

Parties and the power of capital intensive under open-list proportional representation system: The case of Indonesia

Partai dan kekuatan padat modal dalam sistem perwakilan berimbang daftar terbuka: Kasus di Indonesia

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Abstract

Since the Indonesian election adopted the Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system in 2009 until the present, most political parties have altered their campaign strategies in the parliamentary election. The ownership of capital intensive is seemingly a certainty for political parties if they wish to succeed in the electoral match. Therefore, this article is aimed to demonstrate that capital intensive has a powerful impact in regard to the party triumph in the electoral arena under an OLPR system. It can be seen with the successful experience of four political parties in Indonesia, namely the Gerindra Party (Great Indonesia Movement), PKB (National Awakening Party), the Nasdem Party (National Democrat), and PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) in two elections, 2014 and 2019. Methodologically, it is qualitative research by utilizing in-depth interviews and online news gathering as the data collection technique. With the usage of four marketing-mix indicators (product, price, place, promotion), the article findings revealed that most political parties generally had uniformity in those four indicators despite different ideologies, programs, and strategies. Each party respectively required financial costs, an ideological platform, past achievements, popular candidate profile, physiological costs, local networks, direct campaign strategies to voters, elite approaches, and tactical promotions through mass media. Thus, this study concludes that these costs, which are referred to as “*capital intensive*,” determine the party’s victory in achieving electoral success.

Keywords: capital intensive; legislative candidate; open-list proportional representation; political parties

Abstrak

Sejak pemilu Indonesia mengadopsi sistem Perwakilan Berimbang Daftar Terbuka (Open-List Proportional Representation/OLPR) pada tahun 2009 hingga saat ini, mayoritas partai politik mengubah strategi kampanye mereka pada pemilu legislatif. Kepemilikan padat modal (*capital intensive*) seolah menjadi sebuah keniscayaan bagi partai politik jika mereka ingin memenangkan pemilu. Oleh karena itu, artikel ini bertujuan untuk menunjukkan bahwa padat modal memiliki dampak yang signifikan terhadap kemenangan partai pada pertarungan pemilu di bawah sistem pemilu OLPR. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari pengalaman sukses empat partai politik di Indonesia, yaitu Partai Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya), PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), Partai Nasdem (Nasional Demokrat), dan PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) pada dua kali pemilu, yaitu tahun 2014 dan 2019. Secara metodologis, artikel ini merupakan hasil penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan teknik pengumpulan data berupa wawancara mendalam dan pengumpulan berita online. Dengan menggunakan empat indikator bauran pemasaran (*product, price, place, promotion*), temuan artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa mayoritas partai politik memiliki keseragaman dalam keempat indikator tersebut meskipun memiliki ideologi, program, dan strategi yang berbeda. Masing-masing partai membutuhkan biaya finansial, platform ideologi, prestasi masa lalu, profil kandidat yang populer, biaya psikologis, jaringan lokal, strategi kampanye langsung ke pemilih, kunjungan ke tokoh-tokoh, dan promosi taktis melalui media massa. Sehingga, studi ini menyimpulkan bahwa biaya-biaya tersebut yang dimaksud sebagai “*padat modal*”, yang menentukan kemenangan partai dalam meraih kesuksesan pemilu.

Kata kunci: padat modal; calon anggota legislatif; perwakilan berimbang daftar terbuka; partai politik

Introduction

After Indonesia applied the Open-List Proportional Representation (OLPR) system in the 2009 election, most political parties have had to adjust their campaign strategies. For instance, the alteration from the campaign in the public sphere to targeted voters in the small communities. In a global trend, such an electoral system has various implications, mainly to the party's campaign strategies (Ma & Choy 2003, Cheibub & Sin 2020, Nichter 2021). In Sweden, the OLPR system affects to the high financial cost coming from candidates not political parties (Selb & Lutz 2014). In Finland, the candidate's background has positive impacts to attract public votes (von Schoultz & Papageorgiou 2019) and the legislative candidate listed early on the ballot paper has a good chance to be elected while the candidates listed near the end have an advantage over those listed in the middle (Söderlund et al. 2021). In the same vein, the Finland experience also has taken place in Indonesia (Dettman et al. 2017, Al-Hamdi et al. 2022).

Although the number of women legislative candidates under Poland's OLPR system are increasing it still has no a significant implication to electability into the parliament (Jankowski & Marcinkiewicz 2017). Worse, women candidates in Poland have a poor electoral performance. This cannot be separated from their personal experiences in the political arena (Górecki & Kukolowicz 2014). The OLPR system causes internal competition among the party's legislative candidate in collecting votes (Bergman et al. 2013, Cheibub & Sin 2020) but has no effect as to the electability of legislative candidates coming from the minority group (Negri 2018).

