MOZAIK

DAFTAR ISI

Constructing National Identity in Indonesia – Experience for Europe

(Membangun Identitas Nasional di Indonesia – Pengalaman untuk Eropa)

Anna Grzywacz

Department of Liberal Arts, University of Warsaw
Al. Niepodleglosci 22, 02-653 Warszaw
Tel.: +48 (22) 5520000
Surel: anna.y.grzywacz@gmail.com

Abstrak

Identitas bangsa dan negara Indonesia dapat dianalisis sebagai proyek politik yang dikonstruksiberdasarkan pada penggunaan atau penerapanBahasa Indonesia dalam rangka menyatukan semua kelompok etno-linguistik di Indonesia. Ideologi negara Pancasila sebagai dasar untuk membangun hubungan sosial di negara dan agama Islam sebagai unsur yang merupakan proyek ideologis dan filosofis ini telah bergeser jauh dari politik negara. Melalui kajian literatur, tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengungkapkan aspek-aspek identitas Indonesia dan mengemukakan argumen bahwa negara secara aktif membentuk identitas nasional, tetapi masyarakat mungkin tidak sepenuhnya menerima. Dalam kasus Indonesia, identitas nasional merupakan hasil dari dua proses, yaitupemberlakuan Bahasa Indonesia dan ideologi Pancasila secara politis, dan bahwa Islam yang telah dipindahkan jauh dari arus utama politik telah menemukan tempatnya dalam politik karena kebijakan eksklusif pemerintah. Semua elemen ini merupakan bagian dari "Indonesianisasi" yang dipahami sebagai proses pembentukan bangsa Indonesia dan identitasnya. Selain itu, makalah ini berusaha untuk menjawab pertanyaan seperti apa negara Indonesia saat ini dan apakah kasus Indonesia dapat menjadi sumber pengetahuan yang cukup bernilai untuk organisasi politik di Uni Eropa yang mengalami masalah serupa dengan konsep identitas.

Kata kunci: identitas Indonesia, Islam politik, negara-bangsa, Pancasila, Uni Eropa

Abstract

Indonesian nation and state identity may be analyzed as a constructed political projects - based on adoption of a neutral Indonesian language in order to unify all ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia; state ideology Pancasila as the ground for building social relations in the country and Islamic religion as an element that constitutes this ideological and philosophical project shifted away from state politics. This paper aims to reveal these aspects of Indonesian identity and argues that state actively shapes a national identity, but the society may not fully accept what is imposed. In the case of Indonesia, national identity is thus the result of these two processes; the Indonesian language and Pancasila ideology is politically and arbitrarily enforced, but the Islam that has been moved away from political mainstream has found its place in politics due to exclusionary government policy. All of these elements are part of "indonesianisation" understood as the process of shaping the Indonesian nation and its identity. Moreover, this paper attempts to answer the question of what kind of a state is Indonesia today and is it a worth source of knowledge for the political organizations, here for European Union experiencing similar problems with the concept of identity.

Keywords: Indonesian identity, Pancasila, political Islam, national identity, nation-state

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic diversity, social stability and national unity are three basic issues that every postcolonial Southeast Asian countries have to confront with. These elements intermingle and affect each other, so role of the states, which just regained its independence and began the construction of statehood was also the construction of the nation. Without the national unity that is dependent on ethnic politics, there is no social stability determining the development of state.

These three elements have gradually become a problem not only for states, but also for international organizations; members of which are very often ethnically, religiously and culturally disparate. This kind of organization is, among others, the European Union, in which the debate on "European identity" is very current. The EU is today the most powerful organization and in spite of its strength is trying to overcome a traditional attachment to one nation, one language and one country. European countries do not integrate evenly within the EU, so issue of "two-speed Europe" is often raised. It is directly related to not always effective formation of a "European identity". For these reasons, it is worth to look how this issue is governed in other areas - in this study in Indonesia.

Prior to 1945, in the area of present Indonesia were more than three hundred of traditional ethnic groups. Indonesian state, just shaping the political system and constructing a new nation, in all forms of local patriotism has seen a threat to the unity of the nation. The territorial integrity and national unity were basis of a postcolonial nationalist project, implementation of which was to ensure the smooth functioning of the state under the theme of "unity in diversity". Indonesia was for more than three hundred years under the domination of the Dutch, and therefore many issues of ethnic, cultural or political nature may be explained by referring to its history. Territories of present Indonesia were inhabited by the kingdoms over which managed the Netherlands as a whole. Despite this, it is not possible to identify statehood until the late forties of the twentieth century (Vickers 2005:2).

