State-building and internal colonialism: A case study of the separatism in Aceh and West Papua, Indonesia

Pembangunan negara dan kolonialisme internal: Studi kasus separatisme di Aceh dan Papua Barat, Indonesia

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Abstract
Adaptation to the norms of nation-states has always been one of the most important issues for Southeast Asian countries. This paper takes Aceh and Western Papua as examples to explore their interaction with the central government of Indonesia and try to answer why local authorities have different responses after implementing the indirect rule. This study mainly uses process tracking methods to test the interaction between the central and local governments in Indonesia. This study believes that trust is the fundamental factor that determines whether the local authorities and the central government can have a positive interaction. This reason will change the central government in the process of State-building. The study found that Aceh and Western Papua had different feedback to the central government. The key lies in whether they form a “trust” interaction, rather than whether they adopt an inclusive system (democratic system). This study concluded the feedback difference between Aceh and Western Papua as a classic case shows that, as a country, it is not only represented by the central government but also needs the “trust” of the central government and local authorities to form good governance, as well as national development effective.

Keywords: Aceh; direct and indirect rule; internal colonialism; state-building; West Papua

Introduction
State-building has always been a hot topic in international relations. The formation of a state cannot be separated from the cooperation between the central government and local authorities and is also highly related to the cooperation between the central and local political elites. State-building in this paper refers to the process of whether the central government representing the state can concentrate its power and form a modern nation-state. In this paper, “state-building” means that the demand for separation of the state is often related to the direct rule of the central government.
This political phenomenon often occurs in regions with political inequality. Especially in Southeast Asian countries, due to the colonial experience, the state needs to be ruled directly by the central government to ensure its survival of the state, but this has caused the local authorities to lose the space for autonomy. Once this situation intensifies, the independence demands of local authorities will become stronger. In Indonesia, the game between local authorities in Aceh and West Papua and the Indonesian central government is a typical case. After the end of the Cold War, the local authorities in Aceh were dissatisfied with the oppressive rule of the central government of Indonesia, so they repeatedly demanded independence to counter the political and economic inequality brought by the direct rule of the central government. The national culture claimed by the later independence movement was the cultural identity constructed in the 1970s and 1980s. This shows that Aceh cannot integrate with the central government because of its history and culture. It should be noted that this paper does not take national history and culture as variables. The reason is that as early as the 1960s and 1970s, the central government of Indonesia and the local authorities of Aceh and West Papua reached an agreement, which successively granted the status of these local special administrative regions. The main materials we use are related studies in the English and Chinese academic communities, which compare official governments and local government discussions in Indonesia. By using these materials, we can objectively sort out the process of the game between the central governments and local governments in Indonesia.

This article will focus on why local authorities still have a high sense of “relative deprivation” after the Indonesian central government adopts inclusive policies. Modern “State-building” is briefly divided into two parts Content: One is to build a state political structure, system, and law; including Integrating and centralizing administrative resources to enable state power to exercise control over the main body and implementing unified administrative control over territories within the scope of power; Secondly, shaping the cultural value system shared by the people within the state territory is increasing. National identity, including the memory of the community and symbolic symbols growth, cultivation, and transmission; The historical traditions and rituals of the community growth, selection, and transmission (Fukuyama 2015).

However, “State-building” shows that the central government needs to exercise “direct rule” over local authorities and citizens. “Direct rule” means that the central government representing the country can mobilize and mobilize all citizens under its jurisdiction, without being too influenced by local authorities. In other words, the power of the central government is higher than that of local authorities and citizens. The Indirect rule indicates that the central government representing the country does not have the complete ability to restrict local authorities and citizens, and the governance of the central government is restricted by local authorities (Hechter 2012). Hechter believed that “Internal colonialism” was a form of governance related to colonialism adopted by the central government within a state. This kind of colonial rule is called “direct rule”. “Internal colonialism” means that local authorities (including local citizens) believe that they have been unfairly treated by the central government (Hechter 1999).

Due to historical reasons, there is a strong “relative deprivation” between the central government and locals. Gurr defined “relative deprivation” as the result of the actor’s inability to match the value expectation and value ability Especially in the value of rights, actors always expect to “avoid the value of others intervening in their behavior.” In terms of political policy, the value of rights can be divided into two types: one is the value of participation, that is, equal participation in collective decision making; Second, expectations related to security, such as avoiding oppressive political rules (Gurr 2011). In short, the direct rule of the central government leads to a stronger sense of “relative deprivation” among locals.