Theoretically speaking, the OLPR system can be conceptualized as the electoral system where voters are allowed not merely to vote for their favored party but also their favored candidate within the party. The elected candidates are usually determined by the number of individual votes they receive. The more votes that can be collected by the candidate can make him/her as a member of parliament. Thus, voters can intervene the candidate electability (Reynolds & Reilly 2002). Since 2009, the electoral system has eliminated ideological parties with limited supporters due to the parliamentary threshold application. It can be proven with several parties which had parliamentary seats between 1999 and 2009 have no longer gained the seats since 2009. Meanwhile, some parties that participated in the 2009 and 2014 electoral contestations succeeded in surpassing the parliamentary threshold (Honna 2012, Mietzner 2013, Al-Hamdi 2017, Ufen 2018, Al-Hamdi 2021). Therefore, in coping with the current electoral system, Indonesian parties need financial demands and non-financial necessities. That is the so-called "*capital intensive*."

Nowadays, some parties have an outstanding performance in the electoral competition, like the Gerindra Party (*Gerakan Indonesia Raya*, the Great Indonesia Movement), PKB (*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, the National Awakening Party), Nasdem Party (*Nasional Demokrat*, the National Democrat), and PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*, the Prosperous Justice Party). Meanwhile, some have suffered a dramatically decreasing vote, like the Democrat Party and the People Conscience (Hanura) Party, with the latter even being bounced from the House of Representatives in 2019. Most studies analyzed that a party's success in the electoral contest is caused mainly by financial ownership factors. Nonetheless, this study argues that a party's triumph is not merely affected by such financial ownership but also other significant aspects called "*capital intensive*."

The term "*capital intensive*" (*padat modal*) is frequently used in business sectors to denote an enterprise activity that requires immense capital for the business development itself and its operational costs where renewable technologies support them. Merriam-Webster (2020) suggested that capital incentive portrays the high ownership of capital costs in business sectors. Similarly, Economics Help (2020) and Wallstreetmojo (2020) underlined this term as an industry that necessitates a high number of investments to produce goods and services so that it stresses the large assets (machinery, finance, etc.) which should be owned rather than human resources. Suppose the labor intensive prefers to emphasize many employees in an industry. In that case, the capital intensive tends to accentuate the immense ownership of production devices, mostly renewable technologies, to support the thriving industry. Thus, the need for labor can be minimized.

Hamdi: "Parties and the power of capital intensive under open-list proportional representation system"

This paper proves this in further sections. Selecting multiple parties by considering an ideological approach is relevant to investigate contemporary Indonesian ideology. In this paper, four selected parties will be discussed due to their collecting the popular vote in two recent elections, 2014 and 2019: Gerindra, PKB, Nasdem, and PKS. Table 1 demonstrates that Gerindra and PKB obtained the highest popular vote percentage from 2009 to 2014, while Nasdem and PKS achieved the most significant percentage of the vote from 2014 to 2019. Ideologically speaking, the four parties represent Al-Hamdi's (2017) three classifications of the ideological spectrum in current Indonesia: nationalist-secular, nationalist-Muslim, and nationalist-Islamist. If Gerindra and Nasdem characterize the nationalist-secular, PKB embodies the nationalist-Muslim, and PKS symbolizes the nationalist-Islamist. Therefore, this article concerns analyzing the electoral success of these four parties.

Table 1.
Parties' vote in Indonesian election

Results 2009		Results 2014		Results 2019	
Parties	Vote (%)	Parties	Vote (%)	Parties	Vote (%)
Demokrat	20.85	PDIP	18.95	PDIP	19.33
Golkar	14.45	Golkar	14.75	Gerindra	12.57
PDIP	14.03	Gerindra	11.81	Golkar	12.31
PKS	7.88	Demokrat	10.19	PKB	9.69
PAN	6.01	PKB	9.04	Nasdem	9.05
PPP	5.32	PAN	7.59	PKS	8.21
PKB	4.94	PKS	6.79	Demokrat	7.77
Gerindra	4.46	Nasdem	6.72	PAN	6.84
Hanura	3.77	PPP	6.53	PPP	4.52
-	-	Hanura	5.26	Hanura	1.54

Sources: KPU RI (2010, 2014a, 2014b, 2019a, 2019b)

This study's objective is to explore three things: (1) a party's success in the 2014 and 2019 elections under the OLPR system; (2) proving the immense power of capital intensive in determining a party's triumph in the election; and (3) ideology is no longer relevant if the election adopts the OLPR system as a liberal system. Amongst these three aspects, this article will prove that capital intensive has a critical contribution to a party's victory in the electoral stage.

As with Indonesian Parties under Open-List Proportional Representation System, democratic states around the globe adopt various electoral systems. From a theoretical standpoint, the electoral system has three major systems: plural/majority, proportional representation (PR), and mixed system. The majority system reveals a simple popular vote as the winner. Subsequently, the mixed system combines both majority and PR systems into one system and also into one ballot paper. Meanwhile, the PR is a system that converts a party's share of the vote into a corresponding proportion of parliamentary seats. It prefers to require the usage of the multi-member district rather than the single-member district (Reynolds & Reilly 2002). As the third-largest democratic state after India and the USA, Indonesia applies the PR system, mainly the List PR.

