

**Particularity and universality:
The role of religious and nationality values in the formation of political
values of university students**

***Partikularitas dan universalitas:
Peran nilai-nilai keagamaan dan kebangsaan dalam formasi nilai-nilai politik
pada mahasiswa***

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Article History: Received 05 October 2022; Accepted 28 April 2023; Published Online 30 June 2023

Abstract

The discourse of Islamism in Indonesia in the last ten years has been closely associated with the term radical Islam. In previous studies among students, this term has been often contrasted with nationality values concerning democracy, tolerance, and support for the Unitary State of Indonesian Republic (Known as NKRI). This study aimed to find the particularity and universality of individual political values among university students. This research argued that religious and nationality values become part of individual political values. This research used a quantitative method involving 208 respondents of university students at a state university. The data were analysed using cluster and discriminant analysis to identify the discursive conditions of university students. This research generated three clusters. Cluster 1 is the political tolerant, social media savvy of politics, financially unsatisfied. Cluster 2 is the non-political religious. Cluster 3 is the political religious enthusiast, social media savvy of politics. The three clusters have diversities in terms of interest in politics, the use of social media for political issues and activities, and religious values. However, the three clusters have similarities in nationality values. This research also shows that there is a relationship between political values and the faculty; a correlation between political values with political figures and political parties.

Keywords: Indonesia Islamic discourse; nationality values; religious values; students' political values

Abstrak

Diskursus Islamisme di Indonesia dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir lekat dengan istilah Islam radikal. Dalam berbagai studi sebelumnya di kalangan pelajar, istilah ini sering dikontraskan dengan nilai-nilai kebangsaan yang menyangkut demokrasi, toleransi, dan dukungan terhadap Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (dikenal dengan NKRI). Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menemukan partikularitas dan universalitas nilai-nilai politik individu di kalangan mahasiswa. Kami berpendapat bahwa nilai-nilai agama dan nilai-nilai kebangsaan menjadi bagian dari nilai-nilai politik individu. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kuantitatif dengan melibatkan 208 responden mahasiswa pada sebuah universitas negeri. Data dianalisis menggunakan analisis klaster dan analisis diskriminan untuk mengidentifikasi kondisi diskursif mahasiswa. Penelitian ini menghasilkan tiga klaster. Klaster 1 adalah the political tolerant, social media savvy of politics, financially unsatisfied. Klaster 2 the non-political religious. Klaster 3 adalah the political religious enthusiast, social media savvy of politics. Ketiga klaster tersebut memiliki keragaman dalam hal ketertarikan pada politik, penggunaan media sosial untuk isu dan aktivitas politik, dan nilai-nilai agama. Namun, ketiga klaster tersebut memiliki kesamaan dalam hal nilai-nilai kebangsaan. Penelitian ini juga menunjukkan adanya hubungan antara nilai politik dengan fakultas; korelasi antara nilai-nilai politik dengan tokoh politik dan partai politik.

Kata kunci: diskursus Islam Indonesia; nilai-nilai kebangsaan; nilai-nilai keagamaan; nilai-nilai politik mahasiswa

Introduction

In the last ten years, the discourse of Islamism in Indonesia has been associated by the term Islamic radicalism. A number of studies mentioned that students at several cities, which one of them is Surakarta (Solo) city have been exposed to Islamic radicalism (AF 2013, Darraz 2013, Fanani 2013, Qodir 2016, PPIM UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta 2018, Wahid Institute 2018, Muhammad & Hiariej 2021). Some media articles also mentioned Surakarta city as an area exposed to Islamic radicalism (Lestari 2016, BBC Indonesia 2018, Isnanto 2019, Widiyanto 2019).

The discourse of Islamic radicalism is often contrasted with the spirit of nationalism which brings the values of tolerance, democracy, and support for the Republic of Indonesia. Wahid Institute study (2018) found that the activists of an Islamic organization (Rohani Islam/Rohis) in public senior high schools/vocational schools throughout Indonesia are willing to carry out jihad in the future and some of them supported ISIS. Meanwhile in 2011, the MAARIF Institute conducted research at 50 state senior high schools in four regions; Pandeglang, Cianjur, Yogyakarta and Solo. The research reported that religious groups ranged from the extreme to blaspheme against the state and called for the establishment of an Islamic state, to Islamist groups who wanted to fight for the enforcement of Islamic law (AF 2013). It also reported that the Rohis activities of one of the state senior high schools in Solo involves alumni or other networks that participate in providing Islamic study material in the form of mentoring, liqo and/or halaqoh. The network is one of the Islamic boarding schools in Sukoharjo area (AF 2013), which is the former Surakarta residency area. However, our initial study on several high school students showed that the desire to uphold Islamic law was in line with support for the Republic of Indonesia.

Surakarta, on the one hand, is often called the city that became the embryo of a radical Islamic movement. The perpetrators of the Bali bombings and several other places that were bombed are seen as having close ties to local leader Ustaz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. He is also associated with a network of organizations such as *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI) and *Kelompok Militer Muslim Malaysia* (KMMM). After the New Order, other hardline Islamic groups appeared in Surakarta, such as the *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), *Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta* (LUIS), *Forum Komunikasi Aktivis Mesjid* (FKAM), *Laskar Jundullah*, *Majelis Tafsir Al Qur'an* (MTA), *Laskar Mujahidin Kompak*, *Forum Perlawanan Penculikan* (FPP), and *Jaringan Muda Untuk Umat* (Jami'at), and so on. These organizations have the principle of implementing Islamic law completely (kaffah) (Zakiyuddin 2018).