Most scholars believe that the central government, as the representative of the state’s power, plays a dominant role in local authorities (Tilly 2007, Hechter 2012, Dai 2017). Some scholars believe that the formation of the state comes from the elite unit of the political community, and the basis of the direct rule of the central government depends on whether the central government can continue to provide local interests to resist external shocks (Lachmann 2013, Anderson 2018, Poggi 2019). To sum up, although the direct rule of the state is still a controversial issue, most scholars focus on the application of power
and seldom discuss the causal mechanism of the interaction between the central and local governments. Most scholars believe that the central government must suppress the existence of local authorities in this irreversible process. However, this explanation cannot explain why the modern nation-state characterized by centralization and direct rule, always encountered effective local exclusion.

In terms of “internal colonialism,” the Marxist school believes that the central government is composed of capitalists (Wallerstein 1974). When the central government can monopolize the means of production, the local authorities (the working class) will lose their autonomy. John Gerring, Daniel Ziblatt, Johan Van Grop, and Julian Arevalo focused on the internal problems of direct and indirect rule. They have tested the efficiency of direct and indirect governance of the global nation-state, and they believe that only in the mode of effective cooperation between the central government and local authorities can the state-building be stable (Gerring 2011). Some scholars believe that the inclusive system is the key to overcoming internal colonialism (Olson 2007, Tilly 2007, Acemoglu & Robinson 2013, Chong 2012, Migdalm 2012, North 2013). James S. Scott put forward the “State effect theory”. He believed that when the state (the central government) tried to control the local authorities (including the people) with the power of comprehensive rule, the local government tried to prevent the central government from forming a state in the local area in all evasive ways (Scott 2019).

At present, from the institutional level, few scholars systematically compare and analyze the separatism between Aceh and West Papua. Gabriel Lele believes that Indonesia’s decentralization system has solved the problem of Aceh relatively well. Due to the inclusiveness of the system, the content of the policy can respond to local challenges promptly (Lele 2021).

**Research Method**

This paper focuses on qualitative research methods, mainly the “historical comparison method”. The law of historical comparison adopts the “most similar systems design” of the five inductive methods described by Mill John Stuart (2014) in *A System of Logic*. The steps tested in this article are (1) Compare the feedback of Aceh and West Papua to the Indonesian central government, and find out the interactive differences between the process of direct rule and indirect rule; (2) Test the differences of internal colonialism in the process of state-building (3) Track the differences in the adaptability of local authorities to integration into the political community (state-building). Based on a large number of research articles, this article attempts to illustrate the interaction between the central government and local authorities (Table 1).

According to the case analysis of Aceh and West Papua, we try to answer these questions. (1) Why did the norms of nation-states characterized by direct rule in modern times produce vicious feedback?; (2) Why do local authorities and local political elites reject the state-building and national development policies led by the central government? (3) Why does state construction often cause local nationalism? Based on this, this paper will focus on the main issue of the causal mechanism between direct rule and internal colonialism in the process of state-building; (4) Why will the implementation of “direct rule” lead to local resistance?

In terms of theory, this paper will integrate Michael Hechter’s “internal colonialism” theory and T Robert Gurr’s “relative deprivation theory.” When the central government becomes the center, the state must master three kinds of power, namely, political power, economic power, and social normative power. Political power is the power to monopolize violence through tools; Economic power is the power to direct those without scarce resources to engage in specific economic activities; Social normative power is the power to express certain ideas through authority and exert influence on relevant people (Poggi 2019). These three powers apply the universality and unity of the state to all political communities. The emergence of the modern state started with the central government which became a powerful national representative. The dissatisfaction with the locals is like the “sense of relative deprivation” in sociology.

Therefore, this paper believes that Gurr explains the reason why the local authorities reject the central government, while Hecht explains the process of the game between the central and local governments.
On this basis, we will reveal the interactive causal mechanism between the central and local governments. This paper argues that in the process of state-building, the interaction between the central government and local authorities is not only in political, economic, and social norms but also in the recognition of “inequality” in identity. This cognition is the factor that directly leads to the irreconcilable relationship between the central and local governments (Table 1).

