Adaptability of ASEAN states’ political security concept in the post-Cold War under a theory of social evolution analysis

Adaptabilitas konsep keamanan politik negara ASEAN dalam Perang Dingin di bawah teori analisis evolusi sosial

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Abstract

This study attempts to explain the changes in the adaptation of ASEAN states to security norms since the Cold War. This study focuses on qualitative research methods, mainly “process tracking” and “historical comparison.” After the end of the Cold War, the ASEAN states did not immediately adopt the ASEAN framework for security cooperation, but still followed a certain degree of survival instinct. With the strengthening of ASEAN’s normative power, the situation of security cooperation between Southeast Asia and other major states in the region has begun to be dominated by ASEAN. This change has not only led to changes in the security habits of ASEAN states but also prompted ASEAN states to gradually adapt to the security norms based on the ASEAN framework. The changes in the adaptability of ASEAN states to security norms illustrate the fact that ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) are spread from another perspective, and also show the reasons why ASEAN can advance toward a security community. On the whole, the development of security norms of ASEAN states after the Cold War shows a direction of social evolution, and it is a kind of convergent evolution. With the influence of the external environment, ASEAN states “choose” ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) to obtain security, and the ASEAN Security Community finally becomes a form of “inheritance”.

Keywords: ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way); security concept; security norms; social evolution

Introductions

This article attempts to clarify how, as an integration cooperation organization in Southeast Asia, ASEAN dominates the political, economic, cultural, and other orders of Southeast Asia. The strength of integration in Southeast Asia is not characterized by a high degree of institutionalization, but it is
characterized by the gradual reconception of integration strength by member states. This particularity has a changing process. But how does ASEAN adapt to the ASEAN way and form a common security idea? Answering this question is the importance of this article. As a manifestation of security ideology, security norms do not appear in the form of institutionalization, but ASEAN states are increasingly forming a collective force centered on ASEAN. As a driving force to change the behavior of ASEAN states, the concept of security promotes the unity of ASEAN states in a conscious way.

As a security norm, the ASEAN norms are characterized by a decision-making process typified by high consultation, wide consensus, and an autonomous, informal, and non-confrontation-based regional cooperation process, which is mostly used on issues such as non-use of force, peaceful dispute settlement, regional autonomy, and collective self-help (Acharya 1997, Solidum 1997). However, many scholars still question the effectiveness of the ASEAN norms (Amable 2022), and this paper holds that ASEAN norms, as a specification, are effective by complying with thrust (a kind of compliance pull), and although the actor may choose to violate the rule or norm, it can survive if it retains a sense of status (or a sense of standing). Compliance with thrust causes the offender to develop a legitimate strategy (justificatory strategy) for their behavior. Even if someone has violated it, it entices actors to follow rules or norms in the future (Price 2021).

According to Price’s definition of norms, the ASEAN Way is in fact a norm. ASEAN norms not only promote regional cooperation, but also allow ASEAN to play a collective role (Li et al. 2022). However, at present, the academic community has less considered the adaptability of Southeast Asian states to ASEAN norms (Caballero-Anthony 2022). Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has covered most Southeast Asian states, but why does it still have synchronized synchronization in security concept? The close connection between ASEAN from the end of the Cold War to the present day shows that, in the process of adaptation to ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) in Southeast Asian states in the post-Cold War period, there should be a change from an adaptation to a great adaptation. Proposing a kind of analytical framework, this paper will explain the changing process of norms adaptation in ASEAN states, which is reflected in the change in security concepts. However, the ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) are manifested by the informal system, and the academic community has not concluded whether the security concept of ASEAN states is influenced by the ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way). This paper will examine the concept of legal adaptability with the definition of Philippe Bourbeau’s concept of resilience.