At the other hand, Surakarta also has nationalist traits. Surakarta was once the birthplace of the *Sarikat Dagang Islam* (SDI), which is the antithesis of colonialism. SDI turned into the *Sarikat Islam* (SI), which is the antithesis of imperialism. Both are intertwined as manifestations of the discourse of nationalism that exists in Surakarta city. Currently the discourse of nationalism is realized through the domination of *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDIP).

The historical condition of the Surakarta city, ideologically, is the basis for radical Islamic groups, the Kejawen school, and nationalist groups which have become an arena for political discourse contestation. This condition indicates an anomaly in Surakarta city which is a city exposed to high levels of radicalism but on the other hand is a city where nationalist discourse also develops and dominates. In this context, the city of Surakarta has become an arena of contestation for nationalism and Islamism discourse. The historical aspects of Islamism and nationalism in the city of Surakarta, are described in the study of Shiraishi (1997), a history professor, from the time of the Mataram kingdom that met Dutch colonialism, until the period after the establishment of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran in Surakarta, and the Sultanate and Pakualaman in Yogyakarta.

This research argued that individual political values are the result of discourse contestation around the subject. In other words, contestation of various discourses can construct different student identities. Certain dominant discourses are assumed to be in educational institutions. Borrowing Laclau and Mouffe's idea, discourse is a structured totality of articulation practices (Laclau & Mouffe 2001). Every form of social practices that exists around us can be seen through discourse analysis. In the same

educational institution, the subjects can be absorbed or called upon in different discourses. They can be divided into different clusters (groups) based on their political values. Mainly because they interact with different learning environments, referring to increasingly fragmented media, peer group influences, and family influences.

In the space of higher education institutions, it is assumed that subjects can be absorbed in the dominant discourses in each faculty, whose existence may be supported by the scientific field being studied. Based on the facts described above, this research aimed to find the particularity and universality of individual political values among university students by using a number of political psychology concepts (Cottam et al. 2016). Individual political values involve religious and nationality values as part of political values.

Religious and nationality values are part of political values, as Rokeach (1973:24-25) states that values are the determinants of almost all types of behavior, including (1) social behavior; (2) attitudes and ideology; (3) evaluation; (4) moral judgment; (5) self-justification; (6) comparison with others; (7) presentation to others; and (8) attempts to influence others. A person's values indicate an enduring belief that a certain behavior is preferable to the opposite behavior.

The individual political values in this research was developed from Ornstein's study which was reported in the book "The People, The Press & The Politics" (Ornstein et al. 1988). Ornstein et al. used religious faith, tolerance (belief in freedom for those who have different values), social justice (belief in the government's obligation to ensure social justice and social welfare), alienation (belief that the state system does not work for certain people), financial pressure (a person's belief about his own financial status), and attitudes toward government (belief in the role and effectiveness of government). In this research, we added some variables as the individual political values come from the study of political psychology (Cottam et al. 2016). We involved variables of political socialization (Almond & Powell Jr 1966, Cottam et al. 2016), political participation, and political efficacy (Verba & Nie 1972, Cottam et al. 2016).

In the study of political psychology, the concept of political socialization is analyzed by looking at the role of the media in influencing political attitudes (Cottam et al. 2016). The dimension of political socialization consists of political socialization through family, peer groups, and media (digital and conventional). Political socialization is a process in which attitudes and patterns of political behavior are acquired and shaped. It is also a means for a generation to convey political standards and political beliefs to the next generation (Almond & Powell Jr 1966).

Meanwhile, political participation refers to activities carried out by citizens aimed at influencing the selection of people who work in government and/or the actions they take. Basically, political participation is taking action aimed at influencing government decisions (Verba & Nie 1972:2). Related to the political participation is a sense of efficacy (Cottam et al. 2016). Sense of efficacy or political efficacy can be said to be individual values related to the belief that individual participation as a member of society in the political field will have an effect or influence to the state.

As a response for Islamism and nationalism discourse in Indonesia in the past ten years, we added a number of variables related to religious and nationality/nationalism. In the context of this study, the concepts added are belief in religious leader (Breznau et al. 2011, Toft et al. 2011, Fox 2018), nationalism (Blank & Schmidt 2003, Anderson 2006, Delanty & Kumar 2016, De Cleen & Stavrakakis 2017), and patriotism (Adorno et al. 1950, Blank & Schmidt 2003). We also added political socialization through social media (Enjolras et al. 2013, Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012, Lim 2013, Cottam et al. 2016) as generation Z whom most of their time use digital media to access information or entertainment (Nielsen 2016, IDN Research Institute 2019). This variable also included related to the discourse contestation through social media. In fact, the spread of ideology is also increasingly rampant by establishing and developing *da'wah* facilities not only through conventional media (TV stations, radio stations, magazine publications) but also through digital media (websites, personal blogs, Facebook, Twitter, and WA) (Wahab 2019).

The concept of religious leaders used in this study departs from the fact that individuals who want to learn or want to know a lot about religious material are currently easier to access information via social media on various platforms. Religious leaders are also religious actors. According to Toft et al. (2011:23) religious actors are individuals, groups, or any organization that supports religious beliefs and that articulates messages that are quite consistent and coherent about the relationship between religion and politics. Actors can be part of a larger religious entity and can be a collectivity whose members are not united. Religious leaders who are also religious actors have in common that they are recognized by many followers as spiritual leaders and actively use this position to follow political agendas (Fox 2018:56).