Table 1.
The “direct domination - relative deprivation” relationship between central government and local government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The central government has a strong direct ruling power</th>
<th>The direct ruling ability of the central government is weak</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities have a strong awareness of “relative deprivation”</td>
<td>Separatist demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities have a weak awareness of “relative deprivation”</td>
<td>Integration into the political community</td>
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Source: Created by the author

This paper examines the dynamic process and causal mechanism of the direct rule of the Indonesian central government and the internal colonialism in Aceh and West Papua. And answer why the national state norms cause the loss of local autonomy. Why does Indonesian state construction often lead to the formation of local nationalism? Why do Aceh and West Papua dislike the state-building policy of the Indonesian central government? Through the explanation of the above theory, this paper will focus on the direct ruling ability of the central government and the cognition of “relative deprivation” of local authorities. This paper assumes that there will be four situations in the process of interaction between the central government and local authorities (Figure 1).

Based on relevant theories and previous studies, this study formulates several things, including: When the central government has a strong direct ruling ability, the local elites have a strong awareness of “relative deprivation.” This shows that the local authorities are not satisfied with the current political and economic distribution status. However, due to the strong direct ruling ability of the central government,
the local authorities can only play games with the central government with separation demands, and then require the reset of resources in political and economic aspects (Separatist demands). When the central government has a strong direct ruling ability, the local elites have weak cognition of “relative deprivation.” It shows that the local authorities cannot escape the direct rule of the central government and do not feel unequal in political and economic aspects, so they will adapt to the state-building plan of the central government (integration into the political community).

When the central government’s direct ruling ability is weak, the local elite’s “sense of relative deprivation” is strong. It shows that local governments have high autonomy and are unwilling to cooperate with the central government’s policies, and the central government can only maintain the form of indirect governance (indirect rule). When the central government’s direct ruling ability is weak, the local elite’s perception of “relative deprivation” is weak. It shows that local authorities are willing to cooperate with the policies of the central government but retain greater autonomy (half direct rule, half indirect rule).

Results and Discussion

In this section, the discussion focuses on several findings, including: (1) Aceh Democratic reform from the end of World War II to 1998; (2) From democratic reform in 1998 to the promulgation of Aceh Governance Law in 2006; (3) History of West Papua from the end of World War II to the introduction of democratic reform in 1998; and (4) From the introduction of democratic reform in 1998 to the division of the West Papua Separatism.

Aceh Democratic reform from the end of World War II to 1998

In 1959, the central government of Indonesia signed an agreement with Aceh to effectively prevent the rebellion of the local authorities in Aceh. According to this agreement, the central government is willing to make concessions and set Aceh as a special zone, allowing Aceh to enjoy higher autonomy. Similarly, Aceh’s local elite Beureu (Teungku Daud Beureu eh 1899-1987) announced in 1962 that the struggle in Aceh had ended and that Aceh was part of Indonesia. The central government of Indonesia has developed the deep water port Sabang in Aceh for the overall development of the state, trying to drive the local economic development and modernization construction in Aceh. Due to the late integration of Aceh’s construction into the state-building process, the state sacrificed part of Aceh’s freedom and economy for its own stability and rapid development, causing the local authorities in Aceh to begin to have a “sense of relative deprivation”. Compared with the previous, Aceh can no longer have a high degree of autonomy (Dai 2017, Reid 2022).

In 1976, the local political elite of Aceh, Hasan di Tiro, issued the Declaration of Independence. He declared that:

Java people are trying to continue colonialism, which is also condemned by the world. In the past 30 years, the people of Aceh in Sumatra Province have witnessed with their own eyes how our motherland was exploited by the neo-colonial democrats in Java and pushed to destruction; They stole our property; They deprived us of our livelihood; They abused our children’s education and let our people fall into the shackles of tyranny, neglect, and poverty; The life expectancy of our people is 34 years old and is decreasing. However, the province of Aceh, Sumatra, creates more than 15 billion dollars of income for Java every year, all of which is used for Java and Java people (Kingsbury 2005).

