

## Gray area between policy success and failure: Assessing the degree of success of Law Number 7 of 2016 in the salt industrialization program in West Nusa Tenggara Province

### *Area abu-abu antara keberhasilan dan kegagalan kebijakan: Menilai derajat keberhasilan Undang-Undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2016 dalam program industrialisasi garam di Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat*

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#### Abstract

Salt problems in Indonesia are quite complex and persistent, including reliance on imports, low quality, poor trade administration, and high costs. The central government has issued a policy that protects salt farmers, regulates salt imports, and implements the PUGaR program. The NTB Provincial Government as the fourth largest contributor to salt production in Indonesia has a Salt Industrialization Program policy. This article analyzed the existing policies for overcoming the problems and achieving the expected results. Using a descriptive qualitative research method with Policy Success theory proposed by Allan McConnell as its analytical tool, this article examines the success/failure of salt policy from the process, program, and political dimensions, as well as the level of success using the degree of policy success/failure. The results of the study showed that the criterion for maintaining policy objectives/instruments and policy legitimacy on the process dimension is included in tolerable failure because there is still a failure to maintain objectives and legitimacy even though it is not significant. The criterion for building a sustainable coalition is included in conflicted failures because it has not involved all stakeholders in policy formulation. In the program dimension, the criteria for implementation that is aligned with objectives, achieving the expected outcomes, and providing benefits for the target group are included in the conflicted failure category because there are balanced conditions between success and failure. Meanwhile, the political dimension cannot be measured because it still receives minimal public attention.

**Keywords:** policy success; policy success degree; salt industrialization; salt policy

#### Abstrak

Permasalahan pergaraman di Indonesia cukup kompleks dan persisten, termasuk ketergantungan terhadap impor, kualitas rendah, tata niaga yang buruk serta ekonomi biayatinggi. Pemerintah Pusat telah mengeluarkan kebijakan perlindungan terhadap petambak garam, pengendalian impor garam, hingga menggulirkan program PUGaR. Pemerintah Provinsi NTB sebagai penyumbang produksi garam terbesar keempat di Indonesia juga memiliki kebijakan Program Industrialisasi Garam. Artikel ini menganalisis kebijakan yang ada dalam mengatasi permasalahan dan mencapai hasil yang diharapkan. Menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif deskriptif dengan teori Policy Success dari Allan McConnell sebagai pisau analisisnya, artikel ini mengupas keberhasilan/kegagalan kebijakan pergaraman dari dimensi proses, dimensi program dan dimensi politik; serta tingkat keberhasilan menggunakan degree of policy success/failure. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan pada dimensi proses untuk kriteria mempertahankan tujuan/instrumen kebijakan dan legitimasi kebijakan masuk dalam tolerable failure, karena masih terdapat ketidakberhasilan mempertahankan tujuan dan legitimasi meskipun tidak signifikan. Pada kriteria membangun koalisi yang berkelanjutan masuk dalam conflicted failure karena belum dilibatkannya seluruh pemangku kepentingan dalam perumusan kebijakan. Pada dimensi program untuk kriteria implementasi selaras tujuan, meraih outcome yang diharapkan, dan menciptakan manfaat bagi kelompok sasaran masuk dalam kategori conflicted failure, karena dijumpai kondisi yang berimbang antara kesuksesan dan kegagalan. Sementara itu, dari dimensi politik belum bisa diukur karena masih minimnya perhatian masyarakat terhadap program tersebut.

**Kata kunci:** keberhasilan kebijakan; tingkat keberhasilan kebijakan; industrialisasi garam; kebijakan pergaraman

## Introduction

Indonesia consistently imports salt to meet domestic needs, especially industrial salt needs (Ohlhorst et al. 2012, Helmi & Sasaoka 2018, Abdullah & Shalihati 2020, Mahasin et al. 2021). The total national salt demand in 2020 was 4,464,670 tons, with 720,015 tons for consumption (household, commercial, livestock, and plantation consumption) and 3,744,655 tons for industrial needs (chloralkali plant industry, various foods, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, water treatment, leather tanning, animal feed, fish salting, etc.). Of the total need for industrial salt, 2,931,299 tons of salt, or 78.28% is imported (Pemerintah Provinsi Jawa Timur 2021). Australia is the country of origin for the highest salt imports with an average import of 1,906,768.46 tons per year or 82.86% of the total average imports, followed by India and China, New Zealand, Singapore, Germany, Denmark, and other countries (Badan Pusat Statistik 2022).

This condition is ironic considering that Indonesia is an archipelagic country with the second longest coastline in the world, namely 99,093 km with a potential area of salt ponds reaching 26,024 hectares. There are only 14 provinces in Indonesia that have the potential to produce salt (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2022b). Salt potential in an area is strongly influenced by climate/weather conditions, in addition to air humidity, air temperature, and wind speed. Nationally, the amount of salt production from salt ponds that can be optimized in the period 2015 – 2020 averages 1,636,169 tons per year. Provinces with the largest amount of salt production in the last six years include East Java, West Java, Central Java, West Nusa Tenggara, and South Sulawesi as shown in Table 1. The main reason for Indonesia's lack of national salt products to meet industrial needs is a lack of national salt production capacity, as well as the inability of domestically produced salt to meet the salt quality standards required by the industrial sector, namely salt with NaCl quality greater than 97% (Sudaryana & Pramesti 2018).