In the List PR system, each party proposes a list of candidates to the voter for the multi-member district. Voters vote for a party or a candidate. Parties gain seats in proportion to their overall share of the national vote. This system has three sub-variants: Closed-List PR (CLPR), Open-List PR (OLPR), and Free-List PR (FLPR). If a voter only votes for a party in the CLPR, a voter has two choices in the OLPR, whether for a candidate or a party. In the FLPR, a voter has as many votes as seats to be filled and can distribute them to candidates, either in a single party list or across various party lists. If the party determines the elected candidate in the CLPR, the elected candidate is affected by the candidate's highest vote in the remaining systems (Reynolds & Reilly 2002).

In the post-authoritarian New Order regime, Indonesia applied the CLPR in the legislative election of 1999 and 2004. From 2009 to the present, it accepts to utilize the OLPR. If the OLPR is compared with the CLPR, this study postulates that the former can be classified as a more liberal system than the latter. More specifically, the liberal electoral system has some features: (1) it emphasizes the voters' right to

vote for the candidate directly without any pressure; (2) it decreases the party's role in determining the elected candidates; (3) it provides a chance for candidates with much financial capital to be elected and defeats the party's internal cadres who do not have enough modal; (4) it removes the vital role of party cadreization; (5) it affects the candidate's low loyalty to the party because the elected candidate assumes that their success story is not due to the party but themselves.

If such a system is applied, the electoral contestation is similar to a free trade system. It denotes that democracy is a competition merely for capitalists. Instead, the party's internal cadres with loyalty and commitment have difficulties winning under the free trade system. If so, ideology is no longer needed. The contestation does not require values but finances. It needs merely the candidates' money, not their capacity. While the candidates aim to reach as many votes as possible to gain the parliamentary seat, voters earn as much money as possible from the candidates.

In coping with such a liberal system, scholars demonstrate their findings on the dynamics of Indonesia's political parties. Although Ufen (2009) argued that Indonesian parties could participate in free and fair elections, and voters could alert parties with disappointing performances, Ambardi (2008) stated that the competition amid political parties ended after the election, followed by a cartel creation. The cartelized party system's source is the parties' collective dependency on rent-seeking to meet their economic necessity. Nonetheless, Mietzner (2013) underlines that not all parties in Indonesia are cartelized because some of them still have stable bonds with what Poguntke (2006) called "collateral organization." Although they have such a bond, Ufen (2009) stressed that Indonesia's parties are no longer social movements with their vital link of organizations like in the 1950s.

Regarding the institutionalization of Indonesian parties, Tomsa (2008), Choi (2010), and Hamayotsu (2011) postulated that they are feebly institutionalized. However, in the global trend, Ufen (2008), Croissant & Völkel (2012), and Mietzner (2013) argued that Indonesian parties are well-institutionalized if contrasted to parties in Southern America, Asian countries, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. In line with Noor's (2012) thesis, parties in Indonesia have a more significant opportunity to maintain cohesion, but it is likely for them to be splintered parties if they are weakly institutionalized.

Since 2004, the presidentialization of parties is also a common trend after Indonesia applied the direct presidential election (Ufen 2018). This, in turn, can sacrifice the parties' policy. The impact is that the party organization will be marginalized in creating party programs and activities (Samuels 2002). Nevertheless, Kawamura (2013) hypothesized that presidentialized parties could occur merely in major parties, excluding small parties. In the global context, Poguntke & Webb (2005) postulated that party presidentialization is an international tendency in most democratic states caused by the growing ability of parties' leaders to avoid party mechanisms and appeal to voters immediately. The upshot is the rise of autocratic persons.

In the aftermath of the application of such a liberal system, parties in Indonesia cope with several impediments: the increase of presidentialized parties, the election accelerates weak parties with the personalization of legislative polls, the rising intra-party dictatorial person, the rampant vote-buying at national and regional levels, the absence of a party's meaningful platform, feeble loyalties to parties, cartel-like collaboration, the rise of new elites and the political dynasties in regional Indonesia, and factional conflicts in most parties driven mainly by patronage (Ufen 2008, 2009, Tan 2012, Aspinall & As'ad 2016, Aspinall et al. 2017, Aspinall & Rohman 2017, Aspinall & Mietzner 2019, Fionna & Tomsa 2020). Even, some parties attempted to conduct crowdfunding campaigning with social purposes (Vatanasakdakul & Azka 2021) such as crowdfunding for victims of flooding, earthquake and other disasters.

Research Method

This paper sought to apply qualitative research (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, Aspers & Corte 2019, Dodgson 2019, Bonisteel et al. 2021) by utilizing a multiple case study approach as the intensive investigation which explains more than one case for particular objectives through in-depth data gathering with various

relevant informants and sources (Flyvbjerg 2011, Ryan 2017). Thus, this paper selects four different political parties as they represent multiple aspects. Gerindra and PKB in the 2014 election symbolize the nationalist-secular party and the nationalist-Muslim party, respectively, while Nasdem and PKS signify the nationalist-secular party and the nationalist-Islamist party, respectively.