Philippe Bourbeau defines normative fitness as resilience, which can be divided into three aspects: the first is maintenance, which consumes resources and energy to maintain the status quo; the second is marginality, which means that the actor responds within the boundaries of current policies, norms, or social structure; the last is a renewal, which changes existing policy assumptions, sets new governance goals and reshapes social structure (Bourbeau 2013). This paper defines normative adaptability as whether a specification can strike a balance between flexibility and stability, and presents a certain nature of “maintaining the status quo,” “positive response” and “reshaping the social structure.”

Because of the adaptability of ASEAN security norms, this paper can be roughly divided into two categories: “research on ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way)” and “research on adaptability.” In the first category of research, Amitav Acharya discussed the constructivism of the politics, economy, and security of Southeast Asia, and proposed the concept of a “security community.” He believes that the construction of identity and norms makes ASEAN one of the most successful regional organizations in developing states (Acharya 1997). Other scholars, such as Samuel Sharpe, Alan Collins, Munmun Majumdar, Jose T. Almonte, Alex J. Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, Rizal Sukmaand, and Geoffrey B. Cockerham have analyzed ASEAN as a security community from different perspectives (Almonte 1997, Sharpe 2003, Collins 2007, Cockerham 2010, Majumdar 2015).

In terms of political economy, Shaun Narine, Estrella D. Solidum, Dylan M. H. Loh, Lurong Chen, Philippe De Lombaerde, Ludo Cuyvers, Philomena Murray, Heribert Dieter, and Koichi Ishikawa believe that ASEAN is mainly an institution of economic integration, and economic cooperation will lead to political cooperation. They discussed the political and economic and historical changes in Southeast Asia with ASEAN as the center (Solidum 1997, Narine 2002, Heribert 2008, Murray 2010, Loh 2018, Chen & Lombaerde 2019, Cuyvers 2019, Ishikawa 2021).
In terms of the international regime, Sarah Easton and Richard Stubbs distinguished themselves from the constructor dynamics of ASEAN and argue that ASEAN mechanisms are a framework (Easton & Stubbs 2006). Kamarulzaman Askandar, Jacob Bercowtch and Mikio Oishi all believe that ASEAN and ASEAN norms are an international system, and its international system is gradually moving towards institutionalization (Askandar et al. 2002, Capie 2012). On the contrary, Kawasaki believes that the formation of ASEAN was caused by “collective interests” (Kawasaki 2006).

In the study of the ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) practice, Mark Benson discussed some issues of the ASEAN Way, which helped to think about the operation of the ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) (Beeson 2009). Hsueh discusses the effectiveness and lack of ASEAN security management from a pacifist perspective, arguing that ASEAN is unable to handle the rising nationalism caused by the economic downturn (Hsueh 2016). Nischalke sees ASEAN as a community of rules, not a community of identity (Nischalke 2002). Sanae Suzuki discussed the role of ASEAN intervention (Suzuki 2019). In terms of discourse analysis, Taku Yukawa and others all believe that ASEAN norms are a manifestation of ASEAN’S formation of an interactive culture (Yukawa 2018). The above scholars have analyzed the connection between ASEAN and ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) from different perspectives, but they lack the investigation of safety norms in different periods of Southeast Asia and the analysis of the transmission power of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way).

In the second type of research, most scholars only analyze the normative adaptability of the EU, starting from the question of how the adaptability of the norms changes. David Chandler defines adaptability/resilience as “the ability of an actor to actively or successfully adapt to external threats or the ability to deal with problems,” but he does not analyze the changes in adaptability. Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak examine adaptability and find that adaptability can have positive effects. They argue that the key to adaptability lies in the system’s internal perceptual ability to exceed other interfering variables, prompting the system to automatically correct to the adaptive state (Comfort et al. 2010). Other scholars more discuss from the perspective of security governance, such as Elke Krahmann and Mark Webber discussed how the state and international mechanisms participated in the process of governance under the security structure of the post-Cold War period.