The digitization of the media coupled with the disclosure of information after the New Order allowed various Islamic discourses to emerge. In general, religious beliefs have an impact on opinions on various issues (Fox 2018:56). For example, people with high levels of religious belief are less supportive of democracy. This is associated with an inability to accept opposing views and nonbelievers (Bloom & Arikan 2013a, 2013b). In addition, for a similar reason, religious people tend to support a larger role for religion in politics and public space, including support for religious political leaders (Brezna et al. 2011). The presence of the internet and social media has even made it possible for religious leaders, *ulama*, *ustadz/ah* or religious preachers to have a YouTube channel, IG account, Twitter account, Facebook page and so on to spread their content. This research was also intended to look at the role of religious values, which involves belief in religious leaders in the formation of student political values.

Another concept added in this study is the values of nationality/nationalism which are also complemented by patriotism. The concept of nationality or nationalism in this study emphasizes love and pride of Indonesia. Nationalism is translated as an ideology that upholds a sense of nationality. According to Delanty & Kumar (2016), nationalism can be interpreted as a movement, an ideology or a discourse about nationality. In addition, De Cleen & Stavrakakis (2017) discuss the nodal point for the chain of equality which is claimed to be represented from nationalism, namely the nation and/or people as a nation. The subject position offered for nationalism is a “nation” citizen who limits it to those outside themselves (constitutive outside), namely non-members and/or other nations. The subject position in nationalism is different from populism which represents “the people” against the “elite” in the country. Anderson offers the idea of nationalism by calling a nation which is an imagined political community inherently and sovereign (Anderson 2006:6). Anderson further translated the ideas of Cf. Seton Watson about imagined nations and states, because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their members, never meet them, or even never hear about them, but in each mind the image of communion lives.

Complementing nationality values, this study also used the concept of patriotism. Nationalism and patriotism are often used to show the relationship between individuals and society (Bar-Tal 1997). Both are considered as individual attitudes that strengthen the nation (Ajzen 2005, Zanna & Rempel 2009). However, the social goals of nationalism and patriotism imply differences. Although both are consequences of national identity which represent positive evaluations of one’s own group, this also includes the ways in which these concepts relate to attitudes toward foreigners and minorities. Minority here is a sub-group within a nation because they fall into a certain category. If nationalism does not support outside groups then patriotism is a concept that emphasizes more on acceptance of intrasocial diversity, namely support for tolerance of outside groups and minorities. Nationalism seeks to idealize group history, whereas patriotism supports its critical-constructive analysis (Blank & Schmidt 2003). The aspects of nationalism and patriotism used in this study cite several ideas. Nationalism contains aspects of the idealization of the nation, in a positive sense that is generalized to the nation (Adorno et al. 1950, Kosterman & Feshbach 1989, Tajfel 2017). This idealization implies also the history of the group. Kosterman & Feshbach (1989) and Hechter (2003) mention nationalism includes feelings of national superiority.

The notion of nationalism has also been referred to as acceptance of national, state, and political authority (Adorno et al. 1950, Schatz et al. 1999, Meloen 2000). Adorno et al. (1950) also mention that nationalism is an overemphasis on national affiliation in the individual's self-concept. In addition, nationalism according to Evans (1952) and Allport (1995 in Blank & Schmidt 2003), tends to define its own group based on criteria of heredity, race, or cultural affiliation. This appears to be in line with Blank's view (1997 in Blank & Schmidt 2003), that the idea of nationalism tends to regard its own group as a homogeneous group. An overview of nationalism was also conveyed by Cottam as, "Being strongly attached to their nation, nationalists are committed to the unity, independence, dignity, and well-being of the national community and the nation-state. Even when they dislike their government, they love the nation itself" (Cottam et al. 2016:294).

In patriotism, the aspect of the nation is not idealized but is assessed from a critical conscience. Patriotism refers to the formation of an opinion about a nation that is independent from elite groups. Support for a system will end when the goals of the nation are no longer in accordance with the beliefs of humanist values (Schatz et al. 1999, Blank & Schmidt 2003). Patriotism is also a historical reconstruction of a group that allows support for different views (Blank et al. in Blank & Schmidt 2003) as well as support for democracy and rejects authoritarian "subject culture" (Blank & Schmidt 2003).

Another variable added to this study is political socialization through social media. Digitalization of media allows the production and dissemination of information to be very massive and open, in fact, everyone has the potential to make messages, or re-upload other people's writings that are considered important to share with others (Cottam et al. 2016:197). This occurs in the context of social media with various types of e-platforms, with much broader communication capabilities. Several studies on social media used in political contexts, for example, regulate the capacity to protest, sign petitions, join groups, or other social movements. Social media has not only informational effects but also motivational effects because social media publicizes people's decisions to join groups or register for an event (Enjolras et al. 2013).

Social media is also a tool for quickly disseminating protest information, getting individuals out of their homes and onto the streets (Valenzuela 2013). Although Lim's study shows that a number of people who support online do not all have involvement in offline (Lim 2013). Another study on political socialization through social media shows that social media can facilitate the lives of people who have limited political participation (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). Social networking sites (SNS) are said to provide sufficient and relevant information to revive the democratic process. Zuniga et al. (2012) also emphasized that it is not the media itself that influences social capital and individual engagement but the specific ways in which individuals use media.