This paper employs two data collection techniques, namely in-depth interviews and data mining of News channels (Perera 2020). The in-depth interviews were conducted with four functionaries of political parties between 2019 and 2020. Their names are abbreviated and initialized, namely ADY (Central Board of the Gerindra Party, interviewed in Jakarta, 18 February, 2019), GUS (one of the members of House of Representatives 2009-2019 from PKB, interviewed in Yogyakarta, 6 March, 2019), SAS (Central Board of the Nasdem Party, interviewed in Jakarta, 12 February, 2020), and DAS (Central Board of PKS, interviewed in Zoom platform, 8 May, 2020). In the meantime, the collection of relevant news and the data compilation from reputable online media were carried out before, during, and after the fieldwork. After the data were gathered, the last step is data analysis. It starts from data classification into four indicators, displaying data, verification, and conclusion (Creswell 2013).

Results and Discussion

This study employs four indicators of marketing-mix theory introduced by McCarthy (1960) to measure the electoral achievement carried out by political parties: product, price, place, and promotion. It is an integrated capital that political parties should operate if they cope with an electoral contestation. This theory is occasionally called "4P." The political institution operates the 4P at the same time to boost its image to the public. The product plays itself not merely as a product but also as part of promotional strategies.

Table 2.
Four variables of marketing-mix as a diagnose tool

Variable	Indicators
Product	Party platform
	Past records
	Personal characteristics
Price	Economic costs
	Psychological costs
	Image costs/effects
Place	Local networks
	Canvassing
	Leader tour
Promotion	Pull political marketing
	Event publication

Source: Niffenegger (1989) and Firmanzah (2012)

McCarthy's (1960) theory was developed by Niffenegger (1989) and Firmanzah (2012) in political business. They set up political parties as to the institution which promotes itself as a product and, in turn, distributes such a product to the electorates. In product, this study shows three aspects: the party platform in the electoral arena, the record before the D Day of the election, and the profile of legislative candidates. In price, there are three aspects: economic costs spent by parties in dealing with the election, psychological costs which denote the party's success in dominating certain electoral districts (*dapil*) as the main base, and the image costs/effects conducted by parties. In place/distribution, three aspects are investigated: the local network operated by parties, the way the party campaigns directly to the electorates, and the leader tour carried out by the party elites. In promotion, two aspects are explained: how the party promotes itself through mass media and social media and how it publishes its events. For simplicity, it is illustrated in Table 2.

Product: Campaigning with a different catchphrase, businessmen dominate the legislative candidates

Party platform. In addressing the 2014 election, Gerindra had the slogan, “Gerindra wins, Prabowo is president,” by proposing six main programs: building a sovereign, fair, and prosperous economy; realizing a populist economy; inventing program and energy sovereignty and maintaining water resources; improving Indonesian development through educational, healthy, social, and cultural programs; constructing infrastructure and fostering natural and environmental sustainability; and forming a clean, vigorous, and effective government (Detik 2013). Afterward, PKB promoted the motto, “Indonesia Lahir Batin” (inner and outer Indonesia). It denotes a combination of religious and nationalism values, which inspires PKB’s cadres and members to have “the soul of green nationalism” (Sihaloho 2013).

In coping with the 2019 election, Nasdem preferred to take the watchword “politics without dowry,” indicating that this party was striving against the rampant money politics or vote-buying. This mantra was seemingly endowed with magical powers because it set up Nasdem as one of the big five parties in the 2019 national contestation. Another potent mantra also reinforced Nasdem’s success: “Nasdem is my party, Jokowi is my president.” This party consistently nominated Jokowi as the presidential candidate, whether in 2014 or 2019 (Farisa 2019). Afterward, PKS tended to adopt the campaign catchphrase “serving people” by proffering fourfold fundamental programs: realizing driving licenses for a lifetime; removing tax for motorcycles; safeguarding *ulama* (Muslim scholars) and religious symbols, and eliminating any taxes for citizens who have incomes per month under 8 million IDR. The four parties’ platforms commonly take general interests and do not discriminate certain communities, whether religions or tribes. If Gerindra tends to brand the personality of Prabowo, PKB and PKS prefer to promote nationalism sentiments and basic human needs, while Nasdem capitalizes a moral value of anti-vote buying.

Past records. Gerindra always reaches a growing vote in the electoral contestation regarding the party’s record. Based on the Indonesian International Transparency survey, Gerindra was categorized as the best financial transparency between 2009 and 2014 (Kompas 2013). Furthermore, PKB set up its cadre as the elected president in 1999 through a “Central Axis” movement. Many PKB cadres reached various positions in the cabinet due to the strategic coalition with the ruling party. Moreover, Nasdem is the only new party that succeeded in participating in the 2014 election and in continuously gaining an increasing vote. Based on the 2019 electoral result, Nasdem was among Indonesia’s top five parties. Meanwhile, PKS has had a spectacular experience in the electoral stage, where its vote rose drastically from 1.36 percent in 1999 to 7.34 percent in 2004.