To sum up, in addition to focusing more on the EU, most scholars still cannot explain how the adaptability of norms changes. The scholars mentioned above only believe that the adaptive changes come from the passive acceptance of external shocks, such as the refugee issues and the European debt crisis. In addition, scholars do not explain how individuals (or states) adapt to collective (or community) norms, and how this adaptive transition process occurs. On the whole, neither foreign scholars nor Chinese scholars can well explain why the adaptation of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way), and how a country changes its security concept in the process of adapting to the norms. At present, scholars have no way to explain the correlation between national autonomy and normative adaptability. Based on this, this paper will analyze the adaptability changes of ASEAN states in the post-Cold War period to fill the gap in academic research on normative adaptability.

Specification adaptability refers to whether a specification can strike a balance between flexibility and stability, showing a certain nature of “maintaining the status quo,” “positive response” and “reshaping the social structure.” How a state adapts to a norm is largely reflected in whether the national security concept is affected by this norm and then changes. However, in the process of adapting to the norms, the country has a certain autonomy. This autonomy is also closely related to the external environment, so this study will take Tang’s (唐世平) theory of social evolution as the analytical framework to discuss the causal relationship between the change in the external environment and the autonomy of the country’s adaptation to norms, with some discussion as follows: (1) How did the security adaptability of ASEAN states change after the Cold War?; (2) Why are ASEAN states’ security behaviors getting closer?; (3) Why do ASEAN states gradually take the whole ASEAN (altruism) as a consideration to adapt to security norms?
**Research Method**

Tang proposed a theory of social evolution in his book “The Social Evolution of International Politics from 8,000 BC to the Future.” He believed that the impetus of the international structural transition was consistent with the survival mechanism of biology, and so he redefined the “variation” - “selection” - “genetic” mechanism of biology.

In terms of “variation” mechanisms, he regarded the idea of specific institutional arrangements as genes and institutions as a genetic phenotype. Since the germination of ideas involves consciousness, the mutation in social evolution in the concept dimension (that is, the new concept) is not random, but the concept produced by the individual (country) based on solving specific problems and striving for specific goals (Tang 2017).

In terms of the “choice” mechanism, Tang Shiping believes that the choice of what ideas can exist cannot occur without the support of social power and that people with greater power may decide to spread or stifle certain ideas. Existing ideas, especially those that have been dogmatic, often have the power to support them and have a huge impact on the new ideas’ (genetic) adaptability (Tang 2017).

In terms of “genetic” mechanisms, he believes that there is no obstacle that the genes (such as ideas) and phenotypes (such as institutions, and culture) of acquired traits can be passed directly on to the next generation. At the same time, genetic mechanisms are divided into two types. One is longitudinal inheritance, which occurs within individuals and continuously forms groups with consolidated genes with the help of historical memory and education. The other is lateral inheritance, which occurs among individuals and is formed by constantly receiving external unsafe signals (Tang 2017). However, Tang only investigated the international structure and did not analyze the normative structure and the normative adaptability of the country. To this end, this paper will analyze the adaptability of security norms in ASEAN states based on the theory of social evolution.

First, the normative adaptive phenomenon in ASEAN states confirms that the adaptive changes in ASEAN states do exist. Secondly, this paper will examine the change in normative adaptability of ASEAN states in different periods from the post-Cold War to the present period. Second, from the end of the Cold War to the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2003 is a period of “mutation” (Tang 2017). There are two conceptual groups within ASEAN member states: “states that follow the individual survival instinct” and “states that obey the ASEAN framework.” These conceptual groups gradually transform their ideas into foreign policy, forming two traits, namely, “loose security alliance” and “close security alliance” (Tang 2017).

These two traits also represent different situations that ASEAN states are adaptable to security norms and are more adapted to a certain nature of security norms. “Free security alliance” is more adaptable to “the flexibility of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way)”; “close security alliance” is more adapted to “ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) and stability”. Third, from the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 to the construction document of the ASEAN Political and Security Community in 2015, belongs to the role period of the “choice” mechanism. The change in international structure promotes the gradual expansion of the advantages of choosing “states that obey the ASEAN framework,” and the expansion of the advantages drive the spread of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way). At the same time, it also symbolizes the victory of the “close security alliance” adapted to the “norms and stability of ASEAN” in the competition for survival, and moving toward the “loose security community.”