However, under the rule of the Dutch, the Indonesian people began to see themselves as a nation. The Japanese attack on Indonesia in 1942 served as the impetus for the nationalist movements that started to expand and strengthen; the declaration of independence was completed by the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949). National liberation struggle was led by Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, who with obtaining independence faced the challenge of state-building and nation-building (Elson 2008).

Identity is shaped by complex processes and is dependent on both internal and external conditions, therefore it is not a feature given once and for all. It is characterized by volatility, so may be the result of conscious choices as well as accidental circumstances. Identity may be reconstructed according to the social, material, temporal or spatial context in which it is embedded (Castells 1997; Edensor 2002).

This paper aims to show that "the Indonesian nation and state" identity has been constructed - based on the adoption of theneutral Indonesian language to unify all

ethno-linguistic groups in Indonesia, state ideology Pancasila as the ground for building social relations in the country and the Islamic religion as an element that constitutes this ideological and philosophical project shifted away from the state politics. I argue that state actively creates national identity, but the society may not fully accept what is imposed. In the case of Indonesia, national identity is thus the result of these two processes; the Indonesian language and Pancasila ideology are politically and arbitrarily enforced, but Islam that was to be moved away from political mainstream has found its place in politics due to exclusionary government policies. All of these elements are part of "indonesianisation", here defined as the process of shaping the Indonesian nation and its identity. Moreover, this paper attempts to answer the question of what kind of a state is Indonesia today.

This paper is divided into four parts. The first one explains how national identity maybe understood and why it might be analyzed in the Indonesian context as a political instrument aiming to affect the shape of the nation and the state. The remaining three parts analyze the elements that constitute the national identity of Indonesia - Indonesian language as a component of building social bonds and collective memory; Pancasilaideology, its importance and evolution; and religion being a major factor in Indonesian politics.

METHOD
This research employed textual analysis as the main research method. In order to reveal meanings behind cultural texts, textualanalysis could be a powerful tool. As Stokes argues that media texts are part of our world: they are social phenomena and are often part of the debates about society going on in the world outside college or university…Studying texts can improve our understanding of cultural life–of how things mean–and meaning is one of the most important aspects of media use (2003:54).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The Construction of Identity as a Political Instrument
Every nation has its identity or a certain degree of national identity can be identified, but identities differ from each other in intensity and the source of origin. Nations can seek its meaning in a common language, religion, geography, collective memory, cultural practices, or the myth of a common ancestry. All of this helps, politically and culturally, to develop a sense of national uniqueness. Most often this happens through interaction with the outside world, namely the acceptance or rejection of the Other. This interaction is also a prerequisite for the formation of the state (Prizel 1998:16).

This understanding of identity, nation and nationalism leads to assumption that nations do not exist only as a result of its duration, the process of continuation, but exist if is reproduced, is subject of internal and external changes. Just as nationalism does not appear simply but some work is needed to make the process effective. What this work involves and how it affects this process depends on the political and cultural context in which everything is created. When the nation-state is formed it begins to shape this process. This is done by institutions, social rules and norms,

social and political forms of control, but also by formulation of the state ideology, which determines principles for society. These rules should be laid down with regard to the local and regional complexity but also international reality, as all of these factors influence the society and the state.

According to argument of Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) presented in *The Invention of Tradition,* it should be added that the state willingly and often take advantage of the opportunities offered by the possibility to "create" some traditions, strengthening the sense of nationor simply to unite the society as part of the common conceptions. This is particularly important in countries that recently regained their independence, which are struggling with ethnic and religious problems, but also wherever the political goal of unification or reunification requires a social group follow the criterion.

National identity is an instrument that in a political sense allows to build and maintain consolidated society; loyalty to the state is the primary determinant of the countries stability. Creating the nation is based on several factors. Every government needs the support of the society, although generating this sense of allegiance is not without problems, especially in multi-ethnic societies, precisely because of the threat of losing social stability (Ortmann 2009:26).

National identity can be understood as a collective reflection of characteristic way of life. This definition should be complemented by a number of remarks: 1) national identity may be understood as a form of collective self-perception, reflecting the characteristics of national community and its culture; 2) beliefs, attitudes and value systems of all members of the national community or some members within group, may also be included in the political discourse and cultural artefacts; 3) national identity can be considered as "objectively conditioned reflection of the constitutive for the nation cultural values in the long-term historical process" or in accordance with other perspective are constructed and exists primarily as a form of discourse; its content depends on the social, political and economic conditions of their formation, rather than the cultural patterns assigned to a national community; 4) depending on the approach, identified may be the basic features of identity, from constancy and persistence to volatility and "plasticity" that allows intentional formation (Bokszański 2008:107).

Race, ethnicity and nation are closely related, they have a common core, but what separates the nation from the other two categories is that the concept of nation referring to ancestry and cultural communities is complemented by the observation that it should be combined with state or state-like political form (Fenton 2003).