Although PKB suffered internal clashes that affected the decreasing vote in 2004 and 2009, it was able to consolidate itself in the next elections. PKS also had hidden conflicts amongst its elites since its establishment until the present despite being managed well. Likewise, Nasdem had an internal conflict early in its foundation, mainly between the Surya Paloh faction and Harry Tanoesodibjo faction. Although, the conflict was maintained, the party addressed itself to fight in winning the 2014 and 2019 elections. In the meantime, Gerindra seemed to have no crucial conflicts due to the charismatic figure of Prabowo Subianto.

Candidates profile. In 2014, the allocated seats for the House of Representatives were 560, divided into 77 electoral districts across the state. Gerindra and PKB had 562 and 551 national legislative candidates, respectively. In the meantime, the allocated seats in 2019 were 575, spreading in 80 electoral districts. Nasdem and PKS had 575 and 533 candidates, respectively. These data denote the similarity of the number of Gerindra and Nasdem’s candidates with the contested seats. In the religious background, Muslims still dominate all parties’ candidates: 100 percent of PKS’ candidates were Muslims. In the educational background, candidates with college graduates except PKB were dominating. More specifically, 73 percent of Gerindra’s candidates were college graduates, 75 percent of Nasdem’s candidates were college graduates, and 81.7 percent of PKS’ candidates were college graduates. Meanwhile, 55.6 percent of PKB’s candidates were secondary school graduates.

Table 3.
Occupational background of parties' legislative candidates in 2014 and 2019 (%)

Occupational Background	2014		2019	
	Gerindra	PKB	Nasdem	PKS
Businessmen/entrepreneurs	54.08	35.39	58.61	69.50
Academicians: lecturers, researchers, teachers	9.60	13.43	4.52	6.80
Incumbents/former member of parliament	8.54	8.71	11.48	12.50
Advocates, lawyers, notaries, and the like	6.93	1.45	3.48	2.00
Incumbents/former executives officials	3.20	3.81	3.65	0
Health officers	2.84	0.72	1.91	0.90
Celebrities/actors/actresses	2.66	2.17	7.83	0
Expert staff in executive/legislative wings	2.31	6.89	0.87	0.70
Military and polices	1.77	0	1.04	0.50
Journalists or reporters	0.71	0.72	0.35	0
Retirements, civil servants	0.53	0	4.52	2.60
Muslim scholars (<i>kyai/ulama</i>)	0.35	3.26	0	0
Students	0	0	1.74	2.00
Unpublished	6.40	23.43	0	2.80

Source: KPU RI (2014c, 2019c) and compiled by the author

Table 3 reveals that entrepreneurs dominated all parties in the occupational background, where PKS has a highest percentage than the others. It aligned with 45 percent of the elected legislative candidates in 2019 coming from businesspeople. Thus, the OLPR is compatible with the entrepreneurs' engagement to create further liberal acts. It is also essential to highlight that PKB has the highest number of unpublished candidates' occupation backgrounds. It is a disreputable beginning for the public officials, which the legislative candidates should avoid. Besides, most parties have celebrity candidates, with Nasdem as the highest number. Only PKS has no single celebrity because it prefers to nominate its internal cadres despite having no popularity. Nasdem and PKS are contrasting instances in recruiting legislative candidates.

Price: Spending hundreds of billion, Gerindra and PKS won among urban Muslims, PKB succeeded among traditionalist Muslims, and Nasdem dominated Eastern Indonesia

Economic costs. The financial source received by Gerindra and PKB in the 2014 election was 491 billion IDR and 145.9 billion IDR, respectively. In the 2019 election, Nasdem received 259.4 million IDR and PKS earned 150 billion IDR. Table 4 reveals the detailed cost for each party. However, *Republika* reported that PKB had a total income fund of 224 billion IDR (Sasmita 2014). Indeed, each party's operational finances were also supported by other financial sources from institutional and personal donors. Based on such data, Gerindra collected the highest financial cost than other parties. Nevertheless, no one institution, including the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), has detailed data about the total of parties' income and expenditure for the electoral campaign.

Table 4.
Party's Financial Costs in the Elections, 2014 and 2019 (IDR)

Finance Source	2014		2019	
	Gerindra	PKB	Nasdem	PKS
Party treasury	2,000,000	45,000,000,000	80,610,513,963	9,376,131,477
Legislative candidates	491,044,921,309	100,966,440,940	177,863,557,751	139,666,622,439
Other sources	Unidentified	Unidentified	Unidentified	Unidentified
Total	491,046,921,309	145,966,440,940	259,474,971,714	150,042,753,916

Source: LPPDK Partai Gerindra (2014), LPPDK PKB (2014), LPPDK Partai Nasdem (2019), LPPDK PKS (2019)