From the introduction of the construction document of the ASEAN Political and Security Community in 2015 to the promulgation of the Will of the ASEAN Community after 2025 in 2020s the function period of the “genetic” mechanism. The behavior of “states that follow the ASEAN framework” gradually became a habit and circulated among ASEAN members in the form of historical memory. The adaptability of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) has been further deepened, making ASEAN states a close security community. The advantage of a “loose security community” continues to emerge, moving toward a “close security community.”
Based on the analysis of about 50 research articles, this paper hopes to further discuss the adaptation, change and adaptation of ASEAN states to the security ideology on the basis of previous scholars’ research (Beach & Pedersen 2020). This study uses the process tracking method to try to find the causal mechanism. The process tracks have four tests at the operational level, namely, cases selection, tracking mechanism, situation conditions, and evidence testing. Case selection includes finding out the commonality between several cases to prove the relevance between cases. Tracking mechanism should explain the relevance between each mechanism and the whole. Situation conditions describe the conditions under which the mechanism will work. This step is to test the extent to which each mechanism will affect the whole. Evidence testing is to check whether the mechanism found by researchers is tenable and correct. The four tests point to the same purpose: on the one hand, to explain the changes in specific cases on a case by case basis, and on the other hand, to leave enough room for generalization and application of the refined causal hypothesis (Table 1).

Some of the questions asked include: (1) Are ASEAN states’ security behaviors consistent with Tang Shiping’s social evolution theory?; (2) How did ASEAN states’ perceptions and choices of security norms change after the Cold War?; (3) When ASEAN states choose the security norm community of collective identity (altruism), how do they consider it?

The changes in the adaptability to security norms will be reflected in the interaction between security concepts and international structure and ASEAN, so the adaptability of ASEAN states has four situations; altruism or altruism in the international structure, and egoism or altruism in the ASEAN framework. The four situations represent different adaptive behaviors, namely, “loose security alliance,” “tight security alliance,” “loose security community,” and “tight security community.” “Loose security alliance” is where the country chooses to maintain egoism in the international structure and the ASEAN framework, states mainly with their security concept, ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) are only partially observed; “close security alliance” is when the country chooses altruism in the international structure, but chooses egoism under the ASEAN framework. States mainly adopt the mutual security concept, and the ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) are observed; the “loose security community” means that states choose egoism in the international structure, but they choose altruism under the ASEAN framework. The country focuses on its security concept, and the influence of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) is increased. The “close security community” means that states focus on altruism in the international structure and, under the ASEAN framework, states focus on the mutual security concept, and ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) become a system.

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<th>Table 1. The social evolution hypothesis of ASEAN national security concept</th>
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<td><strong>Self-egoism under the ASEAN framework</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Self-interest in the international community</strong> (Individual survival instinct)</td>
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<td><strong>Altruism in the international community</strong> (Collective survival instinct)</td>
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<td><strong>Source:</strong> Created by the author</td>
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Results and Discussion

At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, ASEAN faced a series of challenges, in terms of the nature and form of its challenges, which it had not experienced in the 25 years since its birth (Askandar et al. 2002, Acharya 2005). ASEAN states are becoming aware of the advantages of acting as a collective
in international politics, and are determined to maintain ASEAN’s functioning as a normal institution (Narine 2002, Weatherbee 2005). Before the end of the Cold War, there was only one norm among Southeast Asian states, namely egoism based on survival instinct, embodied in political, military, and ideological confrontation (Almonte 1997, Wesley 1999). At this time, both in the international structure and the ASEAN framework, Southeast Asian states adopted self-interested uncooperative behavior. The concept of following the survival instinct has long existed and has become the consensus of Southeast Asian states.

