Java in 2019. In their research, it was stated that one of the Kades contestants lost badly because they did not have sufficient social capital. He just had courage, hard work and motivation. Meanwhile, in terms of material, he did not have assets that could be used as a mainstay in competing. The research shows that he did not have enough social capital to win the village head election, as Pierre Bourdieu said that social capital is a collection of resources (assets) that have potential that can be utilized by an elite group (Putra & Hanafie 2021).

In the context of the Pilkades in Sungai Manau, Musharuddin, who was already tempted by the power and abundance of village funds, in this second period began to mobilize voters, naturally by giving some money.

The following is an informant's statement:

"Especially at the end of his term of office, Sahar has already felt the pleasure of the abundant village funds. The village fund is very tempting because before the emergence of the Village Law, the highest budget disbursed to villages was only IDR 50 million a year" (Informant AWN).

As the incumbent, Musharuddin was considered a capable, nurturing, honest and open figure. He was also known to have a strong relationship with the Regent of Merangin. Musharuddin is a close friend of Nalim, the Regent of Merangin for the 2009-2013 period. Because he has strong access to the circle of power, Musharuddin found it relatively easy to get the APBD for village development. In the 2013 Pilkada, Musharuddin became one of the core teams to win Nalim. Just like local businessmen in Pulau Pandan Village, to achieve victory, Musharuddin then mobilized voters and received maximum support by utilizing economic capital. However, Musharuddin's capital was not as much as Dori's in Pulau Pandan. This was because Musharuddin had a strong influence from the social capital that is formed. The following is the statement of an informant, who was interviewed recently: "He spent the most of his capital in the range of Rp 300-500 million. He already has a name there" (Informant LEN).

Musharuddin's success in maintaining his power was because he was able to maintain his constituency base. Musharuddin, according to Pareto, has turned into an elite. According to Pareto, every society is always ruled by a small group of people who have qualities. They are called elites. Therefore, the elite are people who are successful and able to occupy high positions in society (Haboddin 2020). Using the term big man (an authoritative man) it means someone who is capable of manipulating people and resources to achieve his goals and objectives (Kurniawan et al. 2019). Likewise with the figure of Musharuddin, who has been identified by residents as a Big Man. He has strong capital and influence, because of his prowess. Musharuddin can also manipulate community groups to maintain his power.

Furthermore, Musharuddin finally returned to power as the Head of Sungai Manau Village for the second time.

In Kungkai Village, Merangin Regency, the succession of the 2015 Pilkades was followed by contestants, one of whom was the former Chairperson of the Merangin Regency KPU, Barlef Tama. Barlef was known as an influential figure in his village. Before becoming the Chair of the Merangin KPU, Barlef was a lecturer at STKIP YPM Bangko. The local people know him as an outgoing and sociable person. He also helped many local residents who were in trouble. After becoming the chairman of the KPU, Barlef's attitude did not change much, he continued to socialize as usual, and did not build distance with the community. Naturally, Barlef's character and attitude formed into social capital.

This is relevant to the Pilkades in Panca Mukti Musi Banyuasin village in 2019. There are several factors that support Nursalim's victory, one of which is the social capital factor he owned. Of course, this cannot be separated from the good social interaction between Nursalim and the Panca Mukti village community. Nursalim was able to build these social interactions starting with an image of himself as a good figure to the village community. The figure of a Nursalim who is considered religious by the community contributed to his success in building a trust with the Panca Mukti village community. Therefore, Nursalim was able to win the Pilkades of Panca Mukti village by defeating the other candidates (Febriansyah et al. 2021).

That a candidate in the Pilkada must have three main capital, namely political capital, social capital, and economic capital. He added the Pilkades process is an arena for political contestation by choosing people and competition between candidates; the candidate who is likely to win the Pilkades is the one who has the capital built. The main capital that must be owned by the candidates who want to take part in the direct pilkades contestation is political capital, social capital, and economic capital. The candidate pair for village head has a high chance of being elected if they have accumulated more than one capital, the greater the pair of candidates who are able to accumulate the three capitals, the more likely to be elected as village head. The probability of choosing a candidate pair is part of a complex process, so it cannot be said to be the result of only one factor or a certain modality (Rasenberg et al. 2020, Putra & Hanafie 2021).