Gerindra's elected candidate in 2014 in the Jakarta 3 District, Aryo Djojohadikusumo, confirmed that he spent more than 6 billion IDR for the campaign finance. He also paid out roughly 100 million IDR per month to pay his campaign team consisting of 150 persons. In addition, Aryo expended five million IDR per day for the operational finance of eight ambulance cars which were free for serving society (Prabowo 2014). Similarly, another of Gerindra's elected candidates in 2014 in the Central Java 4 District, Rahayu Saraswati, claimed that she paid out approximately 6.5 billion IDR for operational costs, such as food and beverage when meeting with society, communication costs for her campaign volunteers, and transportation fuel oil (Putra 2014). Afterward, PKB's elected candidate in 2014 in the Yogyakarta District, as well as a GUS informant, expended almost two billion IDR for his 2014 campaign costs. This amount rose twofold in 2019. He argued that rivals caused the increasing modal with much money to defeat others. Therefore, from the results of interviews with informants in 2019, the GUS informant stated that he would no longer be re-elected in the 2019 election even though he had served two terms previously.

Nasdem's candidate in the Banten 3 District, Yudi Frianto, claimed that he paid out around 4 billion IDR for providing t-shirts, banners, and billboards despite still relying on his networks (Aryodamar 2019). Awang Farouk Ishak and Sulaiman Hamzah, Nasdem's candidates in the East Kalimantan and Papua Districts, respectively, announced that each of them spent roughly one billion IDR merely for the campaign donation (Papua Satu 2019). The high cost of the campaign was also experienced by Nasdem's candidate in the North Sumatera 2 District, Martin Manurung. He used up to a half-billion IDR merely for field visits to villages inside the district (Partai Nasdem 2018). In the same way, PKS' incumbent candidate in the Central Java 5 District, Abdul Kharis Al Masyhari, expended roughly two billion IDR for the electoral campaign. He argued that the key success of electoral contestation is that the candidate relies on not only financial power but also direct interaction with society (Harahap 2019). These candidates' experiences indicate that the electoral cost is not inexpensive. Each item and step requires expenses. The party and each candidate need immense costs to prepare all things to contest. In the national competition, spending billions of IDR is an inevitability.

Psychological costs. In general, Figure 1 proves that northern Sumatera and western Java are the base of Gerindra and PKS. Especially in West Sumatera 2, Gerindra won in 2014, and PKS dominated in 2019. Therefore, the map color consists of golden yellow and black lines. East Java and a few in Central Java are the PKB's grassroots. Indeed, eastern Indonesia belongs to Nasdem.




Figure 1.

The four parties' highest vote in Indonesia's electoral districts in 2014 and 2019

Source: Map of Indonesia and colored by the author

Image effects. Gerindra's image cannot be separated from the figure of Prabowo Subianto. Both are like two sides of the coin. The party's campaign slogan in 2014 was reinforced by "Gerindra wins, Prabowo is president." Thus, most people argued that the increasing vote of Gerindra from 4.46 percent in 2009

Hamdi: "Parties and the power of capital intensive under open-list proportional representation system"

to 11.81 percent in 2014 was due to Prabowo's coattail effect. Furthermore, PKB preferred to adopt public figures outside the party, like Rhoma Irama (*Dangdut* Musician), Mahfud MD (Nahdlatul Ulama/NU cadre), and Jusuf Kalla (former vice president), to promote this party to the public because the three figures were PKB's nominees for the presidential election.

Nasdem was consistent with endorsing Jokowi as the presidential candidate. It always posted Jokowi's photos in Nasdem's campaign props to take Jokowi's coattail effect on the party vote. The role of *Media Group*, one of Indonesia's influential media owned by Surya Paloh (general chairperson of Nasdem), also had significant contributions to boost this party image. Unlike the others, PKS intended to nominate its cadres by proposing at least nine presidential candidates: Ahmad Heryawan, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Anis Matta, Irwan Prayitno, Sohibul Iman, Salim Segaf Al Jufri, Tifatul Sembiring, Al Muzzamil Yusuf, and Mardani Ali Sera.

While Gerindra and PKS preferred to boost their cadres, PKB and Nasdem elevated public figures from outside the party. In a different point of view, while Gerindra and Nasdem merely nominated a single figure, PKS and PKB provided various figure options. It is also critical to remark here that Gerindra and PKS images are popular among rural Muslims, PKB is prevalent among traditionalist Muslims, while Nasdem is a favorite for non-Muslim grassroots. Besides, when most parties involve celebrity candidates as the vote-getter to elevate the party's electability, PKS built an image to prioritize its internal cadres rather than celebrities. In the context of the religious background, when most parties always have non-Muslim candidates, no non-Muslims were nominated by PKS. It was part of the PKS' image in 2019. PKB branded itself as the only party that could solidify the NU's vote in 2014.