**Table 1.**  
National salt production per province 2015-2020

No	Province	2015-2020 Total production (ton)	Average production/year (ton)
1	Aceh	78,277	13,046
2	Banten	84	42
3	West Java	1,967,369	327,895
4	Central Java	2,922,762	487,127
5	DI Yogyakarta	19	10
6	East Java	3,386,685	564,448
7	East Kalimantan	54	54
8	Bali	27,615	4,603
9	West Nusa Tenggara	912,389	152,065
10	East Nusa Tenggara	75,573	12,596
11	Central Sulawesi	6,669	1,334
12	South Sulawesi	434,358	72,393
13	Southeast Sulawesi	5	5
14	Gorontalo	5,159	860

Source: Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan (2022b) - processed data

Problems related to salt still occur today even though the government has implemented a number of policies to support the development of salt businesses in Indonesia. The government passed Law Number 7 of 2016 which regulates, among other things, the protection and empowerment of salt farmers. The government has regulated salt import provisions through Government Regulation Number 9 of 2018 and Minister of Trade Regulation Number 63 of 2019. The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) implemented the People's Salt Business Development Program (PUGaR) through the

Directorate General of Sea Spatial Management (Ditjen PRL). This program was funded from APBN funding sources, provincial deconcentration funds, and district/city assistance task funds. In line with Law Number 7 of 2016, this program has been implemented since the beginning for the benefit of salt farmers. The welfare level of salt farmers is measured by the Salt Farmers Exchange Rate (NTPG). The NTPG target set in the 2020-2024 KKP Strategic Plan is an increase in NTPG from 102.75 in 2020 to 103.75 in 2024. In addition, salt production is targeted to reach 3 million tons per year in 2020, rising to 3.4 million tons in 2024. These targets have not been achieved to date.

Policy failure occurs because of two possibilities: failure because the policy is not implemented, resulting in the policy not being placed in its proper position, or failure because the policy is implemented but does not achieve the expected outcome or results (McConnell 2010b). It is common for the wrong policy failure to occur repeatedly (persistent). The problems that occur in the salt sector are recurring problems from the colonial era to the present (Hidayat & Raman 2020).

McConnell (2010b) proposes a framework for analyzing policy successes and failures based on process, program, and political dimensions. The process dimension is concerned with the process of developing and implementing policies. The criteria examined in this dimension are how policy objectives and instruments are maintained, how policy legitimacy is maintained, and how to build long-term policy coalitions. The program dimension then pertains to how the policy is implemented. This dimension is related to the criteria of whether policy implementation is in line with expected goals, whether expected outcomes are achieved, and whether the target group benefits. The final dimension is the political dimension, which is concerned with the political impact of a policy. The criteria on this dimension are related to how the addition of electoral prospects and increasing the government’s reputation for a policy.

The concept of policy success is inextricably linked to policy failure because the two are in opposing positions. A policy goal is considered successful (policy success) if the expected goals in preparing the policy are achieved. If the goal is not achieved, then the policy is considered a failure (policy failure). However, no policy is completely successful or completely unsuccessful. There is always a space in the middle (gray area) that indicates a successful policy on several indicators but failures on other indicators (McConnell 2015). A policy is considered a failure, even though some parts are successful because, fundamentally, the goals expected and set by its supporters fail to be achieved. Bovens & ‘t Hart (1996) say policy failure is not linked to policy events; rather, an assessment of failure is a judgment of an event. Success and failure are often in a gray area with varying degrees of level. By breaking down the degree of policy failure according to process, program, and political criteria, we can better understand the extent of the failure and its relationship to success. Policy failure categories consist of tolerable failure, conflicted failure, and failure.

According to the above description, the salt policy did not achieve its objectives, though it did not rule out the possibility of success. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to answer the research question: what are the successes and failures of salt business management in the NTB Province? The NTB Province was chosen because it has the most salt production outside of Java. The analysis was carried out using the framework developed by McConnell (2010b), namely the process dimension, the program dimension, and the political dimension, and assessing the categories of policy success/failure based on the degree of success/failure of the policy from McConnell (2015). Several previous studies on policy success and failure have been conducted, including research by Olavarria-Gambi (2018), Fellows & Dollery (2021), and Hammond et al. (2021), which investigated the implementation of the PPIP (Public-Private Innovation Partnerships) program in the UK Government, the vocational education assistance program in the Australian Government, and the Transantiago transport reform program in the Chilean Government. These studies completely analyze the process dimension, program dimension, and political dimension using McConnell’s (2010b) theory. This study’s novelty is related to the object of research, which is salt policy, which has never been done before. Furthermore, this study delves into the dimensions of policy success, all the way up to the degree of success/failure.

## Research Method

This research analyzes the salt policy in the NTB Province, West Lombok Regency, East Lombok Regency, and Bima Regency. This study employs a qualitative method with a descriptive approach to determine the problems that exist in salt policy in the NTB Province in a direct, in-depth, and systematic manner. This study collected data using in-depth interviews and documents. Sources of interviews were stakeholders in the salt business in the NTB Province, from the NTB Provincial Government, West Lombok Regency Government, East Lombok Regency, Bima Regency Government, salt farmers, Directors of BUMD, banking, BPKP, and OJK with a total of 41 people as shown in Table 2. Stakeholders selected as informants are those directly involved in the salt industry and those who implement salt policies in the NTB Province. Meanwhile, documents were obtained from each regional government's regional apparatus organizations (OPD), downloaded from the internet and other media.

The descriptive analysis explains phenomena at three levels: data reduction, where data are analyzed by transforming raw data from the field, presenting data, and finally assembling complex data into a systematic form from which conclusions can be drawn. Furthermore, the data are analyzed and organized systematically to produce research results. The research conclusion is derived from the research results.