After the end of the Cold War, the external environment changed dramatically, and global economic and technological cooperation flourished. At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the large European market and the North American Free Trade Area initially took shape. The mutation of the external environment has made the concept of Southeast Asian states “change” and a new concept appear. In addition to the original concept of compliance with the survival instinct, the concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework has also emerged. Once states comply with the framework of ASEAN, ASEAN has normative powers (Rüland 2011), and becomes the advocate and convergence of norms (norm brewery) (Katsumata 2006, Nair 2011). In other words, within the framework of ASEAN, the diffusion of norms is two-way, including the external diffusion of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way), namely the regionalization and trans-regionalization of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way), and the internal diffusion of international norms, namely the localization of international norms. A typical text of the “variation” in this concept is the Singapore Declaration of 1992 signed by ASEAN states in January 1992. In terms of the political and security cooperation framework, the Singapore Declaration embodies the expansion of horizontal and vertical ASEAN security norms.

In June 1992, Vietnam and Malaysia agreed to jointly develop oil and gas in the South China Sea. In the agreement, when the Philippine Foreign Minister and the Indonesian Foreign Minister met in September 1995, they jointly said that “we welcome countries outside the region to jointly develop the Nansha Islands. To promote the settlement of disputes.” In November 1995, the Philippines and Vietnam reached an agreement on a “code of conduct,” which aims to prevent each other from occupying the disputed area of the Nansha Islands, that is, most of the Nansha Islands) remained stable. The “Code of Conduct” includes the following: Judge to promote the peaceful settlement of the Nansha dispute. With regard to the South China Sea issue, Southeast Asian countries, on the one hand, use ASEAN as a force to fight for the South China Sea, while, on the other hand, the two sides also developed the region in the form of formal or informal cooperation. Although some member states do not compete with China in the South China Sea, these member countries need the help of other member countries economically, so they cannot firmly express their stand and are not willing to have too many disputes with China on this issue, so they rarely express public views and comments on the South China Sea issue, such as Myanmar and Thailand (Li & Zheng 2021).

However, these countries support the principles and spirit of the 1992 ASEAN South China Sea Declaration and hope that the parties to the dispute will maintain the peaceful settlement of the South China Sea issue and try to protect their interests in the South China Sea under the framework of ASEAN. But ASEAN member countries are in the South China Sea. There have always been major differences in the issue and China policy, leading to the fact that ASEAN can only reach a lower level of consensus and maintain ASEAN influence on the South China Sea issue. For example, in 1995, ASEAN issued a joint statement stressing that “it is necessary to solve the problems in the South China Sea by peaceful means the issue of sovereignty and jurisdiction,” and asked to seek solutions through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Li & Zheng 2021).

**ASEAN regional forum as an institutional framework for environmental security**

ASEAN has also been committed to expanding the effectiveness of the ASEAN institutional framework and striving to shape a regional security environment with the ASEAN Regional Forum (Katsumata 2006). For example, the chairman of the second ASEAN Regional Forum in 1995 called on ASEAN to
be the core driving force of Asia-Pacific cooperation. In addition, the concept of survival instinct and refusal to join the institutional framework remains strong. Take Myanmar as an example. Although Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, and ASEAN has tried to make constructive contact with it, Myanmar has always been resistant to ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) and systems and has refused to cooperate with ASEAN states, which has seriously damaged ASEAN’s international status (Acharya 1997:108-113, Haacke 2003, Acharya 2004, Emmers 2005). In the first decade of joining ASEAN, Myanmar preferred to cooperate with other states outside the region (such as India) rather than with ASEAN states under the ASEAN framework.

Since 1992, Myanmar has been an important target of India’s “eastward” policy, with a series of institutionalized talks, including but not limited to the ministerial meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Indo-Myanmar local talks, and the Army Commander-level border liaison officers meeting (Engh 2016). India’s eastward policy is mainly based on economic cooperation to expand its influence in ASEAN states. India is trying to strengthen political, economic, military and other security cooperation with ASEAN states in order to attract ASEAN against China (Ma 2014, Engh 2016).