Place: A similar trend in managing local networks, canvassing, and leader tour

Local networks. Under the OLPR, most parties rely on the ability carried out by their legislative candidates in building and fostering local networks. It can be seen with Gerindra's candidate in West Java, Heri Gunawan, where he cooperated with local legislative candidates to campaign together to society (Pos Kota 2013). Gerindra also maximized celebrities' networks who were running as the legislative candidate, such as Derry Drajat in West Java, Murti Sari Dewi in Central Java, and Moreno Soeprapto in East Java. According to ADY in an interview conducted in 2019 with Gerindra's candidate in Central Java, the informant stated that his party also maximized military networks such as Gerindra Masa Depan (Gerindra in Future, GMP). Such a network is helpful because Gerindra's functionaries must envy their relatives to join GMP as the operators in local areas.

PKB's candidate in Yogyakarta, as informant GUS, built networks with Muslim communities and non-Muslims and cultural-art communities. Informant GUS sometimes visited churches and art groups to discuss things with them. PKB's candidate in West Java, Neng Eem Marhumah Zulfa Hiz, focused on the campaign to women networks through *pengajian* (Islamic teaching meetings) (Wibowo 2014). Nevertheless, most PKB's legislative candidates relied on NU's networks spreading mainly in *pondok pesantren* (Islamic boarding school).

Nasdem maximized the networks of local elites and their relatives who were running as the legislative candidate. It can be seen with Percha Leanpuri, Nasdem's candidate in the South Sumatera 2 District, who is the daughter of South Sumatera Governor (Trisnawati 2019) and Syamsiah Amin, Nasdem's candidate in the West Nusa Tenggara 1 District, who is the wife of Vice Governor of West Nusa Tenggara (Bima Kini 2018). In West Java, Nasdem expected the positive coattail effect of the governor figure, Ridwan Kamil, on the party's popularity in 2019 because it was part of the Ridwan coalition in the 2018 gubernatorial election (Sarasa 2018). In East Java, Nasdem involved *kyai* (Muslim cleric) and *pondok pesantren* as the vote-getters because some of its legislative candidates were NU cadres. In West Java, Nasdem relied on the popularity of celebrities. At least ten celebrities ran for the 2019 legislative election through Nasdem in West Java (Anwar 2018). Informant SAS as the deputy secretary-general of Nasdem, confirmed that local elites, their relatives, and celebrities contributed to the party performance in 2019.

Likewise, cadres from PKS, Zulkieffimansyah as West Nusa Tenggara governor, could jack up his party vote by supporting millennial generations as the legislative candidates –according to interviews with DAS informants in 2019. In Riau, PKS' national candidate, Aida Malikha, collaborated with local legislative candidates to organize *bazar murah* (an affordable market) and a health seminar for society (Sergap Online 2019). In the West Java 6 District, PKS' candidate, Ermi Yusfa, approached well-known Muslim leaders such as Habib Rizieq (leader of Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) and Arifin Ilham (board of *Majelis Dzikir Az-Zikra*) to boost herself to the electorates.

Canvassing. The way legislative candidates' campaign to society under the OLPR has a similar pattern. It cannot be denied that most candidates should visit society immediately carrying out different activities depending on the candidates' ability. The activities could be discussions or meetings with specific communities, whether in a small or large groups, football or volley tournaments, scientific competitions, music or art-cultural concerts, *bazar murah* or *pengajian*. Some candidates even attempted to stay for a few days in local people's houses to make a public impression that they were seemingly close with society. Therefore, it cannot be avoided that the candidates must spend much money as part of the electoral cost when they directly meet the electorates.

Such activities can be seen in the experiences of Gerindra's candidates, such as Moreno Soeprapto in East Java, Jamer Siden Purba in Riau Islands, Nasdem's candidates like Arkanata Akram in North Kalimantan, Hillary Brigitta Lasut in North Sulawesi, and Zulhaida Kalsum Rengen in West Papua, PKS' candidates such as Adang Daradjatun in Jakarta, Ida Farida Darwi in West Java, and Tuti Elfiti in Banten.

Leader tour. There is a common trend in dealing with electoral contestation. Most parties' elites conduct an official visit to potential institutions and communities. Such a visit gives positive impressions that the party is close to those institutions and, hopefully, there is a coattail effect of the visit. It can be proven that the four parties visited NU's leaders, including their *pesantren*, such as Gerindra's visit to the Central Board of NU (Khoiron 2013) and Maimun Zubair at Central Java (Detik 2014c), PKB's visit to NU *kyais* in, mainly Central and East Java (Detik 2014b), Nasdem's visit to some *pesantrens* in East Java (Nashiruddin 2018), and PKS' visit to Kyai Kholil As'ad Syamsul Arifin, a renowned NU figure in East Java (Pinter Politik 2018). Amongst others, PKB had the highest volume of visits to NU communities.