Variable attitude toward political figures and parties were added to this study. Attitudes toward political figures and political parties can be used to measure political values (Cottam et al. 2016). Attitude is a further effect of knowledge (discourse). Political values are a determinant of attitudes. Individual political participation is a manifestation of individual values, in this case political values. In the context of the dominant discourse of Islamism and nationalism, attitudes toward political figures and political parties are used in this research. Mainly because certain figures or figures and certain political parties are connected to the discourse of Islamism and nationalism. Contestation of political discourse (Islamism, nationalism) exists through media spaces called social media which are easily accessible. Social media is a place for individuals to pay attention to certain figures or parties (attention), trigger interest (interest), carry out activities to seek information (search), take action (action), and then share experiences (share). In the communication model known as AISAS (Sugiyama & Andree 2011:78-82), digitalization of the media makes it easier for the public to obtain the necessary information which ultimately leads to a certain attitude.

Two major discourses of Islamism and nationalism have entered into discourse spaces where students are also involved in them. However, Islamism and nationalism are not always two opposing ideologies. This research used the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe's theory of particularity and universality. Particular

in Laclau's concept is a demand seen in itself or referred to as a democratic demand. The totality of these demands, and the particular process that makes all these demands one (universality) is said to be populist demand (Laclau 2005:74).

This research is a way that can be considered to get closer to the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe's discourse. This method is used in identifying discursive conditions in society. A study conducted by Phillips et al. (2019) mentions that the discursive condition of the emergence of collective action that challenges the relationship of subordination can be done with a quantitative approach. Laclau and Mouffe's concept of particularity and universality in this research is carried out by looking at the uniqueness of cluster political values (particularity) and the similarity of cluster political values (universal).

The argument behind this research also supports the concept of subject position which is not singular as Laclau said (2001), which is in line with Sen (2006). As Sen argued, each individual has affiliations with various identities attached to them. This also refers to inclusive characteristics (Ibrahim 2010) resulted from the use of social media as public space where people meet various discourse contestation.

Based on the political values that have been described above, are the students fragmented? At what values do the students who are in different clusters meet (universality) and at what values do they separate (particularity). Does each cluster have a relationship with the faculty of origin, and have a connection to political choices such as political figures and parties that are considered to best represent the aspirations of the people.

Research Method

Data collection

Respondent data were taken using a multi-stage sampling method. The sample was taken proportionally from a population of ten faculties at Sebelas Maret University (UNS), one of the leading state universities in Surakarta. These faculties include the faculty of medicine, faculty of engineering, faculty of mathematics and science, faculty of agriculture, faculty of cultural sciences, faculty of art and design, faculty of social and political sciences, faculty of law, faculty of business economics, and faculty of teaching and education. Respondents were recruited in each faculty from September to October 2017 using face-to-face interviews on a structured questionnaire. The number of respondents in each faculty is taken proportionally. The number of samples was 208 students from UNS with a sampling error of 6.6% and a confidence level of 95%. Each respondent answered a number of questions related to their political values.

Hypothesis

Based on the description previously described, this study proposes four hypotheses as follows:

H1: There is a polarization of students based on political values.

H2: There is a relationship between students' political values and faculty.

Differences in political values which are divided into clusters have a tendency to choose different political parties and political figures. It can also be used to see the accuracy of clustering through the relationship between cluster characteristics (based on the political values they have) and their political choices.

H3: There is a relationship between the cluster and the choice of political figures who can solve the country's problems.

H4: There is a relationship between clusters and the choice of political parties that represent the aspirations of the people.

Indicator variable individual political values

Respondents were asked to choose their level of agreement using a scale of 1 to 5: strongly disagree (1); disagree (2); between agree and disagree (3); agree (4); and strongly agree (5). There are total 200 variable indicators consisting of 18 indicators of religious faith, 10 indicators of belief in religious leaders, 12 indicators of financial pressure, 15 indicators of tolerance/intolerance towards others, 14 indicators of political efficacy, 10 indicators of political alienation, 4 (four) indicators of social justice, 17 indicators of family political socialization, 11 indicators of mass media political socialization, 17 indicators of peer group political socialization, 9 (nine) indicators of social media political socialization, 4 (four) indicators of attitude towards government, 21 indicators of attitude towards political figures and parties, 36 indicators of nationalism, 4 (four) indicators of patriotism, and 15 indicators of political participation.

Faculty variables

In general, the scientific fields in a state university cover the fields of social sciences (social humanities) and natural sciences (science and technology). The faculties in this research are grouped according to the name of each faculty. There are several fields of study at university. In this research there was a representativeness of respondents in several of these fields of study.

Political choice variables: Political figures and political parties

The political figures in this study are the choices of figures that respondents consider the most able to solve problems in Indonesia. Respondents were asked to choose one of the names of political figures in the list or could answer none or do not know. The same is also asked for political parties.

Data analysis

Cluster individuals according to individual political values

We used cluster analysis to test hypothesis 1. Cluster analysis aims to perceive the grouping of objects based on their similarity of characteristics. The basis of grouping is the proximity of the distance between objects, which means that they have relatively homogeneous characteristics in terms of individual political values. This study used hierarchical cluster analysis with Ward's method. Then the distribution of data (objects) are visualized in three dimension using factor analysis. At this stage, the number of clusters and the total proportion of each cluster can be found.