As noted by Steve Fenton (2003) ethnic groups are not just groups of people who share a common culture and ancestor. Ideas of origin and culture are rather stimulated and used in order to strengthen the sense of community, "groupness" and a common destiny. Assuming that the groups are, in some sense, socially constructed, it indicates the possible answers to the question of who is a creator? Steve Fenton suggests three possible answers: 1) the idea of the group is not

constructed by "us", but it is constructed "for us by others". It refers to the reality of the colonial rulers in which established were the name of "indigenous people". In the postcolonial world it is easy to find examples of groups whose names and shapes are a direct consequence of colonial history; 2) the identity of the group, may be the result of the work of the group as well as the efforts of elites within themor political leaders; 3) groups may be formed by state, authorities, and administrative regulations.

Analyzing the problem of identity in Indonesia ethnic identity and national identity should be distinguished. The main difference between them is that the first refers to the sense that citizenship is acquired with the birth, and the other is voluntary and may be earned. Despite justified criticism of classifying identities according to this distinction, it is still important to recognize the dominant position of one of these concepts of identity, both at the government level as well as in its opposition discourse. The promotion by the government of ethnic identity in a multiethnic society leads to social tensions arising from a sense of discrimination and concerns about the survival of the group. For these reasons, the national civic identity seems to be more desirable as it is based on neutral symbols such as the constitution or the flag (Ortmann 2009:25).

Ethnic group usually does not have a strong sense of identity and self-awareness. The acquisition of self-awareness is the period of proto-nationalism, but not all communities go further than this stage of the process. If a group envisions itself as a distinct community then proto-nationalism has the potential of turning into a proper nationalism, however a political project is needed. One of the key principles in the process isachieving a linguistic, religious and cultural homogeneity from the elements considered initially as divergent (Wright 2000:31–33).

Struggle for giving a social importance to "Indonesia" by convincing the population of the archipelago to identify themselves as a collective group turned out to be a very difficult task. It was hard to create collective identification during the struggle for independence and after its gaining. Sukarno and Suharto, two first presidents of Indonesia were largely focused on the consolidation of this identification (Simpson 2007:3).

Therefore, trying to answer the question what "Indonesia" mean it should consider that the name of Indonesia was used for the first time in the mid-nineteenth century and referred to the different geographical, political and social meanings, of which geographical indication is the least controversial. British geographer James Richardson Logan used this name for a wide archipelago consisting of thousands of islands. Indonesia derivedfrom Greek, is a combination of "India" and *nêsos*, what literally means Indian island. Partially, the name reflects the perception of Europeans of that part of the world, for many writers of that time,Indonesian archipelago was seen as an extension of the Indian continent, especially in the cultural sense. British people used also the term of Further India, in the Netherlands it was known as Dutch India. At the end of the twenties of the twentieth century, nationalist movement began to use this term to describe both a political entity that would be born after the

liberation, as well as to name social community, future nation. Nationalists were using this wordin names of political parties, calling themselves Indonesians, referring to their language, formed on the basis of Malay, as Indonesian (Philpott 2002; Simpson 2007).

The Role of Language in the Unification of Society Process
Many states established after the World War II had to struggle with the problem of a decision on the selection of the national language. Most countries in Southeast Asia replaced previously used languages by "their" own language as it was seen as a very important feature of the nation. Former Prime Minister of Malaysia Abdul Rahman said that every country has the right to choose the language. If the national language is not introduced, the state is deprived of something, will not have character and personality. Such nation becomes a nation without a soul. Language fulfils many functions, but its most important is to build a collective consciousness. For these reasons, any newly established state in Southeast Asia sought to adopt a national language. These countries have believed that the language and its development is one of the most important elements of national identity formation. Without this identification process of building a strong state is disturbed and may simply be ineffective (Hoy-Kee 1971:73).

The problem of language in Indonesia appeared with the beginning of the formation of nationalist movements in the first decade of the twentieth century. In 1928 student organization arranged the second Youth Congress. The concept of the "Indonesian identity" was not yet present, but appeared in a stronger form as a result of this conference. Delegates came from different ethnic, religious and cultural groups and by affirming one state, one nation and one language, meeting reflected formation of a new self-awareness. This oath was: "Firstly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one motherland, Indonesia. Secondly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, acknowledge one nation, the nation of Indonesia. Thirdly, we the sons and daughters of Indonesia, uphold the language of unity, Indonesian."

Selection of the national language was extremely important decision, as used by the large number of people and by the media can be an instrument of constructing and consolidating geographically scattered society. In an attempt to build and maintain national identity, language is considered to be the primary determinant of success in this area, while the knowledge and use of a common language throughout the territory unites its inhabitants (Sneddon 2003; Simpson 2007).