To avoid the division of Aceh, in terms of governance, the Indonesian central government set up a military occupation zone (Daerah Operasi Militer – DOM) in Aceh in 1990, trying to eliminate Aceh’s political intentions. This measure lasted until 1998. Although the central government has adopted a policy of strong rule, Aceh has attracted international attention (Mietzner 2007, Kell 2010, Ross 2015, Lele 2021). At that time, the Indonesian central government set up a military occupation zone (Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM) in Aceh in 1990, trying to eliminate Aceh’s political intentions. This measure lasted until 1998. Although the central government has adopted a policy of strong rule, Aceh has attracted international attention (Smith 2015).
After the end of the Cold War, Indonesia still maintained its rule with Suharto as its core. To ensure the stability and survival of the state, the central government is highly bound to the military, society, and finance. Indonesia's economy continues to grow, and the central government relies on the military to control the society. In the period after the Cold War, Indonesia's economic growth rate remained at about 6% - 7% (The World Bank 1990-1998). At that time, the military had the “dual responsibility” of maintaining national security and social and political development. At the same time, to strengthen Indonesia's national identity, the central government publicized that Indonesia's democracy was a “Panchahira” democracy, which was based on the traditional culture of mutual assistance and cooperation between People and people (Freedman & Tiburzi 2012).

With the financial crisis sweeping Indonesia in 1998, Suharto, the national leader of the central government, ended his rule. The leader who succeeded the central government was Abdulrahman Wahid. His attitude towards Aceh did not change the tension between the central and local governments, and he began negotiations with the Aceh Free Movement in 2000. Although the two sides reached a Humanitarian Pause. However, he still adopted a high-handed policy towards Aceh (Hannum 2008). Wahid’s tough attitude did not promote the stability of Indonesia's state-building but resulted in the high development of the number of free Aceh movements. Especially after 1999, the number of the Free Aceh Movement increased from 15000 to 27000, and its members expanded from intellectuals to local military police, accompanied by large-scale demonstrations (Davidson 2019).

From democratic reform in 1998 to the promulgation of Aceh Governance Law in 2006

Since 1998, Indonesia has carried out a series of democratic reforms to calm the tension between the central and local governments left over from the Suharto period. The new President Habibi has adopted a “broad policy of local autonomy,” which is reflected in his passing of the bill of local authority autonomy. Act No. 22 (Law 22/1999) and Act No. 25 (Law 25/1999) on local authorities were passed by the People’s Consultative Conference in May 1999, both of which provide for the transfer of administrative and financial powers to local authorities. The fourth decree (MPR Decree IV/2000) issued in 2000 further stipulates that if the central government does not issue relevant implementation regulations, the local authorities shall formulate relevant regulations by themselves (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs 2000, Neelapaichit 2017). The ideal state of decentralization reform is that local governments can reduce the burden of welfare policies of the central government and encourage local authorities to solve political problems by employing technocrats and reallocation resources (Hadiz 2011). These measures show that the direct ruling ability of the central government is declining and the local autonomy ability is rising.

With the opening of the reform, “Adat” social movements have emerged in various places. The meaning of “Adat” lies in the hope that all localities will restore their historical rights and return the allocation of land and other resources to social authority rather than the government’s national rights. Although the rise of the “Adat” movement has provided explanatory space for local rights protection, “Adat” has become the fuse of mainstream and minority nationalities in resisting the state power of the central government (Tyson 2011). The appearance of “Adat” shows that the local “sense of relative deprivation” is still strong, and they are still compared with their rights in history. After Suharto’s daughter Megawati Sukarnoputri succeeded as President, she negotiated with the Free Aceh Movement through the international coordination agency “Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue” and other forces of the international community (Tissamana 2021, Reid 2022).

The two sides reached the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) in 2002. However, Aceh was not satisfied with the final breakdown of the concession negotiations of the central government. In 2003, Megawati announced that Aceh imposed martial law to strengthen military control. The Indonesian military set up a news center in Aceh and put forward the slogan of “transparent war.” At the same time, Megawati asked Thailand, Libya, Sweden, and other countries to give up the asylum granted to local leader Hasan di Tiro of Aceh, and tried to isolate Aceh from the international community (Budiman 2011).
Although the central government after the reform in 1998 took coercive measures against Aceh, compared with the previous level of control, it can only be regarded as an indirect rule. However, after the 2004 tsunami, the handling of the natural crisis prompted Aceh to reach a reconciliation with the central government. In October 2004, the Indonesian government and GAM reached a nine-point agreement on political issues, an armistice, amnesty, and economic compensation for GAM members. The central government and the GAM were prepared to settle, but the leadership of the GAM refused because it did not involve all parties. After that, the central government sent Kalla and his team to talk with GAM again, and finally, they reached an agreement. The central government and GAM plan to hold further negotiations. However, this is not the case; The Sumatra-Andaman earthquake struck Aceh on December 26, 2004, killing 132,000 people. The tsunami provided the impetus for the negotiations (Awaluddin 2009).