**Table 2.**  
Salt policy stakeholder informant

Informant type	Number
The NTB Provincial government	16
Regency government	9
Regional Owned Enterprises (BUMD)	4
BRI	1
Financial Services Authority (OJK)	1
Pond farmers	7
BPKP	2
Academics	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>41</b>

Source: Researcher's data for 2022

## Results and Discussion

The NTB Province is Indonesia's fourth largest salt producer (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2022b). With a total potential land area of 9,782 ha, the land that can be optimized for new salt production is 2,410.41 ha or 24.62%. The NTB Province could produce an average of 152,065 tons of salt per year from 2019 to 2021. The largest salt producer in the NTB Province is the Bima Regency, with total production reaching 80% of the total salt production in the NTB Province. According to KHA information from the Office of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Province of NTB, the need for salt at the local level of the Province of NTB on average is only 46,591 tons per year. Therefore, West Nusa Tenggara Province should have an annual average salt production surplus of 100 thousand tons. However, this is not the case. Only 10% of NTB's salt products are able to be absorbed by the industrial market. The main reason is that salt produced by producers in the NTB Province has a higher concentration of NaCl levels below 90% or falls into the second and third quality categories (K2/K3) (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2019a). As a result of a large amount of salt produced without being followed by salt product absorption, the price of salt at the level of the NTB salt farmers is low, with an average price of IDR 300,00 per kg. This was revealed by ALI, an employee of the Bima Regency Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service:

“... Productivity in Bima Regency is already overproduction. Salt production in Bima Regency has exceeded 200% of the needs of the whole of NTB. That already creates its problem, which is the problem of overproduction... according to the law of economics, when the stock is abundant, then the price must fall.” (Informant ALI).

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The NTB Provincial Government, as one of Indonesia’s largest salt producers, is also actively developing salt policies. In addition, to carry out the tasks assigned by the Central Government via the PUGaR program, the NTB Provincial Government has made salt a superior commodity by launching the Salt Industrialization program as one of the Governor of NTB’s priority programs. The NTB government encourages the development of industrialization in the NTB Province through Governor Regulation Number 44 of 2019 concerning Priority and Leading Programs in the Context of Achieving Key Performance Indicators. In Regional Regulation Number 13 of 2021, the salt commodity is also included in the NTB Provincial Industrial Development Plan (RPIP) for 2021-2024. Salt industrialization is one of the NTB Provincial RPJMD’s ten leading industrialization Strategic Programs for 2019-2023. A 2020-2024 NTB Salt Business Masterplan and Road Map have been prepared to support this policy, with goals including the development of Lombok, Sumbawa, and Bima Salt Economic Zones, a salt production target of 120,000 tons per year with K1 quality in 2024, and the establishment of a salt business incubation center (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2019b). Several indicators have been established in the roadmap to support these targets, but the majority of these indicators have yet to be met. Finally, the NTB Provincial Government has issued a regional regulation that regulates in detail a salt development strategy by focusing on protecting and empowering salt farmers from upstream during the production process to downstream when marketing salt products (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2022).

### **Process dimension – Maintaining policy objectives and instruments**

RIS, the drafter of the academic text of the Regional Regulation on the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers from the University of Mataram, conveyed:

“Maritime and fisheries stakeholder groups, including fishermen, fish cultivators, and salt farmers are contributors to poverty in NTB. NTB is still the poorest province in the country. The problem that salt farmers in NTB face is that they are vulnerable to climate change and price fluctuations. Then there are land use conflicts, seasonal changes, environmental quality, and land status certainty.” (Informant RIS).

The current salt policy’s objectives are in line with the conditions faced by salt farmers, specifically the issue of salt farmers’ welfare. Law Number 7 of 2016 and the Regulation of the Minister of Trade regarding the regulation of salt imports explicitly contain policy objectives for the welfare of salt farmers. In Law Number 7 of 2016, the goal of making the salt farmers prosperous is further broken down into six objectives, including (a) providing the necessary infrastructure and facilities; (b) providing certainty for sustainable business; (c) increasing salt farmers’ capability and capacity; strengthening institutions in managing resources and running an independent business; (d) developing financing systems and institutions that serve business interests; (e) protecting against natural disasters, climate change, and pollution; and (f) providing security and safety guarantees as well as legal assistance (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia 2016).

RIS further explained:

“The responsibility for achieving objectives is divided between central and regional authorities. The responsibility is mostly borne by the province. According to Law Number 23 of 2014, the Provincial Government has the authority to organize marine and fisheries affairs.” (Informant RIS).

The policy that is in line with the objectives of Law Number 7 of 2016 is the NTB Provincial Regulation Number 3 of 2022 concerning the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers. This regional regulation is a derivative of Law Number 7 of 2016, so its objectives are aligned, particularly for the implementation of policies under the authority of the Regional Government. The regulation is currently still in the socialization stage. Previously, the NTB Provincial Government issued two regional regulations concerning salt, including Regional Regulation Number 3 of 2006 concerning Control of Salt Circulation in West Nusa Tenggara Province and Regional Regulation Number 8 of 2020 concerning Monitoring and Management of Arresting Activities that Destroy Fishery Resources. However, neither of the two regulations has addressed policies for the welfare of salt farmers.