It was decided to adopt the Indonesian language as the national language, formed on the basis of Malay language. However, there were several options: an international language and the language of the colonizer or the local that couldhave become a national language. In the case of Indonesia, there were three languages that might have become national: Dutch as the language of the colonizer, the language of the largest and most influential ethnic group - Javanese and historical *lingua franca* of the region - Malay (Paauwe 2009:2). Dutch language was rejected due to the Indonesian dependence, its adoption would be a symbolic maintaining this relationship. Javanese language was discarded because of fear that the sense of favouring the

largest ethnic group in Indonesia could become an obstacle to the unification of the nation.

Joseph Errington (2001:29) in *Colonial Linguistics* notes that the Malay language as a *lingua franca* in the Dutch East Indies may be considered as a colonial language. Malay language when become widely spoken, was a language of describing and codifying and began to permeate society. On the one hand there was a need for effective communication, on the other there was a problem of language as an element of identity in colonial perspectives.

Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of more than 13 000 islands, of which only a few are uninhabited. Geographical diversity reflects not only the diversity of culture, religion, but also the language variety. Population of Indonesia is around 240 million (2012), while more than 400 languages are used. The National Language Institute (later transformed into the National Centre for Language Development) in 1972 appointed 418 languages in Indonesia. But there is no certainty how many languages is used. Another institution - the Summer Institute of Linguistic indicated 569 languages in West Irian, while the National Centre for Language Development selected 128 in the same area (Nabanan 1991:116–117).

Languages in Indonesia can be divided into three groups: 1) Indonesian language (*Bahasa Indonesia*); 2) local or regional languages, often called vernaculars; 3) foreign languages. According to the census conducted in 1971, 40.8% of the population declared the use of the Indonesian language, 59% local or regional language and 0.2% foreign language. Importantly, those who declaredthe use of local or regional language were unableto speak Indonesian (Nabanan 1991:117).

These data are relevant for the assessment of language policy in Indonesia that was called "a miracle, successful,or perhaps the most spectacular language phenomenon" (Paauwe 2009:1). It is also extremely important asthe learner or user of language, in addition to the conveyance of a communication as the primary function of language, is both temporally and spatiallyconnected with cultural tradition. Language serves the opportunity to access the culture. Each language has its own characteristics by which emotions are expressed and the evaluation is made. By acquiring knowledge about the language, acquired is knowledge about the whole system in which the language operates. The ideal effect of this process is to change and transform our knowledge and ideas about what is normal, appropriate and reasonable, it allows to deconstruct the knowledge that is based on our own language and understanding of what is Other (Lo Bianco 2010:44–45). In the Indonesian context it is crucial as the unity of collective consciousness in a multiethnic society requires re-evaluation of the importance of ethnic identity towards national identity.

According to Anderson (2006:6), concept of nationalism is based on the textual ground. He defines nation as imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."

Pancasila Ideology and Its Significance

Postcolonial nationalist leaders led by Sukarno decided to dismiss Islam and adopt Pancasilaideology as the philosophical and ideological basis for the newly formed state. This decision was made after lengthy discussions and debates during which it was concluded that national unity would be at stake in a situation in which both religiously and ethnically fragmented society would be based on religious ideology (Hamayotsu 2002:355).

In Sukarno's speech from June 1945, it was stated that the Indonesian sovereign state should be based on five principles: 1) the belief in one God (*Ketuhanan*); 2) humanism (*kemanusiaan*); 3) nationalism (*kebangsaan*); 4) the principle of consensus or democracy (*mufakat atau demokrasi*); 5) social justice (*kesejehteraan sosial*).

In the second half of June 1945 was passed a modified version of Pancasila, the document called Jakarta Charter, which changed the order and wording of ideology, and this version was to be included in the preamble of the Constitution, but with the inclusion of the Shariah law for followers of Islam. At the next meeting on July 16 it was agreed that the President of Indonesia can be only a Muslim. It was just a gentlemen's agreement, cancelled on August 18 - the next day after the declaration of independence when constitution was presented. The Muslim community hoped for inclusion of this principle, however the uncertain political situation forced them to postpone this issue. Record that the president of Indonesia canbe only a Muslim was removed, arguing that the Christian communities would feel discriminated (Sukma 2003:19–20).

Many Islamic leaders felt betrayed. According to Muslim groups, Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI) did not adequately represent the interests of Islam and the draft of constitution ignored the demands of Muslim groups. However, the decision was not challenged, at least for three reasons. Firstly, since the independence of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17, the need for adoption of a constitution became a matter of urgency. Secondly, the 1945 constitution was to be only a temporary constitution, an opportunity for Islamic leaders would be the moment of the preparation of the next enactment. Thirdly, after the declaration of independence, worries about the place of Islam in the new state were quickly relegated to second place, as the battle with the Dutch striving to restore sovereignty over colonial administrations began (Sukma 2003:20).