Except for PKB, other parties visited Muhammadiyah elites. Gerindra's elites visited Muhammadiyah at the *Tanwir* Forum, the largest meeting under Congress, in East Kalimantan, 2014. Nasdem's elites met Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Muhammadiyah figure, in Yogyakarta (Putra 2014). In the meantime, PKS's elites visited Muhammadiyah Boards of Central Java in Semarang City (Senjaya 2019). Indeed, each party had an intensive special meeting with their coalition. Additionally, all parties tended to enlarge their networks to other communities, as can be seen with Nasdem's visit to Buya Boy Lestari, a Muslim figure in West Sumatera (Ananda 2019) and the *Isen Mulang* Palace in Central Kalimantan (Roziqin 2017) as well as PKS' visit to Habib Rizieq Shihab, the FPI leader, in Saudi Arabia (Warta Ekonomi 2019), Abdullah Gymnastiar at *Pesantren Daarut Tauhid* Bandung (PKS 2019a), and the Central Board of PERSIS in Bandung (PKS 2019b).

Most parties have a similar trend in managing local networks, canvassing, and leader tour. In maintaining local networks, parties tend to rely on candidates' networks. If PKB optimizes NU's networks, Nasdem and Gerindra tend to maximize local elites and celebrities, PKS capitalizes *ulama* networks. In terms of canvassing, parties depend on candidates' creativeness and abilities in making campaign strategies. In leader tours, parties have similar strategies to visit potential groups such as Muhammadiyah, NU, *ulama*, and local elites. The aim is to attract public sympathy and increase the party's electability.

Promotion: Identical usage of mainstream media and social media

Party campaign in media. Although all parties still use traditional electoral campaign means such as billboards, banners, and flyers, most have identical strategies in campaigning in mainstream media (television and printed papers) and social media platforms (Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, YouTube). Nevertheless, Gerindra, PKB, and Nasdem committed campaign violations like campaigning before the campaign began, and ads surpassed the maximum limit (Detik 2014a, Arifiani 2017). Although

Hamdi: "Parties and the power of capital intensive under open-list proportional representation system"

PKS did not violate the campaign rule, its campaign advertisement received a lot of criticism because it seemed to discriminate against people with mental disorders (Teguh 2019). Indeed, the four parties had their account of social media platforms and the website as a medium to catch all segments of the electorates. Besides, Gerindra used the *I-Tunes* platform to support its party campaign in 2014. The platform allowed all cadres and supporters to know each other up to a maximum of 20 users (Berita Satu 2014).

Event publication. All parties tend to have various campaign activities under OLPR, and, in turn, they wish to publish to the public extensively through mass media and social media. Indeed, this aims to receive as many votes as possible. While other parties publish regular events, PKS conducted "flashmob" joint actions, especially in the street, to promote the party platform and programs to society and, in turn, to appeal to public interests (Ismail 2019). This deed was carried out together by the party's cadres, members, and sympathizers in various places. Due to this flashmob, PKS earned a reward as the largest flashmob in Indonesia from the World-Indonesia Record Museum or MURI (PKS 2019c). However, the high volume of promotion through mass media and numerous event publications entails vast budgets, not merely financial costs but also psychological costs and human resources.

Conclusion

Political parties almost have a common trend in product, price, place, and promotion. Although parties boost themselves with distinctive platforms, they principally take onboard public issues. Interestingly, entrepreneurs dominate parties' legislative candidates. Regarding price, all parties spent hundreds of billion IDR to finance their electoral campaigns. Sadly, no one institution can precisely calculate the party campaign expenditure. Such an expensive cost generates that Gerindra and PKS succeeded among mainly urban Muslims (northern Sumatera and western Java), PKB dominated traditionalist Muslims primarily NU devotees (most East Java and a few of Central Java, and Nasdem won in non-Muslims grassroots (particularly eastern Indonesia). Furthermore, parties have an identical tendency in fostering local networks, canvassing, elite tour, and promotion usage of mainstream media and social media. The Prabowo figure was the determining success of Gerindra in 2014, while the solidity of NU's vote was the most significant factor of PKB in reaching the triumph in 2014. The power of "air-land attack" is the unquestionable element of Nasdem's victory in 2019. The term "air-land attack" denotes a strategy to maximize promotion through mass-social media and optimize candidates' potencies, mainly local elites, public figures, and celebrities, to be the vote-getter. The solidity of militant cadres was the key achievement of PKS in 2019. Therefore, Indonesia's OLPR system from 2009 to 2024 affects the uniformity of parties' campaign strategy.

The paper novelty indicates that capital intensive eventually is a power that political parties should operate if they address the electoral contestation. Such capital can determine the party's triumph under a liberal democratic system. In other words, parties with no capital-intensive power have a small chance of succeeding in the election or surpassing the parliamentary threshold. It can be seen with the immense ownership of capital intensive of Gerindra, PKB, Nasdem, and PKS in 2014 and 2019. Thus, capital intensive is a determining power of the party's success in gaining electoral achievement under the OLPR system. The findings deny the thesis which postulated that the ideology could be manifested in the party policy and agenda because Indonesian parties no longer consider ideological approaches in creating their campaign strategies under the OLPR. The rise of capital intensive power causes such a fading ideology among political parties.

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Hamdi: "Parties and the power of capital intensive under open-list proportional representation system"

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