The next step, we used discriminant analysis. This step of analysis was conducted to determine the membership of each cluster. Each cluster can be distinguished one from another through political values that characterize it. The results are a number of variable indicators that differentiate among clusters. The number can be less than all the indicator variables studied. A number of variable indicators that do not appear are those do not differentiate between clusters, or in other words are relatively homogeneous. A good cluster has a high similarity between members in one cluster, and has a high difference in each cluster.

Furthermore, we conducted a biplot analysis (Jolliffe 2002), which is an exploratory multivariate analysis of data, which aims to simultaneously describe the observed objects (clusters) and the observational variables in low dimensions (two dimensions). The goal is to make it easier to translate the characteristics of the clusters that are formed.

Hypothesis testing

We used cluster analysis and discriminant analysis to test first hypothesis. Meanwhile, to test H2, H3 and H4 we used a test of independence using the Pearson Chi-square. The Chi-square test was used to determine whether there is a relationship between the clusters and the characteristics of the respondents (the respondent's faculty of origin, choice of political figure, and choice of political party). Correspondence analysis was also used for H3 and H4 which aimed to see whether there is a relationship

between variables visually. In addition, it can be used to see the relationship or proximity of a category to one variable compared to other variable categories.

Result and Discussion

Cluster individuals according to political values: Three clusters

By using cluster analysis, the grouping of university students from Sebelas Maret University (UNS) resulted in three clusters. The distribution of the data for the three clusters can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1.
Three-dimensional plot
Source: Primary data

Meanwhile Table 1 shows that cluster 2 has the largest proportion (46.4%), followed by cluster 1 (32.7%), then cluster 3 (15.5%). The total number of respondents is 220 people and the data processed is 208 people from recruited respondents who are Muslim.

Table 1.
Individual distribution

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Cluster 1	72	32.7	34.6	34.6
	Cluster 2	102	46.4	49.0	83.7
	Cluster 3	34	15.5	16.3	100.0
	Total	208	94.5	100.0	
Missing	System	12	5.5		
Total		220	100,0		

Source: Primary data

From the result of discriminant analysis which originally used 200 variables, 33 variables were obtained which significantly distinguished between clusters. Discriminant analysis was conducted using a stepwise method with a probability of F entry 0.05 and removal 0.01. The results of the discriminant analysis are presented in Table 2. There were 33 indicators obtained that distinguished the three clusters of students of UNS.


Next, biplot analysis was used to explain the differences between clusters easier. Biplot analysis is part of exploratory multivariate analysis. The result is presented in Figure 2. A total of 33 variable indicators obtained from discriminant analysis were processed using the data aggregate method. The presentation through this biplot shows the characteristics of the variables and objects of observation as well as their

Table 2.
Discriminant Analysis

Step	Entered	Political Values Indicators	Wilks' Lambda										
			Cluster			Statistic	df1	df2	df3	Exact F			
			1	2	3					Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
1	H.SocMed3	Routinely follow political issues on social media	1		3	0.681	1	2	205,000	48,071	2	205,000	0.000
2	A19.	Will choose a leader who comes from the same religion/belief group		2	3	0.497	2	2	205,000	42,631	4	408,000	0.000
3	L9.	In the last 6 months, submitted an online petition regarding ethnic or racial issues involving debates between majority and minority groups			3	0.404	3	2	205,000	38,815	6	406,000	0.000
4	E8.	Political choices in elections have an impact on change			3	0.359	4	2	205,000	33,754	8	404,000	0.000
5	A7.	Religion/belief as a source to get a sense of calm/peace/happiness		2	3	0.325	5	2	205,000	30,280	10	402,000	0.000
6	H.Socmed6	It's not enough to get political news from one social media only			3	0.298	6	2	205,000	27,743	12	400,000	0.000
7	H.Fam13	My family really wants the current government running the government	1			0.276	7	2	205,000	25,679	14	398,000	0.000
8	J1.	Feel close to certain political figures/political parties			3	0.255	8	2	205,000	24,253	16	396,000	0.000
9	B7.	Make religious leaders the highest priority for studying religion		2	3	0.240	9	2	205,000	22,822	18	394,000	0.000
10	L11.	In the last 6 months, have given advice through social media accounts of government/political parties/government officials/religious figures/political figures related to racial/ethnic issues involving debates between majority and minority groups	1		3	0.226	10	2	205,000	21,674	20	392,000	0.000
11	C2.	Feel never have enough money to meet the needs	1			0.212	11	2	205,000	20,737	22	390,000	0.000
12	B5.	Make religious leaders a benchmark for how to think and act		2	3	0.203	12	2	205,000	19,719	24	388,000	0.000
13	H.Socmed5	Always follow political news on social media seriously and intensely			3	0.194	13	2	205,000	18,871	26	386,000	0.000
14	L13.	In the last 6 months, have shared news (news sharing) about religious issues as a response to the debates of minority and majority groups on social media			3	0.186	14	2	205,000	18,097	28	384,000	0.000
15	E4.	My ideas are recognized as good and are often used in the activities of the political organizations I participated in			3	0.179	15	2	205,000	17,359	30	382,000	0.000
16	I3.	The government's economic policies tend to bring harm to the community				0.172	16	2	205,000	16,787	32	380,000	0.000