Another policy that has been stipulated by the Provincial Government is the declaration of Salt Industrialization as one of the Priority Programs for the Governor of NTB (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2019a). The declaration of industrialization of salt is stipulated in 10 strategic programs in the development of West Nusa Tenggara Province for 2019-2023 (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2021). One of these strategic programs is Leading Industrialization which is included in Mission 5 for Prosperous and Independent NTB where the Fishery Industry in the form of salt is included in this leading industrialization. The leading sector for the Salt Industrialization program is the OPD of the NTB Province Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Office. According to HIK, the Head of the P2SDP3K Division at the NTB Province Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service: “DKP has prepared a master plan. The objectives of the master plan are in line with the objectives of Law 7 of 2016.” Another goal of the roadmap is to meet national salt demands by optimizing natural resources in the marine sector and achieving the target of producing 120,000 tons of K1 quality salt in the NTB Province over a five-year period until 2024 (Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat 2019a).

HIK explained that the Central Government has provided a budget for the PUGaR Program as well as programs for empowering coastal communities and small islands sourced from the Central APBN, Provincial deconcentration funds, and district assistance task funds for policy instruments. Based on the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries’ Decree, the budget is distributed annually to district governments designated to implement the PUGaR program, as well as the provincial government, which implements community empowerment programs for coastal and small islands. The budget is then used to fund grants for salt farmer infrastructure, revitalization of people’s salt warehouses, integration of salt pond land, infrastructure development, and other projects. Meanwhile, there are no policy instruments originating from the Regional Government’s pure APBD budget to support the Salt Industrialization policy in the NTB Province.

Therefore, for the criteria for maintaining objectives and policy instruments, the salt policy in the NTB Province is in the tolerable failure category, which is defined as the objectives and policy instruments that were successfully maintained despite minor failures. The goal of the salt policy, as stated in Law Number 7 of 2016, is to improve the welfare of salt farmers, and this goal is maintained in its derivative policies, namely Ministerial Regulations, and regulations issued by the NTB Provincial Government. The six more specific policy objectives, however, are not entirely maintained in their derivative policies. Although the APBD has not been fully supported, policy instruments from the APBN have been provided to implement the PUGaR program. In their research, Hammond et al. (2021) revealed the importance of maintaining goals when implementing policies. The success of the process is related to the extent to which the policy idea is formulated so that it can be implemented, which is associated with a high level of political accountability.

### **Process dimension – Gaining legitimacy**

The Special Committee (Pansus) I for the Preparation of the Raperda for the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers went through several stages in the process of drafting the Regional Regulation on the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers. This Raperda was included in Propemperda in 2021, despite the fact that it should have been based on the People’s Salt Business Roadmap, and this Perda must have been drafted in 2020. This was revealed by HIK as follows: “The delay in discussing and drafting the regional regulation on salt is due to budget refocusing due to COVID-19.”

According to McConnell (2010b), a policy produced through constitutional and quasi-constitutional procedures will provide a high degree of legitimacy to the policy’s outcome, even if the policy is challenged. Process legitimacy can aid in program implementation success. Policy processes that effectively co-opt participants into discussions are rituals that legitimize existing power structures, making process legitimacy a requirement for political success. Based on an interview with LAL, the Sub-Coordinator of Document Legislation, and the Library of the Secretariat of the DPRD Province of NTB, the Special Committee 1 Raperda for the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers DPRD

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Province of NTB, the stages of drafting local regulations carried out by the Special Committee 1 Raperda for the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers DPRD of the NTB Province have been carried out according to the normal procedure for preparing regional regulations, as described in Table 3.

**Table 3.**

The process of drafting a regional regulation on the protection and empowerment of salt farmers

No	Stages	Description
1	Meeting for discussion and deepening of draft regional regulations	Conducted by Special Committee 1 together with related OPDs and experts to set the agenda and enrich the content of the Raperda. Experts also provided input into the academic draft of the Raperda.
2	Comparative study visit to East Java	Conducted in East Java (Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of East Java Province, University of Trunojoyo Madura as well as field visits to salt farmers in Sampang District, Madura). Special Committee 1 was accompanied by related OPD and BUMD.
3	Working visits to the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and the Ministry of Industry (Kemenperin)	Provided explanation and requests for input on the content of the Perda. The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries has also contributed to the industrialization of salt in the NTB Province by including the NTB Province as a People’s Salt Economic Center (SEGAR) in Indonesia in Presidential Decree 126 of 2022. The Ministry of Industry highlighted the development of the downstream salt sector in the NTB Province.
4	Public test with salt farmers	Field visits and requests for input to salt farmers in salt production centers in the NTB Province, particularly in Sekotong in West Lombok Regency; Jerowaru, East Lombok Regency; and Woha, Bima Regency.
5	Plenary Meeting of the West Nusa Tenggara Province DPRD	Explanation of the entire process of drafting regional regulations by the spokesperson for Special Committee 1 of the Provincial DPRD to the Deputy Governor of NTB. Furthermore, the Perda was approved in plenary and ratified.
6	Ministry of Home Affairs Facilitation and Evaluation	Facilitation at the Legal Bureau of the Regional Secretariat of the Province of West Nusa Tenggara was followed by an evaluation process at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Then, the registration number and Perda numbering were obtained.

Source: An interview with the Secretariat of the NTB Provincial DPRD – processed data

In terms of legitimacy maintenance criteria, the degree of success/failure of the salt policy in the NTB Province falls into the tolerable failure category, which is defined as having several challenges to legitimacy but only in small amounts and no long-term significant matters. The entire process of drafting Regional Regulation No. 3 of 2022 demonstrated success, proving that salt policy formulation has good legitimacy. These findings are consistent with Fellows & Dollery’s (2021) research, which found that, when the Education Amendment Bill is passed through a standard democratic process and is not challenged based on procedures or legal foundations, it is considered valid and nothing undermines or changes the program’s intended purpose.