After Myanmar acceded to ASEAN, the diplomatic exchanges and cooperation talks between India and Myanmar continued to heat up. In 2000, Myanmar Vice President Chiang Chiang visited India; in 2001, Indian Foreign Minister Singh; in 2003, Indian Vice President Ali Shekavat, and in 2004, Myanmar President Dan of State met to hold consultations on strengthening political security and economic cooperation. During this period, India and Myanmar carried out joint military exercises and intelligence exchange work in the traditional security field, as well as specific cooperation in the non-traditional security field (Ma 2014, Engh 2016). At this time, among ASEAN states, the two concepts of following the survival instinct and following the ASEAN framework were balanced (Yukawa 2018).

Changes in the external environment make the “variant” concept of adhering to the ASEAN framework continue to grow. The Asian financial crisis in 1997 swept across Southeast Asian states, which seriously threatened the political security and social security of Southeast Asia and other states, thus endangering the economic and security cooperation of all states. The financial crisis has strengthened the determination of all states to cooperate within the ASEAN framework and maintain the norms and stability of ASEAN (Solingen 2005, Acharya & Stubbs 2006). In December 1997, the ASEAN Summit adopted the ASEAN Vision 2020 through consensus, pointing out that ASEAN should be built into a friendly, closely connected, open and stable community by 2020 (Caballero-Anthony & Emmers 2022). The terrorist attacks in Bali in 2002 made ASEAN states strengthen their attention to non-traditional security, such as terrorism, the epidemic, and immigration. During this period, the concept of strengthening security cooperation within the ASEAN framework was institutionalized into the 2003 Bali Second Treaty Declaration (also known as the ASEAN Second Declaration of Coordination Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)), under which ASEAN states cooperate to address a range of traditional and non-traditional security issues.

The Bali second agreement declaration proposed to build an ASEAN community in 2020, ASEAN community by ASEAN security community, ASEAN economic community, and ASEAN social and cultural community in three parts, the three final pursuits, respectively, being to give up the use of force to resolve disputes with each other, realize the ASEAN regional economic integration and the Southeast Asia region into a friendly community (ASEAN 2003). Since then, the security norms in the ASEAN region have been continuously stable, and they have been deepened into the institutional system with political security, and economic and cultural community as the three pillars. The concept document of the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Conference (ADMM) in 2006 reiterated that ASEAN should be used as a core driving force for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia (Haacke 1999). In January 2007, ASEAN states advanced the establishment of the ASEAN community at the 12th ASEAN Summit in 2015 (ASEAN 2007). In the survival instinct and the “mutation,” the latter has gradually gained the upper hand.
Changes to ASEAN security norms

Since entering the new century, the external environment has changed again, the process of economic globalization has accelerated, and China, India, and other economies have risen rapidly. External environment changes “choice” obey the ASEAN framework so this concept can continue to exist, with the horizontal transmission and longitudinal transmission of ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way), and ASEAN specification internationalization and international norms of ASEAN interaction, Observing the concept is better than following the concept of survival instinct, which is a stable specification of close security alliance, than a flexible specification of the loose security alliance. ASEAN states are deeply aware of the importance of accelerating the process of regional integration and strengthening cooperation within the ASEAN framework, giving ASEAN a stable framework of norms and rules and a more efficient and simplified decision-making process (Lee 2007, Martin & Smith 2007). In November 2007, at the 13th ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Charter, which officially came into force the following year. The ASEAN Charter affirms the construction of the ASEAN community in terms of norms and institutions. When the ASEAN Community is built, it will give Southeast Asian states a collective identity and act on this basis to meet external challenges together (Maull 2005, ASEAN 2008). The introduction of the ASEAN Charter marks that the external environment makes ASEAN states choose to abide by the concept of the ASEAN framework. ASEAN states have established close security alliances with stability and norms and evolved toward a loose security community.