17	K34.	Discussing different views with the majority group only with people who are in the same minority	1	0.165	17	2	205,000	16,239	34	378,000	0.000	
18	K25.	Discussing different views with the majority group with people who are in the same majority group		3	0.159	18	2	205,000	15,734	36	376,000	0.000
19	A13.	The way relate to people outside my religion/belief is in accordance with the advice in my religion/belief	2	3	0.153	19	2	205,000	15,300	38	374,000	0.000
20	E7.	Always vote in elections		3	0.148	20	2	205,000	14,849	40	372,000	0.000
21	P4.	A non-Muslim can lead a country as president	1		0.144	21	2	205,000	14,443	42	370,000	0.000
22	G4.	The government should strive for equal rights between racial groups in Indonesia		3	0.139	22	2	205,000	14,103	44	368,000	0.000
23	K6.	The interests of national unity and ethnicity from diverse ethnicities, races, and religions are higher than the interests of own group		3	0.134	23	2	205,000	13,811	46	366,000	0.000
24	N2	Support a certain political party because have the same ideology		3	0.129	24	2	205,000	13,540	48	364,000	0.000
25	K31.	We must be tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own standards, even if they are very different from us	1	3	0.124	25	2	205,000	13,305	50	362,000	0.000
26	HPeer1	Often hanging out with peer group		3	0.122	25	2	205,000	13,483	50	362,000	0.000
27	A15.	Always follow the teachings of religion related to how to dress	2	3	0.117	26	2	205,000	13,297	52	360,000	0,000
28	E12.	People's political activities give birth to government policies that are in accordance with the wishes of the people		3	0.115	26	2	205,000	13,494	52	360,000	0.000
29	NPol.5.	Interested in a political party that actively conveys people's aspirations		3	0.111	27	2	205,000	13,299	54	358,000	0.000
30	F3.	Feel unable to contribute to solve the nation's problems		2	0.106	28	2	205,000	13,162	56	356,000	0.000
31	C9.	Feel that a lot of money will make it easier to be accepted by friends	1		0.102	29	2	205,000	13,010	58	354,000	0.000
32	HPeer7	Peer group doesn't force you to participate in certain politics		2	0.098	30	2	205,000	12,867	60	352,000	0.000
33	C5	Not quite satisfied with my financial condition	1		0.095	31	2	205,000	12,713	62	350,000	0.000

Source: Primary data



Cluster 1: The political tolerant, social media savvy of politics, financially unsatisfied

H.Socmed3. Routinely follow political issues on social media
 H.Fam13. My family really wants the current government running the government
 L11. In the last 6 months, have given advice through social media accounts of government/political parties/government officials/religious figures/political figures related to racial/ethnic issues involving debates between majority and minority groups
 C2. Feel never have enough money to meet the needs
 K34. Discussing different views with the majority group only with people who are in the same minority
 P4. A non-Muslim can lead a country as president
 K31. We must be tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own standards, even if they are very different from us
 C9. Feel that a lot of money will make it easier to be accepted by friends
 C5. Not quite satisfied with my financial condition

Cluster 2: The non-political religious

A19. Will choose a leader who comes from the same religion/belief group
 A7. Religion/belief as a source to get a sense of calm/peace/happiness
 B7. Make religious leaders the highest priority for studying religion
 B5. Make religious leaders a benchmark for how to think and act
 A13. The way relate to people outside my religion/belief is in accordance with the advice in my religion/belief
 A15. Always follow the teachings of religion related to how to dress
 F3. Feel unable to contribute to solve the nation's problems
 HPeer7. Peer group doesn't force you to participate in certain politics

Cluster 3: The political religious enthusiast, social media savvy of politics

H.Socmed3. Routinely follow political issues on social media
 A19. Will choose a leader who comes from the same religion/belief group
 L9. In the last 6 months, submitted an online petition regarding ethnic or racial issues involving debates between majority and minority groups
 E8. Political choices in elections have an impact on change
 A7. Religion/belief as a source to get a sense of calm/peace/happiness
 HSocmed6. It's not enough to get political news from one social media only
 J1. Feel close to certain political figures/political parties
 B7. Make religious leaders the highest priority for studying religion
 L11. In the last 6 months, have given advice through social media accounts of government/political parties/government officials/religious figures/political figures related to racial/ethnic issues involving debates between majority and minority groups
 B5. Make religious leaders a benchmark for how to think and act
 HSocMed5. Always follow political news on social media seriously and intensely
 L13. In the last 6 months, have shared news (news sharing) about religious issues as a response to the debates of minority and majority groups on social media
 E4. My ideas are recognized as good and are often used in the activities of the political organizations I participated in
 K25. The main way for gaining self-respect is through country's status and prestige
 A13. The way relate to people outside my religion/belief is in accordance with the advice in my religion/belief
 E7. Always vote in elections
 G4. The government should strive for equal rights between racial groups in Indonesia
 K6. The interests of national unity and ethnicity from diverse ethnicities, races, and religions are higher than the interests of own group
 N2. Support a certain political party because have the same ideology
 K31. We must be tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own standards, even if they are very different from us
 HPeer1. Often hanging out with peer group
 A15. Always follow the teachings of religion related to how to dress
 E12. People's political activities give birth to government policies that are in accordance with the wishes of the people
 N5. Interested in a political party that actively conveys people's aspirations

Figure 2.
 Biplot analysis: Political values
 Source: Primary data

To make it easier to read the results of the cluster analysis and the significant variables that explain the differences between clusters, biplot analysis was then used. Biplot analysis is part of exploratory multivariate analysis. The results of the biplot analysis are presented in Figure 2. A total of 33 variable indicators obtained from discriminant analysis were processed using the data aggregate method. The presentation through this biplot shows the characteristics of the variables and objects of observation as well as their relative positions that can be analysed. The results of this two-dimensional plot provide important information about the proximity between the observed objects.