### Process dimension - Building sustainable coalitions

According to McConnell (2010b), policy makers and policy advocates can be viewed as an ongoing alliance-building process. The program can be successful or avoid policy failure if the policy process is successful in involving and reflecting the interests of a strong coalition of interests. Policies are designed in a way that connects actors vertically and horizontally in a process of collaboration and deliberation. Joint deliberations in the context of finding sufficient commonalities to avoid continuous conflicts over the legitimacy of the established policies and missions (Ansell & Gash 2008, Ansell et al. 2017).

Thus far, the Regency Government has treated the NTB Provincial Government's Salt Industrialization Policy as a program belonging to the NTB Provincial Government, so the Regency Government feels it has no obligation to pay more attention to the success indicators of the Salt Industrialization. RID, Head of Bappeda of the East Lombok Regency Government explained:

“...although East Lombok Regency is the second largest salt producer in NTB, salt is not the main priority here. The priorities are lobster and seaweed. Moreover, the provincial K1 target has also never been communicated to the Regency. So far, no initiative has been taken by the province to discuss and include the Regency to include salt targets in planning documents. .... Thus far, the province has never considered budgeting for salt in the APBD. If the province makes salt a priority policy, salt-producing districts should be given special consideration when developing the APBD.” (Informant RID).

This statement was corroborated by LAL, the Head of Balitbang BRIDA (Regional Research and Innovation Agency) of the NTB Province, revealing that the District Government has previously felt that there has been no clear mandate or regulation to serve as a solid foundation for the development of salt businesses in the district.

Law No. 7 of 2016 requires banks to participate in financing the people's salt business, but this condition does not exist in the NTB Province. This was revealed by BAG, the General Manager of Bank NTB Syariah's KRM Division, and the Small Business Manager of Bank BRI Selong Branch. “...NTB Sharia Bank (BUMD banking of the NTB Provincial Government) has never provided financing for salt business actors or salt farmers.”

This situation differs from that of Bank BRI, which has provided financing to salt business actors or salt farmers through the KUR (people's business credit) program. According to the Minister of Economy Regulation Number 8 of 2019 concerning Guidelines for Implementation of People's Business Credit, the people's salt sector is one of eight priority sectors for KUR distribution. Bank BRI Selong Branch (East Lombok Regency) has distributed KUR to salt farmers in East Lombok Regency, with as many as 104 debtors receiving KUR, accounting for only 1.54% of the total KUR disbursed at Bank BRI Selong Branch. According to the manager of the BRI Bank Selong Branch, the lack of KUR distribution to salt farmers is due to a lack of an allocation and priority for special KUR distribution to salt business actors/salt farmers.

Salt farmers and salt farm owners also believe they are being excluded from the development of salt policies. According to AMI, a salt farmer, who is also the Chairperson of the East Lombok Regency Salt Farmers Cooperative, one of the innovations in salt production is the incorporation of salt ponds into the PUGaR program. Land integration combines the location and process of salt production in a unified expanse of at least 15 hectares. The minimum requirement for a pond area of 15 hectares, on the other hand, is incompatible with the geographical conditions of the NTB Province. Furthermore, AMI stated that salt ponds in East Lombok Regency, which has the largest expanse, are only 5 to 10 hectares in size, and, even then, they are owned by multiple pond owners. Therefore, in order to implement the program, the government must try to persuade landowners to pool their resources and work on it together. Pond owners are hesitant to participate in this land integration program because combining their ponds with ponds owned by others raises concerns about unfair yield distribution. Furthermore, landowners are concerned that their ponds will be taken over by the government or other salt farmers. This circumstance has slowed the integration of salt ponds in the NTB Province. As shown in Table 4, the total number of salt ponds successfully integrated into the NTB Province only reached 26.5% as of 2021.

So far, a sustainable coalition for developing salt policies has not been well-developed. According to Hudson (2019), one of the causes of repeated policy failures is insufficient collaborative policy-making. Policy developed in administrative silos will have a narrower reach than problem-solving involving a large network. According to Ansell et al. (2020), involving a broad network in problem-solving will



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result in better decision substance, innovative and stronger legitimacy, democratization effects, being able to produce richer learning, ensuring that all issues and opportunities have been covered, increasing discursive representation, and a growing sense of legitimacy and procedural fairness.

**Table 4.**  
The NTB Province integrated land area

Regency/City	Non-integrated land	Integrated land	Total land area	Percentage
Bima	62,984,620	29,696,060	92,680,680	32.04%
Bima City	35,855	0	35,855	0.00%
West Lombok	261,795	1,188,000	1,449,795	81.94%
Central Lombok	994,503	0	994,503	0.00%
East Lombok	29,392,697	687,000	30,079,697	2.28%
Sumbawa	4,493,140	3,822,330	8,315,470	45.97%
	98,162,610	35,393,390	133,556,000	26.50%

Source: Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan (2022b) - processed data

On the criteria for building a sustainable coalition, the degree of success/failure of the salt policy in the NTB Province falls into the conflicted failure category which is defined as a coalition being formed, but there is a strong signal of disagreement and some potential divisions. The coalition formed was limited to the NTB Provincial Government as the policy initiator of salt industrialization. Policy implementation does not work as expected because key stakeholders who are directly related to the target group are not involved. The circumstances are similar to those described in Sokołowski & Boizarovski's (2022) research on Poland's housing decarbonization policy between 1990 and 2021. This policy was not implemented because the household sector community was not involved in policy formulation. As a result, the household energy conversion process, which causes energy poverty and air pollution, does not have a significant impact