The ASEAN Charter for the first time gives ASEAN legal personality and has formulated specific measures to establish an ASEAN community. ASEAN’s organizational capacity and institutional framework determine the legitimacy of ASEAN’s existence in the Asia-Pacific region (Kahler 2000, Emmers 2005, Ebbighausen 2021). Therefore, the ASEAN Charter focuses on strengthening its organizational capacity and institutional framework. The ASEAN Charter is divided into 13 chapters and 55 articles. The fourth chapter adjusts the organizational structure of ASEAN, changes the loose and weak connection between the ASEAN institutions in the past, integrates resources, and makes the ASEAN departments close and well-coordinated. In addition, paragraph 7 stipulates that the ASEAN Summit (ASEAN Summit) is the highest decision-making body of ASEAN, with four councils, respectively in charge of political security, economic security, cultural security, and coordination. As a result, the various ASEAN departments are not only closely connected, but also much more efficient. Paragraph 9 stipulates that the ASEAN Community will be composed of three parts: political and security community, economic community, and social and cultural community, and focuses on regional non-traditional security issues such as human rights and the environment (ASEAN 2007).

In regard to the South China Sea issue, after entering the 21st century, ASEAN has been actively involved and has been on the official stage. He has frequently said he would deal with the South China Sea issue in a peaceful way. For example, in 2002, China and ASEAN signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The Declaration contains four basic principles: freedom of navigation, self-restraint, confidence-building and maritime cooperation. At the same time, ASEAN stressed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence On the basis of principle, the sovereign countries directly concerned should resolve the territorial and jurisdictional disputes in a peaceful way through friendly consultations and negotiations. In 2011, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, Surin Abdul Halim bin Ismail Pitsuwan, declared that “ASEAN, as a collective, hopes that all parties can resolve disputes peacefully”. Surin Abdul Halim bin Ismail Pitsuwan said, “In view of the close trade relationship between ASEAN and China, in order to ensure that the South China Sea issue will not undermine this relationship. Both sides must not only resolve the South China Sea dispute themselves, but also show the world that they can handle this dispute well” (Li & Zheng 2021).

The changes in ASEAN security norms are embodied in ASEAN’s elaboration on building a political and security community. In February 2009, ASEAN states signed the Roadmap for Building the ASEAN Community for 2009-2015 (ASEAN 2009), which provides detailed plans for the construction of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community. Among them, the part of the ASEAN Political and Security...
Community is called the “ASEAN Political-Security Community Building blueprint” (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint). The blueprint emphasizes that the ASEAN Community should be normative and stable. The stability of norms is embodied in three aspects: First, the stability of ASEAN political norms, that is, to emphasize the democracy and the rule of law of ASEAN states, the respect and protection of human rights and freedom, and to institutionalize the norms, and finally to build a united institutional community. In November 2015, ASEAN states issued the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Building the ASEAN Community and the ASEAN Community 2025: Moving Forward Together at the ASEAN Summit 27th, announcing the successful establishment of the ASEAN Community by the end of the year and planning the development route of the ASEAN Community to 2025.

At the informal meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers held in Ha Long Wan, Vietnam, on March 4, 2004, with the unanimous agreement of foreign ministers of all countries, the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee and Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan said that ASEAN was concerned about the current situation in the Taiwan Strait and stressed that it should avoid taking any action that might lead to the deterioration of the situation, that is, the referendum to be held in Taiwan. In view of this, ASEAN countries reaffirmed their adherence to the one-China policy (China News 2004). From Hassan’s statement, it shows that the adaptability of ASEAN countries to the concept of security has gradually been unified and can express their attitude as a whole. After ASEAN established a common security identity, ASEAN also began to export its own security concept. For example, during the Second Interregional Democratic Dialogue held in Indonesia in 2012, Maxwell Mkwezalamba, the head of the delegation of the African Union Commission, exchanged views with Surin, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, on issues of common concern between ASEAN and the African Union and the further strengthening of bilateral cooperation relations. On May 3, the ASEAN Secretariat said that the leaders of ASEAN and the African Union shared experiences on building a community, integrating into the regional economy, political security and development cooperation, and addressing the common challenges faced by their respective regions and even the world (Vietnam News Agency 2012).