The resulting image from the biplot analysis is able to represent 100% from the data presented. There are three ways to interpret the biplot (Everitt & Dunn 2001); (1) the proximity between objects (clusters). This is to ensure the presence or absence of cluster polarization based on the characteristics of individual political values; (2) Length and angle between variables. The longer the variable line the greater the diversity of the variable, and vice versa. The angle between variables shows the level of correlation. The smaller the angle between two variables, the higher the correlation between them. While the angle of the two variables make an angle $>90^\circ$ the correlation of the two variables is negative; (3) Position of objects and variables. If an object has a corner angle of less than 90° , the object has a value above the average, while its distance from the centre indicates the value (diversity) of the variable.

In cluster 1, the characteristic of political values with the highest diversity is indicator P4. In other words, P4 is the most prominent political value in cluster 1. Variable vectors that lie in the same direction to explain cluster 1 are the characteristics related to the tolerance values (P4, K34, K31), financial pressure (C2, C5, C9), family political socialization (HFam13), political socialization on social media (HSocMed3), and political participation in social media (L11). Cluster 1 also has characteristics that negate religious values in cluster 3 (A19, A13, B5, B7, A7, A15).

In cluster 2, the diversity level of A19 is the highest, namely choosing leaders with the same religion or belief. Cluster 2 also has the characteristics of political values which are the negation of cluster 3 in terms of political activity and engagement with social media to access political news. Meanwhile cluster 2 has characteristics that respond to political alienation (F3) and peer group political socialization (HPeer7). Variable indicators that also have a positive value in cluster 2 are religious faith and belief in religious leaders (A19, A13, B5, B7, A7, A15).

In cluster 3, the characteristics of political values with the highest diversity are HSocmed3 and HSocmed5 which show high involvement on social media in terms of political issues, and also on A19 (electing leaders with the same religion or belief). Cluster 3 has strong characteristics in the variables of religious faith and belief in religious leaders (A19, A13, B5, B7, A7, A15). The six variable indicators have narrow angles to each other which indicates a strong correlation. Some of the variable indicators that are in line with the cluster 3 vector are the variable indicators of attitude towards political figures and parties (N.PolChoice2, N.PolChoice5, J1), political efficacy (E12, E8, E7, E4), political socialization on social media (HSocMed3, HSocMed5, HSocMed6); peer group socialization (HPeer1), political participation in social media (L9, L11, L13), social justice (G4); nationalism (K6, K25), and tolerance indicator (K31).

According to the description above, it can be concluded that cluster 1 is “the political tolerant, social media savvy of politics, financially unsatisfied.” Cluster 2 is “the non-political religious.” Cluster 3 is “the political religious enthusiast, social media savvy of politics.” The particularity of religious values (religious faith, belief in religious leaders) in these three clusters can be seen as other political values which are the characteristics of individuals in the cluster. However, the three clusters do not seem to differ in terms of general nationality values. In other words, these three clusters appear to be united in terms of nationalism values where the attributes are love for the homeland, prioritizing national unity and having an attachment to Indonesia.

This research provides an overview to see the discursive condition of a group of people, in this study a group of university students in terms of political values. Political values in the context of discourse on Islamism and nationalism in Indonesia as well as the rapidly growing digitalization of media, are

This research provides an overview to see the discursive condition of a group of people, in this study a group of university students in terms of political values. Political values in the context of discourse on Islamism and nationalism in Indonesia as well as the rapidly growing digitalization of media, are the arguments to add the concepts of belief in religious leaders, nationalism, political socialization through social media, and attitudes toward political figures and parties. Laclau and Mouffe do not provide specific methods for conducting research using their discourse theory (Jorgensen & Philips 2002). This research is a way that can be considered to get closer to the ideas of Laclau and Mouffe's field of discursivity. This also supports the study of Phillips et al. (2019) related to discursive condition in society that can be done with a quantitative approach.

Laclau and Mouffe's concept of particularity and universality in this study was carried out by looking at the uniqueness of cluster (particularity) and the similarity of cluster (universality). We involved several variables to measure individual political values including religious and nationality variables. We started by contextualizing the latest phenomena, doing several document study within a certain time span (books, journal articles, curriculum implementation guidelines) as well as interviews with a number of sources (Surakarta regional ministry of religion, terrorism observers, and students).

The identity in previous studies tended to be seen as something singular. Clustering in this study looks at the particularity and universality of political values. Subject position in Laclau's terms (Laclau & Mouffe 2001:11) can be understood as something that is not singular because individuals can have various subject positions. A person can be in the position of a student in a certain faculty at a state university, as well as being the coordinator of a religious organization on campus, also as a child of parents who are state civil servants, a Muslim, a Javanese, live in a heterogeneous social culture, and so on. A number of subject positions overlap, negotiate, and argue. The results of that struggle can be seen through their political values.

This research looks at the perspective of multiple identities rather than the view of a single identity. As Sen (2006) argues, every individual has affiliations with various identities attached to them; therefore, assuming that an individual is only connected to a single identity is of course too simplistic. In line with that, the dichotomous notion of identity needs to be challenged because it does not allow for diversity in human experience, attitudes, beliefs, situations, practices, institutions which can be related to race, class, political orientation, religion, ethnicity, age, region, and so on. Islam and nationality are not something singular. In the study of discourse, it depends on the dominant discourse. Various discourses that contest in society allow for various identities. Identity is never full because it depends on the existence of other meanings (identities).