In the context of this research, as the former chairman of the KPU, Barlef also has extensive relations, both political and business relations. So, when he was nominated, it was relatively easy for Barlef to collect economic capital. He could move the team and mobilize the community with the readiness of large enough capital. One of them used the PPS network in the local village that he formed when he was the chairman of the KPU. Barlef was also the single most prominent candidate with the biggest team and the most campaign posters.

The attitude of the former KPU chairman who was desperate to become the village head indicated that they were tempted by the enormous village resources. Moreover, the position of the village head has obtained an official source of income as regulated by the Village Law. The income is fixed, from salaries, allowances and operational costs. The salary of a village head and his apparatus is IDR 2.4 million per month (Dewi & Irama 2018). The Village Law also opens space for all village heads to set their own allowances and operational costs. From some information obtained, it is stated that each village head can bring home an official monthly income of around Rp. 10 million to Rp. 20 million on average. Not to mention other income sourced from project fees originating from the village fund (Masrudiyanto et al. 2017).

The strategy of the Sungai Manau village head to win the Jambi Provincial DPRD seat

After two terms as village head, Musharuddin's interest in politics grew even greater. He then took advantage of the network of village heads and all the resources at his disposal to win seats for members of the Jambi Provincial DPRD, for the 2019-2024 period. In his second term as village head, Musharuddin began to carry out political expansion. With his communication skills and again because he has a large capital, Musharuddin succeeded in targeting the Chair of the Village Heads Forum in

Merangin Regency. The network of village heads at Merangin was then used for political purposes. Musharuddin then resigned from the position of village head and registered as a Jambi Provincial DPRD candidate from the National Mandate Party (PAN) in the 2019 Legislative Election. In the internal PAN, Musharuddin was not taken into account. He was positioned at the most protruding serial number, number 10. Musharuddin also had to compete hard because the internal candidates competing were a group of party elites. Some were even listed as former DPRD members. However, by utilizing the village head's network and capital resources, Musharuddin managed to get the most votes in the internal PAN. Musharuddin entrusted the money to his voters through the Kades forum connection. The following is the statement of the AWN informant: "The amount varies quite a bit, ranging from Rp 50 thousand to Rp 150 thousand per vote. Sahar also made political contracts with village heads and promised to disburse his aspiration funds to local villages after being elected" (Informant AWN).

Sahar is an example of a village head who managed to sit in the Jambi Provincial DPRD and defeated party elites and former DPRD members by taking advantage of his position as village head for two terms. Meanwhile, in Musharuddin's success in occupying the DPRD seat, one of the main factors was his ability to utilize social capital. Musharuddin, according to Bourdieu's theory, is a political figure who has abundant social capital. According to Bourdieu, a person is said to have social capital if he has a very strong social network. The wider the network, the stronger the social capital. On the other hand, the smaller the network, the smaller the social capital. The more social capital they have, the more likely they are to win the contest. The size of social capital can be the key to bringing victory (Skirnevskiy et al. 2017, Ganguly et al. 2019, Pantouw 2019). After two terms as village head, then he was trusted to lead the Se Merangin Village Head Forum, which became social capital for Musahrudin to gather a lot of votes. In fact, the votes obtained by Musahrudin in the 2019 Legislative Elections were evenly distributed in all villages.

Musharuddin obtained this social capital from his position as village head. As Kades for two terms, Musharuddin was able to mobilize his supporters, including organizing his colleagues from the village head, to support him as a legislative candidate. As per Bourdieu's theory, the larger the capital, the greater the social capital. Apart from social capital, Musahrudin's success cannot be separated from the existence of economic capital. According to Bourdieu, this economic capital allows one to move other capitals. Musharuddin has a strong and large network; however, with the availability of sufficient economic capital it is possible for him to move the network. Musahrudin's success in maintaining his position as village head, including being a member of the DPRD, is inseparable from the availability of economic capital because he is a wealthy businessman in the village.