The institution that was founded to prepare the independence of Indonesia— mPenyelidik Badan Usaha-Persiapan Kemerdekaan Usaha Indonesia (BPUPKI) was organized under the Japanese control. The commission consisted of62 members was established to lay down the basic ideological, legal and political principles on which Indonesia could be based. From late May to middle of August 1945 work on the issue of the constitution, territory, citizenship and political structure of the state and religion were carried out. But it is the issue of religion that was the most important matter. For Sukma (2003:18) it was this time when dual identity of Indonesia,

formally and politically,has its origin – debate ended with approvalof dual identity, which contributed to the inability to identify whether Indonesia is a secular or theocratic state. This debate was revival and continuation of the debate that had erupted in the thirties and forties between *Kebangsaan* and Islamic groups. For a group of *Kebangsaan*, represented primarily by Sukarno, the identity of independent Indonesian state could not be defined in terms of any religion. Sukarno himself claimed that the reality shows the principle of state unity and religion in a country where not all residents are Muslims cannot be compatible with democracy. In this context, Sukarno declared that Islam in Indonesia should not become a matter of state.

The interpretation and understanding of Pancasila as the foundation of the state and its ideological and philosophical basis has changed several times since 1945, all the while being challenged and subjected to a redefinition although there is no doubt that the Pancasila has formed Indonesian state. Instead of universal values contained in the original formula, Pancasilais often interpreted as the embodiment of traditional and indigenous (often idealized) value of social harmony and the absence of political conflict, providing culturally neutral guidelines for behaviour in a pluralistic society in which "development" is the definitive goal (Weatherbee 1985:188).

Pancasila has caused extreme concerns from its beginning. After delivering it for the first time, conflict between the adherents of ideology and Muslim communities have begun. Sukarno introduced the concepts that was in opposition to the firm conviction that Indonesia can be an independent state only if it is an Islamic state. His perception of religion in Indonesia, its meaning and impact on social and political life did not change during his presidency (Morfit 1981:844).

In the Independence Day speech in 1959, Sukarno presented five principles, later identified as a political manifesto of the Indonesian nation. Along with the five rules of Pancasila it was the ideological basis of the regime. Bases of *Manifesto Politik* represented a return to the Constitution from 1945, as the most appropriate constitution for Indonesia, the Indonesian understanding of socialism, guided democracy and economy, also the idea of national identity. These principles were consistent with Pancasila. As it was stated, implementation was a way to achieve a just and humanitarian society. The idea of Guided Democracy was particularly defended as a necessary to achieve the objectives of Pancasila (Morfit 1981:843).

Suharto was the second President of Indonesia, who came to power in September 1965. The period of his tenure, defined as an authoritarian system, differently understood and took advantage of state ideology. It seems that Suharto and the New Order ideologues were referring to the 1945 Constitution and the traditional Javanese concept of power in order to reinterpret the meaning of Pancasila democracy and confirm the primacy of the traditional values over the strict observance of the Western law (Gunn 1979:752).

According to the Tri Ubaya Cakti (doctrine of struggle of the army) set in 1965, Pancasila represents not only philosophy, but it should also be understood as a programmatic guide for state or a state ideology. This might be understood not as a product formed during the several years after the independence, but as an ideology based on the principle of religious and cultural traditions of Javanese. It is no coincidence that, despite the professed purpose of modernization and development, the opposition to the continuity and neo-traditionalism could coexist in the Indonesian bureaucratic system. Pancasila, presented during the exercise of power by Suharto, often has been criticized and assessed as an instrument of political manipulation, worthless servant ideology that existed only to help Suharto to hold on the power, in addition to military tradition. But whatever was in opposition to the regime and the dominant ideology, from the liberal intellectuals to students or Muslims, the ideology and its importance to national consciousness was not criticized *per se,* but what was really criticized is this regime itself (Gunn 1979:754).

In the second half of the seventies Suharto made changes that aimed to acquaint all citizens of Indonesia with state ideology, and to ensure that political parties and organizations are consistent with Pancasila. According to the decision of the People's Consultative Assembly in 1978 (nominally the highest political body in the Indonesian constitution at that time) organized were an intensive ideological training programs. Under this education program, all officers below the rank of Cabinet Minister were required to attend a two-week course called P-4 (Pedoman Penghayatan Pengamalan Pancasila - Upgrading Course on the Directives for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila). Partial explanation of P-4 courses lay in the belief that a proper understanding of Pancasila is necessary for the development and future of the nation. This provides the criteria by which state policies are evaluated providing traditional vision of the good society intended to be achieved. In particular, essential was the first principle, which was invoked to prevent a change Indonesia into a theocracy (Morfit1981:838–844). First group of those who had to go through training were bureaucrats, then command took universities and secondary schools. In primary schools, Pancasila Moral Education Program has become part of the standard education program. According to the government decision from October 1984 it was decided to continue the modernization, which included Ulamas, Christian priests and pastors, as well as Balinese religious representatives. Other groups followed this program voluntarily (Weatherbee 1985:188).