Cluster and faculty

The grouping of individuals based on political values above (cluster) is further seen in relation to the variables of the faculty where the individuals come from. Individuals can be absorbed in the discourse of each faculty where they study. This argument forms the basis of the second hypothesis.

The Pearson Chi-square test shows that there is a relationship between cluster and the respondent's faculty, with a level of significance of 0.020. From correspondence analysis in Figure 3, it can be seen that the faculties with the most individuals tend to be in cluster 1 are the faculty of engineering (FT), the faculty of social and political sciences (FISIP), the faculty of law (FH), and the faculty of fine arts and design (FSRD). While in cluster 2 are the faculty of agriculture (FP), the faculty of teaching and education (FKIP), the faculty of cultural sciences (FIB), and the faculty of economics and business (FEB). Meanwhile cluster 3 is the medical faculty (FK) and the faculty of mathematics and natural science faculties (FMIPA). This correspondence analysis plot is able to explain the diversity of the data by 100%.

This relationship between political values and the field of study of university students supports previous research (Saifuddin 2011, Yusar 2016) which generally mention the differences between students in the natural sciences or exact sciences, including medical sciences and those in the social sciences, philosophy, and humanities. Those in the first group are more interested in religion and religious movements.




Figure 3.
Correspondence analysis – Cluster v Faculty
Source: Primary data

Cluster and the choice of political figure

The result of Pearson Chi-square test for hypothesis 3 shows that there is a relationship between cluster and the choice of political figure which is considered capable of solving problems in Indonesia, with a level of significance of 0.016. The correspondence analysis in Figure 4 shows that cluster 1 and cluster 2 share the names of figures such as Joko Widodo, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, Susi Puji Astuti, Ridwan Kamil and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. Cluster 1 compared to clusters 2 and 3 has close ties to Hasto Wardoyo, Abraham Samad and Mahfud MD. Cluster 2 compared to other clusters has a close relationship with the figure of Anies Baswedan, BJ. Habibie, Sri Mulyani, Megawati, Jusuf Kalla, Zainul Majdi, Zaenal Arifin and Ganjar Pranowo. Meanwhile, cluster 3, unlike the other two clusters, is close to Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno.




Figure 4.
Correspondence analysis (%) – Cluster vs choice of political figure
Source: Primary data

Cluster and the choice of political party

The result of Pearson Chi-square test for hypothesis 4 shows that there is a relationship between cluster and the choice of political parties which are considered to represent the aspirations of the people, with a significance level of 0.016. Still consistent with the choice of political figures above, Figure 5 shows that cluster one compared to other clusters has the characteristics of closeness to the Partai Hanura, PND (Partai Nasional Demokrat), PPI (Indonesian Unity Party), PSI (Partai Solidaritas Indonesia), and PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan). Cluster two has the characteristic of being close to PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), PD (Partai Demokrat), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), and Golkar (Partai Golongan Karya). Cluster three has the characteristic of being close to PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) and Gerindra (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya). The total variability that can be explained in the plot is 100%.




Figure 5.
Cluster vs the choice of political party
Source: Primary data

The other side of this research is that individuals who are in the same cluster in terms of political values are not always homogeneous in their choice of political figures and political parties that represent their aspirations. This shows that there is still diversity within the same cluster. In the context of this research, religious and nationality are not something singular, as individuals have different subject positions with a series of identity negotiations so that they can survive in society.

This study proposes a way to approach Laclau's discourse theory. This method can be considered to see discursive conditions in society with various competing discourses. By using cluster analysis through data processing on a series of statements that use an attitude scale, it can be known the individual values of certain populations. A fragmented population indicates the existence of particular individual values in society. This research contributes to measuring individual political values which developed from Ornstein et al. (1988), as a response for Islamism and nationalism discourse in Indonesia recently.

Conclusion

This study shows that the variables of belief in religious leaders, nationalism, political socialization through social media, attitude towards political leaders and parties can be considered to be used in representing political values. In this study, these variables are part of the political values in the discourse of Islamism and nationalism. Those variables become differentiators between clusters. The results of

this study obtained three main clusters of UNS students. Cluster 1 is the political tolerant, social media savvy of politics, financially unsatisfied. Cluster 2 is the non-political religious. Cluster 3 is a political religious enthusiast, social media savvy of politics. The three clusters have particularity in terms of interest in politics, the use of social media for political issues and activities, and religious values. This study also shows that differences in political values cluster have a relationship with the field of study (faculty). This is possible because the absorption of students in the dominant discourses around them can be supported by the field of study being studied. The three clusters also show significant differences in the choice of political figures and political parties that are considered to represent their aspirations. The choice of political figures and political parties in general appears to be in line with cluster characteristics.

The other side of this research is that individuals who are in the same cluster in terms of political values are not always homogeneous in their choice of political figures and political parties that represent their aspirations. This shows that there is still diversity within the same cluster. In the context of this research, Islam and nationality are not something singular, as individuals have different subject positions with a series of identity negotiations so that they can survive in society.

In the context of Laclau's discourse, this study has not been able to explain how individuals are absorbed in certain dominant discourses so that they are in each cluster even though certain values are not different from other clusters. Cluster characteristics are described in terms of having attributes attached to the cluster. In other words, the attributes attached to one cluster will be followed by other attributes. Deepening into particular values and universal values, namely how subjects in each cluster interact with other discursive formations on Islamism and nationalism, is a challenge in qualitative research.

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