In the same year, it was assisted by Martti Ahtisaari the initiator of crisis management. Both parties signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). In this MOU, Aceh gained more authority, symbolizing the success of the game between the local authorities and the central government. Examining the provisions of the MOU, it can be found that the local authorities have acquired some ability to represent the state to a certain extent. Especially in promoting its economy, the Memorandum of Understanding stipulates that Aceh has the right to directly deal with external affairs to develop its economy. For example, Aceh has the right to raise funds through external loans, the right to conduct trade and business at home and abroad to seek foreign direct investment and tourism from Aceh, and the Aceh government has the right to provide tax-free regional development decisions for foreign investors; The Aceh government can independently grant construction permits to foreigners (Lay 2017). MOU is the central government’s surrender of power in exchange for the compliance of local authorities, but it is also the pioneer of Aceh’s struggle for local autonomy.

In 2004, Indonesia held the first direct presidential election. Eighty-two percent of the state’s 153 million voters participated in the presidential election. The presidential election also made the local authorities put forward the slogan of “civilian first” (Suryadinata 2004, Ananta et al. 2005). It shows that the right to participate in politics and security expectations of local authorities are further satisfied. In 2005, the central government of Indonesia and the Aceh Independence Movement signed the Helsinki Agreement, which reconfirmed the boundaries of the interaction between the rights and responsibilities of the two sides. Therefore, in July 2006, the central government adopted the Aceh Governance Law. Despite the delay, the new legislation responds to the commitment of the memorandum of understanding and specifies what kind of international relations the Aceh government and its constituent autonomous regions and cities can establish. In Article 7, although the central government still retains diplomatic power. However, this point is limited in Article 8, which stipulates that international agreements related to Aceh’s specific interests should be negotiated with and approved by the elected parliament of the region. Article 9 goes further and allows the Aceh government to cooperate with “offshore institutions” unless such activities are considered as the business of the national government (Turner 2007).

**History of West Papua from the end of World War II to the introduction of democratic reform in 1998**

In 1960, Indonesia and the Netherlands began a fierce conflict over the sovereignty of Papua. In 1961, the Dutch Foreign Minister Luns submitted the dispute over West Papua to the United Nations, requesting the United Nations to guarantee the right of the people of Papua to make their own choices. Although the Indonesian government forcibly incorporated West Papua into its territory in 1963, it was unable to obtain Papua’s sovereignty under international pressure. From 1963 to 1969, the Indonesian military administration carried out a rigorous campaign to intimidate, oppress, and torture the Papuans. According to the Organization of Free Papua (OPM), “During the period from 1963 to 1969, more than 30,000 people were killed by the central government of Indonesia.” The attempt of the Papuans to independence led to the suppression of the Indonesian central government forces. Finally, the pressure on West Papua to exercise its right to self-determination under international supervision (Gault-Williams 1987, Pouwer 1999).
With the assistance of the Netherlands, local leader Mr. Di Rijke held the Papua National Congress. The local leaders of Papua tried to refute the lawlessness of Indonesia’s unification of Dutch colonial territory. Papua’s move aroused the dissatisfaction of the Indonesian central government, and the two sides reached the New York Agreement at the mediation of the United States. The agreement stipulated that, in 1969, under the supervision of the United Nations, the local authorities of Papua had the right to determine their sovereignty (Kluge 2020).

In 1969, Papua held a referendum, and Indonesia took advantage of the situation to implement the “Act of Free Choice” (action of free choice) to ensure that the election of local people in Papua would not be interfered with by the Netherlands and other external forces in the way of immigration. Finally, 1025 people participated in the referendum and chose to join Indonesia’s territory (Viartasiwi 2018, Kusumaryati 2020, 2021). As for the result of the election, many Papuans believed that it was the result of Indonesia’s coercion and inducement, and the outside world also questioned the result of this time. This distrust factor became the beginning of the “insecurity” of Papua local authorities toward the central government.

West Papua, since the 1969 New York Agreement, has always believed that the “sense of relative deprivation” exists strongly, especially in political participation. Chauvel, the local leader of Papua, said: Papua people have always felt that they have never participated in the political process that is decisive for their future (De Jesus Soares 2004). This “sense of relative deprivation” is mainly because compared with the separatism in other places (Aceh), West Papua is unable to effectively compete with the central government. By 2000, the deputy governor of the Republic of Papua, R.G. Djopari, said that it was necessary to ensure that Papuans were able to handle their affairs and enjoy the desire to freely control and develop their territory (Tebay 2005).