When the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in 2022, the strength of ASEAN’s security community began to show. ASEAN began to take itself as the center to influence security norms into various international mechanisms. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand recently announced that it would send an invitation letter to the leaders of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, especially expecting the heads of major countries with international influence to form a dialogue circle at the three global forums to be held by ASEAN before the end of this year. First was the ASEAN Leaders’ Summit and the ASEAN Dialogue Partners’ Meeting on November 13-14, 2022, which invited China, the United States and other major countries to discuss the issue of global security cooperation. Secondly, the G20 Leaders’ Summit was held in Bali, Indonesia, on November 15-16, and then the APEC Leaders’ Summit Forum was held in Bangkok on November 18-19. In view of the deterioration of the global security situation due to the complexity of the current crisis in Ukraine, the Thai Foreign Minister, Don Pramudwinai, while extending an invitation to all countries, called on the leaders of several superpowers as “stakeholders” in the crisis in Ukraine to make full use of the upcoming three international forums to discuss solutions for resolving the crisis in Ukraine and other international conflicts. At the same time, in 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, the Chairman-in-Office of ASEAN, issued an ASEAN Foreign Minister’s statement on the situation in Ukraine, saying: “We believe that in order to prevent the situation from getting out of control, Russia and Ukraine still have room for peaceful dialogue. In order to achieve peace, security and harmonious coexistence, all parties have the responsibility to adhere to the principle of mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and equal rights of all countries” (China-ASEAN Business Council 2022).

The Indonesian government issued an official statement on Russia’s military action against Ukraine, “condemning all illegal acts violating the territory and sovereignty of other countries.” Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen pointed out that ASEAN must have a “strong voice,” so ASEAN’s statements on issues such as the situation in Russia and Ukraine must reflect the consensus of member countries. Among them, the Indonesian government issued an official statement on Russia’s military action against Ukraine, and “condemned all illegal acts that infringe upon the territory and sovereignty of other countries.” Singapore pointed out that it “strongly condemned all acts of unwarranted invasion
of sovereign countries” and “Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity must be respected” (China-ASEAN Business Council 2022).

Conclusion

By analyzing the adaptation of Southeast Asian states to ASEAN norms (ASEAN way) after the Cold War, this paper finds that the adaptation of Southeast Asian states to ASEAN norms is consistent with the path of social evolution. First, at the end of the Cold War, ASEAN states only followed the concept of survival instinct, both in the international structure and the ASEAN framework, they adopted self-selfish cooperation. At this time, ASEAN was a loose security alliance that adopted flexible norms. The release of the Singapore Declaration in 1992 marked the birth of the new variant concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework. The 1994 ASEAN Regional Forum showed a balanced situation between old ideas and new variant ideas. Subsequently, after the 1997 financial crisis, the ASEAN Vision 2020, the Second Bali Accord Declaration in 2003, and the ASEAN Summit in January 2007, the community-building time was advanced to 2015, and the concept of compliance with the ASEAN framework has gradually enhanced, and the adaptability of ASEAN states to ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) has also strengthened with the signing of a series of documents.

The introduction of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the formation of the ASEAN institutional framework system built to maintain its central position mark that ASEAN has become a close security alliance with stability and norms. After the 2021 Burmese junta coup, Myanmar remains cooperative within the ASEAN framework and has reached a partial compromise with the international community to avoid military confrontation. The 37th ASEAN summit in 2020, the “after 2025 vision,” did not stop because of the Burma military coup in 2022, to carry out the vision. ASEAN stated, according to the cooperative security specification inertia, to close security community evolution, namely in the ASEAN and international structure cooperation behavior of weak sovereignty, strong community forward. We believe that as Southeast Asian states become more and more adaptable, ASEAN will institutionalize ASEAN norms (ASEAN Way) and bind them to ASEAN’s central position in the future. ASEAN will form a real political-security community.

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