### Program dimension – Implementation aligns with objectives

Law Number 7 of 2016 outlines the objectives in six points. The implementation of this policy is carried out by the Decree of the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries concerning PUGaR Technical Guidelines which was issued annually from 2016 until the end of 2022. KHA staff in the P2SDP3K Sector of the Office of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the West Nusa Tenggara Province stated that the PUGaR institution consists of the central and regional levels. The Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries is in charge at the central level, with the Director General of Marine Spatial Management coordinating implementation. At the regional level, the policy is carried out by the Service in the Provincial and Regency Governments, the Coordination and Consolidation Team, Financial Management Staff, and Assisting Personnel. Assistant staff is the spearhead of program implementation because they handle technical matters in the field. PUGaR is a program aimed at accomplishing this. Table 5 shows the comparison between policy objectives and the PUGaR program approach.

According to data from the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service's P2SDP3K Division, not all of the stated policy objectives have been implemented in the PUGaR program. In fact, only two of the four PUGaR program approaches have outputs. The salt policy's objective is to be a cross-sectoral program with guarantees of long-term business certainty in the marketing of salt products. The Ministry of Trade is in charge of this policy. The Ministry of Industry and/or the Ministry of MSME Cooperatives are in charge of the institutional strengthening of salt farmers. However, there is no technical policy that governs each ministry's responsibilities for meeting these targets. Meanwhile, there is no ministry or institution in charge of objectives 4, 5, and 6.

The Salt Industrialization Program which has been proclaimed by the government has set a target of producing 120,000 tons of salt with K1 quality, with strategies to achieve this goal including the reconstruction/improvement of the upstream salt business sector, land intensification through innovation development, learning centers, and business incubation, the establishment of non-bank financial institutions, the construction of salt warehouses, and the support of other technical management activities. The RPJMD has determined that the main OPDs for the Salt Industrialization Program are the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service and supporting OPDs including the Trade Office, the Industry Office, and the Cooperative and MSME Office.

**Table 5.**  
Comparison of objectives - approaches - outputs

No	Objectives	PUGaR approaches	Outputs
1	Provide infrastructure and facilities	- Productivity - Quality	- Facilitation of the integration of salt ponds - Development/revitalization of GGR - Tunnel House Construction - Repairment of pond canals, irrigation canals, and/or production roads - Industrial Salt Purification Equipment
2	Provide certainty of sustainable business	Continuity	Unavailable
3	Increase the ability and capacity of salt farmers; strengthen institutions	Corporatization	Unavailable
4	Develop financing systems and institutions that serve business interests	Unavailable	Unavailable
5	Protect from risks of natural disasters, climate change, and pollution	Unavailable	Unavailable
6	Provide guarantees of security and safety as well legal assistance	Unavailable	Unavailable

Source: Law Number 7/2016, Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Decree 9/2022, 2021-2022 DPA Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Office of the NTB Province – processed data

This is also the case with the district governments of West Lombok, East Lombok, and Bima, which have salt pond areas. According to the findings of the interviews, the three district governments lack programs/activities and do not allocate APBD funds to support salt businesses. The district government simply relies on APBN funds for the PUGaR program for salt management in their area. All regional apparatuses related to the salt business in Bima, East Lombok, and West Lombok Regencies do not have specific performance indicators related to the salt industry or salt business in DPA which are sourced from pure APBD funds. The disparity in development priorities between the NTB Provincial Government and the Regency Government as owners of salt pond areas indicates an inconsistency in implementation across levels of government. Top-level government policies will fail if they do not understand what is happening on the front lines. The lack of involvement of the district government, which will later act as a street-level bureaucrat, will have an impact on the policy's success or failure (Hudson 2019). Failure to understand the target group was also discussed in Sumarto's (2020) research, particularly regarding conflicts occurring in the policy of receiving direct cash assistance. The study focuses on analyzing the failure to understand the characteristics of the target group results in divisions in society and encourages community leaders to modify policies at the grassroots level informally. Olavarria-Gambi (2018) investigated the failure of public transportation transformation in Chile. This failure occurred due to inconsistencies in policy implementation, which made this policy appear unprepared, frequently undergoing revisions, resulting in waves of protests and riots.

In terms of implementation criteria that are aligned with objectives, the degree of success/failure of the salt policy in the NTB Province falls into the conflicted failure category which is defined as mixed results, with some successes, but accompanied by unexpected and controversial failures. The PUGaR program implemented by the Central Government and Regional Government has been successful in producing an output of infrastructure that supports people’s salt production, such as the procurement of geomembranes, tunnel houses, revitalization of people’s salt warehouses, construction of pond water and irrigation infrastructure, facilitation of the formation of land integration, and others. However, the government’s activities have not fully addressed all of the policy’s objectives.

**Program dimension – Achieving the expected outcomes and providing benefits for the target group**

The expected outcome of the salt policy is to improve the welfare of salt farmers. Therefore, the target group of this policy is salt farmers. Because the expected outcomes and the target group are similar, the discussion of these two criteria is combined in this article.


The welfare of the salt farming community is defined as the ability of the salt farming community to meet their daily needs and save. The Salt Farmers Exchange Rate (NTPG) provides an overview of the terms of trade of the products of salt farmers with the goods and services consumed and the cost of the production process. Conceptually, NTPG is a conceptual measure of salt farmers’ ability to exchange salt for goods or services required for household consumption and salt production.  $NTPG = 100$  indicates the break-even point;  $NTPG > 100$  indicates a societal surplus; and  $NTPG < 100$  indicates a societal deficit (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2022a). The NTPG index is calculated on a national scale. Table 6 and Figure 1 show the NTPG targets and achievements from 2018 to 2022.