In terms of economic development, the central government also introduced the development of West Papua in 1969. To vigorously develop Papua, the central government of Indonesia tried to introduce foreign capital such as the United States and the United Kingdom to exploit the resources of Papua. For example, the American Free Port Company obtained the mining rights of West Papua for 30 years. Freeport paid US $10.3 billion to the central government, but this did not involve local people. First of all, before the development of natural resources, the central government had no measures to negotiate with West Papua. For example, West Papua people should be included as beneficiaries in the use of resources, market development, and other economic activities to ensure their integration into the state’s political community. The direct rule of the central government has led to the inability of Papuans to form a political community with immigrants. Secondly, when the central government formulated the development plan, the beneficiaries were still workers from outside West Papua. As a result, the distance between Papuans and non-Papuans is getting wider and wider, and the local people’s dissatisfaction with the exploitation of the central government has led to their marginalization in economic security, which is the main problem that triggered the demand for independence in Papua (Sangsuwan 2017, Eichhorn 2022).

In the 1990s, Governor Yacob Patty (1992-1998) still adopted the method of immigration assimilation to treat West Papua. Yacob Patty focused its development on the agricultural sector through the intensive use of land and the migration plan of the central government. Yacob Patty tried to migrate the population of densely populated areas such as Sumatra and Java to the sparsely populated area of West Papua. Before settling in West Papua, new immigrants had to accept the connection plan operated by the Ministry of Immigration, including modern agricultural technology training and other contents. At the same time, the government would provide free land, housing, and other incentives for settlers who migrate to West Papua (Mollet 2011).

From the introduction of democratic reform in 1998 to the division of the West Papua Separatism

In the Megawati period, Papua’s autonomous system was formed, which included that 70% of the revenue from oil and gas resources went to the local government, 30% to the central government, and 25 years later, it was adjusted to the revenue from oil and gas shared by the central and local governments in half; Eighty percent of other fishery, forestry, and mining revenues go to the local government; West Papua can also receive a subsidy of 2% from the central government; Local authorities have all rights
except for diplomacy, national defense, finance, and justice; The Papua People’s Congress (Majelis Rakyat Papua – MRP) was established with the indigenous people of Papua as the main body (Widjojo 2006, Bevege 2014). The Special Autonomy Law (Law no. 21 of 2001) was issued in 2001, further defining the right of Papua autonomy. In particular, the protection of the historical rights of local people, such as Adat, is a hereditary custom recognized, observed, institutionalized, and maintained by the local data community (Eldridge 2002, Gkazebrook 2008).

Concerning the changes made by the central government, West Papua still does not tend to reduce the “sense of relative deprivation.” In 2000, the local leader of the Papua Presidium Council (PDP), Theye Hiyo Eluay, said at the first Papua People’s Congress that, in 1961, Papua had already possessed independent sovereignty. Willy Madowen, who met with President Habibi in 2000, said that Papua had existed as a sovereign and independent state in 1962 (Hadiprayitno 2017, Kluge 2020). However, in the late period of Megawati’s administration, she gradually opposed the inclusive attitude since Wahid. She divided West Papua into two administrative regions, which slowed down the implementation of the autonomy system. At the same time, she also resumed the direct rule policy of military repression.

For West Papua, local people believe that the quality of education in West Papua is far below the national standard. Although education has been identified as the medium-term development plan (RPJM) and the regional government work plan (RKPD), these plans have not yet been considered priorities in the regional budget (APBD). In 2008, education appropriations accounted for only 4.19% of the total budget. Local education is mainly centered on the central government, rather than local subjectivity. At the same time, this education is called high-quality education, but there is no special fund to improve the infrastructure and cultural heritage required by education (Kivimäki 2006, Woodman 2022). There is a huge difference between the local feelings and the central government’s governance, and these deeds show that the reason for the frequent occurrence of local “independent appeals” is not the absence of an inclusive system, but the local “sense of relative deprivation” has not disappeared.

Although the central government tried to further strengthen the right of Papuans to participate in politics in 2012 and had a dialogue with local separatist leaders, this still did not change the attitude of Papuans. After that, the central government resumed its inclusive attitude and delegated more power to local governments. For example, Presidential Decree No. 66 of 2011 and Presidential Decree No. 53 of 2014. These measures all try to promote the development of education, medical care, and economic construction in West Papua (Supriatma 2013).