With regard to the context of the introduction of courses P-4, Pancasila may be understood as a reflection of internal contradictions, but also as a reflection of the contradictions in the government's development strategy. One important feature of this ideology is its orientation to time and the relevance of the past. Materials developed by the government in connection with courses P-4 define the scope of Pancasila which is seen as the articulation of historical experiences of the Indonesian nation. According to this interpretation, the formulation of state ideology became the traditional philosophy of life rather than the imposition of a foreign doctrine. In this sense, the P-4 is rather a way of reflecting the society than indoctrination of society (Morfit 1981:841).

Douglas Ramage (1995:1) indicates four stages of "forming" different understanding of Pancasila: 1) the development of this process and its origins, which would include a period of Sukarno's political power; 2) ideology, its perception and use in Suharto's policy, from 1965 to 1978; and 3) period in which the Pancasila as planned by Suharto was becoming the basis of all ideological, political and social organizations, from 1978 to 1985; 4) the beginning stage of a debate on the role and essence of ideology, particularly its relationship with Islam, since 1985.This division should be extended to include the period of Indonesian democratization; and period of *Reformasi* - presidency of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibi, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Social conflicts that have taken place since 1998 are the primary factor of interpreting state ideology as an instrument of stabilizing Indonesian society. The second feature refers to democratization, which has changed Indonesia's role in international relations.

Influence of Islam on National Identity in Indonesia
The fate of Islam in Indonesia as a part of the conditioning process of nation building was located somewhere between the political and ideological discourse that focused on the competition between two institutionalized tradition: nationalist, called *merah-putih* (red and white) and Muslim called *hijau* (green). The rivalry intensified after independence, as the debate about what should be the base of Indonesian state dominated political and social life. A reflection of this ideological debate was the assumption that it is impossible to reconcile Islam with nationalism; there was a need to link this religion with the state institutions, and secondly to build a state under the terms of Pancasila (Hamayotsu 2002:356–357).

Ideology, although assumes equal treatment of all religions was not a sufficient guarantee of preservation of the Islam status, whose followers, are majority of Indonesian population. Sukma (2003:3–4) notes that it did not solve the problem of identity politics and on the contrary has strengthened the duality of identity; contributed to the problem of double identity. For most people, no sanction about Islam went hand in hand with a sense of danger and ignoring the needs of society, as Islam is regarded as a source of values and norms that guide behaviour and social life. On the other hand, accepted the reality of religious pluralism does not allow for the establishment of the state based on one religion. Driven by religious identity would be contrary to the ideal of the unity of Indonesia. Therefore, any government in Indonesia is to maintain the principle of secularism, taking into account the aspirations of the Muslim, but not towards the establishment of an Islamic state. So complex political reality requires not only difficulties in managing the affairs of state, but it is also the source of many social tensions. In this political and ideological division very clear is assumption that the "Islamic movement" cannot comply with the standards and nationalist visions – as the result of unfinished philosophical and ideological debate. This debate focuses on two opposing attitudes: those who want to have some type of formal relationship between Islamic ideology and the state, and those who treat Pancasila as the state ideological foundation. Half a century after the birth of pluralistic Indonesia, secular-nationalist tradition has largely rooted in the formal structure shifting away Islam from state. Many modernist Muslims still feel

concern about national ideology and the position of Islam in the country. These tensions - which underlie the discussion on Islam and nation building in the republic of "secular-nationalist" leadership – derived from Suharto era and its essentially exclusive approach to Islam (Hamayotsu 2002:365–366).

The religious content of national identity is expressed in the first principle of Pancasila- the belief in one God. Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of Indonesia, argued that the expression of the principles in such a manner is necessary, and treating Islam as the state religion would threaten the national unity (Sukma 2003:20).