Transformation of the political struggle model at the village level

Departing from the description above, it can be explained that the model of political struggle at the village level underwent a transformation only after the enactment of the Village Law. The transformation was triggered by the struggle for resources in the form of village funds. Meanwhile, the form of transformation is that there is a massive voter mobilization by village head candidates by conducting money politics. The contestants maximized their efforts to gain political support in the Pilkades by giving money, where each voter could get Rp 1 million to Rp 3 million. The behavior of the contestants also changed in response to the presence of the Village Law. A number of local actors with business backgrounds and former officials participated in the Pilkades and on average won the contest. This shows that strong local actors who have capital are trying to take advantage of village democracy to pursue the position of village head because they are tempted by existing resources. And a number of businessmen and former officials won in the end. It became evident that the contestation in the Pilkades was attended by candidates with various variants. This variant never occurred in the era before the Village Law.

Another finding in this research is that not always the four capitals, as stated by Bourdieu, must be owned by a candidate to dominate and win the battle in an arena (Knox 2019). The portrait of the Pilkades on Pandan Island shows that Dori Syafriadi only relies on economic capital to win. There was no social capital, symbolic capital or cultural capital. This shows that, in a narrow arena, with a small number of voters, the most effective way to work for victory is economic capital. Meanwhile, other

capitals are not sufficiently influential in raising votes in a contestation (Atkinson 2022). Dori proved an absolute victory on Pandan Island only because of the money factor.

Apart from Dori in Pulau Pandan Village, Musharuddin's victory in the Sungai Manau also illustrates the same thing. Both can manipulate people into choosing them because they have large capital or economic capital. Using money, they can fulfill the needs or interests of the electorate. They succeeded in changing the political choices of some people, who initially did not like it very much and eventually shifted their support. Money also allows them to construct themselves so that they are imaged as generous figures and care for the community. This happened to Musharuddin on the Sungai Manau. With the power of money they can also form a solid team and work measures. Thus, the succession winner in Pilkades has the potential to only happen to candidates who have very large capital.

Slightly different was Barlef, the former chairman of the Merangin KPU. Even though he is not a businessman, he still won through the power of money. However, specifically for Barlef, another victory factor was supported by sources of social capital because he was considered to have contributed a lot to appointing local village youths as members of KPPS. In addition, Barlef's economic capital is also qualified.

In the end, this research shows that Bourdieu's theory only finds its relevance to capital ownership at the research location in the Pilkades Pulau Pandan. Mobilizing voters with money politics only occurred after the birth of the Village Law. This emphasizes that the shift in the contestation model was triggered since the existence of village funds because the state has allocated money worth billions of rupiah each year.

Conclusion

The results of this study clearly illustrate how Village Law (UU) number 6 of 2014 issued by the government on January 15, 2014 has shifted the political behavior of rural communities, which has led to tense political battles. The massive circulation of money politics at the village level never occurred before the Village Law was enacted. This research shows how the Village Law entices political actors and local businessmen to participate in the contest to seize the power of the village head. Economic motives then encourage them to take part in the contest. Changes in political behavior, especially involving local entrepreneurs in village head elections, can be interpreted as an effort to maintain and multiply wealth. Power means the opportunity to enrich oneself. They use the state as an instrument to maintain wealth. Government institutions are a potential pathway and source of prosperity to become oligarchs.

The findings of this research also show changes in the way village head candidates operate in winning contests, one of which is by mobilizing voters by spreading money. Thus, it can be concluded that the shift in the political motives of local entrepreneurs in competing for the position of village head that occurred after the birth of the Village Law was a response to the enormous availability of resources at the village level. They are willing to spend up to billions of rupiah in capital and costs because the available resources are much larger and lucrative.

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