At the same time, dialogue was strengthened with local leaders to ease the contradictions between the central and local governments, but these measures have not changed the situation of high “relative deprivation” in West Papua. In 2014, the central government began to increase investment in West Papua, trying to further improve the backward situation of local infrastructure. The central government allocated 4.6 billion pounds to West Papua to support its local construction while continuing its dialogue with local separatists (Bertrand 2014, Syailendra 2016). Violent conflicts in West Papua continued to rise, which led President Zoko to change his attitude in 2016.

He said in an interview that there was no need for so-called dialogue to solve the Papua issue, and dialogue is meaningless. After that, President Zoko signed a new security policy, which ostensibly would deploy more troops in Papua, build permanent military bases, and give the army more freedom (Latuputty 2020). At present, about 45000 soldiers are stationed in West Papua to cope with conflicts and disturbances at any time. In terms of economy, although the central government continues to support the development of West Papua, the region is still one of the poorest regions in Indonesia.

In 2020, the proportion of poor people in the two provinces of West Papua was 26.64% and 21.37%, respectively (MacLellan 2017, Viartasiwi 2018, Woodman 2022, Wangge & Lawson 2023). For the West Papua region, the autonomy system has brought different voices inside. Sebby Sambon, leader of Free Papua, said: “For the West Papua region, the autonomy system has brought different voices inside. Sebby Sambon, the leader of Free Papua, said: Papua people do not need special autonomy status. We need independence” (Wilson 2019, Eichhorn 2022, Webb-Gannon 2022).
This study then compares the interaction between Aceh and West Papua and the central government and can find that, even with the implementation of inclusive systems such as indirect rule, the feedback of the two is not consistent. It is noteworthy that, with the mutual trust between Aceh and the central government in the democratic reform in 1998, the local “sense of relative deprivation” has decreased, which is impossible for West Papua to achieve. At the same time, in this special link, the “level of trust” is the key reason for the vicious circle between the central government and the West Papua authorities.

Table 2.
Trust interaction between Aceh, Western Papua, and the central government

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Aceh</th>
<th>West Papua</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the central government before 1998</td>
<td>The central government ruled directly, and the local authorities responded with “separation demands”</td>
<td>The central government ruled directly, and the local authorities responded with “separation demands”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with the Central Government after 1998</td>
<td>The central government adopted indirect rule, and the local authorities gradually reconciled with the central government</td>
<td>The central government adopts the indirect rule, and the local authorities still respond with “separation demands”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust level</td>
<td>Gradually increasing</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in relative deprivation</td>
<td>Gradually decreasing</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by the author

The innovation of this paper is that most scholars believe that the success of state-building depends on whether the country implements an inclusive system. However, in the case of Aceh and West Papua, the inclusive system is not the main reason. This explanation of trust interaction and changing between Aceh, Western Papua, and the central government can be seen in Table 2. The reason for changing Aceh is the increase in “trust” between the central and local governments, resulting in a positive interaction. The local authorities no longer feel the sense of relative deprivation, so the central government’s “state-building” plan has eased the separatism within the country through indirect governance of good governance. West Papua, on the other hand, cannot trust each other with the central government and has formed a positive interaction. As a result, even if the central government implements more inclusive systems, it cannot reduce the relative deprivation of local authorities in West Papua.

Conclusion

By comparing the interaction between the central government of Indonesia and Aceh and West Papua, it can be found that the argument of scholars in the past that the inclusive system determines whether the relationship between the central and local governments is relaxed is untenable. Whether the central government adopts direct or indirect rule mainly depends on whether the central and local governments trust each other. If the two sides can trust each other, the central government will take indirect rule, and the local authorities’ “sense of relative deprivation” will weaken. In the case of Aceh, although its relationship with the central government was not good and they did not trust each other completely, this situation has been effectively improved since 1998. To a large extent, this is not only the reason for democratic reform, but also the central government began to trust Aceh’s independent development and ability after the implementation of indirect rule. This key “trust” is reflected in the fact that the central government allows Aceh to obtain some state capabilities.
For future studies, the interaction between the central government and local governments/ regimes should not be limited to material forces, but should focus on “trust,” “social capital,” and “symbolic power. “Because these cannot be discovered by quantitative research methods, it is even more necessary to consider how to achieve a balance between central and local governments on the issue of “national construction.”

References


Li & Zheng: “State-building and internal colonialism”


Author Biographies

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