**Table 6.**  
NTPG index targets for 2018 – 2022

2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
102.5	103.5	102.75	103	101.25

Source: Performance report (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021) – processed data

The data show that the realization of NTPG from 2018 to 2021 tends to fluctuate. The NTPG index in 2018 was 110.14, which was still higher than the target of 102.5. A failure to achieve the NTPG index target occurred in 2019, 2020, and 2021 with a deficit of -12.31, -22.07, and -1.79 respectively. In fact, the NTPG index in 2019 and 2020 decreased to below 100, indicating that the salt farmers’ receive index is lower than the buying index or that they have an income deficit compared to their expenditure.



**Figure 1.**  
Achievement of the 2018 – 2021 NTPG index  
Source: The data are processed by the author

In addition to the achievement of the NTPG index, the amount of salt production is one of the targets set in the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and the NTB Provincial Maritime Service. Table 7 shows that salt production targets at both the national and NTB provincial levels have not been met in the last three years. The NTB Province still has a higher average achievement percentage of 75.55% than the national achievement percentage of 44.61%. Nonetheless, salt production achievements in the NTB Province have not been able to separate the amount of production based on the quality of the salt.

**Table 7.**  
Salt production targets and realization 2019 – 2021

Year	National		The NTB Province			
	Target (million tons)	Realization (million tons)		Target (thousand tons)	Realization (thousand tons)	
2019	4.5	2.85	63.33	180	151	83.89
2020	3.0	1.06	35.33	190	162	85.26
2021	3.1	1.09	35.16	200	115	57.50

Source: Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) and Marine Affairs and Fisheries Office of the NTB Province – processed data

To find out the condition of the welfare of the salt farmers in the NTB Province, interviews were conducted with salt farmers in Bima, East Lombok, and West Lombok Regencies. Based on the results of the interviews, various conditions in the field were obtained. ALI from the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service of the Bima Regency explained that the high amount of salt production in the Bima Regency was not proportional to the quality. The majority of the salt quality in Bima Regency is still dominated by salt with K2 and K3 qualities. The selling price at the level of salt farmers only reaches IDR 200,00 to IDR 300,00 per kilogram. Because the salt trading system in Bima Regency is flawed, salt farmers only sell salt to middlemen. Middlemen handle all sales needs, such as packing salt into sacks and transporting salt from the pond location to the ship. Because middlemen of any quality will value the same salt, salt farmers choose to produce salt of K2 and K3 quality. As a result, Bima Regency salt farmers would rather increase salt production than maintain salt quality. Komariyah et al. (2021) explained that agents involved in salt distribution determine the desired profit margin and are determined by other salt distributors/agents.

According to the Head of the P2SDP3K Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries for the Province of West Nusa Tenggara, the salt produced by Bima Regency was of poor quality because salt farmers did not follow proper salt production procedures. Socialization has often been carried out by the Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Service, but salt farmers tend to choose their usual method because they are more concerned with quantity than quality.

Different conditions were found during interviews with SRI, salt farmers in East Lombok Regency who revealed.

“... Salt farmers in East Lombok have used the Prisma Method (innovation in salt production), so rain doesn't influence them. People's salt is stored in a warehouse run by a cooperative while they wait for buyers... the price of salt in East Lombok ranges from IDR 80,000.00 to IDR 100,000.00 per sack of 60 kilos...” (Informant SRI).

AMI, a salt farmer in East Lombok Regency, revealed that the government's PUGaR program, which has been implemented so far, aims to increase salt production. Salt farmers complain that their efforts to increase salt production have been hampered by the lack of a market for their salt products. High production in the absence of demand lowers the selling price of salt. Because of this condition, salt farmers are hesitant to participate in government programs. The BRI Manager of the Selong Branch, East Lombok Regency, admitted that the customer's failure to pay loan installments demonstrated that the business was failing. According to BRI monitoring, sacks of salt produced by farmers are piling up in the salt warehouse, but no one has purchased them.

West Lombok Regency is in better condition than Bima and East Lombok Regencies. Although West Lombok Regency has the lowest average salt production when compared to other salt-producing regencies, salt production is well-managed. There are already off-takers in West Lombok Regency who guarantee that salt products produced by salt farmers will be purchased. People’s salt is purchased by the Sari Bina Laut salt cooperative and sold to PDAMs in West Lombok Regency. With prices ranging from IDR 1,800 to IDR 2,000 per kilogram, PDAM absorbs nearly 50% of total salt products in West Lombok Regency. In addition, the Sari Bina Laut Cooperative is collaborating with the West Lombok Regency BUMD to sell consumption salt to ASNs in the West Lombok Regency Government. West Lombok Regency salt farmers maintain the quality of their products in response to market demand. West Lombok Regency has the highest integration of salt ponds in the NTB Province, at 81.94%.