From the first days of independence, Muslim leaders and Islamic political parties were seeking to adopt Sharia -to the Indonesian Constitution. Their efforts were met with failure. For nearly half a century, the debate between supporters and opponents of the Islamic law and constitutional changes in the most populous Muslim country is relatively static. Recent failed attempt to adopt Islam law occurred in 2002 at the annual session of the People's Consultative Assembly. In the first years after independence, Indonesia had undergone a period of liberal democracy. In 1955 there was the first elections to the House of Representatives and the National Constitutional Assembly. Ten political parties mainly based on Islam, took a part in both elections. Two Islamic parties gained a significant number of votes in the elections to the National Constitutional Assembly: 1) the Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslims (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi) with 20.6%, and 2) Revival of Islamic Scholars Party (Nahdlatul Ulama, NU) with 18,5%. On the other hand, Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) received 24% of votes, and the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) with 16.5%. Lack of a clear majority in the National Constitutional Assembly reflected the prolonged and unresolved debate about the ideological foundations of the state. Secular nationalists led by Sukarno - the leader of PNI-promoted five principles, and the Islamists led by Mohammad Natsir - former prime minister and leader of the Masyumi -promoted Islam as the foundation of the state (Baswedan 2004; Cribb 1984; Hillman 2011).

In 1959, Sukarno dissolved the National Constitution Assembly and introduced a system of *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy), which lasted until 1965. During this period, NU was the only Islamic party, which operated in national politics, the other parties were paralyzed. After the fall of Sukarno in 1966 and Suharto taking power and strengthening its position with the help of the army, Islamic parties began to reorganize. Despite the initial impression that the system would allow for free functioning of political Islam, new system prevented a return to the proper functioning of the party Masyumi, which was the largest Islamic party in the fifties (Baswedan 2004:671). Four Islamic parties were forced to merge into a single party called United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in 1973. Ten years later, obligation to adopt Pancasila as *asas tunggal* (the sole principle) of every political parties in Indonesia was introduced. This meant that all religiously oriented organizations were forced to completely re-evaluate their organization (Vatikiotis 1993:121).

Just as Islam is not homogeneous, the idea of secularism is also understood differently. The division between supporters of the secular state was born in the eighties and it was due to the relationship between the aspirations of the Muslim and the sustainability of Pancasila as a non-religious political philosophy of the state. Two groups were formed: 1) secular-exclusive, perceiving Islam as an extraneous, excluding religion in any kind, and 2) secular-inclusive, based on the assumption that as long as Islam does not exclude or deny the Pancasila principles it should be present as a constitutive element of political life and society in Indonesia. Such an approach is useful in analyzing the rivalry among Indonesian secularists, but also makes it easier to note a distinction between groups that are conducive for Muslim movement. Secular-inclusive camp sees the Pancasila as compatible with Islam, so Muslims should not seek to establish an Islamic state, but to focus on the development of Islamic society. This secular-inclusive approach was promoted by Nurcholish Madjid - former leader of the Islamic University Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) and a supporter of separation of the relationship between the state and Islam. It was stated that the development of Islamic society should be treated exactly the same as the United States developed their Christian society based on Judeo-Christian values. This group also pointed that it is a natural and legitimate for Muslims to expect that the government would reflect the moral values of Islam while maintaining irreligious state. Secular-exclusive camp saw the development of Islamic society by adapting Islamic moral values and ambitions to be Muslim by the government through the Islamization of the state. Such actions on the other hand, could threaten the existence of both a secular state and a tolerance towards religious and ethnic minorities in Indonesia. The secular-exclusive trend was promoted by Abdurrahman Wahid, president of Indonesia in 1999–2001 (Ayoob 2008; Baswedan 2004).

Subjectively, Islam is neither monolithic nor homogenous. Islamic communities can be divided into three groups: traditionalists, modernists and fundamentalists, including those who seek to Islamization of Indonesia and those seeking to "indonesianisation" of Islam (Sukma 2003:21–22). In this context, the determination of the place of Islam in politics of post-colonial state is never an easy task. The role of Islam in Indonesian politics is a matter of a certain duality. Although about 90 percent of the population are Muslims, state is not defined in terms of religion of the majority. Indonesia is neither a secular state nor a theocracy. Although Indonesia is often evaluated and characterized as a country in which freedom of religion is one of the basic principles, it is clear that some restrictions on religion are imposed (Sukma 2003:22).

Influence of Islam and religion on Indonesian politics is often described as declining, sometimes as completely irrelevant. This is due to several reasons. First, studies have shown that voters in Indonesia become more "rational", what means that the evaluation of candidate is based on potential benefits. During the voting, religion does not play a bigger role and candidate selection is not based on this criterion. The second argument is that the support for Muslim organization is not significant. In four democratic elections, Islamic political parties received more than 44% of the

votes, despite the fact that 80 to 90 percent of people in Indonesia are Muslims. In 1999, Islamic parties managed to get 36.3% of the votes, while in 2004 they received 41%. However, in 2009 voices dropped to 29.2%, what has been the worst results of the election for the Islamist parties since Indonesian independence.