Therefore, it was concluded that the degree of success/failure of the salt policy in the NTB Province was in the conflicted failure category based on the criteria of achieving the expected outcome and creating benefits for the target group. The definition of conflicted failure for the criterion “achieved the desired outcome” is as follows: achieve some success, but some of the desired results were offset by undesired results, resulting in substantial controversy. While the definition of conflicted failure for the criteria of “creating benefits for the target group” is as follows: the benefits are partially realized, but not as extensive or deep as intended due to substantial failure. Failure to meet the NTPG index and salt production targets, as well as the government’s inability to build a salt trading system and ensure market continuity for people’s salt products, demonstrates policy failure. Nonetheless, salt farmers’ use of PUGaR output, such as geomembrane innovation, prisms, and salt pond integration, has succeeded in increasing the quality of people’s salt production, particularly in salt farming communities in West Lombok Regency and parts of East Lombok Regency. This study is consistent with Figueroa Huencho’s (2021) research on policies toward indigenous peoples in Chile. The policy failed because the policy’s design failed to comprehend the nature of Chile’s indigenous people’s demands. As a result, the policies that have been implemented fail to benefit the target group.

### **The political dimension – Improving electoral prospects or government reputation**

If the policy is broadly defined as what the government does, then the government does more than just oversee the policy process or make programmatic decisions; it also takes political action. Politics can be defined in a variety of ways, ranging from generic issues of conflict and cooperation to the policy-making arena and satellite actors and interests (such as parties, lobby groups, elected representatives, and bureaucrats). The political dimension of success is defined in terms of government, capacity to govern, values promoted, and so on. As a result, the success of the process and/or the program depends on circumstances that can lead to political success for the government. The political dimension addresses two issues: increasing the government’s electoral prospects or reputation, controlling the policy agenda, and facilitating government affairs (McConnell 2010b).

The Salt Industrialization Program was established as a priority program by NTB Governor Dr. H. Zulkieflimansyah, S.E., MSc. at the start of his administration in 2019. No research has been conducted on the impact of implementing this program on electoral prospects or government reputation. This program does not receive widespread community attention, so it is not in the spotlight. Several media reports on salt industrialization, such as government promises to improve salt production quality and productivity, public criticism of the government’s readiness to prepare the market, and a lack of budget support. However, these criticisms did not become a constant spotlight. Nonetheless, the NTB Provincial DPRD is more concerned with salt problems in the NTB Province. The initiatives undertaken in the preparation of the NTB Provincial Regulation No. 3 of 2022 concerning the Protection and Empowerment of Salt Farmers demonstrate this. As a result, it was determined that criteria for improving electoral prospects and government reputation cannot be identified. The conditions are the same as in Fellows & Dollery’s (2021) research on the VET-FEE-HELP policy in Australia. This program was proposed, implemented, and modified under different administrations. The issue of this program has not become such a focal

point of mainstream political debate that it has captured the attention of the mass media. As a result, Fellows & Dollery (2021) could not conclude with certainty the success or failure of policies in the political dimension.

Assessment of the degree of success/failure of salt policy from the process, program, and political dimensions can be summarized in Table 8.

**Table 8.**  
Degrees of success/failur

No	Dimension	Degree of success/ failure	Degree criteria definition
1	Process		
a.	Maintain policy objectives and policy instruments	<i>Tolerable Failure</i>	Policy objectives and instruments are maintained, despite some failures
b.	Obtain legitimacy for salt policy	<i>Tolerable Failure</i>	There are some challenges to legitimacy but with little or no lasting significance
c.	Building a sustainable coalition on salt policy	<i>Conflicted Failure</i>	The coalition is intact, despite signs of strong disagreement and some potential splits
2	Program		
a	Implementation aligned with objectives	<i>Conflicted Failure</i>	Results are mixed, with some success, but accompanied by unexpected and controversial failures
b1	Achieve the expected outcome	<i>Conflicted Failure</i>	Obtained some success, but the achievement of some of the desired results is offset by undesired results, generating substantial controversy
b2	Providing benefits for the target group	<i>Conflicted Failure</i>	Benefits are partially realized, but not as extensive or deep as intended due to substantial failure
3	Politics		
a	Improve the electoral prospects or reputation of the government	Cannot be identified	-

Source: McConnell (2010a, 2015) - processed data

## Conclusion

There are differences in the criteria for success and failure in salt management between the government and salt farmers. The government considers salt management to be successful when salt farmers can produce salt of K1 quality, whereas salt farmers consider salt management to be successful when the government can build a salt marketing system from salt farmers. Policy success and failure, on the other hand, cannot be defined in black-and-white terms. There is a gray area with gradations between them. This gradation is more likely to succeed or less likely to succeed. Assessing and categorizing policy success and failure in degrees on each dimension help to think about the degree of failure and its relationship to success. Categorizing the degree of success/failure of a policy can help determine priority areas for improvement for stakeholders. Likewise, the salt policy has maintained its main objective but has not consistently maintained the support objectives in its derivative policies. As a result, policy implementation cannot support the achievement of the support's main goals and objectives. The

implementation that is not in line with the expected goals will result in the desired outcome and results not being achieved. Re-cascading policy objectives and breaking down policies into more detailed indicators will aid in determining whether policy objectives have been maintained all the way down to derivative policies and their implementation.

This study demonstrates that complex problems that cannot be solved by existing policies can often be solved through collaboration. Administrative silos make policy formulation impossible. Policy formulation that involves a broad network will result in better decision substance, innovation, and legitimacy. Collaborative policy formulation will result in richer learning outcomes, coverage of all issues, and legitimacy. Stakeholder coalitions at the time of policy formulation will facilitate implementation. Because of the outcomes of deliberative decisions, each stakeholder involved bears responsibility for the success of the policies that are jointly supported. A facilitative leader with a vision and the ability to initiate, organize, motivate collaboration participants, and mediate when conflicts arise during the deliberation process is required to drive this collaboration.

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