Despite the minority status of Islamic political parties in the Indonesian parliament in the past few years, a considerable number of laws were compatible or partially aligned with the programs of the Muslim parties. It means that government can be defined as Islamic or religiously conservative. For example, the Education Bill and the controversial Anti-Pornography Bill - relating to religious programs - have been adopted by the national parliament, which is dominated by so-called nationalist, secular and based on Pancasila political parties. Lack of a strong response from the political parties and their representatives in parliament on issues of religious violence - especially in the case of Ahmadiyah - is another example that is contrary to the hypothesis of decreasing the influence of religion on politics Indonesian. In fact, politicians understand that religion is a very sensitive issue that carries serious political implications. Despite the lack of formal political representation by Islamic political parties, Islamic programs are still able to penetrate the legal public sphere. In other words, in contrast to the absence of Islamic political parties, Islam and political Islam is politically present, significant and influential. The claim that voters are no longer under the influence of religious considerations, however, may be premature. No apparent effect of religion on the Indonesian voters can be replaced by the assumption of a lack of adequate religious diversity among the parties and the candidates. However, it does not mean the influence of political Islam disappears. Instead, a more reasonable explanation is that the two parties that call themselves ideologically secular and nationalistic, become more accommodative to religious programs. Some voters in Indonesia has become more religious, pious, and in some areas more conservative. Influence of political Islam is still very significant and its power has penetrated nationalist political parties (Tanuwidjaja 2010:30–31).

CONCLUSION

For many postcolonial states, problem of national identity remains a key issue. The governments of independent states are often confronted with the reality that their identity is inherited and affected by colonial history. In this situation, a sense of common identity must be conceived in a way to bond and to maintain groups of different ethnic and religious identities within state. National identity is also required, as it is a symbol of the independence and sovereignty of the political entity. Formation of national identity becomes even more imperative as the governments of the new states are required to provide the vision and interests of the state and nation.

In the case of Indonesia, the process of constructing identity may be analyzed as a political instrument aiming to maintain national unity and to strengthen the sense of "Indonesianity". Although the majority of the Indonesian population identified themselves first with ethnic group, and then with the state, national identity remains strong enough to call it "Indonesian identity," however the process has not been finished. This "Indonesianisation" is based primarily on three factors: 1) the common, but neutral Indonesian language; 2) the ideology of Pancasila; and 3) Islam

as an element shaping social and political life in Indonesia. It should be noted that during the rule of Sukarno and Suharto Islam was shifted away from the affairs of state, but after 1998it was no longer possible. Islam is present in Indonesian politics, even if government declares its secularism. It is a comfortable solution that satisfies both parties, the state is based on the ideology that does not favour any religion; on the other side government's decisions include Muslim demands. Therefore, Indonesia being a secular state, pursues the religious aspirations of society.

Indonesian identity as European identity can be classified into the category recognized by Manuel Castells (1997:8) as designing identity, which occurs when "the social actors on the basis of cultural material available to them, build a new identity that redefines their position in society, and in doing so, seek to transform the whole social structure". Otherwise, itcan be called multiple identity that is beyond and over our "original" identities. European integration and the European Union as a centre of this integration requires harmonization and Europeanization of some of its elements, so every resident might identify with Europe (Paleczny 2008:43). European identity should be put beyond the understanding of national identity, but also respect and do not stand in opposition to national identities, which are still the basis for European identity.

European bonds were originally built by the economy. Such motives also lie at the origins of the institution, and therefore the development and economic cooperation has been the most important elements of integration. In addition to the economic issues of the time, other aspects started to appear, including cultural dimension of integration. The concept of European identity appeared for the first time in 1973. In the seventies it referred to a community of interests, culture, and traditions of each of the members. Enlargement of the EU by another states, but also the areas of cooperation, carried the cultural and political diversity. In such circumstances, the problem of "European identity" has become even more important and necessary for the smooth functioning of the organization. European identity is to be a link and support economic and social processes, but does not seek to institutionalize by homogenization, but by maintaining the cultural diversity and identity (Michałowska 2004:503). In other words, the preservation of national identity within the process of building a European identity is carried out in the framework of "unity in diversity".

The financial crisis that has started in Europe in 2008 showed some weaknesses in the EU in this issue. Some countries even though they declare their unity and action for the common good, started political competition which was mainly aimed to protect the national economy rather than European economy. The EU is increasingly criticized for its lack of policies that pursue common interests instead of interests its most powerful members. This reality shows even more how necessary is the collective "European identity", which would be at least equivalent to the national identity within the institution.

European Union cannot directly derive from the experience of Indonesia in terms of identity policy. This is mainly due to the nature of this organizationand lack of

superior power, however in some areas it slowly starts to change. Indonesian experience is valuable for the European model of the construction of identity, especially in terms of language policy and efforts of levelling the importance of ethnic identity tonational identity, which in the case of Europe refers to the relationship of national identity-European identity.

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